Category: jurisdiction

New antitrust MoU between COMESA & EEC

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No, that’s not the European Economic Community, but rather the slightly less well-known Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), thank you for asking…

The Memorandum of Understanding, signed in late July in Geneva, is designed to allow the two agencies to “cooperate in addressing anti-competitive conduct in their respective regions, capacity building and research,” according to AAT’s old friend and CCC 2.0 executive, Dr. Willard Mwemba.

His EEC counterpart, Mr. Arman Shakkaliyev, Minister in charge of Competition & Antitrust Regulation, said that the future collaboration “opened up new opportunities” for closer interaction and the sharing of experiences and knowledge as to specific investigations, most notably, in addition to the two agencies planning more standard cooperative ventures such as joint conferences or training seminars.

Says Andreas Stargard, a competition lawyer at Primerio Ltd.:

“This latest MoU represents yet a further step in the clear and unmistakable direction of ever-closer cooperation between enforcement agencies on the African continent that we have seen for a few years now. The advice to be taken from this is fairly simple: Companies operating in more than one country in Africa should take note of this development, as their local ‘competition reputation‘ from one jurisdiction will doubtless precede them in the other, given the information-sharing between African watchdogs, which catches many corporates seemingly unawares…”

Kenyan Competition Watchdog suspends Telkom Kenya / Airtel deal

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Multiple regulatory agencies, competitor complaints and public interest concerns has posed a significant impediment to the proposed merger between Telkom Kenya and Airtel.

The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) recently announced that the Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) is investigating Telkom Kenya amidst allegations of corruption in relation to historic transactions which gave rise to the current shareholding in Telkom Kenya.

The CAK’s decision to suspend the assessment of the merger was announced approximately a week after the Communications Authority of Kenya also suspended its assessment of the transaction pending the outcome of the EACC’s investigation.

The Communications Authority’s investigation will likely include an assessment of a complaint filed with the agency by Safaricom, a competitor to the merging parties.

Furthermore, the deal was also opposed by certain Telkom employees, ostensibly on the basis that their jobs were at risk should the deal go ahead.

Accordingly, the parties appear to have a long road ahead of them before clearance to implement the deal is granted.

The proposed transaction has no doubt attracted an additional degree of scrutiny as the telecom sector in Kenya is a significant market and there have been a number of disputes regarding the CAK’s jurisdiction to assess anti-competitive conduct, particularly abuse of dominance conduct, in this sector. A study into the telecom sector prepared by the Communications Authority was presented to Parliament in 2018. The CAK objected to the findings and remedial actions contained in the report which the CAK argued would amount to “price regulating” by the Communications Authority. Instead, the CAK urged the Communications Authority to focus rather on features of the market which raise barriers to entry or preclude effective competition between competitors.

While Parliament has, as far back as 2015, urged the Communications Authority to consult the CAK before making any determination regarding a telecom service providers’ “dominance”, subsequent litigation led to a High Court ruling in 2017 which confirmed that the Communications Authority’s powers vis-à-vis competition related matters remain vested exclusively with the Communications Authority.

The concurrent jurisdiction between the CAK and the Communication’s Authority has created somewhat of an enforcement discord – at least in so far as assessing abuse of dominance cases are concerned.

The fact that both the CAK and the Communications Authority have decided to suspend their assessments of the proposed merger following the outcome of the EACC’s investigation suggests that the outcome of the EACC’s investigation is relevant to both the CAK and Communication Authority analysis of the proposed transaction. This in turn, seemingly appears that there is at least an overlap in relation to the key issues under assessment by the respective agencies. Assuming there is indeed an overlap between the CAK and the Communication Authority’s assessment of the proposed transaction that naturally raises the risk of having two agencies come to different conclusions based on the same facts.

Telkom Kenya, however, remain confident that the merger will ultimately be cleared by all regulators.

Telkom Kenya have indicated that the merger will have significant pro-competitive and pro-public interest benefits which will have a positive impact on employees (and the market more generally). Whether the CAK conducts a comprehensive assessment between the short term negative impact on employment versus long term positive impact remains to be seen.

Assuming the proposed deal does not raise any traditional competition issues, it cannot therefore be ruled out that the transaction will be approved subject to public interest related conditions regarding retrenchments and/or re-employment obligations.

Whatever decision is ultimately reached, one hopes that the authorities will publish detailed reasons based on a robust assessment of the evidence in order to provide greater objectivity and transparency as to the analysis which is undertaken by the CAK when analyzing a merger – both from a competition and public interest perspective.

The CAK has in the past number of years have made significant positive strides forward in this regard and is deserved of the recognition it receives as one of the most active and robust competition authorities in Africa.

[Michael-James Currie is senior contributor to AAT and a practicing competition lawyer who has assisted clients with competition law related matters in multiple jurisdictions across Africa]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?

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To all our Africanantitrust followers, please take note of the upcoming American Bar Association webinar on 2 July 2019 (11amET/4pmUK/5pm CET) titled:

“Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?”

In what promises to be a highly topical (telecon) panel discussion, Eleanor Fox, Andreas Stargard, John Oxenham, Amira Abdel Ghaffar and Anthony Idigbe will:

  • provide critical commentary of the most recent developments in antitrust policy across the African continent;
  • highlight the most significant legislative amendments and enforcement activities in Africa; and
  • analyze some of the key enforcement decisions.

South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, COMESA and Kenya are among the key jurisdictions under the microscope.

Practitioners, agency representatives, academics and anyone who is an antitrust enthusiast will find this webinar to be of great interest. Not to mention companies actually active or looking to enter the African market place.

For details on how to participate, please follow this Link

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Kenya domestic merger thresholds proposed, limiting notifications

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The Competition Authority of Kenya (“the CAK”) has issued a new proposal introducing financial thresholds for merger notifications which will exempt firms with less than 1 billion Kenyan Shillings (KSh)(approximately US$10 million) domestic turnover from filing a merger notification with the CAK.

Currently, it is mandatory to notify the CAK of all mergers, irrespective of their value.  According to Stephany Torres of Primerio Limited, this may deter investments in Kenya as the merger is subject to delays and additional transaction costs for the merging parties while the CAK assesses it.

In terms of the new proposal notification of the proposed merger to the CAK is not required where the parties to the merger have a combined annual turnover and/or gross asset value in Kenya, whichever is the higher, of below KSh500 million (about US$5 million or South African R60 million).

Mergers between firms which have a combined annual turnover or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, in Kenya of between KSH 500 million and KSH 1 billion may be considered for exclusion.  In this case, the merging parties will still need to notify the CAK of the proposed merger.  The CAK will then make the decision as to whether to approve the merger or whether the merger requires a more in depth investigation.

It is mandatory to notify a merger where the target firm has an annual revenue or gross asset value of KSh 500 million, and the parties’ combined annual turnover and/or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, meets or exceeds KSh 1 billion.

Notwithstanding the above, where the acquiring firm has an annual revenue or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, of KSH 10 billion, and the merging parties operate in the same market and/or the proposed merger gives rise to vertical integration, then notification to the CAK is required regardless of the value of the target firm.  However, if the proposed merger meets the thresholds for notification in the supra-national Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (“COMESA”), then the CAK will accede to the jurisdiction of the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) and the merging parties would not have to file a merger with the CAK.

COMESA is a regional competition authority having jurisdiction over competition law matters within its nineteen member states, of which Kenya is one.

It is worth mention that Kenya is also a member state of the East African Community (“the EAC”).  As AAT reported recently, the East African Community Competition Authority (“the EACCA”) became operational in April 2018 and its mandate is to investigate competition law matters within its five partner states  (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda).  There is no agreement between the CAK and EACCA similar to the one between the CAK and CCC, and it uncertain how mergers notifiable in both Kenya and the EAC will be dealt with.

 

COMESA Competition Chief Approves of FDI, M&A Transactions

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Lipimile Advocates for Foreign Direct Investment, Encouraging Acquisition-Hungry Multi-Nationals in Recent COMESA Trade Remarks

In a comment on the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime (STR) regional programme, recently being implemented locally in the border region between Rwanda and the DRC, George Lipimilie, the Chief Executive Officer of the COMESA Competition Commission, stated that the regional body’s “focus on free movement of goods has generally paid dividends resulting in [] a lot of cross-border mergers and acquisitions,” according to an article in the Rwanda New Times.

George Lipimile of the COMESA Competition Commission

It appears that the CCC chief is expressly favouring foreign direct investment into the region by way of mergers (or perhaps more accurately, acquisitions).  “This is particularly so where the ‘foreign’ (presumably implying non-COMESA) multi-national entity brings with it novel technologies or R&D to improve the market position of the local competitor,” according to Andreas Stargard, a Pr1merio Ltd. competition-law practitioner.

Of interest to M&A practitioners, Mr. Lipimile is quoted as saying: “There are situations when foreign companies use acquisitions to enter the market where you find a multinational company buying a local company which is good because it comes with a lot of technology.” (Emphasis added).

Mr. Lipimile was also rather specific about encouraging FDI in the region’s raw-materials sector from nation states other than the PRC: said Lipimile, “[w]e have seen China taking advantage of our raw materials and we hope more countries can follow suit.”

We note that the domain of international trade — specifically tariffs as barriers to trade — has historically not been within the jurisdictional purview of the COMESA Competition Commission, which was designed to be a competition-law enforcement body.  Technically, there exists the post of COMESA Director for Trade, Customs & Monetary Affairs, held by Dr. Francis Mang’eni and not by Mr. Lipimile.  The CCC, however, “has recently emerged to take a more active role within the COMESA architecture of regional enforcement institutions,” Mr. Stargard says.  He notes that Article 4 of the COMESA Treaty expressly provides that “[i]n the field of trade liberalisation and customs co-operation [the Member States shall] (a) establish a customs union, abolish all non-tariff barriers to trade among themselves”, and that the regional Competition Regulations expressly bestow the CCC with the authority to investigate and abolish all “anti-competitive practices affecting COMESA regional and international trade.”

Namibian Supreme Court rules Competition Commission has no Jurisdiction Over Medical Aid Fund Members

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By AAT contributors Charl van der Merwe and Aurelie Cassagnes

On 19 July 2017, the Namibian Supreme Court, was tasked with settling a long standing dispute (not the first of its kind) as to whether or not the Respondents fell within the jurisdiction of the Namibian Competition Commission (NCC) in terms of the Namibian Competition Act of 2003 (Namibian Act). The case was brought on appeal by the Namibian Medical Aid Funds (NAMAF) and its members (collectively referred to as the Respondents).

After an investigation lasting a couple of years, the NCC announced in November 2015 that it had considered the behaviour of the Respondents in setting a “benchmark tariff” and found that the practice amounted to Price Fixing in contravention of section 23 of the Namibian Act. The Respondents, in pre-empting the commission’s planned litigation, disputed the NCC’s jurisdiction. The High Court found in favour of the NCC which led to the appeal by the Respondents to the Namibian Supreme Court.

Benchmark tariffs, in short, is a recommended fee, payable to doctors, at which medical aid expenses and consultations are covered. The issues surrounding benchmark tariffs has sparked debate across Africa with ‘those for’ arguing that without them, the medical profession would be “nothing short of economic lawlessness” whilst critics argue that it is “quietly killing off the health-care profession”.

The Namibian High Court, in finding against the Respondents, confirmed the NCC’s jurisdiction over the matter and ruled that determining and recommending a benchmark tariff for medical services was unlawful because it amounted to fixing a selling price. The court, in making its decision, held that “The funds’ activities in formulating a benchmark tariff were not ‘designed to achieve a non-commercial socioeconomic objective’. Rather, it was to produce and distribute wealth.” (Own emphasis)

The main issue to be decided on appeal by the Namibian Supreme Court, however, was not whether the benchmark tariff amounted to a contravention of the Namibian Act, but rather, whether the NCC had jurisdiction over the matter. In other words, whether the Respondents were included under the definition of ‘undertakings’ in terms of the Namibian Act.  Chapter 1 of the Namibian Act provides that:

An “’undertaking’ means any business carried on for gain or reward by an individual, a body corporate, an unincorporated body of persons or a trust in the production supply or distribution of goods or the provision of any service”

The Namibian Supreme Court found that the Respondents were not a “business carried on for gain or reward” and, therefore, were not subject to the provisions of the Namibian Act. As such, the Namibian Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s decision, leaving NAMAF and its members to continue the use of benchmark tariffs.

The South African Competition Tribunal (SACT) had similarly dealt with this issue in a series of Orders during the course of 2004 and 2005 (see the Hospital Association of South Africa and the Board of Healthcare Funders of Southern Africa). In this regard, the SACT found that the relevant medical schemes (the Respondents) fell within the ambit of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 (South African Act) and, accordingly, imposed an administrative penalty on the Respondents for “benchmarking tariffs”.

In its consent orders, the South African Competition Commission (SACC), despite mentioning that the Respondents were “an association incorporated not for gain in terms of the company laws in South Africa”, held that the Respondents are an association of firms that “determines, recommends and published tariffs to and/or for its members; and which recommendations has the effect of fixing a purchase price”

Furthermore, the SACC, condemned the ‘benchmarking tariffs system’ put in place by the Respondents and argued, despite the fact that the health care professionals were still largely free to determine their own fees, publishing these recommendations amounted to price-fixing which is a per se contravention in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the South African Competition Act.

Accordingly, the differing approaches in Namibia and South Africa come down to the interpretation of what entities fall within the umbrella of the respective Competition Acts.

Cooperation, handshakes & MoUs: all the rage in African antitrust?

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AAT the big picture

Significant Strides made to Promote Harmonisation across African Competition Agencies

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.

In the past 12 months there has been a steady drive by competition law agencies in Africa to promote harmonisation between the respective jurisdictions.

The African regional competition authority, the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC), has entered into memorandum of understandings with a number of its nineteen member states. On 5 June 2016, it was announced that the CCC has further concluded MoU’s with the Swaziland Competition Commission as well as the Fair Trade Commission of the Seychelles.

On 7 May 2016, it was announced that nine members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have also entered into and MoU. These member states include South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Seychelles, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia.

The SADC MoU was based on the 2009 SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation and Consumer Policies.

SADC MoUAccording to the South African Competition Commissioner, Mr Tembinkosi Bonakele, the MoU creates a framework for cooperation enforcement within the SADC region.  “The MoU provides a framework for cooperation in competition enforcement within the SADC region and we are delighted to be part of this historic initiative,” said Bonakele.

Interestingly, although a number of the signatories to SADC MoU are not member states of COMESA (that is, South Africa and Namibia, who in turn, have a MoU between their respective competition authorities), Swaziland, Malawi and the Seychelles have existing MoU’s with the COMESA Competition Commission. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd., “it will be interesting to see, first, whether there may be conflicts that arise out of the divergent patchwork of cooperation MoUs, and second, to what extent the South African Competition Authorities, for example, could indirectly benefit from the broader cooperation amongst the various jurisdiction and regional authorities.”

Part of the objectives of the MoUs to date has largely been to facilitate an advocacy role. However, from a practical perspective, the SADC MoU envisages broader information exchanges and coordination of investigations.

While the MoU’s are a positive stride in achieving cross-border harmonisation, it remains to be seen to what extent the collaboration will assist the respective antitrust agencies in detecting and prosecuting cross border anticompetitive conduct.

There may be a number of practical and legal hurdles which may provide challenges to the effective collaboration envisaged. The introduction of criminal liability for cartel conduct in South Africa, for example, may provide challenges as to how various agencies obtain and share evidence.

Meet the Enforcers: COMESA’s Rajeev Hasnah, 1st in exclusive AAT interview series

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meet the enforcers

New AAT interview series highlights individual African competition enforcers

In the first instalment of our new Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with Rajeev Hasnah, CFA, who is a sitting Commissioner of the COMESA Competition Commission.  In our exclusive interview, we discuss the CCC’s merger review practice, its revised Guidelines, young history and achievements, and seek practitioner guidance.

Rajeev Hasnah, CFA
You are an economist by training and currently a sitting COMESA Competition Commissioner.  As the young agency is about to celebrate its 2nd anniversary, what do you consider to be the CCC’s biggest achievement to date?
According to me, it is the fact that the CCC is effectively enforcing the COMESA Competition Regulations since it started operating in January 2013.  It is indeed a commendable achievement given that the current Board of Commissioners sworn-in in October 2011.  In 2012, the CCC worked on the drafting of the guidelines, in consultation with various stakeholders, and under the advice of other competition experts.
The institution also established a good working relationship with national authorities across COMESA and beyond, and proved its credibility and effectiveness as a regional competition authority within the business and legal communities globally.  The rather high number of merger notifications with a COMESA dimension already adjudicated to-date (around 50) is testimony to the success of the CCC being an effective competition law enforcer in its still early days.
Comparing the CCC merger review in practice with that of other competition enforcement agencies worldwide, where do you see the key differences?
Nowadays it is getting harder to talk about differences in any field of economic activity in this increasingly globalised world.  In my view, the key principles and the application of the Competition Law in the COMESA region do not differ significantly either from that of the national authorities or other major jurisdictions across the globe.  The assessment of “substantial lessening of competition” as the underlying fundamental test in merger reviews is at the core of the evaluation conducted by the CCC as well.
Does the multi-national nature of the CCC (akin to the European Commission) make the substantive work more difficult?
It is definitely not an easy feat to enforce the COMESA Competition Regulations across 19 different countries, each with its own economic, legal and cultural environments.  Yet, under the leadership of the current Chairman, Alex Kububa and Director/CEO of the CCC, George Lipimile, a good working relationship and collaboration has been established with the different national authorities across the COMESA region, which facilitates an effective enforcement of the Competition Regulations.   This also ensures that the CCC has a good perspective of the individual local realities, which is no doubt a key element to assess the impact on competition at the regional level.
What prompted the re-drafting of the CCC Merger Guidelines, and why was the indirect path of an administrative guidelines interpretation of the verb “to operate” chosen to elevate the review thresholds, as opposed to increasing the thresholds in the underlying Rules themselves?
It is not uncommon that an authority reviews its guidelines as it gains experience in enforcing the law.  Any changes or further clarifications are geared toward ensuring that the business and legal communities as well as competition economics experts have a good understanding of how the Regulations are enforced by the CCC.  This indeed shows that the CCC stands ready to ensure an improved clarity of its enforcement of the Competition Regulations among its key stakeholders.
The relevant paragraphs defining the verb “to operate” in the Merger Guidelines, should not be construed as a review of the merger notification thresholds per se.  The latter has its own procedures regarding any likely review.  The definition in the Merger Guidelines is rather to ascertain whether the said undertaking is construed to be effectively operating in a Member State or not.
Do you have advice for African practitioners counselling their clients on whether or not to notify a merger to the CCC?
Taking into consideration the rise in the enactment and enforcement of a competition policy regime across various jurisdictions and at the level of regional trading blocs as well, one can safely say that a competition authority is here to stay and to enforce the law as prescribed.
One of the key considerations in doing business is a proper assessment of the risks the undertaking faces or could potentially face and the implementation of a suitable actionplan to deal with these risks.  I believe that non-notification of a notifiable COMESA dimension merger to the CCC should not be construed as carrying a low probability of being detected by the CCC and certainly not a low impact one for the undertaking.
What is your view about the elevation of non-competition assessments above those of pure competition tests in merger review?  Is it good for the adjudication of competition matters generally?
Some jurisdictions consider public interests as important, while some don’t.  This is normally provided for or not in the respective laws, and whichever is the case, as adjudicators, we need to follow what is prescribed in the Regulations.
It is also important to note that in practice, the enforcement of competition law can be defined as being the conduct of economic analysis within a legal framework.  Both the economic analysis and legal framework evolve accordingly in line with the development of the jurisdiction’s economy.  We can take the examples of more mature competition policy regimes which started with the consideration of non-competition issues in merger review, to then afterwards moving to assessing only competition matters.  As such, each jurisdiction has its own specificities that it needs to take into consideration, though these are bound to evolve with time.
By way of background, how did you get into antitrust/competition law & economics?
I am an economist and a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) by training, and prior to joining the antitrust world I was an investment professional.  Four years ago I had the choice between acquiring experience in private equity or joining the nascent competition law enforcement team of the Competition Commission of Mauritius as its Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director, working with the then Executive Director, John Davies.  I chose the latter for its excellent combination of applied microeconomics and law.
What was the path that took you to working for competition enforcement agencies?
I started as a macroeconomist working in London for an economic consultancy firm in the city, where I was advising traders and asset managers.  I then moved on to financial investing in an investment management firm and to corporate finance in one of the largest conglomerates in Mauritius.  So I came to the antitrust world as a business/investment practitioner with a strong background and experience in applied economic and financial analysis.
Having seen the world from the private sector side, I acquired an edge in the application of competition economics in my previous role as a Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director and as a current Commissioner at the COMESA Competition Commission.
What skills would you encourage regional African practitioners focus on for purposes of developing antitrust advocacy in the COMESA region?
Having previously led the Competition Culture project for the International Competition Network (ICN) Advocacy Working Group (AWG), I am now one of the strong proponents of the importance of advocacy to develop and maintain a strong competition culture within society.
Ensuring that advocacy activities are properly designed and tailored to meet the requirements of the target group is crucial.  Equally important is to ability to communicate in a very simple and easy to understand language, adapted to meeting the target audience’s expectations.
Thank you, Mr. Hasnah.

Confusion reigns in COMESA: filing fees misstated, “operation” vs. “threshold”, and new web site

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COMESA Competition Commission logo

COMESA Competition Commission makes changes, but observers deplore lack of clarity and persisting mistakes

Visiting the CCC web site will yield a surprise to COMESA followers, as the Commission’s online presence has an updated look.  (Importantly, we express hope that it’s not all cosmetic but also substantive, and that the CCC’s webmaster has improved online security, in light of the numerous hacking attacks to which the agency was subjected in 2014.)

What’s more, the new web site has some new merger-related information, most notably of course the new finalized Merger Assessment Guidelines and an “Explanatory Note” on mergers.

Guidelines subvert Rules threshold under guise of companies’ “operation” within region

The former attempt to infuse some sense into the previous zero-dollar notification threshold regime (by re-defining in the Guidelines what it means to “operate” in COMESA countries as having turnover of >$5 million per annum).  They do so without actually amending or otherwise revoking the underlying Rules, which still do specify to this day that the turnover threshold for notification is “$0” COMESA dollars (which are the fictitious FX equivalent currency of U.S. dollars, so there is effectively no currency conversion required from USD figures).  CNBC/Africa has an 8-minute interview on the topic with a World Bank Group staffer who was part of the working group making the revisions here.

We at AAT respectfully question both the validity and the sensibility of keeping the flawed legislation of the Rules in place, while making agency ex parte interpretive changes via CCC “Guidelines” that notably do not have the force of law in COMESA countries.

“Explanatory Note” and the question of filing fees: 0.01% or 0.5%? Errors continue to persist.

The latter document (reproduced below in full) tries to do the same in a more simplistic fashion — asking, curiously, “What is merger?” [sic!]  However, the Explanatory Note appears fundamentally flawed as it incorrectly includes a reference to the filing fee as being set at 0.01% of the parties’ combined annual revenues.

AAT analysed this statement and believes that the CCC improperly refers to the old Rules (which provided for a 0.01% fee in Rule 55) until they were revised and then subsequently interpreted by CCC guidance in February of 2013: since then, filing a CCC notification incurs a fee of 0.5% of turnover, as we extensively discussed here.  (Update: The CCC has apparently read our post and, as of 5 Nov. 2014, changed this incorrect statement, deleting all references to filing fees in their entirety.)

Continuing lack of clarity emanates from COMESA’s official statements and publications

AAT deplores the ongoing confusion that reigns with respect to the CCC’s pronouncements on crucially important issues such as thresholds, filing fees, and the like.  It takes more than a new web site design to instill parties’ and attorneys’ trust in the young antitrust regime’s competency, and with it, new filings (which have notably stalled at zero for the past half year).

Mergers and Acquisistions

What is Merger?

Most mergers pose little or no serious threat to competition, and may actually be pro-competitive.  Such benevolent mergers have a number of economic advantages such as resultant economies of scale, reduction in the cost of production and sale, and gains of horizontal integration.  There could also be more convenient and reliable supply of input materials and reduction of overheads.  These advantages could, and should, lead to lower prices to the consumer.

Other mergers, however, may harm competition by increasing the probability of exercise of market power and abuse of dominance.  Mergers can also sometimes produce market structures that are anti-competitive in the sense of making it easier for a group of firms to cartelise a market, or enabling the merged entity to act more like a monopolist.

An increasing number of business firms in the COMESA region are merging, or entering into other forms of strategic alliances, in order to take advantage of the many economic benefits that arise from such transactions.  Undertakings in the COMESA region are relatively small compared with those in other parts of the world.  Mergers in the region, however, would create ‘regional champions’ capable of competing with other international companies on an equal footing.

Companies however need to notify the Commission their proposed mergers to enable the mergers to be thoroughly examined for any anti-competitive features that might reduce or eliminate the transaction’s economic benefits.  Not all mergers are notified to the Commission.  Only those large mergers that exceed a certain prescribed threshold have to be notified.  The fee for notifying mergers is not punitive, but is only meant to defray the costs to the Commission for examining the transactions.  The COMESA Competition Rules provide for a relatively small merger notification fee calculated at 0.01% of the combined annual turnover or combined value of assets in the COMESA region of the merging parties.  (NOTE by editor: The CCC has, as of 5 Nov. 2014, changed this incorrect statement and deleted all references to filing fees entirely.) Failure to notify mergers can however be very costly to the merging parties.  The Regulations provide for a high penalty of up to 1% of the merging parties’ annual turnover in the COMESA region for not notifying eligible mergers

Merger in COMESA Competition Regulations

The word merger in this COMESA Competition Regulation is construed in the context of its definition under Article 23(1) of the Regulations.

Control is used in the context of controlling interest as defined under Article 23(2) of the Regulations. Without prejudice to Article 23(2), control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination with and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. The COMESA Competition Commission (‘the Commission’) shall deem a person or undertaking to exercise control within the meaning of Article 23(2) of the Regulations if the person or undertaking;

  • Beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the undertaking;
  • Is entitled to cast a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of the undertaking;
  • Is able to appoint, or to veto the appointment, of a majority of the directors of the undertakings;
  • Is a holding company, and the undertaking is a subsidiary of that holding company;
  • In the case of the undertaking being a trust, has the ability to control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust;
  • In the case of an undertaking being a close corporation, owns the majority of the members’ interest or controls directly, or has the right to control, the majority of the members’ votes in the close corporation; or
  • Has the ability to materially influence the policy of the undertaking in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).

The Commission shall assess material influence on a case by case basis, having regard to the overall relationship between the acquiring firm and the target firm in light of the commercial context.

In its assessment of material influence, the Commission shall focus on the acquiring undertaking(s). Minority and other interests shall be examined by the Commission to the extent that they are able to influence the policy of the undertaking(s) concerned.

The Commission shall consider an acquiring firm’s ability to influence policy relevant to the behaviour of the target firm in the market place. This includes the management of the business, in particular in relation to its competitive conduct, and thus includes the strategic direction of a firm and its ability to define and achieve its commercial objectives.

The Commission shall consider an acquiring firm’s ability to block special resolutions by virtue of share ownership or other factors, including:

  • The distribution and holders of the remaining shares, in particular whether the acquiring entity’s shareholding makes it the largest shareholder;
  • Patterns of attendance and voting at recent shareholders’ meetings based on recent shareholder returns, and, in particular, whether voter attendance is such that in practice a minority holder is able to block a special resolution;
  • Any special voting or veto rights attached to the shareholding under consideration; and
  • Any other special provisions in the constitution of the target firm which confer the ability to exercise influence.

Where an acquiring firm is not able to block special resolutions of the target firm, the Commission shall have regard to the status and expertise of the acquiring firm, and its corresponding influence with other shareholders, and shall consider whether, given the identity and corporate policy of the target company, the acquiring firm may be able to exert material influence on policy formulation at an earlier stage.

The Commission shall review the proportion of Board of Directors appointed by the acquiring firm and the corporate/industry expertise of members of the Board appointed by the acquiring firm. The Commission may also assess the identities, relevant expertise and incentives of other Board Members.

Interpretation of Article 23(3) of the COMESA Competition Regulations
Article 23(3) of the COMESA Competition Regulations (‘the Regulations’) provides that:

                        “This Article shall apply where:

  • both the acquiring firm and target firm or either the acquiring firm or target firm operate in two or more Member States; and

  • the threshold of combined annual turnover or assets provided for in paragraph 4 is exceeded”.

The interpretation shall focus on Article 23(3)(a) since Article 23(3)(b) is superfluous due to the non-existent of thresholds currently. Article 23(3)(a) is divided into two parts as follows:

  • both the acquiring firm and the target firm operate in two or more Member States;
  • either the acquiring firm or target firm operate in two or more Member States.

The meaning of the first part above is that for a merger to fall within the dominion of Part IV of the Regulations is that both the acquiring firm and the target firm should operate in two or more Member States. For example if Company A is the acquiring firm and it operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B is the target company and it equally operates in Zambia and Malawi, then the requirements of the first limb are satisfied and the merger falls within the ambit of Part IV of the Regulations.

Another scenario where the first part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B the target firm operates in Zambia and Ethiopia. In this example, both Company A and Company B operate in two or more Member States.

The third scenario where the first part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B the target firm operates in Djibouti and Madagascar. In this example, both Company A and Company B operate in two or more Member States.

As regards the second part, a merger falls within the province of Part IV of the Regulations where for example Company A the acquiring firm operates in Kenya and Seychelles and acquires Company B the target which has no operations in the COMESA Member States.

Another scenario where the second part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm has no operations in any of the COMESA Member States but acquires Company B the target which operates in Rwanda and Burundi.

The foregoing are pursuant to the second limb which uses the words “either or” and therefore presupposes that both the acquiring firm and the target firm do not have to operate in two or more Member States as is the case for the first limb but that where either the target or acquiring is operates in two or more Member States, the merger is captured under Part IV of the Regulations.

It is important to note that where the acquiring firm operates in only one Member State and the target firm operates in another Member State and only that Member State, then such a merger does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Part IV of the Regulations. This is however on the premise that such firms do not control any other firm whether directly or indirectly in a third Member State. Such firms should also not be controlled whether directly or indirectly by any other firm in a third Member State. For example, where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Swaziland only and Company B the target operates in Rwanda only, such a merger does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of Part IV of the Regulations. The situation may be different where Company A has a stake in Company C which operates in Mauritius or Company B has a stake in Company D which operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The word operate is taken to mean that a firm(s) in issue derives turnover in two or more Member States. Therefore does not need to be directly domiciled in a Member State but it can have operations through exports, imports, subsidiaries etc. in a Member State.

COMESA merger stats: January ’14 outperforms first 6 months of 2013

Posted on by Editor
COMESA Competition Commission logo
Three merger notifications in one month set new record for COMESA Competition Commission.

After commenting on the rather lackluster statistics of the first 11 months A.D. 2013, we observed that some deal-making parties might be “flying under the radar” and asked the question:

Combine Point 4 above (low filing statistics) with the zero-threshold and low nexus requirements that trigger a COMESA merger notification, and the following question inevitably comes to mind: With such low thresholds, and the certain existence of commercial deal activity going on in the COMESA zone, why are there so few notifications?

Well, the young agency’s stats have picked up some steam in 2014, it would seem: based on a review of its online document repository, the CC has received a whopping three notifications in January alone.  They are, in chronological order:

  1. Mail & courier services: FedEx / SupaSwift – a transaction involving the acquisition of a South African courier with operations in multiple COMESA member states, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia.
  2. Agricultural distribution and financial services: AgriGroupe / AFGRI Ltd. – Mauritian SPV AgriGroupe seems to be taking AFGRI (listed on the JSE) private.  The target has operations in multiple COMESA countries.
  3. Generic pharmaceuticals: CFR Inversiones SPA / Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd. – Chilean CFR is buying all of South African off-patent pharmaceuticals manufacturer Adcock’s shares. Notably, the buyer has no COMESA activities; target is active in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

(c) AAT
Merger notification stats for COMESA as of Feb. 2014

Take-aways:

  • Activity has increased dramatically.  Is it a coincidence & a statistically irrelevant blip on the radar screen?  This remains to be seen. The parties are – unlike last year’s – not “repeat parties” and therefore the increase in notifications seems to be natural/organic growth, if you will, rather than a case of the same bear falling into the same honey-trap multiple times…
  • The Competition Commission has listened to its critics (including this blog). Notably, the CC now clearly identifies the affected member-state jurisdictions in the published notice – a commendable practice that it did not follow in all previous instances, and which AAT welcomes.

Post-scriptum: Adding up the total 2013 tally of notifications, the Tractor & Grader Supplies Ltd / Torre Industrial Holdings transaction (notified after our prior statistics post in November 2013) brought the sum-total of COMESA merger filings to 11 for FY2013.