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Malawi: More than CCCC HQ. A short Retrospective on Mergers in Malawi.

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Updated Malawi Merger Control Thresholds

By Michael Williams

Malawi’s new Competition and Fair Trading Act came into effect in 2024 (“2024 Act”).[1]  While this lags behind one of the best-known competition authorities in Malawi, namely COMESA’s Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“CCCC”) headquartered in Lilongwe to the tune of over a decade, the domestic antitrust regime is being reinforced, as this legislative update shows. And with this latest edition, it is firmly in place when it comes to those national merger-control matters that escape the one-stop-shop of the CCCC. The Competition and Fair Trading Commission of Malawi (“CFTC”) stated that the goal of the 2024 Act is to:

  1. supplement certain areas that the previous Act lacked; and
  2. improving effective enforcement.

Several notable changes were included in the 2024 Act, particularly in respect of the introduction of a suspensory merger control regime. 

The 2024 Act also introduces a public interest test that the CFTC must apply when evaluating whether a proposed merger can or cannot be justified. This public interest test includes several factors including the effect of the potential transaction on:

  • specific industrial sectors or regions; 
  • employment levels; and 
  • the saving of a failing firm.

The CFTC has also been granted the power to impose administrative orders on parties who violate the 2024 Act, which include administrative penalties of up to 10% of a firm’s annual turnover or 5% of an individual’s income. 

The CFTC can also levy orders to redress wrongdoing, such as instructing refunds, exchange or return of defective products, and termination of unfair and exploitative contracts.

These increased powers come after the High Court of Malawi Civil Division ruled in the 2023 case of CFTC v Airtel Malawi that the CFTC lacked the authority to impose fines under the 1998 Act.[2]

To supplement the 2024 Act, the Minister recently published a Government Notice[3] that provides for the financial thresholds for mandatory merger notifications as well as an overview of other fees payable to the CFTC.

THE FINANCIAL THRESHOLDS FOR MANDATORY MERGER NOTIFICATIONS

Any transaction exceeding the following financial threshold will require prior approval from the CFTC before implementing:

  1. The combined annual turnover or combined value of assets whichever is higher, in, into, or from Malawi, equals to or exceeds MWK 10 billion (approximately USD 5 800 000); or
  2. The annual turnover of a target undertaking, in, into, or from Malawi, equals to or exceeds MWK 5 billion (approximately USD 3 000 000).

FEES PAYABLE TO CFTC FOR COMPETITION FILINGS 

The Government Notice sets the merger application fee payable at 0.5% of the combined annual turnover or total assets whichever is higher of the merging parties derived from Malawi. It is important to note that the Government Notice does not specify a maximum fee payable.

OTHER FEES PAYABLE TO THE CFTC

  1. Application for an Authorization of an Agreement at MWK 10 million (approximately USD 5 800) an agreement, a class of agreements under section 24(1) of the 2024 Act or an agreement which, any person who proposes to enter into, or carry out an agreement which, in that person’s opinion, is an agreement affected or prohibited by the 2024 Act. Importantly, an ‘agreement’ is defined in the 2024 Act, being: “any agreement, arrangement or understanding, whether oral or in writing, or whether or not the agreement is legally enforceable or is intended to be legally enforceable”
  2. Application for Negative Clearance at MWK 10 million (approximately USD 5 749,49) for any party to a merger transaction seeking clarification as to whether the proposed merger requires the formal approval of the CFTC or whose proposed merger is subject to review by the CFTC.
  3. Training on Competition & Consumer Protection at MWK 5 million per training package (approximately USD 3 000);
  4. Non-Binding Advisory Opinions for SMEs: MWK 200 000,00 (approximately USD 115); Micro-enterprises: MWK 100 000,00 (approximately USD 58); Other businesses: MWK 500 000,00 (approximately USD 300).

CONCLUSION

This supplementation by the Government Notice to the 2024 Act is of utmost importance for businesses and competition law practitioners operating within the jurisdiction of Malawi to ensure smooth transactions and to avoid statutory sanctions.

[1] Competition and Fair Trading Act No. 20 of 2024

[2] Competition and Fair Trading Commission v Airtel Malawi Ltd. & Anor. (MSCA Civil Appeal 23 of 2014) [2018] MWSC 3

[3] Government Notices No. 76 and No. 77 of 2024

Problems in the Ports! Competition Commission of Mauritius Launches a Market Study in the ports industry

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By Tyla Lee Coertzen

On 26 February 2024, the Competition Commission of Mauritius (“CCM”) announced the launch of a market study in the ports sector established in terms of section 30 of the Mauritian Competition Act of 2007 (the “Act”).

Section 30 empowers the Executive Director of the CCM to, inter alia, undertake general studies on the effectiveness of competition in individual sectors of the economy in Mauritius. In the media release published by the CCM,[1] it is stated that the outcome of such study will be to enable the CCM to make recommendations to the Mauritian government in an effort to improve the market for the benefit of consumers, businesses and the Mauritian economy at large. The CCM’s media release confirms that the study is aimed at identifying potential distortion in the competitive process that might have a negative effect on competition. Importantly, a market study undertaken in terms of section 30 is not to be construed as a formal investigation of restrictive practices by the CCM, but rather a general consideration of any relevant market to ascertain further information the effectiveness of competition in the sector. The Act does not make provision for the consideration of public interest effects in respect of competition law in Mauritius. Thus, presumably, the market study will focus only on competition-related effects.

It is said that several stakeholders have notified the CCM of conduct within the ports sector that potentially has a negative effect on competition, further, that similar issues have been faced by Greece, Romania and Mexico, where the competition authorities have also conducted market studies have also been undertaken in respect of ports.

The Mauritian economy is heavily dependent on the harbor located in Port Louis, which is said to handle over 95% of the total volume of external trade to and from Mauritius and amounts to a significant portion of the Mauritian GDP. It is predominantly regulated by the Mauritius Ports Authority as well as the Cargo Handling Corporation.[2]

For purposes of conducting the market study, the CCM has appointed a ‘study team’ consisting of its own staff as well as experts in the competition law and economics fields. A key individual part of the team is John Davies, a member of the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal and who served as the Head of the Competition Policy Division at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). John Davies also previously served as the Chief Executive of the CCM. Other key members of the study team include Simon Roberts, a Professor at the School of Economics of the University of Johannesburg as well as Thando Vilakazi, the Director of the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development (“CCRED”).

Interestingly, in an OECD Policy Roundtable conducted in 2011,[3] the OECD Competition Committee debated the issue of competition in ports and port services, building from key experiences of relevant jurisdictions. In this regard, it was noted that the two main competitive restraints facing ports come from other modes of transport and other ports, however it was agreed between OECD Member States that generally other modes of transport (i.e., road, rail and air) pose very limited constraints on maritime transport. However, given that the Port Louis handles close to all external trade in Mauritius, and operates as the only port in Mauritius, it is clear why the CCM would wish to ensure that the port works efficiently from a competition perspective.

Stakeholders who wish to engage with the CCM to participate in the market study are encouraged to contact the CCM.

[1]             See the media release at https://competitioncommission.mu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/MR-Port-Market-Study.pdf.

[2]             See https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mauritius-port-expansion-and-bunkering.

[3]             See the OECD Competition Committee Roundtable on Competition in Ports and Port Services at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/48837794.pdf.

COMESA Snapshot: How have the COMESA Draft Regulations changed its competition regime?

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By Gina Lodolo & Tyla Lee Coertzen

On 24 January 2024, the COMESA Competition Commission (the “CCC”) issued a press release requesting comments to its proposed Draft Regulations (as amended in November 2023) (“Draft Regulations”).

The Draft Regulations contemplate an over hall of many key features of the CCC’s current competition regime, which has been in place since 2014. The Draft Regulations, importantly, make provision for the CCC to act as a consumer protection agency as well as an antitrust enforcer. While the consumer protection provisions have also been significantly bolstered, this article provides an overview of the salient aspects that the Draft Regulations seek to change vis-à-vis the competition regime. We highlight the key proposed amendments in this article.

Merger Control Regime:

  • One of the most salient amendments to the regime is contained in Article 37, which proposes to change the CCC’s merger control regime from non-suspensory to suspensory. In this regard, when the amendment comes into effect, notifiable mergers cannot be implemented by parties before approval is obtained from the CCC.

Previously, a party to a merger was required to notify such a merger within 30 days from the date of the ‘decision to merge’ (which date has generally been considered by the CCC to be the date any agreements underlying a merger were signed by parties). With the introduction of a suspensory regime, the 30-day rule is expected to fall away, thereby alleviating the pressure off of merging parties to ensure timeous notification of a merger with the CCC.

However, under the current regime, the CCC has a review period of 120 calendar days, with the ability to extend the review period for a maximum of 90 days. Importantly, the Draft Regulations do not envisage a shorter review period, and given that the regime is to be amended to a suspensory one, such a review period could result in significant delays in global transactions, particularly as the old regime was non-suspensory. In its Draft Regulations, the CCC has, however, contemplated a simplified procedure where a merger does not give rise to significant competition or public interest concerns.

  • In the Draft Regulations, the threshold for the definition of a merger has been heightened through the introduction of a change of control of a firm being on “a lasting basis”. 

The definition of a ‘merger’ also now expressly includes joint ventures, that perform on a long-lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. In this regard, the Draft Regulations bring the notifiability of joint ventures largely in line with European case precedent. Thresholds have also been introduced for joint ventures whereby a joint venture will be notifiable if it intends to operate in two or more member states, at least one parent of the joint venture operates in one or more member states and the thresholds are met.

  • Interestingly, the Draft Regulations introduce separate thresholds for firms operating in digital markets. In this regard, the Draft Regulations contemplate that a prescribed transaction value be met, as opposed to the more traditional asset/turnover value thresholds.
  • The CCC has also introduced broad powers under Article 38(3) to conduct an investigation where it believes that a merger has been implemented without approval and where the CCC finds that a merger has been implemented prior to approval, a penalty of up to 10% of the merging parties’ annual turnover in the Common Market may be imposed.
  • Another important contemplated amendment is found in Article 40, which provides COMESA Member States with an opportunity to request that a merger be considered under its national competition law within 21 days of receiving notice of the merger from the CCC. The relevant Member State must, however, demonstrate that the merger is likely to disproportionality reduce competition to a material extent in the Member State before the CCC determines whether it will allow the referral in whole or part. Similarly, the CCC may refer a merger for independent consideration to any Member State.
  • The CCC has introduced significant consideration for public interest factors when considering mergers. These include, inter alia, the effect on employment, ability of small and medium sized businesses to be competitive, ability to compete in international markets, environment protection / sustainability considerations and innovation. The latter two considerations are a rather novel concept that the CCC is seeking to introduce, and which has been introduced more prominently in the European Union. The consideration of public interest factors could, however, lead to unintended consequences such as introducing uncertainty and subjectivity / favouring short term public interest considerations at the behest of long-term growth for the greater public interest benefit. Following finalisation of the Draft Regulations, the CCC will publish Public Interest Guidelines which may give guidance in relation to the CCC’s extent of its public interest considerations.
  • The Draft Regulations apply to mergers that meet the relevant threshold, and additionally, where a merger is non-notifiable, the Regulations will still apply to mergers that are likely to restrict competition in the Common Market or any substantial part of it- this may introduce some uncertainty over when the CCC will exercise jurisdiction over mergers that do not meet the statutory thresholds. This seems to be an indication that the CCC is trying to avoid situations of ‘merger creep’ in the digital platform markets.

Market Inquiry powers:

  • The Draft Regulations introduce the powers of the CCC to conduct ‘market inquiries’, in order to inquire into issues affecting consumers or the general state of competition without necessarily referring to the conduct or activity of any particular undertaking.
  • On the basis of the CCC’s findings following the conclusion of a market inquiry, the CCC may initiate a formal investigation, enter into agreements with or order undertakings to implement remedies aimed at addressing the CCC’s concerns, make policy recommendations, conduct advocacy initiatives or take further actions within its powers.  
  • The Draft Guidelines further obligate COMESA Member States to assist the CCC with its investigations, market inquiries or studies within their territory when requested, which investigations, market inquiries or studies may be conducted jointly or under the CCC’s guidance.

Settlement:

  • The Draft Regulations introduce the ability of the CCC to develop procedures to negotiate settlements, however, salient features of a (binding) settlement provided for in the Draft Regulations are as follows:
    • there must be an acknowledgment for engagement or participation in conduct that violated the Regulations;
    • liability in respect of conduct is acknowledged; and
    • agreement with the CCC’s findings to avoid lengthy standard procedures.

Anti-competitive agreements:

  • The Draft Regulations provide that anti-competitive agreements can attract a fine of up to 10% of annual turnover in the Common Market for each of the participating undertakings (previously penalties were determined by the Rules).
  • Public interest factors will be taken into account when assessing potentially anti-competitive agreements, including the novel consideration of the effect on environmental protection and sustainability (it is not clear whether these will be considered for purposes of aggravating or mitigating circumstances).
  • Public interest factors will also be considered when considering whether the CCC will grant an application for authorization for a firm to enter into an agreement even if the agreement is anti-competitive, if the benefits from the agreement outweighs the anti-competitive effects.
  • Minimum resale price maintenance has been introduced as a per se contravention. The Draft Regulations do not delineate whether a minimum price may be recommended as long as it is not enforced (such is the case in the South African Competition Act).

Abuse of dominance:

  • Article 31 of the Draft Regulations introduces a presumption of dominance threshold of 30%. This is a low market share threshold in circumstances where market power does not also need to be established. The CCC will also give consideration to firms operating in digital markets wherein data quantity, accessibility, control and network effects will be relevant considerations.
  • An additional violation for an abuse of dominance has been added for applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
  • Article 33 of the Draft Regulations introduces a separate violation for an abuse of ‘economic dependance’. The reference to ‘gatekeepers’ infers that this Article could be targeted towards digital platforms /markets.

Cartel conduct:

  • A leniency policy has been introduced by the CCC. This is particularly welcomed as it will assist in avoiding applying for leniency across multiple jurisdictions, which usually results in firms being disincentivized to apply for leniency where results are uncertain. The CCC will develop Guidelines for the implementation of the leniency programme.

General other proposed amendments include:

  • Obligations of Member States will become more extensive under Article 7 of the Draft Regulations and the Draft Regulations clearly provide that decisions of the CCC will bind Governments of Member States as well as State Courts.
  • The CCC is set to be renamed as the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission and will thus increase its focus in relation to consumer protection related matters.
  • Stringent appointment requirements and procedures for members of the Board of the CCC have been introduced.
  • Article 17 introduces the appointment of an Executive Director to act as the chief executive officer of the CCC. The Executive Director will not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
  • The Executive Director is provided with various new powers, including:
    • the powers to conduct market inquiries into matters affecting competition and consumer welfare.
    • The ability to negotiate and conclude settlement and commitment agreements through the Executive Director, largely solidifying negotiations that already take place in practice.
    • The power to make interim orders, conduct dawn raids, issue comfort letters and issue advisory opinions.
  • The Draft Regulations provide the Board with the power to issue block exemptions (subject to approval of the Council, through the Bureau), exempting any category of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices from the application of Article 29 of the Regulations.
  • The CCC now has the power to enter into, search and inspect any premises, including a private dwelling where the CCC reasonably suspects that information or documents that may be relevant to an investigation are kept.
  • Interim orders can be made in matters of urgency, pending the conclusion of an ongoing investigation where there is a risk of serious irreparable damage to competition or consumer welfare or to protect the public interest.

Asked to comment on the proposed Regulations, Primerio director, Michael-James Currie says “the proposed amendments go a long way to bringing the COMESA antitrust regime in keeping with most jurisdictions with well established competition law enforcement. The removal of finite penalty caps in favour of a common “10% of local turnover” threshold, the (eventual) introduction of a leniency policy and introduction of a suspensory merger regime are welcomed. The ambiguity created by the current regime (which requires a merger to be notified within 30 days after a decision to merge has been taken) can be impractical and served little benefit. Companies operating within the Common Market will need to re-evaluate their commecrial operations from a compliance perspective as the risk matrix will change considerably”. Currie went on to say that these proposed Regulations are a continuation of the strong leadership shown at the CCC under CEO Willard Mwemba, and that he expects to see more enforcement activity by the CCC over the next two years.

The time to provide comment to the Draft Regulations has been extended to 14 March 2024.  The Draft Regulations can be accessed here.

South African Competition Appeal Court releases its decision in respect of the Forex matter: The hindering of international cartel conduct or the inadequate presentation of a case

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By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Sarah van den Barselaar

Introduction

In our previous update on this matter, we reported on the South African Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”)’s second hearing of the Forex case.

On Monday, 8 January 2024, the CAC handed down its judgement of the appeals brought by several national and foreign banks (the “Respondents”) against an earlier decision handed down by the South African Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”).

The CAC’s decision comes eight years after the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) commenced its investigation into various national and foreign banks for alleged collusion and manipulation of the Rand-Dollar exchange rate between the years 2007 to 2013. The appeals heard by the CAC arose from the exceptions proceedings launched by majority of the Respondent banks, which sought to attack the allegations against them.

The CAC has now formally dismissed the cases against 23 of the 28 Respondents, highlighting a significant question on the impact of the judgement, namely whether it has the effect of hindering international cartel conduct or whether it was merely a product of an inadequate case presented by the Commission.

Background to the judgement

The CAC’s judgement follows a decision handed down by the Tribunal in 2019 (which ordered the Commission to comply with several requirements to establish the necessary jurisdiction over a number of Respondent banks who were neither domiciled nor carried on business in South Africa) as well as the 2020 decision of the CAC in the same matter. In this regard, the Commission was ordered by the Tribunal to reconfigure its referral affidavit to include allegations pertaining to, inter alia, (i) the establishment of a direct or immediate and substantial effect in South Africa, (ii) confining the case to a single overall conspiracy (“SOC”), (iii) the facts relied on to prove that the relevant bank had joined the SOC, and (iv) the facts on which the Commission relied to allege that there were adequate connecting factors between the Respondents. In summary, the Commission was ordered to amend its referral affidavit to ensure it met the requirements of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction against the Respondents.

The Commission based its entire case on the alleged SOC in which it alleges all of the Respondents were participants. The Commissions case thus had to: (i) meet the requirements set out in the Tribunal’s 2019 decision and the CAC’s 2020 decision, (ii) set out the core requirements of a SOC, and (iii) show that each firm was aware of actual conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of same. The Commission’s case against the Respondent banks was based on the establishment of a SOC, namely, a common anti-competition objective (i.e., that each firm intentionally contributed to the common objectives that were pursued by all participants).

Simply put, the Commission had to prove that all the Respondent banks in its referral affidavit had perpetrated the SOC and, where that each bank could have reasonably foreseen their participation in the SOC, were aligned with the risk of such. In determining whether the Commission had alleged this, the following legal issues were placed before the CAC:

  1. whether Respondents who were not traders in foreign currency could be included in the alleged conduct;
  2. whether the referral affidavit complied with the requirements set out by the Tribunal;
  3. whether the Commission adequately demonstrated the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction in cases of pure peregrine (i.e., firms neither domiciled nor carrying on business in South Africa);
  4. whether the Commission adequately demonstrated the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction in cases of incola and local peregrine (i.e., banks with some presence in South Africa by way of a local branch in South Africa);
  5. whether the allegations contained in the referral affidavit were sufficient to show the Respondents had joined and/or actively participated in the SOC; and
  6. whether certain Respondents were incorrectly joined in the proceedings.

Key findings

The CAC made the following key findings.

Holding company liability

The CAC found that the fact that certain Respondents who were merely holding companies of banks (and who were not themselves registered banks and not authorized to trade in foreign currency) cannot be a sufficient basis on which to establish a case against such company. On this issue, and due to the insufficient evidence presented by the Commission, the CAC found that several Respondents had been incorrectly joined in the proceedings.

Personal and subject matter jurisdiction

The CAC found that that in establishing the requisite jurisdiction over international Respondents, there are separately defined requirements for the establishment of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, in respect of subject matter jurisdiction, it must be established that the alleged conduct has a direct or immediate or substantial effect in South Africa. On personal jurisdiction, the CAC found that one needed evidence of linkages to each South African bank as part of the SOC (thus linking the incola banks and the peregrini banks).

The CAC found that reference to an occasional participation without any evidence and that is not linked to a South African bank is inadequate to meet the requirements set out by the Tribunal, and resultantly found that the Commission had failed to show personal jurisdiction for several of the Respondents.

Non-traders

The CAC emphasized that the individuals who were not traders in foreign currency employed by the banks derived no basis to be joined to the matter. On this basis, the CAC dismissed the case against the sixth Respondent’s (namely, Standard New York Securities Inc.).

Impact of the judgement

Simply put, the CAC upheld the appeals brought by 23 of the Respondent banks and dismissed the appeals brought by the remaining 4 Respondent banks. As such, the remaining 4 Respondent banks will proceed to face charges at a main trial before the Tribunal alongside Investec Bank (who elected not to join the other Respondent banks in the exception proceedings).

The scope of the judgement is significant in that it did not sanction cartel conduct. Rather, the decision concerns the key averments that needed to be put forward by the Commission in order to successfully present a case against all the Respondent banks it joined in the proceedings. While the Commission had several opportunities to amend its pleadings in order to comply with the requirements set out by the Tribunal and the CAC, it could not do so adequately and was unable to provide the necessary evidence nor establish the necessary jurisdiction against several of the Respondent banks. Thus, the CAC’s judgement represents the Commission’s inadequate case for prosecution of the alleged cartel conduct.

The inadequacies are seen in the findings of the CAC, including, inter alia, the Commission failing to comply with the requirements of the CAC’s 2020 decision, and the failure of the Commission to lead a sufficient case with adequate evidence against the Respondent banks. This is despite the Tribunal’s previous decision indicating the need to establish personal jurisdiction and allowing the Commission the ability to reconfigure its referral affidavit in an attempt to ensure a fair and just handling of the matter. Despite several years of investigations and preparation, the CAC’s recent judgement represents a mere product of the Commission’s case being flawed and lacking necessary evidence.

WomenAT Launches in South Africa: Connecting and Empowering Women Professionals

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African Antitrust editor

WomenAT, a platform dedicated to connecting and promoting women professionals worldwide, is set to launch in South Africa on 6 July 2023. The launch event represents a significant milestone for WomenAT as it expands its mission to empower women professionals in the field of competition policy and regulation. One of the key highlights of the event is a panel discussion centered around the role of competition policy and regulation in South Africa’s challenging economic climate. Esteemed facilitator Yasmin Carrim will lead the discussion, joined by industry experts who will provide valuable insights.

W@Competition, was initially launched in Brussels in 2016, drawing inspiration from the rich antitrust policy heritage of the city. Since then, it has successfully established national branches across Europe, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. The organization has further expanded its influence with regional branches in the CEE, Iberia, and Nordic regions. In the Americas, the Washington DC branch caters to women antitrust professionals in the US, Canada, Central, and South Americas.

Primerio South African directors, John Oxenham and Michael-James Currie says that “Primerio is a proud supporter of WomenAT and looks forward to more collaborative initiatives. We are particularly proud of the contribution and initiative demonstrated by Primerio’s Gina Lodolo and Jemma Muller, who are part of the Executive Committee of W@CompetitionZA and who contributed to making this timely event happen”.

The launch of WomenAT in South Africa signifies a major step towards empowering women professionals in the country’s competition policy and regulation sector. By facilitating connections, promoting knowledge-sharing, and advocating for gender diversity, WomenAT is poised to make a significant impact in fostering an inclusive and thriving professional community.

For those who are interesting in attending the event, please reach out to Gina or Jemma.

Important Regulations recently published by the Department of Trade Industry and Competition to prepare for the upcoming release of the SACC’s final recommendations in respect of its various market inquiries.

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By: Gina Lodolo

By way of background, the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018 (“Act”) included amendments to the powers of the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) in respect of market inquiries.  In terms of the amended Section 43C of the Act, should the SACC find that there are features which have an adverse effect on competition, with particular regard to the “impact of the adverse effect on competition on small and medium businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons”, the SACC must make recommendations, which will mitigate the adverse effects on competition.  The SACC’s remedial powers include, most notably under Section 43D(2) read with Section 60(2)(c), that the SACC can make a recommendation to the Competition Tribunal to order a divestiture in relation to such an adverse effect on competition identified in the market inquiry.

On 24 May 2023, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition published regulations titled ‘Regulations relating to appeals arising from market inquiries before the Competition Tribunal in terms of section 43F and Regulations relating to a divestiture recommendation by the Commission in terms of Section 43D(2) of the Competition Act, No.89 of 1998, as amended’ (“Regulations”), which took effect upon publication thereof, to govern the procedure that the SACC must follow when making such a recommendation to the Competition Tribunal to order a divestiture following a market inquiry, together with the rules for appealing a decision made by the SACC emanating from a market inquiry.  In this regard, where the SACC concludes in a market inquiry that a divestiture be recommended to the Competition Tribunal to make such an order, the SACC must file a notice of motion and affidavit providing:

  1. grounds for the recommendation;
  2. material facts;
  3. the law relied on by the SACC; and
  4. provide reasons for the divestiture being reasonable and practical.

The respondent will be provided with an opportunity to oppose the recommendation to the Competition Tribunal.

In respect of appealing a recommendation by the SACC emanating from a market inquiry, any person that is materially and adversely affected by a decision of the SACC in respect of remedial action taken by the SACC to remedy an adverse effect on competition, may appeal the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 25 business days after the affected organisation has received a notice from the SACC of the decision. While the evidence in the appeal will usually be confined to the market inquiry record, the Regulations do provide a number of exceptions.

The Regulations provide that the Notice of Appeal must contains the following:

‘(a) the determination or decision that is the subject of the appeal;

(b) whether the whole or part of the determination or decision is the subject of the

appeal;

(c) if only part/s of the determination or decision are being appealed against, which

part/s of the determination or decision are the subject of the appeal;

(d) the grounds on which the appeal is based; and

(e) the relief sought.’

For the full process governing the appeal, see here.

These Regulations are vital to be cognisant of as the SACC is currently in the process of undergoing various market inquiries, including the Fresh Produce Market Inquiry, the Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry, the South African Steel Industry Market Inquiry and most notably the Online Intermediation Platform Market Inquiry which is due to be completed on 30 June 2023 (after an extension was recently granted for the SACC to finalise the report and draft remedial actions and recommendations).

Primerio director, Michael-James Currie says given the SACC’s broad remedial powers following the conclusion of a market inquiry, coupled with a very different competition test to be used in market inquiries than the traditional SLC test, is likely to result in various market participants utilising the appeal procedures in the near future.

Media PAIA request reveals evidence underlying South African Competition Commission dawn raid

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By Tyla-Lee Coertzen

Following the South African Competition Commission’s (“SACC”) dawn raids conducted on eight major South African insurance firms in August of 2022, a popular South African news resource, News24, was successful in a Promotion of Access to Information (“PAIA”) request to gain access to the court documents which granted the SACC permission to conduct the dawn raid.

In our previous update on the matter, we recorded that the SACC conducted a dawn raid on the following insurance firms: Discovery Limited; Hollard Insurance Group (Pty) Ltd; Momentum, a division of MNI Limited; Old Mutual Limited; BrightRock Life Limited; FMI, a division of Bidvest Life Limited; Professional Provident Society Limited, and South African National Life Assurance Company (Pty) Ltd. The dawn raids were conducted as part of the SACC’s ongoing investigation into potential collusion between insurance firms.

Collusion is described as a per se prohibition in the South African Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (as amended) (“the Act”). This means that competitors who are found to have colluded with each other may not raise efficiency defences. Mere participation in a restrictive horizontal practice will attract administrative penalties and imprisonment.

The PAIA request provided News24 with access to certain evidence including emails circulated between insurers which the SACC believes to have taken place since 1989. According to News24, the SACC alleges that historically, the insurers formulated a ‘rate book’ in which information regarding information regarding prices of certain products were recorded. This rate book was allegedly exchanged between insurers. Thereafter, it is alleged that the insurers exchanged floppy disks with sensitive pricing information. In more recent times, it is alleged that pricing information was uploaded onto password protected online platforms, and the passwords were shared between insurers. The SACC also alleges that technical information regarding the design of products were shared, thereby allowing insurers to decrease competition amongst themselves. To see the full News24 article on the matter, click here.

Primerio director, John Oxenham, who notably acted for the leniency applicant in the infamous bread cartel says: “After a lengthy hiatus, it is apparent that the SACC is using significant investigative tools in an effort to uncover and prosecute potential cartel conduct. In the past, this mechanism of investigation, namely dawn raids, has been of significant effect in assisting the agencies to fulfil its mandate of preventing corrupt activity.”

Fellow Primerio director. Michael-James Currie said “one of the key challenges, for all parties involved, in cases where the alleged conduct was often historic, there is a lack of credible witnesses to contextualize certain evidence. It very often happens that evidence, when considered in isolation, presents a very different picture than what truly transpired”.

The Risk of Price Regulation: A Review of Recent Abuse of Dominance Cases in South Africa

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By: Michael-James Currie, Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard 

As aptly put by Campton P[1] “it is probably safe to say that in the developed world, competition is now accepted as the best available mechanism for maximizing the things that one can demand from an economic system in most circumstances. Economic regulation is increasingly perceived to be at the opposite end of the spectrum – it tends to leave a larger number of people with a reduced real income and a lower standard of living.” 

Introduction 

Regulatory intervention in the competition law arena, which is aimed at ensuring markets function optimally and are competitive, is the essence of most traditional competition law regimes. There is, however, an increasing risk of over regulation and over enforcement which may undermine incentives to invest and innovate, ultimately leading to a dampening effect on pro-competitive conduct.

Competition enforcement should principally be aimed at ensuring features of the market do not distort competition on the merits. It should not be used as a tool for price regulation. In this paper, we explore some of the recent abuse of dominance cases in South Africa – most notably the “price gouging” cases – adjudicated during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic and flag several risks that may materialize if those cases are to be used as blueprints for future enforcement activity.

In this paper we explore the benchmarks set out in what was the leading jurisprudence on excessive pricing in South Africa, namely the Sasol Chemical Industries Limited v Competition Commission[2]  before the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) and Competition Appeal Court  (“CAC”)[3] respectively and how the excessive price test and standards against which excessive pricing cases have recently been adjudicated, has developed – both in terms of the amendments to the legislation as well as recent cases assessed under the “price gouging” rubric. This is particularly topical as we expect to see an increase in the number of excessive pricing cases brought in South Africa.

In the CAC decision of Babelegi,[4] however, Judge Dennis Davis himself noted the challenging nature of the excessive pricing doctrine for competition authorities, as it “requires them, to a considerable extent, to act in the manner of a price regulator”.[5] He further notes in relation to these challenges, that the decision by the CAC in Babelegi was even more complicated in light of the fact that it had to be “determined through the prism of an excessive pricing provision” which was not specifically designed for the complex and novel conditions brought about by the pandemic.[6] 

Against this backdrop, we discuss the Sasol case as well as unpack the price gouging cases and highlight several concerns associated with an overly interventionist approach in prosecuting perceived excessive pricing cases.

Excessive pricing: Unpacking the Sasol Benchmark

Excessive pricing cases have been inherently difficult to sustain by the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), especially in industries where there are low barriers to entry. This is because, in ordinary circumstances, for an incumbent firm to charge excessive prices, they need to be a quasi-monopolist, otherwise the charging of excessive prices typically encourages entry by third parties as there are pecuniary profits to be made. This new entrant would ordinarily result in the incumbent reducing prices to ultimately reach competitive levels. In simple terms, the market self regulates.

Before discussing the price gouging cases, it is useful to briefly sketch an overview of excessive pricing cases in South Africa and the clear benchmarks set in Sasol. In this regard, the CAC in Sasol noted the complexity associated with excessive pricing cases in that: “[p]ricing power derives from market power. However, the mere possession of market power is not contrary to competition law. Indeed, some important source of market power is innovation and other, pro-competitive conduct. The rents derived from the possession of market power will, in most circumstances, sooner or later attract new entrants, the more so if the dominant incumbent takes ‘excessive’ advantage of its privileged position. And so, the effort to acquire market share and, therefore, pricing power and the attention it attracts from rivals are an important driver of the competitive process.”[7]

Notwithstanding the likelihood that the market will find a way to self-regulate through the threat of new entrants, when considering an excessive pricing case, there are further factors that need to be taken into consideration to determine whether the price is indeed excessive. For example, the Tribunal in Sasol considered the risk versus reward dynamic and the reasons why a dominant firm “is able to charge a price above the economic value of the good or service”.[8] An oft used example is prevalent in the context of patents. A patent holder is conferred a statutory monopoly position and is entitled to charge prices which are substantially above the cost of producing the patented product. This is because, simply put, a manufacturer must be entitled to benefit from the risks of developing a patented product (which has no guarantee of success) as well as the costs associated with failed attempts. If a firm is deprived of the ability to potentially earn substantial profits if they are successful in developing a patented product, why take the risk in trying to develop such a product in the first place. This would clearly deprive consumers of innovation.

The Tribunal’s major gist in the Sasol case was that Sasol, as a previously State-Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) achieved its dominance by virtue of State support as opposed to risk and innovation.[9] Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Sasol had engaged in excessive pricing. Sasol, however, successfully had the Tribunal’s finding overturned on appeal.

In short, the CAC applied a revised costing calculation mechanism which led to the conclusion that Sasol had implemented substantially lower mark-ups in comparison to those calculated by the Tribunal, and in relation to this determination, established that returns that are above economic value are not unreasonable per se.[10] Further, the CAC in Sasol noted that pricing is not excessive merely because it is above economic value, rather, such pricing should be substantially higher than the economic value: “some measure of latitude has to be given to firms with regard to pricing. If not, a court will become a price regulator”.[11]

While the CAC deviated slightly from the Tribunal in imputing significant importance to the question of how Sasol obtained its market position, the CAC and Tribunal still aligned to the extent that innovation and risk-taking “may have a bearing on economic value of its product and the reasonableness of the price” – it is, however, not a “license for patent holders to engage in excessive pricing”.[12]   

Subsequent to Sasol, the Competition Act, 18 of 2018 (“Amendment Act”) came into force to provide that when determining whether a price is “excessive”, the SACC must inter alia, take into account  “the structural characteristics of the relevant market, including the extent of the respondent’s market share, the degree of contestability of the market, barriers to entry and past or current advantage that is not due to the respondent’s own commercial efficiency or investment, such as direct or indirect state support for a firm or firms in the market”.8 (own emphasis) 

Further, the Amendment Act changed the test for excessive pricing from “a price for a good or service which bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or service; and is higher than [a certain value]” to now provide that a price can be excessive where the price is “higher than a competitive price and whether such difference is unreasonable.”  This Amendment makes the position even more opaque. 

While cases such as Sasol remained the guiding precedent, the quantitative benchmarks were relatively clear. However, the outcome of the excessive pricing decisions in Dischem[13] and Babelegi, leaves much to be said about the certainty of excessive pricing cases to follow. In this regard, we argue below that the latter judgments create uncertainty considering their application outside of the ambit of the anti-price gouging regulations (“Regulations”)[14] and their deviation from the notion that excessive pricing may incentivize entry into the market and that the market self-regulates.

A Discussion of the Subsequent Price Gouging Cases

Price gouging occurs when sellers of goods and/or services increase their prices for these economic commodities to levels considered unreasonable or unfair, usually during periods of extreme supply or demand changes in the market.[15]

As a result of a short-term change in market conditions, price gouging is a form of excessive pricing which is usually subject to a different standard from the usual excessive pricing tests contemplated by competition laws.  

In order to address price gouging concerns in South Africa during the Covid-19 pandemic, the South African Government declared a State of National Disaster in March 2020, and published the emergency Regulations. These Regulations applied to both the supply and the pricing of certain ‘essential’ goods.[16]

In short, the Regulations prohibited firms from increasing prices unless it was directly proportional to a cost increase. Policy issues aside, the Regulations could not be faulted in so far as they were clear and ensured that all players in the market knew what the rules were – i.e., a key tenet of the principle of legality.

Notably, however, the two precedent-setting price gouging cases adjudicated before the South African Competition Authorities, were based on conduct which preceded the promulgation of the anti-price gouging Regulations. The Regulations were therefore not applicable, and the cases were adjudicated under the excessive pricing prohibition in the Amendment Act. Moreover, it was also the first excessive pricing cases to be adjudicated under the new amended excessive pricing test following the amendments to Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”). As some final contextual background, these cases were brought on an urgent basis and parties only had a matter of a few weeks to prepare economic evidence in these cases.

The Dischem and Babelegi decisions, which both concerned instances where the respondents had increased the prices they charged for face masks during the initial stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, were decided within a month of one another.

Both parties disputed their dominance in the market. In Babelegi, it was not disputed that Babelegi only had less than 5% market share, yet it was held to be “dominant” based on short term market power. In Dischem, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to conduct a market share analysis as Dis-Chem’s market power was directly inferred from its conduct. The Tribunal held that Dis-Chem’s ability to significantly increase the prices of face masks all the while increasing sales volumes was direct evidence of Dis-Chem having market power. 

In Babelegi, the Tribunal held that a firm’s ability to increase prices within a short period of time is indicative of dominance and that market power or dominance must be determined with reference to context. In this regard, the Tribunal states that even small firms may have market power. In emphasis of the point that even small firms may be considered dominant,we note again that Babelegi had less than a 5% market share and was still deemed to have had market power as it had the ability to profitably increase its prices without providing any cost justifications.

Similarly, in Dischem, the Tribunal found that the SACC had established a prima faciecase of excessive pricing based on Dis-Chem’s ability to substantially increase its profit margins and pricing above what is reasonable, which, in relation to essential goods was held to be any increase whatsoever.

Although the CAC upheld the Tribunal’s decision in Babelegi, Judge Dennis Davis made the following noteworthy statement:

“These observations do not detract from the complexity of the task confronting this court, particularly in the present case where at the relevant time, government had not introduced bespoke price gouging regulations. As a result, the present case has to be determined through the prism of an excessive pricing provision [which] was not intended for use in the specific and unique conditions of a Covid 19 pandemic. The present case is mercifully somewhat more confined than might otherwise confront a competition authority in dealing with an excessive pricing case.”[17]

The CAC therefore acknowledged that the “price gouging” case was really a product of extreme market circumstances and an unfortunate lacuna in the regulatory environment. It should therefore not be used as a benchmark against which all future excessive pricing cases are adjudicated. Failure to consider the unique circumstances which both the Tribunal and CAC sought to emphasize throughout their respective decisions, will significantly water down the excessive pricing standards and most notably, create uncertainty for businesses in the pursuit of profit maximizing conduct fearing the risk of being sanctioned for taking advantage of short-term market fluctuations.

Following the Dischem and Babelegi decisions, in Tsutsumani,[18]the Tribunal decided the first case under the Regulations, read with section 8(1)(a) of the Amendment Act, wherein which it also confirmed that the Regulations were not in force during the complaint period of Babelegi.[19]  Tsutsumani emphasised the importance of “context” (as also emphasised in the Babelegi CAC decision) – being the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic.[20] In this regard, to determine whether the price was “excessive”, the Tribunal in Tsutsumani applied the various benchmarks set out in section 8(1)(a) and 8(3)(a)-(f)[21] of the Amendment Act. In this regard, to determine whether a price that is higher than a competitive price is unreasonable, the Amendment Act, in section 8(3)(b)(f), provides for consideration of “any regulations made by the Minister, in terms of section 78 regarding the calculation and determination of an excessive price.”  It was within this framework that the Tribunal applied the Regulations to ultimately make an adverse finding against Tsutsumani.

To establish dominance, the SACC, however, relied on Dischem to find that, even though Tsutsumani only entered the market during the pandemic, its market power could be inferred by its pricing.[22]  Even though Tsutsumaniargued thatthere were 18 other alterative suppliers who responded to the Request for Quote from the South African Police Service, the SACC went further to place reliance on Babelegi wherein it was found by the CAC that “a store, by merely having PPE products in the context of such excess demand could enjoy market power. Multiple firms – even stores located in the same shopping mall – could conceivably exercise market power in the supply of PPE vis-a-vis their customer”.[23] The Tribunal again, however, in making a finding that Tsutsumani was dominant, emphasized that Tsutsumani was a “lucky monopolist” that capitalized on a crisis and further that even though there were alternative suppliers, “the lucky monopolist might not be a single firm in the relevant market. Given the exogenous factors, multiple firms can be found to be dominant during the crisis”[24] – thereby confining its decision to this crisis context only.[25]  

Interestingly, in Tsutsumani, the Tribunal suggests that the National Disaster Regulations prescribe a 10% benchmark.[26] This appears to be an error as the National Disaster Regulations suggest that “any markup” may be scrutinized. The error arises likely by a reading of the Dischem[27] and Babelegi[28]   decisions where the SACC considered the United States wherein a 10% markup during price gouging situations is usually the benchmark. Accordingly, in conjunction with the uncertainty created regarding the conferring of short-term market power as a benchmark for dominance, there is further uncertainty as to what profit margin may prima facie be viewed as excessive. This results in a lack of clarity in how businesses can ensure that price increases are proportionate to cost increases in circumstances where the increase is usually benign. This places a significant administrative burden on firms and an unjustified increased cost of compliance.  It would be preferable if there was a clear materiality threshold so that competitively benign or cost justified price increases do not get caught in the snare of an overly conservative approach to excessive pricing.

Accordingly, the context in which these cases were decided is instructive. The risk, however, of the price gouging decisions finding application in other markets or other market circumstances is not immaterial. The incoming Commissioner of the SACC has expressly stated that the price gouging cases provide a basis for the SACC to implement the amendments to the Act – these include not only excessive pricing but also amendments to the price discrimination (and several other abuse of dominance) prohibitions. In this regard, newly appointed Commissioner, Ms Doris Tshepe, whose role is inter alia to fulfil the mandate embodied in the amendments to the Act, stated that “[w]hat the Commission did, together with the Competition Tribunal and the CAC [Competition Appeal Court], during the COVID crisis, was to show that there is capacity to find and deal with matters as efficiently as possible. We could learn and use those lessons to try and implement the amendments [to the Competition Act].”[29] The Commissioner added further that “[w]e don’t have 10 years to set precedents on the new amendments. There is an urgency, we are in a crisis, our economy is in crisis, and in order to achieve desirable outcomes we are going to have to work a bit faster”.[30] 

Accordingly, while much of this paper has been dedicated to the price gouging cases, the principles underpinning these cases may well be used in pursuing other sectors or instances of market shocks which are unrelated to the Covid pandemic. We suggest that this would pose a significant risk of regulatory intervention and amount to quasi-price regulation.

Market Inquiry Powers: A Power Tool to Price Regulate  

In addition to the lower standards and approaches to market power and excessive pricing, we note that the amendments to market inquiry provisions in the Act provide expansive and far-reaching powers to the SACC to pursue behavioral and structural remedies.

Previously, the SACC’s powers, following the conclusion of the market inquiry, were limited to making recommendations to the Legislature to address any perceived features in the market which hinder effective competition. The SACC now has powers to directly impose any remedy (except penalties), including behavioral and structural remedies (the latter to be confirmed by the Tribunal) directly following the conclusion of a market inquiry. Unlike the sanctions for abuse of dominance findings, which are typically the imposition of an administrative penalty by the Tribunal, the SACC could notionally impose more direct pricing related remedies following a market inquiry.

The test against which the SACC will assess whether any features distort competition is also lower than the “substantial lessening of competition”. While market inquiries typically do have lower standards, the power to make behavioral or structural remedies based on a standard that does not require a showing of substantial lessening of competition poses a significant risk to firms.

To date there have not been any market inquiries which have been concluded (although there are several which have, or will soon, commence) and hence it is too early to make any pronouncements on the manner in which market inquiries are used as an investigative tool to price regulate markets. Suffice to note in this paper that the SACC has an important responsibility not to overstep and utilize its broad powers in pursuing perceived distortions by price regulating markets.

Conclusion 

The price gouging cases in South Africa are somewhat unfortunate. While they protected the public from significant price hikes for critical products during the pandemic, the urgent manner in which they were brought and the fact that they were the first cases assessed under the amended excessive pricing prohibitions, has resulted in an application of the excessive pricing test which may not be fit for purpose. Notwithstanding the CAC’s cautionary remarks that context matters in excessive pricing cases and that Covid-19 posed unique challenges, the principles set out in those cases are likely to be utilized in pursuing cases unrelated to the Covid-19 pandemic. Excessive pricing cases, which are pursued too liberally based on short term market power and without clear benchmarks as to what constitutes “excessive”, amounts to price regulation (or at least an attempt to price regulate). This risk should be guarded against by the competition adjudicative bodies.  Having clear anti-pricing gouging regulations in instances of national disasters published (as they were in South Africa albeit after the conduct in respect of the precedent setting price gouging cases took place) would be preferable to using traditional excessive pricing tests and frameworks to penalize firms who only temporarily possess market power due to a demand or supply shock.

The SACC has, however, indicated in several instances, either directly or indirectly, that the principles set out in the price gouging cases will be utilized going forward. Combined with the SACC’s expanded market inquiry powers, there is a material risk of over regulation in pursuit of price regulation which is not what competition law was designed for.

[1]            Crampton P “Striking the right balance between competition and regulation: The key is learning from our mistakes.” OECD 16-17 October 2002.

[2]            Sasol Chemical Industries Limited v Competition Commission 48/CR/Aug10 (“Sasol Tribunal”).

[3]            Sasol Chemical Industries Limited v Competition Commission 2015 (5) SA 471 (“Sasol CAC”).

[4]            Babelegi Workwear and Industrial Supplies CC v The Competition Commission of South Africa 186 CAC (“Babelegi”).

[5]            Babelegi Para 41.

[6]            Babelegi Para 43.

[7]            Sasol CAC Para 2.

[8]            See Sasol Tribunal Para 101 and Para 94 read with footnote 44 wherein it was stated that “the real distinction to be drawn lays in those advantages which are the product of the dominant firm’s own innovation, risk taking and investment, for example stemming from the patent or an innovation. For example, if a firm invests particular software or innovates and then patents, it will enjoy certain advantages as a result this would be a return for its own efforts and risk taking and innovation and should be rewarded”.

[9]            See Para 76 of Sasol Tribunal where it was stated that “the principal issue thus was whether or not one should take SCI’s feedback cost advantage into account in favour of SCI, given the peculiar circumstances as alleged by the Commission, namely that this advantage is not as a result of SCI’s own risk taking and innovation, but the result of its history of state support”.  

[10]          Sasol Tribunal Para 174.

[11]          Sasol CAC Para 184.

[12]          Sasol CAC Para 173.

[13]          Competition Commission of South Africa v Dis-Chem Pharmacies Limited CR008Apr20 (“Dischem”).

[14]          The Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster Management Regulations and Directions GN R350 GG 43116, 19 March 2020.

[15]          W Boshoff “South African Competition Policy on Excessive Pricing and its Relation to Price Gouging during the Covid-19 Disaster Period”(2020) 0 SAJE 1.

[16]          J Oxenham & MJ Currie “Covid-19 Price Gouging Cases in South Africa: Short-term Market Dynamics with Long-term Implications for Excessive Pricing Cases”(2020) 11 JECLAP.

[17]          Babelegi Workwear and Industrial Supplies CC v Competition Commission of South Africa CR003Apr20 para 41.

[18]          The Competition Commission v Tsutsumani Business Enterprises CC COVCR113Sep20 (“Tsutsumani”).

[19]          Tsutumani Para 3.

[20]          Para 13.

[21]          Section 8(1)(a) of the Amendment Act provides that “it is prohibited for a dominant firm to— (a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers or customers”. Further section 8(3)(a)-(f) of the Amendment Act provides that “any person determining whether a price is an excessive price must determine if that price is higher than a competitive price and whether such difference is unreasonable, determined by taking into account all relevant factors, which may include— (a) the respondent’s price-cost margin, internal rate of return, return on capital invested or profit history; (b) the respondent’s prices for the goods or services— (i) in markets in which there are competing products; (ii) to customers in other geographic markets; (iii) for similar products in other markets; and (iv) historically; (c) relevant comparator firm’s prices and level of profits for the goods or services in a competitive market for those goods or services; (d) the length of time the prices have been charged at that level; (e) the structural characteristics of the relevant market, including the extent of the respondent’s market share, the degree of contestability of the market, barriers to entry and past or current advantage that is not due to the respondent’s own commercial efficiency or investment, such as direct or indirect state support for a firm or firms in the market; and (f) any regulations made by the Minister, in terms of section 78 regarding the calculation and determination of an excessive price.”

[22]          Tsutsumani Para 61.

[23]          Para 62.

[24]          Para 71.

[25]          Para 70. In this regard even though there were alternative suppliers, the South African Police Service lacked sufficient information on the status and available volumes from other suppliers and feared that they would be able to obtain the stock required.

[26]          Tsutsumani Para 90.

[27]          Dischem Tribunal Footnote 66.

[28]          Babelegi Tribunal Para 98-103.

[29]          Media Statement: New Competition Commissioner Doris Tshepe says she is Ready to Push Boundaries and be Innovative (2022) (Available at https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Media-Statement-on-the-final-day-of-the-competition-conference-1-September-2022_.pdf) 1.

[30]          Media Statement: New Competition Commissioner Doris Tshepe says she is Ready to Push Boundaries and be Innovative (2022)(Available at https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Media-Statement-on-the-final-day-of-the-competition-conference-1-September-2022_.pdf) 1.

Competition Commission Releases Online Intermediation Platform Market Inquiry Provisional Summary Report

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By Nicola Taljaard

On 13 July 2022, the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) released a Provisional Summary Report (“Report”) on the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (“OIPMI” or “Inquiry”) which was initiated on 19 May 2021. The Commission initiated the Inquiry following reason to believe that certain features of the online intermediation platforms market could be impeding, distorting or restricting competition.

The Commission placed specific emphasis on getting small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) and historically disadvantaged persons (“HDPs”) to participate in the relevant markets, and premised the Inquiry on the following competition and public interest considerations in relation to market features:

  • Hampering competition between the actual platforms;
  • Hindering competition between business users or undermining consumer choice;
  • Giving rise to abusive treatment of business users; and
  • Which may have disadvantageous impacts on the ability of SMEs and/or HDPs to participate in the market.

The Commission further noted a lack of participation by HDPs as a common thread which prevails in the online intermediation platforms market, which seems to languish in an untransformed state relative to the broader South African economy.

The remedial action proposed in the Inquiry ranges in severity based on the impacts which the market features have on competition, particularly in relation to SMEs or HDPs. The leading platforms on which the remedial actions are proposed are the Apple App and Google Play stores, Takealot, Property 24 and Private Property, Autotrader and Cars.co.za, Booking.com and Airbnb, Mr. Delivery and UberEats, and Google. Although the Commission did not consider it necessary to enter a dominance inquiry, it did remark that these platforms show features of dominance when considering their positions in the respective markets.

In addition to the more general constructive proposals, the Commission also suggests provisional remedies which are more robust, including against Google, stating that it plays an integral role in how consumers interact with relevant platforms. In this regard the Commission intends to further its inquiry into the viability of keeping Google Search as the default search on mobile devices in South Africa.

The OIPMI came to the provisional conclusion that the digital economy is deficient in relation the country’s transformation goals and deviates significantly from the transformation trends of other traditional industries. The lack of transformation in most of the industries investigated as part of the intermediation platforms continues to display major barriers to entry for HDP entrepreneurs. This conclusion is particularly pertinent in light of the ever-widening digital divide.  

The Commission has made all of the documents and public submissions in relation to the Inquiry, as well as the Summary Report (which can be accessed here) available on its website. The public has six weeks within which to submit comments to the Summary Report, after which the Inquiry body has committed to consider the views and incorporate changes, where appropriate, to the final report and findings which will be released in November 2022.

South African Competition Tribunal Hands Down Another Price-Gouging Case: Face Masks Supplier Fined Maximum Penalty

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By Michael-James Currie and Nicola Taljaard

[Currie is a director at Primerio and Taljaard is a lawyer at Primerio]

On 28 April 2022, the South African Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) handed down a decision in which it found Tsutsumani Business Enterprises (“Tsutsumani”) had contravened the excessive pricing prohibition contained in section 8(1)(a) of the Competition Act (“Act”). The conduct relates to the supply of face masks by Tsutsumani to the South African Police Services (“SAPS”) during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The case against Tsutsumani is the first time that the Commission has successfully prosecuted a company for price gouging in the context of a public procurement process. The Commission did, however, successfully prosecute two companies for supplying masks at excessive prices at a retail level. In 2020, the Tribunal, in Competition Commission v Babelegi Workwear and Industrial Supplies CC (“Babelegi”) and Competition Commission of South Africa v Dis-Chem Pharmacies Limited (“Dis-Chem”) the Tribunal found the respondents guilty of excessive pricing. In the latter case, the Tribunal warned that ‘material price increases of essential items such as surgical masks, even in the short run, in a health disaster such as the Covid-19 outbreak, warrants its intervention.’ This warning has certainly proved to be a serious one in light of the Tsutsumani case.

Tsutsumani is a general trader who participated in a tender for the urgent supply of face masks to South African Police Services (“SAPS”) during the first hard lock-down in South Africa. The complaint, lodged by SAPS to the Commission on 5 May 2020, alleged that Tsutsumani had engaged in price gouging following a major and unprecedented surge in the demand for face masks.

The Tribunal recognized the precarious position SAPS found themselves in as it required nine million masks per month during the relevant period and found that Tsutsumani acted exploitatively towards the SAPS by quoting the State entity R16.25 million for a 500 000 bulk mask supply order during April 2020. The determination that this price was excessive was made following evidence being led showing that Tsutsumani added a mark-up of 87%, giving them a 46% gross margin per mask. The monetary reward amounted to approximately R5.3 million in excessive profits alone. In accordance with the fines prescribed by legislation, the Tribunal fined Tsutsumani the maximum administrative penalty of 10% of its relevant turnover, amounting to a total of R3 441 689.10.

Assessing the South African price gouging cases purely from a competition law point of view, the Tribunal’s price gouging cases do raise several concerns regarding the extent to which excessive pricing – or abuse of dominance cases more generally – may be prosecuted in future. Most notably, the earlier price gouging cases found a firm which had only a 5% market share to be dominant on the basis that the firm possessed “market power”, albeit for a very short period, as a result of the Covid 19 pandemic. Basic economic principles tell us that price is typically influenced by the demand-supply relationship. Assessing “market power” with reference to a very short time frame notionally means, therefore, that any factors which give rise to a demand surge or supply shortage, may confer “market power” on a firm who may be subject to scrutiny if they increase their prices subject to such demand/supply pressures. Such a short term approach to assessing market power also naturally excludes any assessment to consider likely market entry or incentives to increase supply to respond to the demand surge.

Although the Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court sought to emphasise the unique market dynamics due to the pandemic, the economic and legal principles set out in these decisions could be expanded to other cases beyond circumstances as significant as a global pandemic. It would be preferable if there were clear rules published as to when firms (even small firms) are at risk by raising prices during a state of national disaster (such as those which were in fact published in South Africa but only after the alleged conduct subject to the price gouging cases took place). While one might have some sympathy for the competition authorities wanting to protect consumers during the pandemic, by departing from traditional approaches to assessing excessive pricing cases so as to address price gouging concerns risks potentially undermining certainty and makes it difficult for firms to internally assess their conduct against the relevant benchmarks. The enforcement and application of competition law, like all laws, should always strive to advance legal certainty. This is why deviating from a body of international precedent and best practice should not be easily departed from. If it was clear that price gouging cases such as those prosecuted to date were only applicable during states of National Disaster that would go a long way to providing such certainty. But there is no basis why complainants are not able to apply the principles set out in the price gouging cases to all sorts of market dynamics which may ordinarily lead to significant price increases. We have already noted the Commission’s public warning to domestic airliners not to increase prices when a certain airliner carrier had its licence temporarily suspended for a few days. A case entirely unrelated to the pandemic.

So, with a lower standard against which to prosecute excessive pricing cases and the introduction of a reverse onus on the respondent to demonstrate that its prices are not excessive (in particular instances), coupled with a potentially much lower threshold against which to find a firm is “dominant” than traditionally the case, we expect to see more excessive pricing complaints being pursued.