Category: AAT

Changing Channels: Competition Commission Tunes Into MultiChoice and Altech’s Alleged 2014 Market-Sharing Agreement

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By Tyla-Lee Coertzen and Matthew Freer

On 15 April 2026, the South African Competition Commission (the “Commission”) referred a complaint against MultiChoice South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“MultiChoice”) and Altech UEC South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Altech”) to the Competition Tribunal for prosecution.

The Commission’s complaint centres around allegations of breaches of section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”) regarding a market-division agreement entered into between Multichoice and Altech. Specifically, the Commission’s complaint alleges that that, in February 2014, the firms agreed that Altech, a manufacturer of Set Top Boxes (“STBs”), would refrain from entering the pay-television (“pay-TV”) market as a competitor to MultiChoice.

At the time, Altech was a key supplier of STBs to MultiChoice. The Commission argues that this arrangement effectively resulted in allocation of the pay-TV market, where MultiChoice remained a dominant provider of subscription television services, while Altech remained confined to the hardware manufacturing space, despite having the theoretical capability to become an effective competitor.

The referral was announced on 4 May 2026, by way of a media statement released by the Commission issued a media statement announcing the referral of a collusion complaint against pay-TV giant MultiChoice and electronics manufacturer Altech. The referral marks a significant escalation in the Commission’s enforcement of cartel conduct within the broadcasting and technology sectors.

Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act prescribes as follows:

  • An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if-
  • it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:
  • dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services;

The allegations are founded on a potential per se prohibition, meaning that the Commission is not required to prove that the agreement had actual anti-competitive effects, the existence of the agreement itself is sufficient to establish a violation of the Act.

If the Tribunal ultimately finds against the firms, they face administrative penalties of up to 10% of their respective annual turnovers.

To understand the competition concerns arising from the Commission’s complaint, one must examine the relationship between the two entities during the 2014-2015 period. At the time of the alleged agreement, Altech was a unit of the JSE-listed Altron group (Business Day, 2026). Beyond manufacturing decoders, Altech launched a product known as the “Node,” an interactive smart home and video-on-demand device that utilised satellite connectivity. The Commission appears to view the “Node” as a potential competitive threat to MultiChoice’s DStv service (Business Day, 2026). The agreement in question, according to the regulator, ensured that Altech would not transition from a supplier of hardware to a rival provider of pay-TV services, thereby protecting MultiChoice’s market dominance.

In response to the media statement and the referral, MultiChoice issued a formal statement to the press denying any contravention of the law. The company confirmed that the agreement in question was a “historical supply agreement” that has since come to an end in 2015 (Business Day, 2026).

Multichoice asserts that the arrangement was a standard commercial supply agreement rather than a cartel arrangement. MultiChoice also noted that it is “considering the referral and will respond fully within the prescribed timelines,” indicating that it will challenge the Commission’s interpretation of the facts in due course during the subsequent proceedings before the Tribunal. As of the publication of the Commission’s statement, Altech, which was sold by Altron to Skyblu Technologies, a Skyworth affiliate, in 2019, had not issued a public response.

John Oxenham, Partner at Primerio notes: “The referral of MultiChoice and Altech illustrates the Commission’s continued vigilance regarding market allocation in the digital broadcasting sector. While the Commission asserts that the 2014 agreement served to push a potential competitor out of the market, MultiChoice argues that the historical agreement was benign. The case analysis will likely hinge on whether the Tribunal views Altech as a potential competitor in the pay-TV market at the time of the agreement.”

Merger Control at a Cost: Understanding the CCCC’s Fee Schedule

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By Kelly Baker

The COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (the “CCCC”) published its Schedule of Fees (the“Schedule”) and detailed procedures under the 2025 COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations (the “Regulations”). The publication marks a significant step in strengthening and clarifying the COMESA merger control regime. The Schedule issued pursuant to Regulation 10(1)(d) read together with Regulation 17(2) of the Regulations, sets out the fees payable for four categories of services: (i) expedited merger review, (ii) comfort letter requests, (iii) advisory opinions, and (iv) other services.  

The Schedule arrives on the heels of the landmark 2025 Regulations, which were adopted by the COMESA Council of Ministers on 4 December 2025 and which, among other things, introduced a suspensory merger control regime. Against that backdrop, the newly formalised fee structure provides important practical guidance for businesses and their advisors navigating the CCCC’s processes.

What Does It Cost?

The CCCC’s fee for an Expedited Merger Review is set at USD 120,000. Under the standard merger review timeline, the CCCC has 120 days from receipt of a complete notification to issue its decision. The expedited process, by contrast, is designed to deliver a decision within 45 days of notification, a significant acceleration for parties with time-sensitive transactions. Notably, the CCCC retains sole discretion to determine eligibility for expedition, and mergers that may raise any prospect of competition concerns are excluded from the process. Parties must request for an expedited merger review in their cover letter accompanying the merger notification form. For completeness, the request for an expedited merger review is only considered complete once payment of the fee is made in full.

Comfort letter requests and advisory opinions are subject to a fee of USD 10,000 each. A Comfort Letter is a mechanism by which an acquiring party may seek confirmation that a transaction does not meet the CCCC’s notification thresholds and is a particularly useful tool for parties uncertain about whether their deal triggers the COMESA filing requirements. Advisory Opinions, which are expressly non-binding under the 2025 Regulations, provide a further avenue for businesses to seek informal guidance on competition-related matters. Further, the catch-all “other services” category is priced at USD 5,000.

For both comfort letters and advisory opinions, the CCCC has a 45-day turnaround from receipt of a complete application, with the possibility of a 30-day extension in respect of Advisory Opinions where circumstances require.

Practical Implications

Michael-James Currie, a partner from Primerio notes: “The formalisation of a fee schedule, particularly the introduction of a priced expedited review mechanism, signals the CCCC’s intent to operate with greater institutional discipline and commercial awareness, and businesses engaging in cross-border M&A activity across the COMESA region should factor both the timelines and the associated costs into their deal planning from the outset. The introduction is of particular importance for merger parties given the new suspensory regime having come into effect.”

The Schedule is notably detailed in its procedural guidance. On the expedited merger review, the CCCC has made clear that fees are refundable only in limited circumstances – specifically, where the CCCC revokes a merger’s eligibility for the expedited process due to (i) parties’ non-responsiveness to additional information requests from the CCCC, (ii) new information coming to light subsequent to the CCCC’s approval for the expedited service; or (iii) unforeseen circumstances on the CCCC’s side hinder the CCCC from rendering the expedited service. Fees are not refundable for any other reason, placing the risk squarely on the notifying parties.

If the CCCC receives a request for a comfort letter that contains any material misstatement or omission of information or documentation, and subsequently issues a comfort letter on the basis of such misstatements or omissions, the CCCC reserves the right to revoke the comfort letter, and the parties may be exposed to the risk of a finding that they failed to notify a notifiable merger or are otherwise in contravention of the Regulations.

It is important to note that the above-mentioned fees are in addition to the prescribed fees in respect of merger notifications. In other words, should a notification be required and the merger parties opted for an expedite review of their transaction, the notification will cost the merger parties 0.1% of the combined turnover, or a cap of USD 300,000 plus the expedited fee of USD 120,000.

Looking Ahead

The release of the Schedule marks another step in the CCCC’s ongoing effort in developing its suspensory merger control regime. For practitioners and businesses operating in Eastern and Southern Africa, staying abreast of these developments is becoming increasingly important.

To access the schedule, see here Fee Schedule

Empowering Competition: The Launch of Market Inquiry Guidelines and the New Era for Mauritian Markets

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By Megan Armstrong

On 31 March 2026, the Competition Commission of Mauritius reached a significant regulatory milestone with the publication of its Guidelines on Market Inquiries (CC 8 Guidelines). These Guidelines have been published following recent amendments to the Mauritius Competition Act of 2007, and provide a formal roadmap for the Commission to examine entire sectors of the Mauritian economy, rather than focusing solely on individual firm misconduct.

Why these Guidelines are Important

The introduction of these Guidelines mark a shift from reactive to proactive enforcement. Historically the Competition Commission of Mauritius has focused on investigating specific restrictive practices, such as cartels or abuse of monopoly power. However, many markets fail to deliver competitive outcomes due to structural issues, regulatory barriers or complex consumer behaviour, even in the absence of a specific law-breaking act.

Alignment with Recent Developments

The publication of these Guidelines is not an isolated event, but a strategic move. Over the past few months the Competition Commission of Mauritius has intensified its focus on modernising its oversight of the Mauritian economy.

The Guidelines arrive mere weeks after the Mauritian Competition Commission released its Digital Market Landscape Report, which reviewed market conditions across various digital platforms, signalling the Commission’s intent to monitor these high-growth and complex sectors.  

The Commission was officially vested with the power to conduct market inquiries following an amendment to the Competition Act in September 2025. The CC 8 Guidelines serve as an operational manual for these newly granted powers to transform the legal text into a functioning regulatory tool.

The start of 2026 has seen the Commission host the first meeting of the Tripartite Technical Committee, and the collaborative ethos of this meeting is echoed in the CC 8 Guidelines, which emphasise the importance of working with other regulators and government bodies to implement the recommendations that arise from market inquiries.

Conclusion

By formalising the market inquiry process, the Competition Commission of Mauritius is moving towards a more sophisticated and transparent model of economic regulation. As Mauritius navigates the complexities of digital transformation and global economic shifts, these guidelines provide the ‘rulebook’ necessary to ensure that markets remain open, innovative and fair to all consumers.

FUEL AT THE BOILING POINT: Competition Commission Issues Price Gouging Warning

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By Megan Armstrong and Matthew Freer

South African consumers have received warning to expect oil price hikes from 1 April 2026, at a time when households are already price-constrained and cost-conscious. Naturally, as oil prices increase, consumers can reasonably expect these hikes to be passed down through corresponding price increases on the respective goods and services. The question to business is how much of an increase is reasonably permitted within the ambit of competition law, and what should the timing of such an increase be?

The Commission’s Warning

In response to the anticipated price volatility, the Competition Commission of South Africa (the “Commission”) has issued a media statement warning of heightened risks of price gouging across several sectors. The Commission stated the following:

“The risk is prevalent for unregulated fuels such as diesel retail prices and jet fuel; oil-based products such as nitrogen-based fertilisers and plastics; fuel-intensive services such as air, land and sea transport and logistics; and all other products and services that rely on these inputs, particularly food products and delivery services.”

Additionally, the Commission set out clear rules for businesses navigating the looming price increase:

  • “Businesses may not increase prices in anticipation of future fuel cost increases; they may only increase prices once they experience actual fuel cost increases.
  • Businesses that experience fuel cost increases may only increase their prices in proportion to the actual fuel cost increases they experience.
  • In effect, these two conditions mean that product or service margins after the surge in fuel prices should be no higher than the margins prior to the fuel price increase.
  • Furthermore, once fuel costs decline, product or service prices should decline immediately.”

What is Price Gouging?

Price gouging is the act of charging customers unreasonably high prices for goods or services typically in response to a crisis, natural disaster or demand shock where consumers have few alternatives and the product is a necessity. This behaviour sits at the intersection between business ethics and consumer protection in considering exploitation of a demand spike to maximise profits.

South Africa’s legal approach to this issue does not use the term “price gouging” directly in its primary statutes, rather the framework is built upon two distinct pillars. The first pillar is found in the Competition Act 89 of 1998. Section 8(1)(a) of the Act prohibits a dominant firm from charging an “excessive price to the detriment of consumers or customers”, a definition refined by the Amendment Act of 2018 to mean “higher than a competitive price” and where such a difference is “unreasonable”, targeting firms with substantial market power which abuse their dominance. The second pillar is enshrined in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. Sections 40 and 48 of this Act prohibit suppliers from engaging in unconscionable conduct and from supplying goods or services “at a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust”. This provision has a broader application, as it does not require a firm to be dominant. It applies to any supplier who takes unfair advantage of a consumer.

Considering the existing legislative framework on price gouging behaviour in South Africa, price gouging is then defined as the practice of increasing prices on essential goods or services during a declared disaster or crisis to a level that:

1.         Does not correspond to increased costs of providing the good or service; or

2.         Exceeds pre-crisis profit margins without justification; and

3.         Takes unfair advantage of those consumers with limited alternatives as a result of the emergency situation.

Lessons from COVID-19

The most significant development in South Africa with regards to price gouging came in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 19 March 2020, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ebrahim Patel, published the Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster Management Regulations and Directions (the “Regulations“). They were designed to prevent an escalation of the disaster and to protect consumers from exploitative commercial practices during this period of vulnerability.

The Regulations formalised a cost-based test for determining excessive or unfair pricing, that a material price increase of an identified good or service will be considered indicative of excessive pricing if:

  • it “does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the cost of providing that good or service“; or
  • it “increases the net margin or mark-up on that good or service above the average margin or mark-up for that good or service in the three month period prior to 1 March 2020“.

Furthermore, the Commission’s 2021 Guide for Business Compliance with Price Gouging Regulations, emphasised that during a disaster, price increases must be strictly proportionate to cost increases, and businesses must not exploit temporary demand surges to inflate profit margins.

The Commission’s willingness to act was demonstrated early in the pandemic in the Babelegi case, where a firm was found liable for excessive pricing after increasing mask prices by over 1 000% while its own supply costs remained unchanged.

In essence, South Africa’s legal framework defines price gouging not by the final price itself but by seller behaviour, where an unjustified cost increase representing abuse of a temporary situation in which consumers are a captive market and desperate for essential goods and services. A framework established during COVID-19 now guides current pricing conduct and sheds some light on how the Commission would evaluate seller behaviour in relation to demand shocks arising from emergencies, natural disasters, or market disruptions.

What Businesses Should Do

Business should be mindful of not increasing prices in anticipation of the impact of the oil price increase and engage in corresponding price increases once these price increases have a clear and quantifiable impact on internal pricing mechanisms.

The wider public does have recourse available to contact the Commission, should it appear that a business is engaging in price gouging behaviour, or has responded too erratically to the market disruptions caused by the sudden spike in the oil price. The Commission has stated the following: “Given the heightened risk of price gouging during this period of oil price volatility, the Commission calls on the public and businesses to report instances where they believe price gouging is occurring so that the Commission can investigate.”

Ultimately, the lesson from COVID-19 remains unchanged in that price increases have to be justified by evident supply cost increases and not by opportunity. As the Commission has made clear, anticipation pricing and margin expansion will not be tolerated.

South African Competition Appeal Court Still Grappling with Complex Forex Case

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By Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard

Eight years after the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) commenced its investigation into various national and foreign banks (“the Respondents”) in the Rand rigging case commonly referred to as the “Forex case”, the competition authorities continue to grapple with this complex case. While the Commission has continued to encourage the respondent banks to enter into settlement agreements with it, and several banks have done so, the case continues in respect of several Respondents. 

Briefly, the Forex case pertains to an allegation of collusion between South African and foreign banks which would have led to the manipulation of the Rand-Dollar exchange rate amongst said banks. The complained of conduct is alleged to have occurred between 2007 – 2013 (at least) amongst 28 banks in Europe, South Africa, Australia, and the United States of America. The banks allegedly conspired to manipulate the South African Rand by, inter alia, electronically sharing information on USD/ZAR currency pair trades. The harm alleged to the Commission extended to the Rand exchange rate, which had spillover effects on South African trade, foreign direct investment, corporate balance sheets, public and private debt, financial assets, and concomitant prices of goods and services. Accordingly, the Commission’s case is premised on section 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) – being market allocation and price fixing.

Earlier this month, the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) again heard the Forex case, as new arguments have come to the fore. This time, the remaining Respondents have alleged that the Commission bears the onus to prove that all the Respondents partook in a single overarching conspiracy to manipulate the Rand. In this regard, despite the Tribunal having noted that the Commission’s referral “contains adequate details that have enabled us to conclude that the Referral, as a whole, prima facie, shows that there was a [single overall conspiracy] between the foreign and local banks to manipulate trading in the USD/ZAR currency pair”, the Respondents maintain that the case cannot proceed until this onus has been fully discharged.

Despite various developments over the past years, including a number of unsuccessful exception, objection, dismissal and strike out applications brought by the Respondents relating to jurisdiction, prescription and lack of particularity as well as successful joinder applications (in respect of the primary case) by the Commission, the case has not substantively progressed, and it currently stands to become one of the longest running matters before the competition authorities.

One of the Respondent’s Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”), a multinational British Bank, has also recently entered into a settlement agreement with the Commission, in terms of which it admitted liability to the manipulation of the USD/ZAR currency pair and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of c.ZAR 42 million. SCB’s settlement follows a similar settlement between the Commission and Citibank in 2017. The Commission did not seek penalties against ABSA Bank, Barclays Capital and Barclays Bank as these Respondents had applied and were granted leniency in terms of the Commission’ Corporate Leniency Policy.  

 The Tribunal and CAC did, however, in March this year, require that the Commission file a new referral affidavit in order to substantiate the case that it had previously pleaded insufficiently. As to the Respondent’s argument that the Commission could not initiate complaint referrals absent the initiation of an investigation, the Tribunal noted that while the Commission needs to commence an investigation against a Respondent specifically to be able to initiate a complain referral against them, it clarified that whether such initiation is express or tacit, is immaterial. The Tribunal further noted that to oblige the Commission to specifically mention each respondent in its complaint to the Tribunal would lead to an absurd outcome, namely that the Commission would be precluded from joining potential or even self-confessed member(s) of a cartel subsequent to its complaint referral.

As it stands, the CAC continues to hear arguments on behalf of 13 banks, predominantly regarding evidence as to their involvement in the alleged “single overarching conspiracy”, and while the Respondents have spared no expense in defending their case, the competition authorities have in no way backed down.

This is an important case, but has also served as an important precedent setting case in relation to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter involving foreign entities (i.e., whether the Commission has jurisdiction to hear a complaint where firms are neither domiciled nor carry business in the Republic of South Africa). In this regard, the CAC held that the Competition Tribunal could enjoy personal and subject matter jurisdiction over pure peregrini, provided that there were adequate connecting factors between the foreign firms’ conduct and the complaint from the Commission and upheld that Tribunal’s decision in relation to local peregrini that the Tribunal had jurisdiction where the qualified effects test was met and that a penalty sought should be confined to turnover within and exports from South Africa.

Primerio Director, Michael-James Currie provides the following insights: “the Forex case has, throughout the several bouts before the adjudicative bodies, confirmed that the thresholds for establishing jurisdiction over foreign entities and foreign conduct have been lowered. The Commission does however still have the onus on demonstrating that the conduct had a “substantial, direct and reasonably foreseeable effect in South Africa”. This will likely remain a contentious issue at trial as even South Africa’s National Treasury has confirmed that the conduct unlikely had any impact on the ZAR exchange rate. To the extent that individuals were prejudiced by the alleged conduct, it would be particularly interesting to see whether such victims would consider civil follow-on damages actions.”

[Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard are lawyers in the competition law department at Primerio. The views expressed in this article are their own and not attributable to Primerio]

South Africa: Motor vehicle finance institutions referred to the Competition Tribunal for alleged collusion

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By Gina Lodolo

On 3 February 2022, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), released a press statement confirming that the SACC has made a referral to the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) to prosecute FirstRand Bank Limited (“First Rand”), Wesbank, and Toyota Financial Services South Africa Limited (“TFS”) (jointly “Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions”) for allegations of a violation of Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended (“Act”).

In this regard, Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that :

“an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if-(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: (ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services”

Generally, once the SACC has initiated a complaint and found that a prohibited practice has  been established, it must refer the complaint to the  Competition Tribunal. Wesbank (as a division of FirstRand) and TFS allegedly prevented competition by entering into a shareholders agreement containing non-compete clauses. The SACC press statement provides that the Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions allocated markets because they are ‘suppose to compete’, which means that they are firms in a horizontal relationship.  In particular, the shareholders agreement included clauses ‘that prohibit[ed] WesBank from offering vehicle finance to customers seeking to purchase vehicles at authorised Toyota dealerships’. Further, Wesbank was also prohibited from financing specific vehicles, being ‘the “new” TOYOTA, LEXUS and HINO vehicles and any “used” vehicles sold through any authorised Toyota dealership, except McCarthy Group’.

Should the Competition Tribunal indeed find that the Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions violated the Act, Section 59 of the Act provides that the Competition Tribunal can impose an administrative penalty of up to 10% of the firm’s annual turnover for engaging in a prohibited practice. Further, if the same firms are found to repeat the conduct, an administrative penalty for a repeat offence can be up to 25% of the firm’s annual turnover.  

Primerio Director Michael-James Currie notes that cartel conduct in South Africa constitutes a criminal offence and respondents found liable are also potentially at risk of follow-on civil damages.

To view the full press statement click here

South Africa’s Second Price Gouging Case: Dis-Chem Penalised For Excessive Pricing re Face Masks

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By Michael-James Currie and John Oxenham

On 14 July 2020, the South African Competition Tribunal published its written reasons in relation to its decision to penalize Dis-Chem (a large pharmaceutical chain in South Africa) for contravening section 8(1)(a) of the Competition Act by charging excessive prices for a variety of surgical face-mask products.

The Tribunal’ latest price gouging decision follows closely on the heels of the Tribunal’s decision in Babelegi, which was the first decision price gouging decision in South Africa during the Covid-19 pandemic (in terms of which the Tribunal also imposed a penalty on Babelegi based on a finding that Babelegi charged excessive prices for face masks during the pandemic). Babelegi was a firm which -pre-Covid 19 had a market share of less than 5%.

Turning to the Dis-Chem case, the price increases at play for three different face-masks were 261%, 43% and 25% respectively, on 9 March 2020 as the Covid-19 pandemic gripped South Africa, but before the Minister of Trade and Industry published the commonly referred to ‘Price Gouging Regulations’ (Regulations). The Regulations, promulgated, on 19 March 2020, essentially place a reverse onus on dominant firms (in relation to a defined list of “essential goods”) to demonstrate why any price increases post the proclamation of the Regulations, which were not directly and proportionally linked to a corresponding cost increase, are not “excessive”.

Although the Competition Commission (SACC) had initially framed its case in terms of the Regulations, the Tribunal confirmed that the Regulations did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the Tribunal proceeded to analysis the complaint in terms of section 8(1)(a) of the Act read together with the factors set out in section 8(3) of the Act in order to determine whether a price is excessive. This is noteworthy as the principles underpinning the Dis-Chem decision are applicable regardless of whether the Regulations are, or remain in, force and may well apply to cases beyond the Covid-19 pandemic.

In terms of the recently amended Competition Act, an “excessive price” is defined as a price which has “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product”. If there is a prima facie case of excessive pricing, the onus shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that the price is not excessive.

The Tribunal held that in order to demonstrate an “excessive price”, what the complainant must show is a price which “on the face of it was utterly exorbitant”. The respondent would then need to show that the increase was reasonable.

The crux of the case, however, largely turns on whether Dis-Chem is in fact considered “dominant”. Dominance, generally, is determined with reference to whether a firm is able to exert a substantial degree of “market power”. In terms of South Africa’s Competition Act, a firm is irrebuttably presumed to be dominant if it has market shares in excess of 45%. A firm can still be found to be dominant, however, with market shares less than 45% if it can be established that the firm is able to exert “market power”. “Market power” is specifically defined in the Act as “the power of a firm to control prices or to exclude competition, or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers”.

The Commission argued that defining the relevant market was not necessary. Rather, the fact that Dis-Chem was able to materially increase its prices in the context of a global health crisis independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers, meant that Dis-Chem was able to exert “market power” and was therefore “dominant”.

The Tribunal confirmed that the assessment of “market power” may be conducted with reference to the prevailing market conditions without having to specifically define the market. In essence, the Tribunal asked itself what advantages the global-health crisis conferred to the respondent (in this case Dis-Chem) that it would not enjoy absent the crisis?

At the time of the relevant price increase, the public were encouraged to wear surgical face-masks. The Tribunal rejected, therefore the argument raised by Dis-Chem that cloth face-masks are a suitable substitute. Dis-Chem had argued that barriers to entry were low as face-masks where easy to produce from a supply-side. The product market was broadly defined as the market for surgical face masks.

Turning to the geographic market definition, the Tribunal suggested that the geographic market must be narrowed (based on customers reluctance to travel far during the pandemic) despite Dis-Chem applying a national pricing strategy. The Tribunal ultimately did not define the geographic market. Instead, its assessment essentially refers back to that relating to the tests for market power. In essence, the Tribunal held that because there were concerns among consumers about supply shortages, consumers would not be prepared to “shop around” for better options fearing they may miss out altogether. The Tribunal mentioned that applying the well known “hypothetical monopolist test”, that Dis-Chem would have been able to profitably raise its prices by more than 5% and, therefore, was essentially in its own market (the Tribunal did not define the precise geographic boundaries of the market even though these was evidence put up suggesting that there were many suppliers of surgical face masks within a very small geographic radius of Dis-Chem’s largest outlets). Accordingly, this case was not determined by narrowing the geographic market.

Turning to the economic tests utilized or considered by the Tribunal, the following is summarized:

  1. The relevant “benchmark” price used was the price immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic compared to the prices thereafter.
  2. The relevant complaint period was held to be 1-31 March 2020.
  3. That the empirical evidence assessed pointed to an increase in prices in March (compared to prices prevailing in January and February) without a direct link to cost increases. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the gross-margins increased “exponentially” during the complaint period.
  4. The Tribunal rejected the argument that for multi-product retailers, profit margins ought to be assessed with reference to “net” as opposed to “gross” margins. In other words, the Tribunal precluded any cross-subsidization type defences.

The Tribunal found that had it not been for the surge demand for surgical face-masks as a result of the health crisis posed by Covid-19, Dis-Chem would not have been able to increase the prices to the extent it did. Further, the Tribunal found Dis-Chem enjoyed and exerted market power by substantially increasing its prices and profit margins for face-masks and therefore the SACC had established a prima facie case of excessive pricing which shifted the burden of proof to Dis-Chem to show its price increases were “reasonable”.

In determining whether a price increase is “reasonable”, the Tribunal appears to disfavour any economic assessment to the inquiry. Instead the Tribunal suggests that any price increase (presumably irrespective of the percentage increment) in relation to an item essential for the public’s health is unreasonable. Following the Tribunal’s earlier finding that the price increases were substantial, the Tribunal held that Dis-Chem’s price increases during the pandemic were “utterly unreasonable and reprehensible”.

As an aside, the Tribunal suggests that the price increase of any good in South Africa between 47%-261% would affect the public interest adversely. In the context of a health crisis where those increases related to essential goods, the price increase has a particular impact on poor customers.

Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Dis-Chem had engaged in excessive pricing in contravention of the Act and imposed a penalty of R1.2 million (which was calculated based on approximately twice the turnover which Dis-Chem derived from face-masks during the complaint period).

The Tribunal’s decision in Dis-Chem provides more analysis and considerations to market definition than the case of Babelegi although the central features and findings in both cases are the same. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, both Dis-Chem and Babelegi charged higher prices to consumer in relation to products considered essential to the health and well-being of the public and because these price increase were nor justified with reference to cost increases, the prices were considered “excessive”.

The Tribunal (as part of its assessment under the geographic market definition analysis) provides an important qualifier to intervening in matters arising from short-term market conditions. In particular, the Tribunal stated that “material price increases of life essential items such as surgical masks, even in the short run, in a health disaster such as the Covid-19 outbreak, warrants our intervention”. This is an important caveat as the Tribunal appears to recognize that intervening in competition law matters based on short term market conditions may have unintended consequences and that ordinarily competition authorities should allow the market to “self-regulate”.

While opportunistic and exploitative behaviour during a time of crisis may indeed warrant scrutiny, one does question whether these decisions fall into the classic “hard cases make bad law” dictum coined by US Supreme Court Justice, OW Holmes.

Different standards of law and economics should not apply to firms simply based on the type of product that they produce or sell. To punish a firm because it supplies essential healthcare products may indeed be a noble public interest objective, but caution must be had to using mechanisms such as the Competition Act to achieve these outcomes if the economic principles and justifications do not stack up.

While the Tribunal was at pains to point out in Dis-Chem that context matters, it is less clear precisely what context matters in excessive pricing cases going forward. Are the market dynamics due to the Covid-19 pandemic an outlier unlikely to repeat itself in history and that the Tribunal’s recent price gouging decisions should be assessed in that context? Or, does the Tribunal’s decision effectively mean that any firm who is able to profitably increase a price by 5% has market power (and is, therefore, dominant) and, therefore, any such price increase (unless linked proportionately to a cost increase) is prima facie excessive? When will the Tribunal intervene in excessive price cases and when will it allow the normal forces of supply and demand and the hallmark features of a dynamic competition to rectify any market abnormalities?

While the Tribunal suggests that a 47% increase and above would be excessive for “any good” in South Africa, the Tribunal does not provide much guidance on where to the draw the line. The Tribunal rejected the US’s guidance which refers to a 10% increase (in the context of a price increase of an essential good). Previously the Competition Appeal Court in the Sasol judgment suggested (without setting a firm benchmark) that a price which is less than 25% more than the economic value of the product cannot be said to be excessive.

While the Tribunal does make cursory mention of the prices of other competitors, the Tribunal seems to err in one important regard. Excessive price cases and indeed the assessment of market power should not be conducted with reference to the overall demand shock in the market but with reference to the firm’s ability to act independently of other competitors in the same prevailing market conditions. A comparison therefore between pre-market shock and post-market shock insofar as the shock applies to the whole market, is somewhat irrelevant.

If the overall demand for face-masks increased and all face-mask suppliers are able to profitably increase their prices for face-masks during the relevant period, it can hardly be said that every face-mask supplier is “dominant” during that period. If all ice-cream suppliers raise their prices in summer versus winter that would clearly not be a result of ice-cream suppliers having market power during the summer months only. The Tribunal’s analysis in Dis-Chem does not seem to answer this issue and in fact lends credence to such an outcome which would clearly not be supported by any credible economic justification.

The Tribunal does not deal with another important aspect relating to principles of supply and demand more generally. The Tribunal recognizes that there were (and are) a shortage of supply for face-masks. It was the shortage of supply (be it actual or potential) which in fact led to “panic buying” and higher demand and therefore higher prices. To suggest that the poorest customers are most likely to be harmed due to price increases following demand shocks is correct. However, all customers (including the poorest) are likely to be harmed if the supply shortage cannot be addressed and is perpetuated by the on-going health crisis. The most sensible way to encourage entry into the supply side market for face-masks is to allow such firms to earn short term profits which it would not otherwise enjoy. Without the upside incentive, new entry into the supply side market is unlikely and the only disciplining safeguard left in the market is quasi-price regulation by the competition authorities. The forces of competition in such instances are, therefore, precluded from being allowed to operate to restore the market to competitive levels. The Tribunal, however, recognizes in the Dis-Chem decision that in certain instances it should in fact play the role of a price regulator.

So where does that leave us? Firstly, it seems very likely that the Dis-Chem decision will be taken on appeal. Until such time as the Tribunal’s decision is altered (if at all), firms selling goods which are considered “essential” in the fight against Covid-19 should take particular cognizance of this decision. Secondly, the price gouging regulations published by the Minister are essentially rendered nugatory by the Tribunal’s approach to excessive pricing cases. Thirdly, regardless of the size of the firm pre-Covid, if a firm is able to increase its prices unilaterally as a result of a demand shock following the Covid health, there is a significant risk that the Tribunal will consider such a firm to possess market power and hence unless such price increase is justified with reference to cost increases, potentially liable to an administrative penalty (and possibly follow-on civil damages).

[About the Authors: John Oxenham and Michael-James Currie are practicing competition law attorneys based in South Africa and advise clients on competition law related matters across most African jurisdictions]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

South Africa Competition Tribunal: Regulations published to expedite COVID-19 excessive and unfair pricing complaint referrals

Posted on by Editor

[The editors at AfricanAntitrust wish to thank Jemma Muller and Gina Lodolo for compiling this article]

On 3 April 2020, Minister Ebrahim Patel made amendments to section 27(2) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) with regards to the regulations pertaining to the functions of the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

The amendment was enacted to regulate complaint referrals for alleged contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act which deals with the charging of excessive prices by a dominant firm. The amendment is crucial in light of the current state of affairs, where the charging of excessive prices has become more frequent during the Covid-19 outbreak. Accordingly, the amendment is only applicable for the duration of the period of the declaration of a Natural State of Disaster with regards to COVID-19.

An applicant who wishes to bring a complaint based on an alleged contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act, read with the Consumer and Customer Protection Regulations, must file a Notice of Motion and founding affidavit to the Tribunal.

Urgent complaint referral procedure

Who must file the complaint referral?

A complaint referral may be filed by the Commission or a complainant, as soon as possible after the commission has issued a notice of non-referral to that complainant.

Notice of motion requirements

An applicant must allege a contravention of section 8(1)(a), indicate the order sought against the respondent(s) and state the name and and address (electronic or otherwise) of each respondent in respect to whom the order is sought. Applicant’s may also state the date and time on which the applicant wishes the matter to be heard by the Tribunal.

Founding affidavit

The founding affidavit must set out the grounds of urgency and the material points of law and evidence that support the complaint. In addition, the applicant may include confirmatory affidavits from any factual or expert witnesses.

Procedure

The applicant must serve a copy of the Notice of Motion and founding affidavit on each of the respondent(s) named in the Notice of Motion and file a copy of the application with the Tribunal.

The important time periods:

A respondent must serve a copy of their Answering Affidavit on the complainant within 72 hours of service of the complaint referral. Thereafter the person who filed the Complaint referral may serve a copy for their Reply within 24 hours after being served with a copy of the Answering Affidavit.

The Tribunal will then determine the date and time for the hearing of the complaint referral (Tribunal Rules 6,16,17,18,18,47,54 and 55 apply to an application under this Rule unless they pertain to Rules which stipulate time-frames).

These documents may be filed electronically.

Urgent hearing

The Tribunal may direct that the urgent complaint proceedings in terms of the Rules may be conducted wholly as video or audio proceedings.

If no answering affidavit is filed within the period set out in the Notice of Motion or such extended period as may be determined by the Tribunal, the urgent complaint referral may be heard on an unopposed basis.

The Tribunal will determine if there was contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act based on the evidence contained in the affidavits unless there is a substantial dispute of fact which cannot be resolved by affidavits. In this case the Tribunal may determine an expedited procedure (which may include oral evidence on an expedited basis by way of video or audio proceedings). The Tribunal may also call for further evidence if it is required (subject to section 55 of the Act).

Remedies

The Tribunal may impose a pricing order if the respondent has been found to contravene section 8(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent may apply to appeal or review the decision on an urgent basis to the Competition Appeal Court (the pricing order will remain in force unless it is set aside by the court on appeal or review).

Consent order

The Commission may at any time (before, during and after and investigation) conclude a consent agreement for a complaint under section 8(1)(a) of the Act and it will be the full and final settlement of the matter  (including settlement of civil proceedings). This consent order may be confirmed by the Tribunal without hearing any evidence.

The amended complaint referral procedures equip complainants with the means in which to assist the competition authorities in penalizing those who have used the prevailing circumstances to exploit consumers, and is thus a commendable and efficient tool invoked by the Minister.

 

PepsiCo/Pioneer merger: Minister Patel approves the Deal

Posted on by Editor

In one of the few megamergers of the 2019/2020 season, the South African Competition Tribunal approved, subject to a wide range of public interest related conditions, PepsiCo’s acquisition of South Africa’s largest FMCG producers, Pioneer Foods.

In predictable fashion, this was not the type of transaction which would escape the attention of Minister Patel (who oversees the portfolio of the competition agencies). Despite not being a transaction which raises any competition concerns (i.e. there being no substantive overlap in product portfolios) and no material public interest concerns, the merger was an acquisition by a major international producer, PepsiCo and Minister Patel has openly expressed his intention to involve himself in acquisitions by foreign firms in an effort to extract a “socio-economic” tax from the merging parties. This was first seen in the Massmart/Walmart deal in 2012 but more recently in the AB-InBev/SAB and SAB/Coca-Cola mergers.

Competition lawyer, Michael-James Currie points out that a noteworthy difference between the legislative environment in terms of which the PepsiCo/Pioneer merger was assessed are the amendments to South Africa’s Competition Act. Under the new merger regime, public interest standards have been elevated, as a test, so as to be on par with the traditional competition analysis. Furthermore, the public interest grounds which the competition authorities are mandated to take into account have been expanded and now specifically include ownership levels among historically disadvantaged persons (commonly referred to as BBBEE policies in South Africa – Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment).

The Competition Tribunal’s reasons are noteworthy. In a transaction of this magnitude, the Tribunal did not provide any reasons or findings as to the assessment of the merger. There was no analysis as to the relevant markets nor an assessment of the negative effects that the merger may have on the public interest factors.

The Tribunal’s reasons jump straight to the conditions ostensibly on the basis that the merging parties, the Competition Commission and Minister Patel had “agreed” to the conditions and, therefore, there was no reason to assess the transaction and the Tribunal could go ahead and rubber stamp the terms of the agreement.

Based on the majority of the conditions imposed, it is safe to assume that the transaction raised no material competition or public interest concerns. Notwithstanding that the transaction raised no adverse effects, the conditions imposed on the merger include:

  1. The creation of a BBBEE Workers Trust which will receive at least R1.6 billion (USD 10.6 million) in equity and the appointment of a non-executive director to the PepsiCo board together with voting rights of 12.9% in lieu of the equity for a period of 5 years;
  2. Employment:
    1. A moratorium on merger related retrenchments for a period of 5 years;
    2. An undertaking to maintain the aggregate levels of employment for 5 years; and
    3. An undertaking to create 500 direct new employment opportunities and 2500 indirect employment opportunities over the next five years.
  3. An undertaking to invest a cumulative amount of R5.5 billion (USD180 million) in production capacity over the next five years.
  4. Promote procurement from local suppliers and producers;
  5. Maintain all sales and distribution agreements currently in place for a period of two years;
  6. Contribute at least R600 million (USD60 million) to the creation of a development fund to be used for education, small medium enterprise development and agriculture programs.

Despite the substantial conditions imposed on the merger, Minister Patel surely finds himself in a catch twenty two. On the one hands, Minister Patel is a socialist at heart and has very much focused his efforts on utilising the Competition Act and authorities to promote industrial policy action and advance socio-economic objectives. Now, both as Minister of Trade and Industry and in light of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s drive to attract foreign direct investment, Minister Patel needs to tread a far more intricate line than ay previously the case (under President Jacob Zuma’s reign).

On the one hand, large foreign mergers present Minister Patel with a golden opportunity to extract non-merger specific public interest commitments – which merging parties often acquiesce to in order to preclude protracted litigation. On the other, Minister Patel needs to ensure that South Africa’s message to the rest of the world is that we would welcome foreign investment with open arms.

John Oxenham says that while it is perhaps regrettable that the Competition Tribunal did not grapple fully with the extent to which these types of conditions would have been objectively justifiable in terms of the new merger control regime or whether they amount to an overreach. While the Tribunal typically does not dedicate substantial resources to evaluating mergers when there is no dispute between the parties – and understandably so – the Tribunal should be mindful of rubber-stamping approvals of this nature. The message that this decision sends to foreign firms seeking to invest in South Africa is certainly not a warm and inviting message. The lack of analysis and objective justification for the conditions sends a strong message to merging parties that the most important aspect for purposes of obtaining merger approval is to engage and reach settlement terms with Minister Patel.

When the executive becomes the gatekeeper to merger control approvals (or competition law enforcement more generally), this very rapidly blurs the distinction of the separation of powers.

South Africa News Alert: Price Discrimination and Buyer Power Provisions brought into effect.

Posted on by Editor

On 13 February 2020, exactly a year since the price discrimination and buyer power provisions were signed into law, President Ramaphosa and Minister Patel have brought into effect the operation of the amended section 9 of the South African Competition Act (price discrimination) as well as section 8(4) (buyer power provisions) together with the respective Regulations.

Both provisions are aimed at ensuring that small or medium owned businesses or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons are able to “participate effectively” in the market.

While the buyer power provisions are largely consumer protection provisions – which require large firms to impose fair trading terms vis-a-vis their smaller customers, the amended section 9 of the Act has material ramifications not only for large suppliers but consumers as well.

At the heart of section 9, is a prohibition of volume based rebates/trading terms. While the Act permits for certain efficiency based pricing differentials (provided they are proportionate and reasonable), suppliers are prohibited from competing purely based on quantities. Low margins high volume type strategies would in many instances be prohibited – with the concomitant imposition of administrative penalties.

The motivation behind the amendments is to assist smaller players participate in the market. A noble objective. Although it seems quite apparent that those in support of the amendments have not fully recognized, appreciated or cared about the unintended consequences which are likely to flow from section 9.

Pro-consumer welfare pricing strategies may, under the amended Act, be outlawed. So while the counter factual is that certain small businesses may benefit, is this an industrial policy victory if consumer welfare is diminished? Hardly.

Although section 9 and section 8(4) where brought into effect on the eve of President Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address – certainly not coincidental – a challenge to the rationality of section 9 seems most likely.

The Competition Commission’s price discrimination draft guidelines expressly preclude any considerations to the level of efficiency of downstream customers or any impact (good or bad) on consumer welfare).

Seriously concerning stuff and large suppliers (across all industries) should take note of these amendments with urgency.