On 15 April 2026, the South African Competition Commission (the “Commission”) referred a complaint against MultiChoice South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“MultiChoice”) and Altech UEC South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Altech”) to the Competition Tribunal for prosecution.
The Commission’s complaint centres around allegations of breaches of section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”) regarding a market-division agreement entered into between Multichoice and Altech. Specifically, the Commission’s complaint alleges that that, in February 2014, the firms agreed that Altech, a manufacturer of Set Top Boxes (“STBs”), would refrain from entering the pay-television (“pay-TV”) market as a competitor to MultiChoice.
At the time, Altech was a key supplier of STBs to MultiChoice. The Commission argues that this arrangement effectively resulted in allocation of the pay-TV market, where MultiChoice remained a dominant provider of subscription television services, while Altech remained confined to the hardware manufacturing space, despite having the theoretical capability to become an effective competitor.
The referral was announced on 4 May 2026, by way of a media statement released by the Commission issued a media statement announcing the referral of a collusion complaint against pay-TV giant MultiChoice and electronics manufacturer Altech. The referral marks a significant escalation in the Commission’s enforcement of cartel conduct within the broadcasting and technology sectors.
Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act prescribes as follows:
An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if-
it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:
dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services;
The allegations are founded on a potential per se prohibition, meaning that the Commission is not required to prove that the agreement had actual anti-competitive effects, the existence of the agreement itself is sufficient to establish a violation of the Act.
If the Tribunal ultimately finds against the firms, they face administrative penalties of up to 10% of their respective annual turnovers.
To understand the competition concerns arising from the Commission’s complaint, one must examine the relationship between the two entities during the 2014-2015 period. At the time of the alleged agreement, Altech was a unit of the JSE-listed Altron group (Business Day, 2026). Beyond manufacturing decoders, Altech launched a product known as the “Node,” an interactive smart home and video-on-demand device that utilised satellite connectivity. The Commission appears to view the “Node” as a potential competitive threat to MultiChoice’s DStv service (Business Day, 2026). The agreement in question, according to the regulator, ensured that Altech would not transition from a supplier of hardware to a rival provider of pay-TV services, thereby protecting MultiChoice’s market dominance.
In response to the media statement and the referral, MultiChoice issued a formal statement to the press denying any contravention of the law. The company confirmed that the agreement in question was a “historical supply agreement” that has since come to an end in 2015 (Business Day, 2026).
Multichoice asserts that the arrangement was a standard commercial supply agreement rather than a cartel arrangement. MultiChoice also noted that it is “considering the referral and will respond fully within the prescribed timelines,” indicating that it will challenge the Commission’s interpretation of the facts in due course during the subsequent proceedings before the Tribunal. As of the publication of the Commission’s statement, Altech, which was sold by Altron to Skyblu Technologies, a Skyworth affiliate, in 2019, had not issued a public response.
John Oxenham, Partner at Primerio notes: “The referral of MultiChoice and Altech illustrates the Commission’s continued vigilance regarding market allocation in the digital broadcasting sector. While the Commission asserts that the 2014 agreement served to push a potential competitor out of the market, MultiChoice argues that the historical agreement was benign. The case analysis will likely hinge on whether the Tribunal views Altech as a potential competitor in the pay-TV market at the time of the agreement.”
COMESA’s long-delayed and much-anticipated publication of the new 2025 Competition and Consumer Protection has prompted much fanfare, and rightfully so. It represents a potential turning point and coming-of-age for the now 12-year old regional antitrust regulator.
We decided to swim against the current and, rather than focus exclusively on “COMESA 3.0,” take a look back at the past year, so as to better gauge the (now) CCCC’s future performance versus its immediate past.
Fortuitously, our editor was present at a gathering of the ‘Fourth Estate,’ convened in Nairobi by COMESA’s Dr. Willard Mwemba. For the third consecutive time, the Commission had invited members of the press to present its successes, show off the tight relationships between its staff and that of other national authorities (of note, David Kemei, Director General CAK, chairman of the EACA and local host, was present for most of the event, as was of course the agency’s éminence grise, Dr. George Lipimile), and to remind the assembled journalists that, in the bigger picture, the agency’s AfCFTA competition protocol coordination remained ongoing — more on that another day…
Without further ado, here are the 2025 COMESA highlights, as selected by the Commission:
Mergers
The large francophone-anglophone broadcasting deal of Canal+ acquiring Multichoice presented “lots” of competitive concerns according to Dr. Mwemba. Already dominant firms merging to form an even larger entity was a serious threat to broadcast competition. Multichoice’s past behavior of refusing sublicenses and threatening to leave certain markets showed its unparalleled dominant position in various COMESA submarkets. The parties did compete head-on with head other in three jurisdictions, Rwanda, Madagascar, and Mauritius, and would have had a foreclosing position COMESA-wide in relation to super premium content, leading the (then still) CCC to seek prohibition of the merger, and at a minimum the survival of Multichoice (and its “Talent Factory”) as an independent entity and employer in the region.
The parties’ defense relied in part on arguments alleging subscriber losses, eventually resulting in a conditional approval by the CCC with several commitments of the parties.
Two failure-to-file violations stand out in the past year: The Bosch/Johnson Control deal drew a failure-to-file violation of the (much maligned and soon to be replaced under the new Regulations) “30-day rule”. Interestingly, the fine was reduced from a significant $400,000 initial amount to an almost negligible $8000, as JCI (the target and a first-time offender entitled to a 30% fine reduction) was to blame for the “inadvertent” false company statistics Bosch used to calculate whether the filing threshold was met. While challenged by the acquirer, Bosch received a symbolic $1 fine for its own negligence in failing to vet the target’s figures for purposes of determining notifiability.
In the Mauritian BRED/BFV banking transaction, the fine was significantly reduced by the acquirer’s cooperation, minority shareholding status in many subsidiaries, and first-time offender status, resulting in merely $28,005 initial F2F fines.
On a broader scale, looking to the newly established EAC competition regime and its merger notification requirements, Dr. Mwemba recognized the concern that dual notifications will occur in all likelihood for the foreseeable future.
Anticompetitive Practices
The Commission’s standout case this past year was doubtless the “beer matter”: three main areas of concern stood out in the Heineken case, in which the respondent was found to be dominant in various geographic markets. The three issues were: single-branding (foreclosing competing products at the downstream distribution level), absolute territorial restrictions (prohibiting distributors from not only active but also passive selling into unauthorized regions), and resale price maintenance (imposing a firm price — or here, a fixed profit margin — on resellers of the products). A long lasting case, from June 2021 until early September 2025, resulting in a settlement procedure, eliminating the three clauses of concern and imposing the maximum settlement amount of $900,000 on Heineken. Of note: Beer makers are also subject to an ongoing CCC investigation into the cross-shareholdings of various manufacturers.
Similarly, the Commission accused Diageo of the same types of anticompetitive practices in several COMESA member states. As the respondent had stopped one of the offending types of conduct (RPM) prior to the investigation’s commencement, the final combined fine amount was reduced to $750,000.
A further territorial restriction investigation into Toyota’s distribution practices is ongoing and “at an advanced stage”, with the CEO expecting to close the matter by Q1/2026. Finally, the CCC is evaluating the effects of, among other things, Coca-Cola’s unilateral single-branding rules against retailers stocking only its own products in branded refrigerators, which can result in effective foreclosure of competing brands, especially at small retail businesses with limited floor space allowing only a single fridge.
Consumer Protection
The airline sector did not escape the CCC’s enforcement net, as British Airways/Qatar experienced in the recently concluded investigation into Nairobi-London route collaboration among the parties, which they claimed allowed them to increase the volume of flights to 28 per week and lower ticket prices. The CCC permitted the conduct for a limited time of 5 years, requiring the parties to provide proof of the alleged efficiencies within two years.
On the consumer protection front, the CCC was heavily focused on the air travel sector over the past reporting year. It will publish, on Monday coming, a report detailing the results of its year-long airline survey and study, undertaken in conjunction with the African Union’s airline regulator.
Its signature agriculture study program, the African Market Observatory, continues to be funded and operationally supported by the Commission, having provided a key report to the COMESA Council of Ministers. This effort has also led to the ICN having awarded the running of its agriculture program to the Observatory. Dr. Mwemba proudly highlighted that the CCC assisted in averting a potential hunger crisis, namely in an (unpublished, we presume) maize case involving a sovereign engaging in absolute territorial restrictions, threatening serious food insecurity in Eswatini; it was the CCC’s advocacy efforts, as opposed to a full-fledged investigation, that yielded the positive results.
Finally, the CCC also concluded its drafting of a unified Model Consumer Protection Law, to serve as a standardized & harmonized guideline for African countries. This comes as part of an effort to eradicate the fragmentation of competition and consumer protection laws, seeking the eradication of harmful corporate conduct and non-tariff trade barriers.
Looking Ahead: What’s in Store for COMESA 3.0?
Diverging from the titular “retrospective,” it appears fitting to step forward into the present moment and look ahead, with the Commission’s recent successes under its former Regulations now firmly established. To do so, I will quote from an article Dr. Liat Davis and I recently published in the Concurrences journal, entitled “Refining Regional Rapprochement: COMESA’s Competition Enforcement Comes of Age“:
The Mwemba era (2021 – present) has both accelerated and consolidated these earlier reforms, contributing to increased confidence in the regime among international stakeholders. With the exception of a temporary pandemic-related decline, merger activity has continued to rise, surpassing 500 notifications to date and now including the Commission’s first enforcement against gun-jumping. Non-merger enforcement has also expanded, with 45 conduct investigations and at least two cartel cases initiated. In parallel, the Commission has entered into numerous Memoranda of Understanding and multilateral cooperation agreements with African and global counterparts, strengthening its external partnerships. At the regional level, the CCC has acted as a catalyst for the establishment and development of National Competition Authorities (NCAs), offering indirect financial support, training, and collaborative initiatives.
This iterative process of course correction and capacity-building is now culminating in the long-awaited revision of the primary legislation. The new CCPR, due to take effect at the end of 2025, will formalize the Commission’s expanded mandate. In light of the extensive reforms embodied in the new CCPR, and consistent with the prior informal designation of the CCC’s post-2021 period as “COMESA 2.0,” the implementation of the CCPR will mark the beginning of a third phase in the regime’s evolution. Appropriately described as “COMESA 3.0,” this stage is expected to be characterized by the following key attributes:
Expanded unilateral-conduct enforcement, owing to increased staffing, sustained capacity-building, and growing experience in conduct and cartel cases;
A significant rise in cartel investigations, driven principally by the forthcoming leniency regime;
Higher merger volumes, resulting from the move to a suspensory filing regime and accompanied by a likely increase in conditional approvals (subject to wider global economic conditions); [note: the CCC’s statistical trajectory is already sloping upward, as it has reviewed approximately the same number of transactions in the past 4 years as it had in the first 8 years of its existence.]
Strengthened consumer-protection enforcement by the ‘CCCC’, reflecting the Commission’s broadened mandate and aligning with wider African competition-law trends, including South Africa’s increasing incorporation of public-interest factors in merger analysis and Nigeria’s FCCPC using data-protection grounds to impose record fines; and
The development and application of a carefully delineated “public interest” standard in competition cases, subject to strict guardrails to prevent politicization and adapted to the unique constraints of a multi-national enforcement regime.
Zuku pay-TV launched complaint against DStv in Kenya
As we reported in “Your Choice“, MultiChoice has been an active (if unwilling) player in African antitrust news. Zuku pay-TV has recently requested the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) to impose a financial penalty on DStv for refusing to re-sell some of its exclusive content like the English Premier League to its rivals.
In its letter to the CAK, Zuku pay-TV accuses MultiChoice, the owners of DStv, of abusing its dominance and curbing the growth of other, competing pay-TV operators. Furthermore, Zuku pay-TV requested the CAK to compel DStv to re-sell some of its exclusive content and impose a financial penalty, which can be up to 10 per cent of a firm’s annual sales, on the South Africa firm. According to Zuku pay-TV, DStv has a market share of 95% in Kenya.
The CAK has not indicated whether it is investigating the complaint yet.
Mr Wang’ombe Kariuki, director of the CAK
Kenya to get leniency policy
In addition to the ongoing pay-TV antitrust dispute, the CAK has drafted a law (the Finance Bill of 2014) which will create a Kenyan cartel leniency programme in order for whistleblower companies and their directors to get off with lighter punishment, for volunteering information that helps to break up cartels, as AAT reported here.
To recap the leniency programme will either grant full immunity for applicants or reduce the applicant’s fines, depending on the circumstances. The Finance Act 2014 is awaiting its third reading in Parliament.
The introduction of a leniency programme in Kenya is a pleasing sight due to leniency programmes’ proving to be an integral and vital tool for uncovering cartels in every jurisdiction in which it has been deployed.
Revelations from Bonakele’s interview with CNBC Africa
South African interim Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele called his agency, the Competition Commission (“Commission”), a “kind of reactive” enforcement body, aiming primarily to uncover cartel conduct. In an interview with CNBC Africa‘s “Beyond Markets” segment, journalist Nozipho Mbanjwa asked the acting Commissioner tough questions on the Commission’s enforcement tactics, legislative mandate, fines imposed, the adequacy of the Commission’s capitalization, and whether the South African antitrust watchdog was, in fact, a “toothless dog.”
Bonakele held his ground, referring multiple times to the Commission’s recent successes, including the construction cartel, the bread case, cooking oils, and other “basic products” matters on which he said his agency would place the largest focus going forward.
The Acting Commissioner
Some of the highlights from the interview:
Bonakele is “quite satisfied” with the agency’s funding and performance of its 180 staff, but may ask for “more funding” specifically for the Commission’s sectoral health-care inquiry.
The Commission will focus its cartel-busting efforts on sectors in the basic products category such as foods and health-care.
The Commission will “definitely appeal” its loss of the SABMiller abuse-of-dominance matter, a “very tricky kind of offence in terms of competition law” according to Bonakele. He said he did “not like” the 7-year long duration of the SABMiller saga, but felt compelled to extend the matter by bringing the case before the Competition Appeal Court.
On the much-malignedMultiChoice broadcaster, Bonakele called the company a “monopoly created by legislation” in a regulated market, and deferred to parliament to rectify the situation.
The Commission receives approximately 30% of its funds from revenues that are the result of merger filing fees.
The South African publication The Citizen also reported the most recent ICASA attack, noting the alleged “restrictive horizontal practices involved collusion and certain competitor agreements and practices, while restrictive vertical practices involved certain customer or supplier arrangements.”
Johannesburg – The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa has recently requested the Competition Commission to investigate a possible restrictive horizontal practice between the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and MultiChoice. This follows an agreement entered into between the two parties in July 2013 whereby the SABC would have to provide a 24-hour news channel on MultiChoice’ DSTV platform.
News reports at the time indicated that the agreement also contained an obligation relating to set-top-box control in which the SABC is alleged to have agreed that it will transmit its free-to-air channels without encryption.
In the context of the ongoing public dispute between e.tv and MultiChoice over whether free-to-air TV services should utilise set-top-box control, the question arises as to whether the agreement between the SABC and MultiChoice, as it affects the issue of set-top-box control, may constitute a form of restrictive horizontal practice in the television market.
ICASA has requested both the SABC and MultiChoice to provide a copy of the agreement but both parties have failed to honour that request. This failure has made it difficult for the Authority to verify the claim put forward by MultiChoice that `any contractual obligation upon the SABC to continue to transmit its free-to-air channels in the clear (i.e. without encryption) is an incident of the distribution arrangements agreed upon by the SABC and MultiChoice. Such obligation, as indicated forms part of an agreement between parties in a vertical relationship and is not, as alleged, a horizontal restrictive practice’.
As the issue of restrictive horizontal practices falls within the scope of Section 4 of the Competition Act, the Authority has requested that the Competition Commission open an investigation into this matter.
African Antitrust & Competition Law 