On 31 March 2026, the Competition Commission of Mauritius reached a significant regulatory milestone with the publication of its Guidelines on Market Inquiries (CC 8 Guidelines). These Guidelines have been published following recent amendments to the Mauritius Competition Act of 2007, and provide a formal roadmap for the Commission to examine entire sectors of the Mauritian economy, rather than focusing solely on individual firm misconduct.
Why these Guidelines are Important
The introduction of these Guidelines mark a shift from reactive to proactive enforcement. Historically the Competition Commission of Mauritius has focused on investigating specific restrictive practices, such as cartels or abuse of monopoly power. However, many markets fail to deliver competitive outcomes due to structural issues, regulatory barriers or complex consumer behaviour, even in the absence of a specific law-breaking act.
Alignment with Recent Developments
The publication of these Guidelines is not an isolated event, but a strategic move. Over the past few months the Competition Commission of Mauritius has intensified its focus on modernising its oversight of the Mauritian economy.
The Guidelines arrive mere weeks after the Mauritian Competition Commission released its Digital Market Landscape Report, which reviewed market conditions across various digital platforms, signalling the Commission’s intent to monitor these high-growth and complex sectors.
The Commission was officially vested with the power to conduct market inquiries following an amendment to the Competition Act in September 2025. The CC 8 Guidelines serve as an operational manual for these newly granted powers to transform the legal text into a functioning regulatory tool.
The start of 2026 has seen the Commission host the first meeting of the Tripartite Technical Committee, and the collaborative ethos of this meeting is echoed in the CC 8 Guidelines, which emphasise the importance of working with other regulators and government bodies to implement the recommendations that arise from market inquiries.
Conclusion
By formalising the market inquiry process, the Competition Commission of Mauritius is moving towards a more sophisticated and transparent model of economic regulation. As Mauritius navigates the complexities of digital transformation and global economic shifts, these guidelines provide the ‘rulebook’ necessary to ensure that markets remain open, innovative and fair to all consumers.
South African consumers have received warning to expect oil price hikes from 1 April 2026, at a time when households are already price-constrained and cost-conscious. Naturally, as oil prices increase, consumers can reasonably expect these hikes to be passed down through corresponding price increases on the respective goods and services. The question to business is how much of an increase is reasonably permitted within the ambit of competition law, and what should the timing of such an increase be?
The Commission’s Warning
In response to the anticipated price volatility, the Competition Commission of South Africa (the “Commission”) has issued a media statement warning of heightened risks of price gouging across several sectors. The Commission stated the following:
“The risk is prevalent for unregulated fuels such asdiesel retail prices and jet fuel; oil-based products such as nitrogen-based fertilisers and plastics; fuel-intensive services such as air, land and sea transport and logistics; and all other products and services that rely on these inputs, particularly food products and delivery services.”
Additionally, the Commission set out clear rules for businesses navigating the looming price increase:
“Businesses may not increase prices in anticipation of future fuel cost increases; they may only increase prices once they experience actual fuel cost increases.
Businesses that experience fuel cost increases may only increase their prices in proportion to the actual fuel cost increases they experience.
In effect, these two conditions mean that product or service margins after the surge in fuel prices should be no higher than the margins prior to the fuel price increase.
Furthermore, once fuel costs decline, product or service prices should decline immediately.”
What is Price Gouging?
Price gouging is the act of charging customers unreasonably high prices for goods or services typically in response to a crisis, natural disaster or demand shock where consumers have few alternatives and the product is a necessity. This behaviour sits at the intersection between business ethics and consumer protection in considering exploitation of a demand spike to maximise profits.
South Africa’s legal approach to this issue does not use the term “price gouging” directly in its primary statutes, rather the framework is built upon two distinct pillars. The first pillar is found in the Competition Act 89 of 1998. Section 8(1)(a) of the Act prohibits a dominant firm from charging an “excessive price to the detriment of consumers or customers”, a definition refined by the Amendment Act of 2018 to mean “higher than a competitive price” and where such a difference is “unreasonable”, targeting firms with substantial market power which abuse their dominance. The second pillar is enshrined in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. Sections 40 and 48 of this Act prohibit suppliers from engaging in unconscionable conduct and from supplying goods or services “at a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust”. This provision has a broader application, as it does not require a firm to be dominant. It applies to any supplier who takes unfair advantage of a consumer.
Considering the existing legislative framework on price gouging behaviour in South Africa, price gouging is then defined as the practice of increasing prices on essential goods or services during a declared disaster or crisis to a level that:
1. Does not correspond to increased costs of providing the good or service; or
2. Exceeds pre-crisis profit margins without justification; and
3. Takes unfair advantage of those consumers with limited alternatives as a result of the emergency situation.
Lessons from COVID-19
The most significant development in South Africa with regards to price gouging came in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 19 March 2020, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ebrahim Patel, published the Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster Management Regulations and Directions (the “Regulations“). They were designed to prevent an escalation of the disaster and to protect consumers from exploitative commercial practices during this period of vulnerability.
The Regulations formalised a cost-based test for determining excessive or unfair pricing, that a material price increase of an identified good or service will be considered indicative of excessive pricing if:
it “does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the cost of providing that good or service“; or
it “increases the net margin or mark-up on that good or service above the average margin or mark-up for that good or service in the three month period prior to 1 March 2020“.
Furthermore, the Commission’s 2021 Guide for Business Compliance with Price Gouging Regulations, emphasised that during a disaster, price increases must be strictly proportionate to cost increases, and businesses must not exploit temporary demand surges to inflate profit margins.
The Commission’s willingness to act was demonstrated early in the pandemic in the Babelegi case, where a firm was found liable for excessive pricing after increasing mask prices by over 1 000% while its own supply costs remained unchanged.
In essence, South Africa’s legal framework defines price gouging not by the final price itself but by seller behaviour, where an unjustified cost increase representing abuse of a temporary situation in which consumers are a captive market and desperate for essential goods and services. A framework established during COVID-19 now guides current pricing conduct and sheds some light on how the Commission would evaluate seller behaviour in relation to demand shocks arising from emergencies, natural disasters, or market disruptions.
What Businesses Should Do
Business should be mindful of not increasing prices in anticipation of the impact of the oil price increase and engage in corresponding price increases once these price increases have a clear and quantifiable impact on internal pricing mechanisms.
The wider public does have recourse available to contact the Commission, should it appear that a business is engaging in price gouging behaviour, or has responded too erratically to the market disruptions caused by the sudden spike in the oil price. The Commission has stated the following: “Given the heightened risk of price gouging during this period of oil price volatility, the Commission calls on the public and businesses to report instances where they believe price gouging is occurring so that the Commission can investigate.”
Ultimately, the lesson from COVID-19 remains unchanged in that price increases have to be justified by evident supply cost increases and not by opportunity. As the Commission has made clear, anticipation pricing and margin expansion will not be tolerated.
In this new series, entitled “Antitrust-Adjacent,” AAT covers relevant developments of interest & adjacent to competition-law issues. Our first installment on AI Regulation is co-authored by Kenya Primerio Partner Fidel Mwaki and Alfred Nyaga.
By Fidel Mwaki & Alfred Nyaga
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping Kenya’s digital economy. From financial services and telecommunications to healthcare, logistics and digital platforms, AI systems increasingly underpin critical decision-making and service delivery across both the public and private sectors.
The introduction of Kenya’s Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026 (the Bill) marks a significant milestone as the country seeks to articulate a comprehensive regulatory and governance framework for AI.
However, as Kenya moves toward formalising this framework, several foundational questions arise. Does the Bill effectively regulate AI systems? How should institutional oversight be structured? What would a practical regulatory model look like in the Kenyan context? And what governance architecture is required to ensure responsible, transparent and innovation-friendly deployment of AI?
Key Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry
To strengthen the effectiveness and practicality of Kenya’s Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026, the following considerations may be useful:
Establish clear and operational risk classification criteria
Define objective and measurable criteria for determining what constitutes a high-risk AI system. This should enable developers and deployers to assess compliance obligations at the design stage and reduce regulatory uncertainty.
Introduce a framework for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models
Recognise the growing role of GPAI models as foundational infrastructure and consider tailored obligations around transparency, accountability and safe deployment.
Adopt a sector-sensitive regulatory approach
Different sectors present different AI risks. The framework should enable coordination with sector regulators such as finance, telecommunications and healthcare to ensure context-specific oversight.
Clarify liability and accountability across the AI lifecycle
Establish a clear allocation of responsibility between developers, deployers and users of AI systems, particularly where systems are used in decision-making with real-world consequences.
Strengthen institutional coordination mechanisms
Provide clear guidance on how the proposed AI Commissioner will coordinate with existing regulators, including the ODPC, CA, CBK, CAK and other sector bodies, to avoid duplication and regulatory fragmentation.
Provide for independent oversight and audit mechanisms
Introduce provisions for AI audits, documentation standards and oversight processes, particularly for high-risk systems and sensitive applications.
Embed flexibility through phased and adaptive regulation
Allow for the framework to evolve through secondary regulations, guidelines and regulatory sandboxes, ensuring responsiveness to technological developments without creating uncertainty.
These measures would help ensure that Kenya’s AI regulatory framework is practical, coordinated and capable of supporting both innovation and responsible deployment.
Understanding the Regulatory Gaps: Does the Bill Effectively Regulate AI Systems?
The Bill places considerable emphasis on high-risk AI systems. While this approach mirrors developments in jurisdictions such as the European Union, it is not immediately clear how developers or deployers are expected to determine whether an AI system falls within that category.
In practice, this classification becomes one of the most important compliance questions for organisations building or deploying AI systems. Without clear and predictable criteria, organisations may struggle to assess their obligations. This uncertainty has the potential to affect both compliance and innovation.
Equally important is the treatment of AI systems that fall outside the high-risk category. AI technologies can generate meaningful societal and economic risks even where they are not formally classified as high risk. Issues such as misinformation, manipulation, algorithmic bias and systemic economic disruption may arise from such systems.
The Bill also appears to focus significantly on public sector deployment of AI systems, yet much of the development and deployment of AI in Kenya currently occurs in the private sector. Industries such as financial services, telecommunications, logistics and digital platforms already rely heavily on AI-driven systems. A balanced regulatory approach should therefore account for both domains.
A further gap is the absence of a clear framework addressing general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, including systems capable of generating text, code, images and other forms of content. These models increasingly serve as foundational infrastructure for a wide range of downstream applications and may require tailored regulatory treatment.
Globally, regulators are beginning to address these issues more directly. The EU AI Act introduces detailed risk classification frameworks and obligations for developers and deployers of high-risk systems, while also addressing GPAI models. China’s evolving regulatory framework similarly addresses algorithmic transparency, registration of AI deployers and security assessments prior to deployment.
The Governance Question: How Should AI Oversight Be Structured?
The Bill introduces an important institutional feature through the establishment of an AI Commissioner, tasked with overseeing AI development and deployment, monitoring compliance and issuing guidance on the responsible use of AI technologies in Kenya.
The creation of a dedicated oversight authority reflects an important recognition that AI presents regulatory challenges that extend beyond traditional legal frameworks.
However, the Bill raises a broader governance question: how should this oversight function interact with Kenya’s existing regulatory institutions?
Kenya already has several regulators whose mandates intersect with AI governance, including the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC), the Ministry of ICT and Digital Economy, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA), the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS), the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK), the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), and various sector-specific regulators.
The Bill does not yet clearly define how the proposed AI Commissioner will coordinate with these institutions. In practice, effective governance of AI will require structured collaboration across multiple regulators rather than reliance on a single oversight authority.
There are also broader concerns around transparency and accountability across the AI lifecycle. AI systems typically involve multiple actors, including developers, deployers and organisations relying on system outputs. A coherent framework must therefore clearly allocate responsibility when AI systems produce harmful or unintended outcomes.
In addition, several aspects of operational governance are left to future regulations. These include independent AI audits, organisational governance frameworks, model transparency requirements and coordination mechanisms. While this approach provides flexibility, it also means that the governance architecture remains only partially defined at the legislative stage.
Designing a Practical Regulatory Framework for Kenya
These gaps point to a broader question: what would a practical and workable AI regulatory framework look like in the Kenyan context?
AI regulation globally is still evolving. Jurisdictions such as the European Union, China and Singapore are adopting different approaches, creating an opportunity for Kenya to design a framework that reflects both international best practice and local priorities.
A practical regulatory framework would benefit from several structural elements:
A clear and predictable risk classification approach
Regulatory obligations should be tied to well-defined categories, enabling developers and deployers to assess their obligations at the design stage and reducing uncertainty.
Recognition of general-purpose AI models
These systems increasingly function as foundational infrastructure and may require tailored transparency, accountability and safety obligations.
Sector-sensitive regulation
Algorithmic risks vary significantly across industries, and systems deployed in sectors such as healthcare, financial services or critical infrastructure raise different regulatory concerns. Coordination with sector-specific regulators will therefore be necessary.
Clear allocation of responsibility across the AI lifecycle
AI systems often involve multiple actors, and a coherent framework must assign responsibility across this lifecycle to prevent regulatory gaps.
Building an Effective Governance Architecture for AI Oversight
Beyond identifying the governance gaps in the Bill, a key question is how Kenya can structure an effective and coordinated AI governance architecture in practice.
The introduction of an AI Commissioner is an important step toward institutionalising AI governance. However, effective oversight will require more than the creation of a single regulatory office.
AI intersects with multiple regulatory domains, including data protection, financial regulation, competition policy, communications regulation and consumer protection. Governance of AI systems will therefore require coordination across multiple institutions.
Organisational transparency and accountability will also be critical. As organisations increasingly rely on AI in decision-making, internal governance structures such as AI risk frameworks, audit mechanisms and oversight committees may become necessary.
At the same time, governance frameworks must ensure that regulation does not unintentionally discourage innovation. Mechanisms such as regulatory sandboxes and collaborative oversight models may help strike a balance between risk management and technological development.
Conclusion
Kenya now stands at a defining moment in shaping its AI regulatory and governance framework. The Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026 provides an important starting point. However, its effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether the regulatory and governance framework is sufficiently clear, coordinated and capable of evolving alongside technological development.
The framework will need to reflect Kenya’s economic context and development priorities, while drawing from comparative approaches where relevant.
As the Bill moves forward, the upcoming public participation process presents an important opportunity for policymakers, technologists, legal practitioners and industry stakeholders to engage constructively with these issues and help shape a framework that supports both innovation and the responsible deployment of AI in Kenya.
Fidel Mwaki is the Managing Partner of FMC Advocates LLP (Kenya) and In-Country Partner (Kenya) at Primerio. He advises on corporate, regulatory and governance matters, with a focus on emerging issues in digital regulation and AI governance.
Alfred Nyaga is a Director at Digital Ethics Hub, a platform focused on shaping policy and practice in digital rights and AI regulation.
Nigeria’s courts are preparing for a wave of complex competition litigation as digital transformation reshapes the legal landscape, the Chief Justice of Nigeria announced at a three-day strategic judicial training programme held from 10 to 12 March 2026 in Abuja.
Justice Kudirat Kekere-Ekun disclosed that Nigerian courts “may witness a substantial increase in the volume and complexity of cases arising from competition and consumer protection disputes” as enforcement expands across the country’s evolving economy (The Guardian, 2026). The programme was organised by the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“FCCPC”) in collaboration with the National Judicial Institute (“NJI”).
Digital Markets Drive New Legal Challenges
FCCPC Executive Vice Chairman Tunji Bello emphasised that “competition and consumer protection law often finds its most practical expression in the courtroom,” where legal principles governing markets are “tested, clarified and given authoritative interpretation” (Business Day, 2026).
The Chief Justice warned that the “proliferation of AI-driven systems is transforming markets in unprecedented ways,” introducing complex risks including “data exploitation, algorithmic manipulation of consumer choices, privacy infringements and the dissemination of misleading information” (Blueprint, 2026).
Bello noted that “technological innovation, digital commerce, cross-border transactions and increasingly complex corporate structures continue to reshape how markets function,” raising new questions around market dominance, restrictive agreements and consumer rights (The Whistler, 2026).
Building Capacity for Economic Evidence
NJI Administrator Justice Babatunde Adejumo explained that the training was designed to deepen judicial understanding of competition law principles, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (“FCCPA”) framework, and evidentiary standards in competition litigation, particularly regarding emerging issues in digital markets and financial technology (Blueprint, 2026).
The Chief Justice highlighted that Section 146 of the FCCPA permits consumers to approach courts directly without exhausting administrative remedies, reinforcing the need for judicial preparedness. She also emphasised strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce pressure on courts (The Guardian, 2026).
Implications
The programme signals Nigeria’s proactive approach to building institutional capacity for competition enforcement. As Bello concluded, “the development of clear and principled jurisprudence in competition and consumer protection law will help shape market behaviour, strengthen investor confidence and protect the welfare of Nigerian consumers” (Business Day, 2026).
The message to multinationals operating in Nigeria is unmistakable: competition enforcement is no longer just an administrative risk but a serious legal frontier with real judicial teeth. For regulators elsewhere in Africa, the initiative offers a powerful reminder that effective antitrust systems require not just bold enforcement agencies, but judiciaries equipped to handle the technical complexity of modern digital markets.
Dominance in the Air: How Mozambique’s LAM Landed in Competition Trouble
By Matthew Freer
In August 2025, Mozambique’s Competition Regulatory Authority (“ARC”) imposed a significant fine of 11.1 million meticals (approximately ZAR 3 million or $175,000) on the national airline Linhas Aéreas de Moçambique (“LAM”) for breaching competition law by imposing unlawful surcharges and obstructing an official investigation.
Background to the Sanction
The ARC’s decision, formalised in Decision No. 03/2025 and published in the Boletim da República (Government Gazette), followed an investigation that began in November 2022 into alleged anti-competitive pricing practices by LAM. The regulator concluded that LAM, which operates the majority of domestic passenger flights in Mozambique, had abused its dominant market position by unlawfully applying a fuel-related surcharge, referred to as “YQ”, to ticket prices.
Originally designed to adjust fares in response to volatile fuel costs on international routes, the YQ surcharge had been banned by the Mozambican Government in 2021. Despite this, LAM continued to levy the charge on domestic flights, in some cases resulting in the surcharge amounting to up to 60% of the total ticket price (e.g., 6,000 meticais on 10,000 meticais fare).
According to the ARC, there was no legal basis or transparent accounting methodology to justify the continued application of the surcharge, which had the effect of inflating, and distorting, the real price of air travel for consumers. The conduct was therefore deemed unjustifiably excessive and harmful to passengers.
Breakdown of the Penalty
The total fine of 11,109,738.05 meticais comprised two parts. 8,332,303.54 meticais for the improper collection of the surcharge and 2,777,434.51 meticais for failing to cooperate fully with the ARC’s investigation, including providing incomplete or insufficient information.
The ARC gave LAM 15 days to settle the fine and two months to stop the surcharge practice completely. Should further irregularities be established, the matter has also been referred to the Attorney General’s Office for potential further action.
LAM’s Response and Appeal
LAM’s management, in a press conference in Maputo on 12 August 2025, publicly rejected the sanctions and announced its intention to appeal the ARC’s decision, asserting that key facts presented in its defence were not adequately considered by the regulator. The airline’s leadership further argued that its limited fleet and operational challenges, including competition from larger regional carriers, should be taken into account.
While LAM maintains that past administrations’ decisions contributed to the circumstances under scrutiny, the current board has acknowledged ongoing efforts to restructure and stabilise the airline, including fleet expansion plans.
Implications for Competition Enforcement in Mozambique
This enforcement action underscores the increasingly active role of the ARC in policing domestic markets and holding even state-owned enterprises accountable to competition standards. By confronting dominant behaviour and unjust pricing strategies, the regulator is signalling a robust application of the Competition Law (Law No. 10/2013), which prohibits abuse of dominance and empowers the ARC to impose fines for anti-competitive conduct and non-cooperation in investigations.
As Mozambique continues to liberalise and diversify its market economy, this case may set an important precedent for competition enforcement, particularly in sectors traditionally characterised by limited competition and strong public ownership.
Ms. Siboniselizulu Simelane Maseko has been appointed as the new Chief Executive Officer of the Eswatini Competition Commission (“ESCC”). The announcement was made by Minister of Commerce, Industry and Trade Manqoba Khumalo, who praised Maseko as a seasoned professional whose experience and leadership is well-suited to advance the ESCC’s mandate of promoting competition, regulating markets, and protecting consumer interests.
Says Andreas Stargard, competition lawyer with Primerio, “Siboni Maseko’s pick as CEO is a wise one — we were just discussing her potential new role while attending the COMESA conference in Livingstone, Zambia, in fact… While she is full of youthful drive and innovative ideas, she still brings well over a decade of experience in competition law and economic regulation to her small agency.” He describes her as “a friend of AfricanAntitrust.com and a well-connected player in our small niche field, due in large part to her multi-year COMESA experience.”
Ms. Maseko first joined the ESCC in 2011, working in the Mergers and Acquisitions Division, before spending eight years at the COMESA Competition Commission, where she rose to Principal Analyst and served as Acting Manager in the Enforcement and Exemptions Division.
Maseko returned to Eswatini in 2024 to take up her current leadership position as Director of Competition and Consumer Protection at the Competition Commission, with AAT reporting extensively on this development. She holds a master’s degree in EU Competition Law from King’s College London and is currently pursuing a Master of Science in International Business Leadership and Management at the University of York.
A long-running investigation, which is still ongoing, has yielded insights into a massive healthcare fraud at a local South African hospital.
Background
On 23 August 2021, Babita Deokaran, a whistleblower and acting Chief Director of Financial Accounting in the Gauteng Department of Health, was assassinated after exposing around R850 million worth of suspicious procurement payments at Tembisa Hospital. In July 2025, the SIU confirmed that it was finalising the investigation into the assassination.
On 1 September 2023, Proclamation No. 136 of 2023 (the “Proclamation”), was published in the Government Gazette, which gives the Special Investigating Unit (“SIU”) power to investigate accusations of corruption and maladministration regarding Tembisa Hospital and the Gauteng Department of Health. The Proclamation was signed under the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996 (“SIU Act”).
In terms of the Proclamation, the SIU is authorised to:
Investigate procurement, which is not fair, competitive, transparent, equitable, or cost-effective, or which is prohibited by National Treasury guidelines;
Investigate unauthorised, irregular, or fruitless and wasteful expenditure;
Institute civil litigation in the High Court or Special Tribunal to recover losses suffered by the State;
Pursue pension benefits of resigned or retired officials during investigations;
Conduct criminal referrals to the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”);
Refer conduct to the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) and National Treasury for blacklisting.
Key Findings
On 29 September 2025, the SIU released an interim report, indicating that approximately R2.043 billion was misappropriated via nine syndicates, including the Maumela, Mazibuko, and X syndicates, manipulating the hospital’s procurement system, which was not used for hospital equiptment. The total amount connected to officials amounted to R122,228,000, with 15 officials being implicated, and 116 disciplinary referrals arranged.
Criminal Charges against Former CFO
On 16 October 2025, criminal charges were laid against the former CFO of the Gauteng Department of Health, Lerato Madyo, who had originally frozen R104 million in questionable payments which had been flagged by Babita, but allowed them to go through and conducted an incomplete related audit report. Lerato resigned in August 2024 before a disciplinary finding was finalised. The charges against Lerato include violations of:
Section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (the “PRECCA”) for failing to report corruption exceeding R100,000;
Section 21 of PRECCA for conspiracy;
Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (conspiracy to commit fraud);
Section 38 of The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (the “PFMA”) for the failure to report irregular expenditure;
Section 51 of the PFMA for negligent procurement oversight;
Section 81 of the PFMA for financial misconduct; and
Theft and fraud.
Asset preservation
On 29 September 2025, the Special Tribunal granted an interim preservation order regarding around R900 million in assets allegedly acquired unlawfully from Tembisa Hospital. On 9 October 2025, an SIU Curator obtained R133,5 million in assets in Gauteng and Mpumalanga. In terms of the preservation order, implicated individuals must declare all assets to the SIU, with failing to do so being considered contempt of court. The SIU is authorised to institute a maximum of 41 civil recovery proceedings within 60 court days.
Arrests and bribery
In April 2025, evidence was given by the SIU to the NPA, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (“DPCI”), and Asset Forfeiture Unit (“AFU”) against the Operations Manager of Tembisa Hospital, Zacharia Tshisele, regarding asset recovery and criminal prosecution.
The SIU found that Tshisele obtained unlawful gratification from service providers between 2020 and 2023 and in November 2025, Tshisele paid R13,530,904.27 to the SIU, representing a portion of his proceeds from corrupt conduct.
On 23 November 2025, Papi Tsie, DPCI Sergeant, and Tshisele allegedly gave a R100,000 cash bribe to an investigating officer to attempt to interfere with prosecution. The exchange was a sting operation and led to the arrest of both Tshisele and Tsie, who both pleaded not guilty and were granted R5,000 bail. The case was moved to 27 February 2026 and Lt-Gen Siphosihle Nkosi, Hawks Acting National Head, stated that the investigation would proceed against officials participating in criminal dealings.
Suspensions and estate recovery
On 14 October 2025, Lesiba Arnold Malotana, Gauteng Health Head of Department, was suspended by Gauteng Premier Panyaza Lesufi. On 21 October 2025, an SIU lifestyle audit was released, indicating that Malotana was considered high-risk, and revealed R1,627,300 in ATM deposits which did not coincide with his salary. Malotana challenged his suspension in the Labour Court, which held that the suspension was lawful and rational.
On 4 November 2025, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, Minister of Health, stated that the government would pursue the estate of the late Tembisa Hospital CEO Dr Ashley Mthunzi for asset recovery as he had allowed irregular purchase orders to go through. As of 8 November 2025, only one of 467 implicated entities had been placed on the National Treasury’s Restricted Supplier Register, prompting an ActionSA complaint to the Public Protector.
Implications
The investigation is still ongoing, with the SIU’s final report not having been released yet. This case illustrates systemic failures in anti-fraud controls in South Africa. Acting Police Minister Firoz Cachalia confirmed to Parliament on 5 November 2025 that criminal cartels have corrupted South Africa’s healthcare procurement at a systemic level beyond Tembisa. The SIU has indicated that Tembisa may represent only the tip of the iceberg across Gauteng’s public health system.
On 13 February 2026, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) released a Media Statement (the “Statement”) indicating that it had carried out several search and seizure operations at four scrap metal purchasing companies in Germiston, Nigel, Vanderbijlpark, and Hammanskraal.
The SACC initiated the dawn raid investigations upon grounds of reasonable suspicion that the four companies – namely, Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Scaw”), Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd (“Cape Gate”), Shaurya Steel (Pty) Ltd t/a Force Steels (“Force Steels”), and Unica Iron and Steel (Pty) Ltd (“Unica”) – were involved in fixing purchasing prices of shredded or processed scrap metal, used in the manufacturing of steel products, which may amount to a contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”).
Section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Act prohibits agreements made between competitors, or concerted practices by competitors, including directly or indirectly fixing purchase prices or trading conditions. Firms who are found to be in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) may be liable to pay penalties of up to 10% of their annual turnover.
In terms of the Statement, the companies are suspected of having announced their price adjustments of the same prices, to be executed around the same time. The SACC alleges that this conduct amounts to a contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Act, which prohibits hardcore cartel conduct. The SACC’s investigation is said to have been brought about by a complaint submitted by a third-party in 2023, as well as a complaint initiated by the SACC in February 2026.
Section 48 of the Act empowers the SACC to conduct search and seizure operations and collect documents which concern an ongoing investigation. In respect of the scrap metal dawn raids that took place on 13 February, SACC provided that it received a search warrant from the North Gauteng (Pretoria) High Court authorising it to carry out these operations. The SACC further indicated that documents and electronic data will be seized and analysed with other relevant information to establish whether the companies are engaged in conduct which contravenes the Act.
Search and seizure operations are also known as “dawn raids” and are often initiated at the start of an investigation, usually before the respondents are aware they are under investigation, to enable the SACC to obtain the information before it might be destroyed. These inspections often come as a surprise to parties and are done in an effort to obtain evidence of potential infringements of the Act. The SACC, often accompanied by the South African Police Service, is provided wide powers for search and seizure through dawn raids, and would be entitled through a warrant to inspect company records, employee records, and both company and personal electronic devices.
Cape Gate responded to the allegations stating that it believes the search warrant is unlawful and that it plans on instituting legal proceedings to have the warrant set aside. The warrant was granted ex parte, meaning it was granted in the absence of the affected parties, and thus Cape Gate believes it has the right to institute proceedings against it. Cape Gate alleges that the SACC did not disclose all the necessary information to the Court when it applied for the warrant. Dorothea Ziegenhagen, the CEO of Cape Gate, stated that the company denies any wrongdoing and asserts that its operations fully adhere to competition law.
Interestingly, in 2025, the Competition Tribunal found Cape Gate guilty of being involved in the fixing of prices in the scrap metal market. Cape Gate denied this and has stated that the calculation was decided on in terms of transparent negotiations between buyers and merchants and has maintained that the SACC and Department of Trade and Industry knew of the negotiations and failed to acknowledge such. Cape Gate lodged an appeal with the Competition Appeal Court which is expected to be heard by the end of March 2026.
Commissioner of the SACC, Doris Tshepe, had indicated in a statement that the scrap metal market forms part of industrial intermediary products, one of the priority sectors monitored by the SACC, and thus false coordination of purchase prices may materially interfere with pricing in the downstream steel value chain. Commissioner Doris Tshepe further provided that dismantling any alleged price-fixing cartel in the scrap metal market would significantly assist in getting rid of artificial barriers to entry and foster a favourable environment for all firms, especially small firms and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged persons to contribute to the market.
The dawn raid comes as a surprise, particularly given that while dawn raids are certainly an effective investigative tool that may be utilised by the SACC as part of its enforcement efforts, the use of dawn raids has been significantly limited in recent years, with the last dawn raid conducted in 2022 on a number of insurance firms. The dawn raids, however, indicate the SACC’s continued commitment to enforcement in the metal sector.
On 5 January 2026, the competition and consumer practice group, AdLegal, lodged a complaint with the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (the“CCCC”) under Regulation 67 of the new COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025 (the “Regulations”). This complaint was launched against Meta Platforms Inc and Meta Platforms Ireland Limited, following its 15 October 2025 amendment to WhatsApp User Agreements, which allegedly restricts the manner in which other AI chatbots can use WhatsApp’s application programming interface (“API”).
The User Agreement is a contract entered into between users and WhatsApp that sets out what either party is entitled to do. With WhatsApp alleged to be a preferred, or ‘dominant’, messaging platform throughout the African continent, this purportedly provides both WhatsApp and its parent company, Meta, an unduly strong platform on which to promote its own services.
Meta has been accused of the similar violations by competition authorities elsewhere and faces probes across multiple jurisdictions, including in the European Union and Brazil.
AdLegal’s claim against Meta
AdLegal alleges that Meta currently allows users access to Meta AI directly in WhatsApp chats, further that the API is used to integrate any third-party software, including alternative AI products, which compete directly with Meta AI, such as Grok, Gemini and Open AI’s Chat GPT.
In this regard, AdLegal alleges that:
Meta’s updated user contract, which restricts the use of this API by competing AI companies, restricts entry of new AI companies into the market, violating Regulation 36(1)(a) of the Regulations;
this conduct deters and prevents competition in the AI market, which violates Regulation 36(1)(b) of the Regulations.
the update can foreclose other undertakings from the market that rely on WhatsApp’s platform to provide their AI services to users, violating Regulation 36(1)(c) of the Regulations.
What this means for Meta and for the COMESA market
While the CCCC’s investigation into the alleged conduct remains in its initial stages, the complaint sends a strong message to multinational companies that enforcement and complaints in the COMESA region are to be taken seriously, particularly with the onset of the new Regulations, promulgated in late 2025. The complaint is a signal to multinationals, particularly in digital markets, that compliance with the competition regulations will be enforced, particularly where dominant market positions are alleged to have been abused.
John Oxenham, director at Primerio notes that the complaint marks a significant step towards challenging anti-competitive practices and holding tech companies in the COMESA region accountable. The outcome of the investigation could mean that dominant tech companies operating across Africa must adopt open, competitive digital ecosystems instead of leveraging their market position to sideline rival AI providers.
African Antitrust & Competition Law 