compliance, East Africa, Kenya, Price fixing, public-interest, trade associations

Kenya Antitrust Enforcer Reiterates Warning to Professional Associations

By Ruth Mosoti, Esq.

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK, or the Authority) issued a public notice to members of professional associations who are seeking to set minimum chargeable fees for their members notifying them that they need to comply with the provisions of the Competition Act. The Competition Act (the Act) provides for parties to file an application for an exemption on behalf of any association whose agreements may contravene the Act. Notably, the determination of an exemption application factors in public-interest considerations. In addition to this, when an exemption is granted, the same is not perpetual the period of validity of the exemption is at the discretion of the Authority.

Regulation of professional bodies is governed by different sources under Kenyan law. This can occur either through statutory law or rules issued by the professional bodies themselves. In Kenya we have professional bodies regulated by statute and others are wholly self-regulatory. This in turn brings in the issue of self-regulation and regulation by statute. As such, if a professional body is allowed by law to prescribe fees applicable for certain services offered by members of that association. Therefore, in such an instance then the Authority cannot fault such an association because the actions of the association are sanctioned by the law. In such an instance, the correct course of action would be the Authority to first seek intervention from the courts to declare such activities authorized by the law as unlawful and if successful, then any future activities of the association that involve the prescription of fees will be subject to an exemption application.

In 2017, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) made an exemption application in regard to prescribing of fees charged by its members and the same was rejected by the Authority. Following the rejection of their application ICPAK has opted to bypass the Authority and has begun to push for the prescription of the fees through the law and in 2020, they published the proposed remuneration order. Similarly in 2020, the Engineers through the Engineers board of Kenya also have the draft scale of fees for professional engineering services.

As mentioned above, there is the issue of self-regulation versus regulation by statute. Relevant Kenyan law includes the Statutory Instruments Act, which provides for the making, scrutiny, publication and operation of statutory instruments. Statutory instruments include but are not limited to rules, guidelines or by-laws made in execution of a power conferred by an existing statute. It is important to mention the Statutory Instruments Act because under this law, all statutory instruments are required to carry out consultations with the Authority to establish whether the proposed instrument restricts competition. It is however unclear whether the opinion of the Authority matters because despite complying with this requirement. What would be interesting to watch for now is whether ICPAK is successful in its quest for setting of professional fees there being a gazette notice where the CAK rejected its exemption application over the same subject matter.

Associations that self-regulate fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the CAK and that is why the Authority has in the past successfully pursued contraventions by trade associations like in 2016, the association members in the advertising industry who were involved in price fixing were penalized. This can be compared to the activities of the Law Society of Kenya  which are governed by statutes which empower it to recommend to the Chief Justice fees to be charged in relation to certain services offered by its members.

In conclusion, while the CAK may be justified in its quest to reign in the behavior of professional associations that are engaged in conduct that may amount to price-fixing, there needs to be a balance in the approach the CAK takes, where protection of fair remuneration is taken into account while preventing what would amount to abusive conduct. That being said, the CAK should also consider challenging the other laws that are in place that allow the professional associations to engage in conduct that it believes should be subject to an exemption application.

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meddling, MergerMania, public-interest, South Africa

Revisiting the Burger King prohibition: [Unintended] Consequences & [Possible] Reconsideration

By Joshua Eveleigh

On the 1 June 2021, the South African Competition Commission (SACC) released its media statement announcing the prohibition of ECP Africa’s proposed acquisition of Burger King (South Africa) and Grand Foods Meat Plant Pty (Ltd) from Grand Parade Investments.   AAT published a note on this precedent-setting decision here.

Despite finding that the acquisition would not have any likely effect of substantially lessening or preventing competition, the transaction was prohibited as it would result in the merged entity having no ownership by historically disadvantaged persons (HDPs) and workers. In its media statement, the SACC states that both Burger King SA and Grand Foods Meat Plant form part of an empowering entity in which HDP’s have 68% ownership. This ownership stake would decrease to 0% if the transaction were to be approved. In this regard, Tembinkosi Bonakele, chairperson of the SACC, states:

“You had an entity that had quite an impressive transformation profile, and all of that was going to disappear at the stroke of a pen with this transaction.”

Unsurprisingly, Grand Parade Investments, as well as the general public, have responded to the SACC’s decision with discontent.

The topical concerns regarding the prohibition of the acquisition include:

  1. The unintended, prejudicial impact upon black shareholders of sellers / target companies; and
  2. The equally detrimental deterrence of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Republic of South Africa.

i. Harm to HDP shareholders

Grand Parade Investments had supposedly been attempting to sell Burger King and Grand Foods Meat Plant for a period of 18 months in order to settle debts and pay dividends to its black shareholders, whom had reportedly not received dividends for a number of years. Furthermore, the shareholders would incur even greater harm upon the SACC’s media statement as Grand Parade Investments share price would plummet by 10%, making future dividend payouts ever less likely.

Bonakele argues that the Competition Act cannot waiver in its goal of transformation purely because of the prejudicial impact that a decision may have on individuals.

“This is about the system, it is not about individual shareholders. We are not really concerned about the immediate impact on Joe Soap today, that’s not the criteria.

ii. Deterring FDI

The decision of the SACC raises varying concerns for foreign investors, and understandably so. The key concerns can be encapsulated into the following: certainty, timing and costs.

Firstly, merger review is subject to ever-evolving standards. In this regard, foreign investors cannot approach a merger with full certainty as to whether it will be approved or not. Moreover, continually changing standards presents increased opportunities of opposition from competition authorities which furthers investor uncertainty. Secondly, subsequent to changing standards and increased opposition, the timing of proposed mergers is significantly lengthened. Lastly, the imposition of non-competition conditions on transactions incurs significant costs on the burden of investors.

These principles of certainty, timing and costs can be considered as the essential elements of a sound merger regime. Ultimately, the SACC’s decision of prohibition strikes at the balance of South Africa’s merger regime by introducing great uncertainty, prolonged timing and greater costs  – all of which present themselves as significant areas of concern for foreign investors.

In response to these FDI concerns, Bonakele states that South Africa’s democratic sustainability is of paramount importance and that foreign investors must consider the long-term effects that exclusionary investments would have on the Republic, particularly in regard to transformation and empowerment:

“But it’s not like empowerment imperatives are less important than FDI.”

A potential for reconsideration?

A window for reconsideration of the proposed acquisition presents itself where the merging parties present a better offering of HDP ownership. Bonakele suggests that this is potentially on the table as the parties to the agreement have continued engagement despite the SACC’s decision.

Therefore, the proposed acquisition may eventually find approval where ECP Africa and Grand Parade Investments agree on an improved HDP empowerment plan, of which the SACC is satisfied.

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Conclusion

In essence, the SACC’s decision to prohibit the proposed acquisition of Burger King (South Africa) and Grand Foods Meat Plant by ECP Africa has had prejudicial effects upon the seller’s black shareholders.

Further, the decision presents concern for foreign direct investment by striking at the essential elements of a sound merger regime, namely: certainty, timing and costs.

However, the chairperson of the SACC has now noted that the SACC may change its initial decision upon the improvement of empowerment considerations between the parties to the transaction.

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AAT exclusive, meddling, MergerMania, mergers, public-interest, South Africa

Precedent-Setting Decision: Burger King Acquisition Prohibited Purely on Public Interest Grounds

By Charl van der Merwe

The South African Competition Commission (SACC) made headlines with its first prohibition of an intermediate merger that was based solely on public-interest grounds.

Emerging Capital Partners (ECP), a private equity firm founded in the US, was to acquire all Burger King assets from South African Grand Parade Investments, a South African majority black owned entity. 

The SACC, while finding that the proposed transaction will have no actual impact on competition, prohibited the transaction on the basis that the transaction will have a substantial negative effect on “the promotion of greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons” (HDPs).

The SACC found that the merger would lead to a 68% reduction in the shareholding of HDPs in the target entity.

As John Oxenham, director at Primerio points out, “public interest” considerations have long been a feature of competition law in South Africa, particularly in relation to merger control. In this regard, mergers, which may otherwise be deemed problematic, could be ‘justified’ on public interest grounds. Public interest, while initially limited to employment, was first informally expanded through notable mergers such as Walmart/Massmart (2011) and AB Inbev/SAB (2016) where public interest conditions were imposed related to empowerment and ownership, through agreement by the merging parties.

The Competition Amendment Act, which largely became effective in 2019, formally expanded the recognised public-interest factors contain in Section 12A(3) of the Competition Act to include the “promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the market”. Further, the public-interest element was elevated to a separate and self-standing assessment, which must be assessed as an integral part of the merger assessment.

While the Competition Act, as amended, has made provision for mergers to be assessed and prohibited on pure public interest grounds since July 2019, the Burger King merger is the first merger to be prohibited on this basis.

SACC Commissioner, Tembinkosi Bonakele noted that the SACC had no choice but to recommend that the merger be prohibited as, clearly, the merger would result in a reduction of HDP ownership from 68% to 0%, which the SACC believes is substantial. This concern was raised with the merging parties, who were unable to address the concern in a suitable manner.

Regarding the broader impacts of the decision on investment and merger control in South Africa, Bonakele noted that the SACC is merely a statutory agency obliged to impose the law as it currently stands and, according to the Bonakele, there is no uncertainty regarding the transformation objectives which had been introduced to the Competition Act. The SACC is clear on its mandate in terms of the Competition Act, as amended, and will continue to implement such mandate.

The legal basis for the decision is clear, however, as is the case with any new legislation, implementation thereof less so. At the time of the enactment of the amendments to the Competition Act, it was well recognised that the practical implementation of these provisions will be critical and that it may lead to significant unintended consequences – including adverse effects on consumer welfare and even broader public interest. Primerio director, Michael-James Currie points out that, ironically, HDP-owned target firms might be negatively prejudiced by this criterion, as the pool of potential buyers is limited (and hence the value) if non-black owned firms are not able to successful acquire the target’s business.

It is not clear, at this stage, what the assessment in the Burger King merger entailed, what evidence was put forward by the parties and what the relevant counterfactual may have been. It is also not clear whether the transaction presented pro-competitive elements which outweigh the adverse effect on public interest – similar to what is required in terms of public interest where a merger may have an adverse impact on competition. The SACC confirmed, however, that the transaction was ultimately prohibited after ECP failed to adhere to requests to proffer conditions relating to shareholding and empowerment.

The SACC has the power to assess and prohibit intermediate mergers. Accordingly, the SACC’s prohibition can only be challenged by way of a request for consideration, to be filed by the merging parties, to the South African Competition Tribunal. The SACC opined, however, that unless the acquiring firm is prepared to make concession to remedy the public interest concerns, the decision is unlikely to be overturned.

Grand Parade has been vocal in its dissatisfaction of the prohibition. The matter will be highly contested, and it is not uncommon for transactions to be approved on a request for consideration to the Tribunal.  Furthermore, any decision by the Tribunal is likely to be taken on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court and likely also the Constitutional Court.

The Burger King decision, regardless of its eventual outcome, will leave a lasting precedent and shape merger control proceedings in South Africa going forward.

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AAT exclusive, COMESA, COVID-19, East Africa, exemptions, Kenya, public-interest

Antitrust enforcer to allow self-assessment of competitor collaborations amidst pandemic

Following the (thus far rarely used) “Block Exemption” procedure under Section 30 (2) of the Kenyan Competition Act, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) has proposed a new set of draft Guidelines as to competitor collaborations during the COVID-19 pandemic, so as to assist with the country’s economic recovery efforts. It specifies five (5) focus sectors, namely Manufacturing, Private Healthcare, Aviation, Travel & Hospitality, and Health Research. The Guidelines are ostensibly inapplicable to firms that engage in economic activity outside these five sectors.

In issuing its soon-to-be finalized guidance, the CAK wishes to provide “direction to undertakings in making a self-assessment as to whether the agreements, decisions or practices which they intend entering into will qualify for block exemption within the Covid-19 Economic Recovery Context without the need to seek the Authority’s intervention.” (A.(4))

A key aspect, in the view of antitrust litigator Andreas Stargard, is the renewed attention given to “public-interest factors” in competition law.

He believes that this concession to non-traditional competition-law theory is “necessitated by the broad economic havoc COVID-19 has wrought, including on historically peripheral-to-antitrust aspects such as overall employment, public health, en masse business closures, and the like, which would normally not be highly relevant factors in the strict sense of conducting a rigorous competition-law analysis.”

Stargard continues that “Condition III of the CAK’s so-called ‘Self-Assessment Principles‘ expressly highlights this element, namely forcing firms to evaluate whether their proposed collaboration with competitive entities is ‘in the public interest, such as creation of employment’,” citing para. 11(vii) of the draft Block Exemption Guidelines on Certain Covid-19 Economic Recovery Priority Sectors.

The CAK’s proposal thus strongly echoes what its regional sister authority, the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) openly discussed as early as July of last year. As we wrote in our assessment of the official CCC staff’s thoughts on competition enforcement amidst the pandemic in 2020:

The concept of non-competition factors (i.e., the public-interest element) was also raised, as there is a “growing debate on whether the pandemic may necessitate changes in [the] substantive assessment of mergers, e.g., towards more lenient consideration of failing firms.”

As Andreas Stargard observes, “just as COVID-19 is truly global, Kenya and COMESA are likewise not alone in their quest to master the difficult balancing act between sufficiently enforcing their domestic or regional antitrust laws versus allowing reasonable accommodations to be made for necessary competitor collaborations in light of the pandemic’s impact. Indeed, other enforcers have also made accommodations for such unusual collaborative efforts, given the emergency nature of the pandemic.”

In the U.S., the federal antitrust agencies have issued analogous guidance for competitors, issuing a joint guidance document specifically on health-care providers collaborating on necessary public-health initiatives. What stands out is the agencies’ express invitation for health-care players to take advantage of the (now-expedited to 7 days’ turnaround time) business-review/opinion-letter procedures.   Mr. Stargard notes however that, unlike the Kenyan proposal of “self-assessment by the affected entities, the American approach still necessitates an affirmative approach of the enforcers by the parties, seeking official sanctioning of their proposed cooperation by submitting a detailed explanation of the planned conduct, together with its rationale and expected likely effects.

By way of further example, in Canada, as the OECD notes, the government “has developed a ‘whole-of-government action’ based on seven guiding principles including collaboration. This principle calls on all levels of government and stakeholders to work in partnership to generate an effective and coherent response. These principles build on lessons learned from past events, particularly the 2003 SARS outbreak, which led to dedicated legislation, plans, infrastructure, and resources to help ensure that the country would be well prepared to detect and respond to a future pandemic outbreak.”

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AAT exclusive, COMESA, COVID-19, Meet the Enforcers, mergers, notification, public-interest

COMESA antitrust enforcer holds COVID seminar

 

Willard Mwemba

Dr. Mwemba of the CCC

The COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) hosted a live webinar today on the impact of COVID-19 on merger regulation and enforcement within the common market in the COMESA region.  The seminar was aptly sub-titled “Challenges and Way Forward,” and the CCC representatives, in particular Dr. Willard Mwemba, did indeed lay out the problems faced by them and the measures proposed and taken to alleviate them.

COVID-related business and national competition agency closures have led to “significant delays in information gathering” from NCAs, third parties, and merger parties themselves.

CCC has relaxed the hard-copy filing requirements for merger notifications.

The concept of non-competition factors (i.e., the public-interest element) was also raised, as there is a “growing debate on whether the pandemic may necessitate changes in [the] substantive assessment of mergers, e.g., towards more lenient consideration of failing firms.”

That said, the CCC emphasized that its adjustment to enforcement actions should not be construed as any weakening of competition principles taking place.  The harmonization and coordination among the COMESA member countries’ agencies and the CCC remain a critical element of the operation of the single market.

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AAT, mergers, public-interest, Uncategorized

PepsiCo/Pioneer merger: Minister Patel approves the Deal

In one of the few megamergers of the 2019/2020 season, the South African Competition Tribunal approved, subject to a wide range of public interest related conditions, PepsiCo’s acquisition of South Africa’s largest FMCG producers, Pioneer Foods.

In predictable fashion, this was not the type of transaction which would escape the attention of Minister Patel (who oversees the portfolio of the competition agencies). Despite not being a transaction which raises any competition concerns (i.e. there being no substantive overlap in product portfolios) and no material public interest concerns, the merger was an acquisition by a major international producer, PepsiCo and Minister Patel has openly expressed his intention to involve himself in acquisitions by foreign firms in an effort to extract a “socio-economic” tax from the merging parties. This was first seen in the Massmart/Walmart deal in 2012 but more recently in the AB-InBev/SAB and SAB/Coca-Cola mergers.

Competition lawyer, Michael-James Currie points out that a noteworthy difference between the legislative environment in terms of which the PepsiCo/Pioneer merger was assessed are the amendments to South Africa’s Competition Act. Under the new merger regime, public interest standards have been elevated, as a test, so as to be on par with the traditional competition analysis. Furthermore, the public interest grounds which the competition authorities are mandated to take into account have been expanded and now specifically include ownership levels among historically disadvantaged persons (commonly referred to as BBBEE policies in South Africa – Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment).

The Competition Tribunal’s reasons are noteworthy. In a transaction of this magnitude, the Tribunal did not provide any reasons or findings as to the assessment of the merger. There was no analysis as to the relevant markets nor an assessment of the negative effects that the merger may have on the public interest factors.

The Tribunal’s reasons jump straight to the conditions ostensibly on the basis that the merging parties, the Competition Commission and Minister Patel had “agreed” to the conditions and, therefore, there was no reason to assess the transaction and the Tribunal could go ahead and rubber stamp the terms of the agreement.

Based on the majority of the conditions imposed, it is safe to assume that the transaction raised no material competition or public interest concerns. Notwithstanding that the transaction raised no adverse effects, the conditions imposed on the merger include:

  1. The creation of a BBBEE Workers Trust which will receive at least R1.6 billion (USD 10.6 million) in equity and the appointment of a non-executive director to the PepsiCo board together with voting rights of 12.9% in lieu of the equity for a period of 5 years;
  2. Employment:
    1. A moratorium on merger related retrenchments for a period of 5 years;
    2. An undertaking to maintain the aggregate levels of employment for 5 years; and
    3. An undertaking to create 500 direct new employment opportunities and 2500 indirect employment opportunities over the next five years.
  3. An undertaking to invest a cumulative amount of R5.5 billion (USD180 million) in production capacity over the next five years.
  4. Promote procurement from local suppliers and producers;
  5. Maintain all sales and distribution agreements currently in place for a period of two years;
  6. Contribute at least R600 million (USD60 million) to the creation of a development fund to be used for education, small medium enterprise development and agriculture programs.

Despite the substantial conditions imposed on the merger, Minister Patel surely finds himself in a catch twenty two. On the one hands, Minister Patel is a socialist at heart and has very much focused his efforts on utilising the Competition Act and authorities to promote industrial policy action and advance socio-economic objectives. Now, both as Minister of Trade and Industry and in light of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s drive to attract foreign direct investment, Minister Patel needs to tread a far more intricate line than ay previously the case (under President Jacob Zuma’s reign).

On the one hand, large foreign mergers present Minister Patel with a golden opportunity to extract non-merger specific public interest commitments – which merging parties often acquiesce to in order to preclude protracted litigation. On the other, Minister Patel needs to ensure that South Africa’s message to the rest of the world is that we would welcome foreign investment with open arms.

John Oxenham says that while it is perhaps regrettable that the Competition Tribunal did not grapple fully with the extent to which these types of conditions would have been objectively justifiable in terms of the new merger control regime or whether they amount to an overreach. While the Tribunal typically does not dedicate substantial resources to evaluating mergers when there is no dispute between the parties – and understandably so – the Tribunal should be mindful of rubber-stamping approvals of this nature. The message that this decision sends to foreign firms seeking to invest in South Africa is certainly not a warm and inviting message. The lack of analysis and objective justification for the conditions sends a strong message to merging parties that the most important aspect for purposes of obtaining merger approval is to engage and reach settlement terms with Minister Patel.

When the executive becomes the gatekeeper to merger control approvals (or competition law enforcement more generally), this very rapidly blurs the distinction of the separation of powers.

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BRICS, Grocery Retail Market Inquiry, mergers, public-interest, South Africa

South Africa: PepsiCo acquisition of Pioneer recommended for approval, at a price!

On 11 February 2020, the South African Competition Commission (SACC) recommended that PepsiCo’s acquisition of Pioneer Foods, be approved, subject to a number of conditions.

Despite there being no material overlap between the parties which give rise to any competition concerns, the Commission has proposed substantial public interest related conditions – including the establishment of an enterprise development fund and a BBBEE deal worth R1.6 billion in order to spread ownership among historically disadvantaged persons.

It is not yet confirmed whether the merging parties have agreed to these conditions although I strongly suspect that they have so as to avoid third party intervention.

The Commission has, as per its media release, recommended that the Tribunal approves the merger subject to several public interest commitments including:

(i) A moratorium on merger related retrenchments for a certain period;

(ii) The creation of additional jobs at the merged entity;

(iii) Significant investment in the operations of the merged entity, the agricultural sector and the establishment of an enterprise development fund; and

(iv) A B-BBEE transaction to the value of at least R1.6 billion that will promote a greater spread of ownership and participation by workers / historically disadvantaged South Africans.

Many of our readers will recall that the AB InBev/SAB and SAB/Coca-Cola mergers in 2016 were only recommended for approval by the SACC (in the face of Minister Patel’s intervention in these mergers) following the merging parties’ commitment to establish similar development funds. Further, Minister Patel (responsible for the executive portfolio which overseas the competition authorities) has on a number of occasions expressly indicated that he will look to intervene in large mergers by foreign firms in order to extract additional commitments to advance socio-economic objectives.

Those who monitored the AB InBev/SAB transaction will recall that executives of the merging parties engaged Minister Patel directly and negotiated the “public interest” conditions. A transaction of that nature, two of the world’s largest beer manufacturers, took approximately 6 months to obtain final approval in South Africa. Approval which included approximately a R1 billion “development fund”.

Prior to this merger, SAB and Coca-Cola had engaged with the SACC for approximately 18 months in order to obtain approval. After AB InBev acquired SAB, SAB also offered a supplier development and agreed to pay R600 million to this fund. The transaction was approved shortly thereafter. This was despite the Commission not having identified any material competition concerns.

While the merging parties may have consented to these conditions in an effort to avoid protracted hearings before the adjudicative bodies, the blatant extortion of foreign firms seeking to invest in South Africa is concerning and certainly does not assist or support President Ramaphosa’s foreign investment drive. Minister Patel has been prone to utilising market inquiries in an effort to address perceived high levels of concentration in the market (despite the vast unintended consequences of destabilizing those industries, sectors and private firms who are actually sustainable in challenging economic times and offer consumers great products and prices). It would be interesting to have a market study commissioned that attempts to quantify the amount of “lost foreign investment” into South Africa as a result of the political climate, interference and policy uncertainty. The number of jobs and spinoff benefits from that foreign investment is likely to substantially exceed any “supplier development fund” benefits which Patel seems to be vindicated in extracting from those firms who are actually prepared to invest in South Africa. Such a study wouldn’t even be particularly difficult to conduct. Survey foreign firms and ask how interested would they be to invest in South Africa if the merger filing fee for multinational foreign firms was lets say R1 billion (USD65 million)? South Africa would have to be a very attractive environment to operate in to justify that sort of commitment.

 

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AAT, AAT exclusive, East Africa, fraud/corruption, jurisdiction, Kenya, mergers, mobile, public-interest, Telecoms, Uncategorized

Kenyan Competition Watchdog suspends Telkom Kenya / Airtel deal

Multiple regulatory agencies, competitor complaints and public interest concerns has posed a significant impediment to the proposed merger between Telkom Kenya and Airtel.

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) recently announced that the Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) is investigating Telkom Kenya amidst allegations of corruption in relation to historic transactions which gave rise to the current shareholding in Telkom Kenya.

The CAK’s decision to suspend the assessment of the merger was announced approximately a week after the Communications Authority of Kenya also suspended its assessment of the transaction pending the outcome of the EACC’s investigation.

The Communications Authority’s investigation will likely include an assessment of a complaint filed with the agency by Safaricom, a competitor to the merging parties.

Furthermore, the deal was also opposed by certain Telkom employees, ostensibly on the basis that their jobs were at risk should the deal go ahead.

Accordingly, the parties appear to have a long road ahead of them before clearance to implement the deal is granted.

The proposed transaction has no doubt attracted an additional degree of scrutiny as the telecom sector in Kenya is a significant market and there have been a number of disputes regarding the CAK’s jurisdiction to assess anti-competitive conduct, particularly abuse of dominance conduct, in this sector. A study into the telecom sector prepared by the Communications Authority was presented to Parliament in 2018. The CAK objected to the findings and remedial actions contained in the report which the CAK argued would amount to “price regulating” by the Communications Authority. Instead, the CAK urged the Communications Authority to focus rather on features of the market which raise barriers to entry or preclude effective competition between competitors.

While Parliament has, as far back as 2015, urged the Communications Authority to consult the CAK before making any determination regarding a telecom service providers’ “dominance”, subsequent litigation led to a High Court ruling in 2017 which confirmed that the Communications Authority’s powers vis-à-vis competition related matters remain vested exclusively with the Communications Authority.

The concurrent jurisdiction between the CAK and the Communication’s Authority has created somewhat of an enforcement discord – at least in so far as assessing abuse of dominance cases are concerned.

The fact that both the CAK and the Communications Authority have decided to suspend their assessments of the proposed merger following the outcome of the EACC’s investigation suggests that the outcome of the EACC’s investigation is relevant to both the CAK and Communication Authority analysis of the proposed transaction. This in turn, seemingly appears that there is at least an overlap in relation to the key issues under assessment by the respective agencies. Assuming there is indeed an overlap between the CAK and the Communication Authority’s assessment of the proposed transaction that naturally raises the risk of having two agencies come to different conclusions based on the same facts.

Telkom Kenya, however, remain confident that the merger will ultimately be cleared by all regulators.

Telkom Kenya have indicated that the merger will have significant pro-competitive and pro-public interest benefits which will have a positive impact on employees (and the market more generally). Whether the CAK conducts a comprehensive assessment between the short term negative impact on employment versus long term positive impact remains to be seen.

Assuming the proposed deal does not raise any traditional competition issues, it cannot therefore be ruled out that the transaction will be approved subject to public interest related conditions regarding retrenchments and/or re-employment obligations.

Whatever decision is ultimately reached, one hopes that the authorities will publish detailed reasons based on a robust assessment of the evidence in order to provide greater objectivity and transparency as to the analysis which is undertaken by the CAK when analyzing a merger – both from a competition and public interest perspective.

The CAK has in the past number of years have made significant positive strides forward in this regard and is deserved of the recognition it receives as one of the most active and robust competition authorities in Africa.

[Michael-James Currie is senior contributor to AAT and a practicing competition lawyer who has assisted clients with competition law related matters in multiple jurisdictions across Africa]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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AAT exclusive, new regime, no antitrust regime, public-interest, South Africa

Book Review: “Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Developments and Competition Law in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Eleanor M. Fox and Mor Bakhoum

Thanks to the diverse and on-going commitments by our contributors, AfricanAntitrust is considered the leading resource tracking competition law developments across the continent. AfricanAntitrust has, over the past number of years published numerous articles, updates and expression pieces by numerous contributors both in an effort to ensure our readership remains up to date on all regulatory developments in Africa, and also to stimulate robust debate on competition policy and enforcement across the continent.

Developing countries have unique socio-economic issues and market dynamics which many have argued justify a unique approach to the role competition law policy should play.

The editors at AfricanAntitrust were, therefore, particularly interested in the book authored by well-known Professor, Eleanor Fox and co-author Mor Bakhoum . AAT is honoured to have been requested to provide a book review and indebited to John Oxenham, Andreas Stargard and Michael-James Currie for their commentary below.

The book’s title Making Markets Work for Africa: Markets, Developments and Competition Law in Sub-Saharan Africa provides significant insight into its subject matter and the topics covered. As an introductory remark, the content provides a concise but necessary introduction to the social, political and economic challenges which underpin most sub-Saharan jurisdictions. Readers who may not be familiar with the jurisdictions covered in the book will find this useful for purposes of contextualising the competition policy debate and the nuances which underpin this debate.

After sketching an overview of the economic and political background, the authors go on to detail the relevant competition laws and the application thereof across the sub-Saharan jurisdictions.

The authors have, usefully, selected certain key enforcement activities in each of the jurisdictions covered in an effort to demonstrate the robustness of the respective agencies’ enforcement activities.

The authors then do a neat job of teeing up the crux of the debate, should competition law in developing countries converge towards a ‘global standard’ (which in this context refers primarily to US and EU precedent) or rather, do market and socio-political challenges which are often unique to most sub-Saharan countries, require a different set of rules, benchmarks or policy outlooks to competition policy and enforcement. In this regard, the authors provide a useful platform for debate among competition lawyers, economists, academics and law makers alike.

The book was not intended to provide a complete and robust assessment of the multitude of policy options available when developing competition law. Further, the authors have elected not to engage in a highly technical critique or assessment of the key decisions which have shaped competition policy across the African continent. Rather, the authors highlight the need to consider and debate different policies.

The authors correctly highlight South Africa as the “golden standard” insofar as competition law enforcement in developing countries is concerned – particularly in relation to the role of public interest enforcement in merger reviews. The authors discuss the seminal case in this regard, namely the Walmart/Massmart merger, as the foundation from which numerous subsequent mergers have been approved subject to public interest related conditions.

While the Walmart/Massmart merger was finally approved in 2013, the authors may consider, in subsequent editions, whether the substantial litigation and interventionist risks which are inherent in assessing public interest factors in competition law enforcement (particularly merger control) can be quantified. A departure from traditional competition law standards and precedent, particularly with the introduction of subjective considerations, is likely to increase the scope for litigation and interventionist strategies which may hinder the very objectives sought to be advanced.

The authors do, however, recognise that when assessing competition policy, one must consider the objectives of the policy against its practical enforcement – particularly in light of the principle of rule of law and sound economic analysis. The book certainly does not profess to ignore these and at numerous instances expressly or implicitly acknowledges that a transparent and objective competition enforcement regime is critical.

With the “hipster antitrust” movement ostensibly gaining traction in the US and EU, South Africa (and indirectly Africa more generally) it would appear there is a more mainstream deviation from traditional competition law enforcement. It certainly suggests a uniform standard in competition policy may become even more difficult to sustain. Alternatively, it may be the inherent complexity and trade-offs which are always at play in developing competition policy which may in fact necessitate a form of convergence. The authors give some insight into these trade-offs and the various factors which legislators and practitioners should take into account.

The authors also raise a number of issues which are often left out of the policy debate, yet play a crucial role in the efficacy of competition law enforcement in developing countries.

Factors such as political interference, corruption (as an overarching concern) and the limited resources available to many African competition agencies contribute to certain markets remaining inaccessible to new entrants and preclude efficiencies from materialising to the benefit of consumers. The authors point out, quite correctly, that judgments or decisions by agencies are often entirely devoid of substantive reasons let alone robust economic analysis.

The above recognition further reinforces the need for objectivity and transparency in developing competition enforcement regime.

Finally, readers will find the authors’ discussion on the regional blocs in Africa (COMESA, SADC, EAC) and explore the level of harmonisation between these regional blocs and their respective members states.

The timing of the book in this regard could not be more apposite in light of the current negotiations regarding a uniform African competition policy as contemplated by the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.

We congratulate the authors on this important and well researched text.

 

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East Africa, ECONAfrica, ECOWAS, Egypt, Extra-judicial Factors, jurisdiction, Kenya, legislation, Meet the Enforcers, mergers, new regime, Nigeria, no antitrust regime, Patel, predatory pricing, Price fixing, Protectionism, public-interest, South Africa, Tanzania, Uncategorized, Unfair Competition

Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?

To all our Africanantitrust followers, please take note of the upcoming American Bar Association webinar on 2 July 2019 (11amET/4pmUK/5pm CET) titled:

“Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?”

In what promises to be a highly topical (telecon) panel discussion, Eleanor Fox, Andreas Stargard, John Oxenham, Amira Abdel Ghaffar and Anthony Idigbe will:

  • provide critical commentary of the most recent developments in antitrust policy across the African continent;
  • highlight the most significant legislative amendments and enforcement activities in Africa; and
  • analyze some of the key enforcement decisions.

South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, COMESA and Kenya are among the key jurisdictions under the microscope.

Practitioners, agency representatives, academics and anyone who is an antitrust enthusiast will find this webinar to be of great interest. Not to mention companies actually active or looking to enter the African market place.

For details on how to participate, please follow this Link

 

 

 

 

 

 

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