KENYA: ENFORCEMENT ALERT

Restrictive Practices

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) recently announced that it had entered into a settlement agreement with local beer producer Kenya Breweries Limited (KBL), a subsidiary of UK Diageo’s East African Breweries Ltd (EABL).

The settlement follows from an investigation by the CAK in terms of section 21 of the Competition Act (12 of 2010) wherein the CAK had found that KBL’s distribution agreements with its downstream distributors – which provides for inter alia, territorial exclusivity  – is anti-competitive and may lead to the lessening of intra-brand competition.

The settlement was reached in terms of section 38 of the Competition Act and requires that KBL establish an internal compliance policy and review and amend the problematic and restrictive clauses in its agreements with distributors.

Michael-James Currie, an African focused competition lawyer, says that the decision is particularly important for companies which use third parties to execute their distribution strategies as the majority of distribution agreements contain restrictions of some kind (often transported from international distribution agreements) which will need to be assessed against the standards of the Competition Act in Kenya as the CAK is actively focusing on these types of restrictive verticals arrangements.

Abuse of Dominance

Styles Industries (Darling Kenya)

Braids supplier, Styles Industries Ltd (Styles) has been found guilty by the CAK for abuse of dominance in contravention of Section 24 of the Competition Act.

The CAK launched an investigation into Styles on the basis of a complaint received by a competitor in the market, Solpia Kenya, claiming that Styles had abused its dominance by imposing unfair selling prices and conditions on suppliers who sell its products.

The CAK’s investigation found that Styles had abused its dominance by imposing unfair trading conditions on its downstream suppliers which it sought to enforce through threatening its downstream suppliers with account closure, removal of discounts and refusal to supply products.

The CAK is currently in negotiations with the parties and have indicated that its finding could result in Styles paying the complainant an amount in damages and/or a fine Sh10 million. In terms of Section 54(3) of the Competition Act, the relevant individuals within Styles could further face imprisonment for a period of up to 5 years.

Kaluworks

The CAK dismissed an abuse of dominance case against cookware manufacturer, Kaluworks Limited (Kaluworks).

The case emanated from a complaint by rival company, Sufuria World (Sufuria) in which it was alleged that Kaluworks had refused to sell to them certain aluminum circles which it required for purposes of manufacturing its aluminum cooking ports. This, Sufuria claimed, amounted to an abuse of dominance in terms of section 23 and 24 of the Competition Act.

The CAK, however, found that the conduct did not amount to abuse of dominance under the Competition Act as Sufuria had other options available to it in that it had the ability to replicate the technologies used by Kaluworks to produce the aluminum circles (as other manufacturers have done) or it could increase its order volumes in order to make it economically feasible for Kaluworks to supply it with the aluminum circles.

This finding was based on the representations made by Kaluworks that:

  • it primarily produces aluminum circles for in-house production for a variety of its own cookware products intended for local and export markets; and
  • it could only manufacture the aluminum circles to third parties where such third parties placed an order which met certain minimum quantities that would guarantee optimal scale of production

In supporting its findings, the CAK stated that in assessing the conduct of a dominant firm and whether it amounts to a ‘refusal to deal’, “is necessary to prove indispensability of the facility to the operation of the complainant or other third parties as arbitrary intervention may hurt innovation.

Market Inquiries

Transport Inquiry

The CAK has recently announced that it has initiated a ‘regional study’ in the Shipping, Trucking and Haulage industry in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

According to the announcement, the objective of the inquiry is to identify and remedy features of the market and trade practices which are anti-competitive and which impedes the national and intra-regional trade which in terms slows the potential growth of the manufacturing sector in Kenya.

Leasing Sector

The CAK has further announced a market study into the leasing sector which it will be conducting in conjunction with the Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya.

The objective of the market study is to assess the level of competition in the sector and to identify areas of concern in order to enhance competition in the market by facilitating SME entrants into the market.

John Oxenham, director at African antitrust advisory firm Primerio, says that market inquiries can be used very effectively, however, they are resource intensive and in order to achieve there objectives must be concluded expeditiously. The CAK should be cognizant of the challenges and experiences of the South African Competition Commission (SACC) where the market inquiries are not being concluded timeously.

[The editor wishes to thank Charl van der Merwe for his contribution to this update]

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South Africa: Overview of the Price Discrimination and Buyer Power Draft Regulations

By Michael-James Currie

[*Michael-James Currie is a practising competition lawyer based in Johannesburg and a regular contributor to Africanantitrust]

The South African Competition Amendment Act was signed into law by the President on 13 February 2019.

Two of the contentious aspects which were raised during the drafting of the Amendment Bill related to the price discrimination prohibitions and the introduction of express “buyer power” provisions. The key areas of concern relates to the fact that these practices are not ordinarily anti-competitive but quite the opposite – they are generally  pro-competitive and more often than not lead to an increase in consumer welfare. Simply put, price discrimination allows firms to charge different customers a price relevant to what those customers are prepared to pay. In other words, it enables firms to ensure that the customer utility is maximized. If firms are obliged (or consider themselves required) to set prices at a uniform price, it is unlikely that the firm will adopt the “lowest price point” at which to sell its products but rather an average or the highest price point. This means that while customers who were prepared to pay more for a product at a certain price point may enjoy some discount, those customers who were only prepared to pay for the product at the lowest price point will either have to cough up more or will not buy the product altogether. Intuitively this results in a decrease in consumer welfare.

From a buyer power perspective, provided the downstream market is competitive, any buyer power exerted upstream will result in lower prices to consumers.

The Minister of the Department of Economic Development has published draft Regulations in relation to Price Discrimination and Buyer Power respectively in an effort to provide greater clarity as to how these provisions ought to be applied.

The Regulations will be particularly relevant to companies who have a market share in excess of 35% – therefore rebuttably presumed to be dominant – as they affect both the upstream and downstream pricing and more importantly, do not require any assessment of anti-competitive or consumer welfare effects. Instead, the provisions introduce a public interest standard against which to assess these practices. The Regulations expressly state that the assessment against the public interest standards does not require a consideration of anti-competitive or consumer welfare effects. In other words, a firm could be found liable to an administrative penalty despite its conduct being pro-competitive or enhancing consumer welfare.

Although the most contentious amendments brought about by the Amendment Act are aimed at dominant entities, it should be noted that the thresholds for being considered dominant in terms of the Competition Act are low. A firm is rebuttably presumed to be dominant if it has a market share (in a specific product or geographical market) between 35%-45% while a firm with a market share in excess of 45% is irrebuttably presumed to be dominant.

This raises the question as to why the price discrimination and buyer power provisions only apply to so-called “dominant entities”. The primary purpose for prescribing dominance thresholds based on market shares is that it serves an important (although contentious) screening process for purposes of determining when a firm is likely to have “market power”. The assumption being that the higher a firm’s market shares the more likely it is that the firm in question has market power. Market power in short refers to the ability of a firm to set prices above a competitive level for a sustained period of time. Consequently, assessing a firms’ “market power” is the crucial for purposes of determining whether a firm’s conduct is anti-competitive or harmful to consumers. Turning to the draft Regulations, however, if anti-competitive effects or consumer welfare are not factors taken into account when assessing the conduct against the price discrimination or buy power provisions from a public interest perspective, then there is no rationale link between “dominant firms” and the prohibited conduct itself.

The lack of economic rationale supporting the objectives of the Act’s amendments together with the Regulations benchmarks results in a legal framework which seems uncertain, subjective and risks dampening pro-competitive conduct. John Oxenham, Director at Primerio says that the Bill, together with the Regulations, has the potential to have a dampening effect on pro-competitive conduct as firms may be overly cautious in their commercial practices as the risk of “getting it wrong” exposes firms to potential administrative penalties and reputational risk.

What follows, however, is a high level summary of the legal framework insofar as it applies to price discrimination and buyer power.

In relation to the price discrimination and buyer power provisions, it is noteworthy that:

  • the impact on small, medium and HDI owned firms is separate and independent from any assessment as to whether the alleged conduct is anti-competitive or adverse to the consumer welfare;
  • there is a reverse onus on the dominant entity to demonstrate that its conduct is justifiable once a prima facie case has been made out against the respondent; and
  • differentiating between customers or suppliers based only on “quantity” of products bought/sold (as the case may be) is essentially prohibited. There are, however, certain permissible grounds which justify differentiation in price or trading terms.

Price Discrimination

The Bill introduces a dual assessment for price discrimination in terms of which a firm can be found guilty of price discrimination either where its pricing has the effect or substantially lessening competition or where its pricing “impede[s] the ability of small and medium businesses and firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to participate effectively.” It has further been made clear by way of the Draft Regulations that under the second assessment, there is no need for a complainant to show any anti-competitive or consumer harm – a complainant only needs to demonstrate a hindrance to being able to participate effectively in the market.

It is also an offence for a firm to avoid or refuse selling goods or services to a purchaser who is a small or medium business or controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons in order to circumvent the operation of section 9.

Once a prima facie case has been made out by a complainant, the onus rests on the dominant entity (as the respondent) to demonstrate that its pricing strategy does not impede the ability of small businesses or firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons to participate effectively in the market (and that it has not avoided or refused selling to a particular purchaser).

The Bill expressly precludes a dominant entity relying on “different quantities” alone as a defence if there is a prima facie case of price discrimination which impedes the ability of small, medium or HDI owned firms to “participate effectively” in the market. In other words, the Bill is aimed at protecting businesses who are unable to obtain the same prices as larger customers due only to their limited size.

The draft Regulations published in terms of section 9(4) sets out the relevant factors and benchmarks for determining whether the practice set out in subsection (1)(a)(ii) impedes the ability of a small and medium business or a firm owned  or  controlled  by  a  historically  disadvantaged person, to “participate effectively”.

The Regulations set out further factors which ought to be taken into account when assessing the impact that the price discrimination has customers. There must, however, be a causal connection between the price discrimination and the complainant’s inability to participate effectively in the market. “Participate effectively” is defined as the “ability of or the opportunity for firms to sustain themselves in the market”.

Buyer Power

In terms of the Regulations, a dominant firm, in a sector designated by the Minister, is prohibited from imposing unfair prices or trading conditions on “a supplier that is a small and medium business or a firm controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons…”.  It is also an offence for the dominant firm to refuse or avoid purchasing from such a supplier.

This includes discounts, rebates, commissions, allowances and credit and that firms cannot contract out of the rights contained in this sections.

A price/condition will be unfair if it is inferior relative to other suppliers and there is no reasonable rationale for the difference or where it impedes the ability of a firm to sustainably operate and grow its business. A designated supplier may not be prejudiced based on its size and accordingly volume based differences are not justifiable as a standalone defence.

With regard to ‘trading conditions’, the Regulations sets out various examples of terms which are impermissible vis-à-vis designated suppliers. These include, inter alia, terms which unreasonably transfers risk/costs to the suppliers, is one sided or bares no relation to the objective of the supply agreement and unfair payment terms.

Examples of unfair trading terms include:

  • Trading without a contract, which imposes uncertainty and risk on the supplier, whilst at the same time denying them standard contractual rights and protections;
  • Imposing costs or risks onto the supplier that are not spelt out in a clear and unambiguous manner or quantified within the supply contract;
  • Unilateral changes in the supply terms that are detrimental to the supplier;
  • Retrospectively changing supply terms of a material nature to the detriment of the supplier;
  • Excessively long payment terms;
  • An unreasonable transfer of the buyer’s costs of promotion and marketing onto the supplier; and
  • Transfer of the buyer’s risks of wastage or shrinkage onto the supplier where it is not due to the supplier’s negligence or fault.

It is unfortunate that the Draft Regulations were published after the Bill itself has already been passed by Parliament. At the time of promulgating the Bill, assurances were given that the Regulations would provide clarity and objectivity in relation to the price discrimination provisions in particular. The Draft Regulations have not addressed the concerns raised by many commentators during the promulgation of the Bill. Instead, the Draft Regulations are now ostensibly being justified on the basis that Parliament has approved the Bill and is, therefore, in keeping with the objectives of the Bill. This “circular logic” is a process flaw in the promulgation process, which has seemingly been capitalized on by the Department of Economic Development.

Regardless, it is unlikely that their will be a materiel amendments to the draft Regulations and therefore the new landscape in relation to price discrimination and buyer power enforcement is likely to become effective imminently – raising unique but important challenges from a compliance perspective.

 

 

 

Antitrust Overhaul: South Africa to amend Competition Act today

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is expected to sign the Competition Amendment Bill into law today, February 13, 2019, continuing a busy seven-day streak for major legislative antitrust developments on the continent (see here). The new law will be amending the venerable Competition Act, one of the preëminent antitrust statutes of the continent.  The amendment has been pushed for by Minister for Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel.  The official Presidential commentary on today’s signing notes the novel fights against “concentration and economic exclusion as core challenges” to the country’s growth, as well as the perceived dangers of economic exclusion from major markets of small and black-owned businesses.

As a trio of competition attorneys write in a recent article in the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, the Amendment Bill alters key provisions of the South African Competition Act focusing specifically on the redistribution of wealth and transformation of ownership in lieu of pursuing traditional antitrust goals.

The Bill provides for greater ministerial intervention at the initial stage of a merger (based on national security), during the merger investigation (based on public-interest grounds) and broadens the right of appeals to parties outside the merger control review.

The Bill lowers the standard that the South African Competition Commission must meet to prosecute cases and foreshadows a risk of increased third-party interventionism more generally.

The departure from a traditional substantial lessening of competition (SLC) test to an adverse effects-based test, which takes public interests considerations into account, is likely to result in the injection of greater subjectivity into the decision-making process and parties’ increased difficulty in self-assessment of conduct particularly in relation to dominant firms.

AAT has published further articles on the topic here, here, and here.

Minister Patel speaks

Minister Patel speaks

Breaking News: Nigerian Competition Act Signed into Law

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has signed the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill into law (the “Competition Act”).

nigeriaAfter years of deliberations, the legislative process is now complete, and with the establishment of a Competition Commission and Competition Tribunal, Nigeria is the latest African jurisdiction to establish a dedicated antitrust authority.

From a merger-control perspective, the Competition Act and the Commission’s jurisdiction will ultimately supersede the ‘placebo antitrust’ role historically played by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has thus far received and assessed merger notifications above certain turnover thresholds, pursuant to the Investments and Securities Act.  The Act repeals the Consumer Protection Act, which did not contain stand-alone antitrust provisions.

Michael-James Currie, a competition lawyer advising clients across Africa, says the new Competition Act applies broadly to all commercial activities within Nigeria, but also to conduct outside of Nigeria (if the person or company is a Nigerian resident or incorporated in Nigeria or products are sold into Nigeria).  Furthermore, any acquisition or change of control of a business or asset outside of Nigeria which results in the change of control of an asset or business in Nigeria will also fall within the jurisdiction of the Competition Act.

The Commission has substantial powers, including considering and approving mergers, declaring business practices as amounting to abuse of dominance, prohibiting price discrimination or declaring unlawful any agreement which is in contravention of the Competition Act.

From an investigatory perspective, the Commission may subpoena witnesses or, upon obtaining a search warrant, conduct dawn raids, consistent with international best practices.

Any reviews or appeals in relation to a decision taken by the Commission may be made to the Competition Tribunal.

In relation to prohibited conduct, any agreement which has the effect or likely effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in any market is unlawful. Currie notes that the Act in particular prohibits collusive arrangements but also various forms of unilateral conduct include tying or bundling or limitations on the production or distribution of goods. John Oxenham, director at Primerio, echoes these sentiments and confirms that the Act provides for a rule-of-reason analysis.  He notes further that, in addition to the above general prohibitions, the Act also prohibits minimum resale price maintenance.

Fellow Primerio Director, Andreas Stargard, notes that the “monopolisation” prohibition against abuse of dominance mirrors those typically found in most jurisdictions; the wording of the Act appears to be influenced largely by the South African Competition Act.  That said, the test for dominance is essentially whether a firm is able to exert market power and, unlike South Africa, cannot be based on market-share thresholds alone.  In sum, he concludes:

“This latest piece of competition legislation was first introduced in 2011 by Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara from Bauchi State, who perhaps not surprisingly happens to be an attorney, and co-sponsored by Sen. Ahmed Lawan (Yobe North).

Its now final — and successful — iteration that was signed into law this week brings Africa’s largest economy into the fold of modern antitrust jurisdictions.  Many have called for this to happen for years [see hereand here).  Our firm’s West Africa team is eager to work on matters arising under the Act.”

The Bill's sponsor, Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara

One of the Bill’s sponsors, Rt. Hon. Yakubu Dogara

In terms of penalties, an antitrust violation attracts both a potential administrative penalty (capped at 10% of the respondent’s annual turnover) and criminal liability for directors who commit an offence, notes Currie, pointing to a  maximum of three years imprisonment as a fairly severe white-collar sentence potential.  It remains unclear to-date whether the turnover calculation for purposes of the administrative penalty determination refers to local or worldwide revenues, observes Stargard.

In relation to merger control, Oxenham notes that the Competition Act provides further clarity as to the type of transactions which require mandatory notification, notably including joint ventures, which were previously not identified by name under the SEC’s legislative regime.  The Act has introduced both de facto and de jure forms of control as potential triggers for merger notification. The Commission has not yet published Regulations which will prescribe turnover thresholds for “small” and “large” mergers. Both Oxenham and Currie point out that based on the wording of the Act, there seems to be a substantial amount of similarity between the Nigerian Act and the merger control process in South Africa including time frames involved and the introduction of public interest assessment in merger control.

This is not surprising, as the South African Competition Commission (SACC) has, through the African Competition Forum, been instrumental in advocating a robust competition regime. Furthermore, Oxenham suggests that there may be substantial amount of cooperation and assistance provided by the SACC to their Nigerian counterparts.

[AfricanAntitrust will provide further updates in relation to the Nigerian Competition Act and appreciates the input from leading antitrust practitioners and the on-going support of the Primerio team. To contact a Primerio representatives, please click here ]

SOUTH AFRICA COMPETITION LAW: NEW REGULATIONS RE ACCESS TO RECORD

By Charl van der Merwe

The South African Minister of Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel (Minister) last week published the amended Regulation 15 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Commission. The amended regulation is effective from date of publication being 25 January 2019.

The amended Regulation 15 has the effect of restricting access to the Commission’s record and preventing litigants from accessing the Commission’s record for purposes of preparing its defence in a legal matter before any court or administrative body (i.e. the Competition Tribunal).

In terms of the old Rule 15, any person had the right to request access to the Commission’s record, subject to certain rules regarding confidentiality and legal privilege. This led to various cases being brought before the Competition Tribunal and ultimately the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) where respondents requested access to the Commission’s record, prior to pleading and prior to discovery.

Issues regarding the proper interpretation of the old Rule 15 was finally settled by the CAC in the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v the Competition Commission of South Africa (160/CAC/Nov17) case a mere four months prior to the Minister publishing the draft amended Regulation 15.  See AAT exclusive here

In summary, the CAC in Standard Bank confirmed its earlier judgement in the Group 5 case and held that any member of the public (regardless of whether it is also a litigant/respondent in proceedings before the Tribunal) must be granted access to the Commission’s record within a ‘reasonable time’. The CAC made clear that a member of the public’s right to access the Commission’s record should not be prejudiced by the fact that such an applicant is also a litigant.

Furthermore, the CAC also rejected the Commission’s argument that a reasonable time for purposes of producing its record to a litigant would be at the time of discovery (after pleadings have closed).

The amended Regulation 15 in direct conflict with the CAC’s ruling and further states that any record obtained in a manner that contravenes the Regulation 15 (i.e. in that the record was requested by and provided to a litigant) will not be admissible as evidence unless the court or administrative body finds that the exclusion of the record would be against the interests of justice.

In order to ensure compliance with the right to access to information in the Constitution, the amended Regulation 15 states that a litigant may request access or the production of the record through means of any other laws or rules of any court, including the Tribunal.

The Tribunal Rules deal only with information which has been submitted to the Tribunal and will not contain the Commission’s record prior to discovery (which is when the Commission contents a record must be made available to the respondents).

Furthermore, requiring a litigant to request access to the Commission’s record through means of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2002 (PAIA) is simply a shifting of the goalpost, effectively by passing the Competition Tribunal and CAC (which is bound by the CAC’s prior legal precedent). In terms of PAIA an individual or organisation (requester) must apply (by way of a specific form) to the relevant government body. If refused, the applicant must then request an internal appeal (which must be concluded within 30 days) and, only after the applicant has exhausted the internal appeal procedure, may the applicant apply to the High Court for access to the record.

The amended Regulation 15, therefore, effectively means that a litigant must now apply to the High Court (as opposed to the specialist Competition Tribunal and CAC) for access to the Commission’s record in instances where it is a litigant/respondent and where the Commission refuses to allow the litigant/respondent access to its record.

According to competition lawyer Michael-James Currie, while the amendment to Rule 15 is clearly motivated to preclude litigants accessing the Commission’s record prior to pleading, what is less clear is why granting litigants access to their record is such a contentious aspect from the Commission’s perspective. Presumably, the Commission  only refers cases for prosecution once it is in possession of sufficient evidence to sustain the allegations (at least on a prima facie basis). A respondent may, therefore, be better placed to gauge whether to oppose a complaint referral or settle the complaint referral once it has been provided with access to the record. This, says Currie, would go a long way to ensuring matters are resolved expeditiously as opposed to protracted litigation – particularly when the respondents’ representatives and decision makers have no knowledge of the alleged conduct or the conduct is historic, as firms are generally reluctant to settle a case unless they are fully aware of the evidence against it. Providing access to the Commission’s record would more likely result in the expeditious resolution of cases as opposed to being exploited by respondents. It will also ensure that the level of investigatory work is of the highest standard if respondents are granted access to the record prior to pleading.

Whether there are any constitutional challenges to the Regulations remains to be seen.

KENYA: BUYER POWER

Kenya has in some respects become the leading African authority in the regulation of buyer power in December 2016 when it adopted specific legislative provisions on buyer power through its competition law framework.

The CAK has long viewed buyer power as a concern as in its view, unequal bargaining power, particularly in the retail sector has had serious anti-competitive effects in the market, leading to the foreclosure of suppliers, particularly in the retail sector.

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) formally initiated a market inquiry into the branded retail sector, with one of its key objectives being the bargaining power between retails and their suppliers. See the ATT exclusive here

Ostensibly in light of the identified concerns, the CAK assisted in developing a new industry code (which is being proposed in terms of the Kenya Trade Development Bill). In terms of the industry code, retailers are prohibited inter alia from:

  • Making late payments to suppliers;
  • Forcing suppliers to contribute to marketing costs;
  • Forcing suppliers to pay for shrinkage;
  • Unilaterally terminating commercial agreements (without reasonable notice and on good cause);
  • Imposing unfair risk/liability on suppliers.

The purpose of the code of practice is to encourage self-regulation and harmonise retailers’ and suppliers’ ways of engagement and in so doing, also apply international best practice applicable to the Kenyan situation,” says Kenya Trade Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo

The industry code also establishes a Retail Trade Dispute Settlement Committee, who will act as an industry ombudsman to settle disputes arising out of the code.

The CAK also formed a specific ‘Buyer Power Unit’ within the CAK to oversee market conduct and to enforce compliance with the buyer power provisions of the Kenya Competition Act which attracts a sanction of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years and/or a fine of Sh10million. Previously, the CAK had limited powers to intervene in commercial dealings between retailers and suppliers.  Ruth Mosoti, director of Primerio Kenya says with the code, together with the provisions of the Competition Act, “we are bound to see an increase in enforcement action by the CAK given that the legal framework is in place as well as the fact that the ‘Buyer Power’ department is fully operational”.

Further south, the South African Department of Economic Development has published draft guidelines on buyer power, in terms of the South African Competition Amendment Bill. The Bill and Draft Guidelines, prohibits a dominant firm from imposing unfair prices or trading conditions on “a supplier that is a small and medium business or a firm controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons…”.  It is similarly an offence for the dominant firm to refuse to or avoid purchasing from such a supplier.

According to Andreas Stargard, also at Primerio, these latest developments are in line with the broader public interest initiatives which are increasingly prevalent in African competition enforcement. African competition authorities have identified competition enforcement as a key to driving growth in African economies through the protection and inclusion of local and small businesses.

The role of public interest in competition law enforcement has made competition compliance in these jurisdictions particularly complex as quantifying socio-economic effects is a particularly subjective exercise, says John Oxenham.

South Africa: Competition Tribunal Fines Computicket for Abusing its Dominance

By Charl van der Merwe

On 21 January 2019, the South African Competition Tribunal (Tribunal), ruled in favour of the South African Competition Commission (SACC) who prosecuted Computicket (Pty) Ltd. (Computicket) for abuse of dominance in contravention of the Competition Act.

The Tribunal ruled that Computicket had abused its dominance, in contravention of section 8(d)(i) of the Competition Act (which prohibits dominant entities from inducing customer or suppliers not to deal with competitors) by engaging in exclusionary conduct and fined the company R20 million (approximately US$1.44 million), payable within 60 days.

In terms of section 8(d)(i) of the Competition Act, exclusionary conduct is prohibited unless the dominant firm can show that the anti-competitive effect of the exclusionary conduct is outweighed by technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains.

The SACC referred the complaint to the Tribunal in April 2010 after its investigation found that Computicket had entered into long term exclusive agreements with customers for the period 2005 to 2010 (immediately after being acquired by a large South African retailer, Shoprite), thereby excluding new entrants from entering the market. At the hearing of the matter, the SACC produced evidence that Computicket entered into these agreements shortly after being acquired and that employees vigorously enforced the exclusive agreements, particularly when new entrants sought to enter the market.

Computicket denied the allegations, arguing that its long term exclusive contracts had no anti-competitive effects as it was offering a superior service and the exclusive contracts were necessary to safeguard against reputational risks.

The Tribunal rejected the argument on the basis that:

  • Computicket had a near monopoly in the market;
  • there was limited market entry during the relevant period which coincided with the introduction of the longer term exclusivity contracts; and
  • no other theory was put forward as to why entry into the market was so limited and ineffectual.

The Tribunal, however, limited the period of the conduct to that period for which the SACC managed to produce conclusive evidence of anti-competitive effects.

The Tribunal found that while some of the anti-competitive effects were inconclusive, the evidence suggesting that the foreclosure of the market to competition during the period (coupled with the cumulative effect of the other inconclusive theories) is sufficient to prove an anti-competitive effect on a balance of probabilities.

According to John Oxenham, director at Primerio,  the Tribunal’s decision followed  largely on the same principles which were set out in the South African Airways case some years earlier. In terms of principles set out in SAA, the SACC was required to prove that the conduct of a dominate firm constitutes an exclusionary act as defined in section 8(1)(d) and, if so, that the exclusionary act has an anti-competitive effect. In other words, whether the conduct resulted in harm to consumer welfare or was “substantial or significant” in that it led to the foreclosing of market rivals. It is then for the respondent to justify its conduct based on a rule of reason analysis.

Competition lawyer, Michael-James Currie says that although there have been a limited number of abuse of dominance cases in South Africa which have successfully been prosecuted, companies with high market shares should take particular cognizance of the Tribunal’s decision. Tackling abuse of dominance cases is very much on the SACC’s radar and the Competition Amendment Bill (expected to be introduced in early 2019) will assist the SACC in prosecuting abuse of dominance cases by introducing thresholds divorced of competition or consumer welfare standards and placing a reverse onus on respondents to justify its conduct (particularly in relation to the excessive pricing, price discrimination and buyer power prohibitions).

Currie says that over and above the administrative penalty, companies found to have contravened section 8 of the Act are potentially at risk from a civil liability perspective. In this regard, both Currie and Oxenham point to the SAA case which resulted in Comair and Nationwide successfully claiming damages in the first follow-on damages case in South Africa for abuse of dominance conduct.

It appears that Computicket will take the Tribunal’s decision on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court.

 

 

 

South Africa: Competition Tribunal dismisses cartel complaint despite settlements by other respondents

On 15 January 2019, the South African Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) dismissed the Competition Commission’s (“Commission”) cartel complaint against Tulisa Cables. Tulisa Cables was one of four respondents to the Commission’s complaint referral.

The other respondents included Aberdare Cables who approached the Commission for leniency and Ocean Electric Wire Company and Alvern Cables who both concluded settlement agreements with the Commission (the latter concluded a settlement agreement on the first day of the hearing before the Tribunal). Alvern paid an administrative penalty of R4.7 million which equated to 5% of its total turnover for 2010. Ocean Wire paid an administrative penalty of approximately R13.3 million.

Tulisa, as the only remaining respondent, opposed the Commission’s complaint referral.

The Commission alleged that for a period between 2001 and 2010, the respondents attended meetings and engaged directly with each other to, inter alia, discuss the price of power cables. Furthermore, that Aberdare would circulate price lists to the respondents and that this constituted a concerted practice between the respondents to fix prices as it was common cause that all the respondents based their own prices off Aberdare’s price lists (which were circulated monthly). The first allegation was therefore that a collusive “agreement” had been reached by the respondents, and secondly that there was a concerted practice between the respondents which amounted to collusive conduct.

Tulisa denied attending meetings as alleged by the Commission. Based on the evidence, the Tribunal found that there was insufficient proof of an agreement having being entered into between Tulisa and the other respondents to collude.

In relation to the concerted practice allegation, Tulisa argued that Aberdare’s price lists were circulated to it via its customers and not directly by Aberdare. Furthermore, Tulisa  argued that it used Aberdare’s price lists to discount off Aberdare’s prices.

Michael-James Currie, a competition lawyer practicing in sub-Saharan Africa says that Tulisa appears to have adopted a “follow the leader” pricing strategy so as not to potentially be undercut by the largest player in the market (Aberdare) were Tulisa to make the first move (from a pricing perspective).

John Oxenham, director of Primerio, says that the Tribunal found that in light of the evidence and the market structure Tulisa’s explanation for its pricing strategy is a plausible one – particularly in oligopoly markets.

Both Currie and Oxenham agree that there are a number of markets in South Africa where “conscious parralism” may be particularly prevalent due to the size of the domestic market. Provided, however, that the market structure and conduct of the players in those markets does not compromise their independent decision, there are ordinarily limited concerns regarding anti-competitive effects in the market. In this regard, Currie points to the following paragraph of the Tribunal’s decision which succinctly summarises the issue as follows:

Tulisa’s actions appear to be consistent with those of a player in an oligopoly market acting rationally and independently of its competitors but well alive to the  actions  of  the  competitors  (referred  to  in  literature  and  case  law  as ‘conscious  parallel  behaviour’  or  ‘conscious  parallelism’).  It is generally accepted that conscious parallel pricing is unlawful if it is the result of a collusive arrangement but is lawful if it is unilateral as a consequence of the market structure. Where the line is drawn between the two is a matter of fact and evidence.

To access the full judgment click here.

 

Ghana slowly inches towards antitrust law

As one of two key West African nation states (the other being Nigeria), Ghana still lacks functioning competition legislation at the close of 2018.  Adding to the chorus of calls for the introduction of a Ghanaian antitrust act, the local branch of the global advocacy group CUTS (“Consumer Unity and Trust Society”), has now asked the government to ensure a currently pending draft competition bill becomes law in 2019.  The bill is, at present, before the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Department for further consideration, prior to being presented to Parliament.

ghana

Speaking on the topic of “Competing Without Market Rules” at the annual U.N. World Competition (Antitrust) Day, CUTS’ local director is quoted as deploring the absence of any competition policy or law, allowing unscrupulous firms to engage in conduct that would be deemed illegal virtually anywhere else and impeding the proper functioning of the Ghanaian market in the process.

Notably, Ghana’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Alan Kyeremanten, provided a written statement, noting that the country’s government was formulating its approach to competition policy with an eye toward enacting a law that would go beyond the relatively ineffectual Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, dating back to 2000 (Act 589).  Goals of enacting a more effective competition legislation would be to promote private sector development, economic growth, poverty reduction and increasing Foreign Direct Investment.

Nominate! 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards (Concurrences / GWU Law)

Nominations for the 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards are open

We are pleased to announce that nominations for the 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards are now open. For the 8th consecutive year, our friends over at Concurrences Review has brought together an impressive jury panel consisting of antitrust enforcers, professors, and in-house counsels to select the Best Articles and Best Soft Laws published and released in the past year.

The deadline for submission is December 2, 2018.

The present Call for Nominations concerns 3 types of publications:

  • Best Articles: Articles published or accepted for publication in 2018, in both academic journals and professional magazines.

  • Best Soft Law: Most innovative non-enforcement tools issued by competition agencies in 2018, such as guidelines, market studies, white books, etc.

  • Best Newsletters: Leading antitrust newsletters published by law firms that stand out for coverage, contents, readership or innovation.

To nominate an Article, Soft Law or Newsletter, and read full eligibility rules, see here: http://awards.concurrences.com

Articles must be submitted before December 2nd.

The Editorial Committee will select 100 Articles, 30 Soft Law and 30 Newsletters.

Winners will be invited to attend the Gala Dinner on March 26, 2019 in Washington, DC in the presence of the Board and Steering Committee Members. To see the full list of Jury Members, click here.

The Antitrust Writing Awards is a joint initiative between Concurrences Review and the George Washington University Law School. Learn more about the Jury, the Awards categories and Rules on the dedicated website here.