Panel highlights SA Competition Amendment Bill’s pitfalls

As AAT has reported on extensively, the South African Competition Amendment Bill, currently pending in Parliament, is likely to be adopted in short order in its current draft form.

It carries with it significant, and in our view, adverse, effects that will burden companies trying to conduct business or invest in South Africa. These burdens will be particularly onerous on foreign entities wishing to enter the market by acquisitions, as well as any firm having a market share approaching the presumptive threshold of dominance, namely 35%

On Wednesday, 17 October 2018, the law firms of Primerio and Norton Incorporated held an in-depth seminar and round-table discussion on the ramifications of the Competition Amendment Bill. The setting was an intimate “fireside chat“ with business and in-house legal representatives from leading companies, active across a variety of sectors in the South African economy.

Moderated and given an international pan-African perspective by Primerio partner Andreas Stargard, the panel included colleagues John Oxenham and Michael-James Currie, who delved into the details of the proposed amendments to the existing Competition Act, covered extensively by AAT here.

As of today, 18 October 2018, the Bill appears set to be promulgated.  The SA Parliament’s committee on economic development has rubber-stamped the proposed amendments after a prior committee walk-out staged by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), in opposition to the Bill. DA MP and economic development spokesperson Michael Cardo states:

The ANC rammed the Competition Amendment Bill through the committee on economic development, and adopted a report agreeing to various amendments. To make sure they had the numbers for a quorum, the ANC bussed in two never-seen-before members to act as pliant yes men and women. Questions from the DA to the minister… This bill is going to have far-reaching consequences for the economy. It gives both the minister and the competition authorities a great deal of power to try and reshape the economy. It is unfortunate that the ANC, and the committee chair in particular, have suspended their critical faculties to force through this controversial bill and behaved like puppets on a string pulled by the minister of economic development.”

The Amendment Bill introduces significant powers for ministerial intervention and bestows greater powers on the Competition Commission, the investigatory body of the competition authorities in South Africa.

The panel discussion provided invaluable insights into the driving forces behind the Bill and ultimately what this means for companies in South Africa as it certainly won’t be business as usual if the Amendment Bill is brought into effect – particularly not for dominant entities.

[If you attended the panel discussion and would like to provide feedback to the panelists or would generally like to get in touch with the panelists, please send an email to editor@africanantitrust.com and we will put you in touch with the relevant individuals]

 

Advertisements

Namibian Competition Commission Investigates Pharmacies for Cartel Conduct

The Namibian Competition Commission (NaCC) recently announced that it is investigating the pharmacy sector for allegedly fixing prices. The investigation is focused on the Pharmaceutical Society of Namibia (PSN) and over 200 of its members.

The allegations include, inter alia, that the PSN requires its members to impose a 50% mark-up on the dispensing of medicines and that the PSN disciplines members for deviating from the mark-up.

The investigation follows closely on the heels of an earlier announcement that the NaCC is investigating short term insurance companies for allegedly agreeing to cap maximum mark-up rates and maximum labour rates which panel beaters may charge for repairing vehicles.

The Namibian Competition Act prohibits agreements or concerted practices between competitors which have as their object or effect the prevention or lessening of competition in the market.

The recent activity by the NaCC is indicative of the NaCC’s intention to increase competition enforcement in the region and firms doing business in Namibia are increasingly required to self-assess their conduct to ensure compliance with domestic competition laws not only in Namibia but in most sub-Saharan countries.

The Long(er) Arm of Malawi’s Competition Law: CFTC Investigates Foreign Textbook Supplier in Cartel Probe

By Michael-James Currie

In a potential first, Malawi’s Competition and Fair Trade Commission’s (CFTC) Chief Executive Officer, Ms Charlotte Malonda, recently announced that the CFTC is investigating a UK-based supplier of textbooks, Mallory International, for alleged cartel conduct.  Mallory had partnered up with a local company, Maneno Books Investments, as part of a joint venture, called “Mallory International JV Maneno Enterprise”.  In addition, other companies also being investigated include Jhango Publishers, South African based Pearson Education Africa, Dzuka Publishing Company and UK based Trade Wings International.

The investigation follows complaints received by the Human Rights Consultative Committee as well as a number of its constituent civil society organisations and NGOs.

textbooksThe allegations include price fixing and collusive tendering vis-à-vis tenders issued by the Malawian government for the supply of pupils’ text books.

Section 33 of the Competition and Fair Trade Act prohibits collusive tendering and bid rigging per se. Furthermore, a contravention of section 33 is an offence in terms of the Act carries with it not only the imposition of an administrative penalty, which is the greater of the financial gain generated from the collusive conduct or K500 000, but also criminal sanctions, the maximum being a prison sentence of five years, notes Andreas Stargard, a competition attorney:

“The Malawian competition enforcer, under Ms. Malonda’s leadership, has shown significant growth both in terms of bench strength and actual enforcement activity since her involvement began in 2012.”

He continues:

“The present price-fixing investigation began as a result of complaints brought by HRCC, a human-rights network of 90 civil-society organisations.  Together with several NGOs, they evidently felt that the CFTC was the most competent domestic enforcer with long-arm jurisdiction and potential criminal sanctions at their disposal; and in Ms. Malonda — whose personal C.V. notably also includes prior human-rights law experience — they have found an effective champion of their cause.  Based on some of the complainant’s testimony, the alleged conduct goes back over a decade and included collusion with Ministry of Education staffers and even  direct intimidation of potential competitors not to bid on the government’s tenders…”

The Nyasa Times quoted the CFTC head as confirming that the agency had “received a few complaints about allegations of a cartel and other procurement malpractices, hence our commencement of the investigations to get the bottom of the matter.”

Based on the language of Section 50 of the Act suggests that the sanctions for committing an offence in terms of the Act requires the imposition of both a penalty and a five year prison sentence. Although not aware of any case law which has previously interpreted this provision, the wording of the Act is particularly onerous, particularly in light of the per se nature of cartel conduct.

The Act is not clear what “financial gain” means in this instance and whether the penalty is based on the entire revenue generated by the firm for the specific tender (allegedly tainted by collusion) or whether it applies only to the profit generated from the project. Furthermore, it is unclear how this would apply to a co-cartelist who did not win the tender. The Act may be interpreted that the “losing bidder” is fined the minimum amount of K500 000 which equates to appox. USD 700 (a nominal amount) while the “winner” is penalised the value of the entire tender value (which would be overly prejudicial, particularly if turnover and not profit is used as the basis for financial gain).

Although the investigation has only recently commenced and no respondent has admitted to wrong doing nor has there been a finding of wrongdoing, this will be an important case to monitor to the extent that there is an adverse finding made by the CFTC. Unless the Malawian authorities adopt a pragmatic approach to sentencing offending parties, section 50 of the Act may significantly undermine foreign investment as a literal interpretation of the Act would render Malawi one of the most high risk jurisdictions in terms of potential sanctions from a competition law perspective.

It may also result in fewer firms wishing to partner up with local firms by way of joint ventures as JV’s are a particularly high risk form of collaboration between competitors if there is no clear guidance form the authorities as to how JV’s are likely to be treated from a competition law perspective.

[Michael-James Currie is a competition lawyer practicing competition law across Sub-Saharan Africa. To get in touch with Michael-James, please contact the editors of AfricanAntitrust]

Shipping cartels: BMW Pursues Civil Damages Claim against certain Carriers

By Stephany Torres

BMW plans to lodge a claim in South Africa for damages against international car-carriers and shipping companies which have been found guilty or have pleaded guilty to competition law contraventions, including Japanese-based Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (“MOL”) and K-Line Shipping South Africa, the local subsidiary of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-Line”), Norway’s Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics AS (“WWL”) and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (“NYK”).  BMW is seeking compensation for the losses it alleges to have suffered as a result of the anti-competitive price-fixing arrangements between the car carriers.

BMWship.jpgBMW’s case stems from an amnesty application, by which MOL approached the South African Competition Commission (“the Commission”) in terms of its Corporate Leniency Policy (“CLP”), which outlines a process through which the Commission may grant a self-confessing cartel member, who approaches the Commission first, immunity for its participation in cartel activity upon the cartel member fulfilling specific requirements which includes providing information and cooperating fully with the Commission’s investigation.  Says John Oxenham, a South African competition lawyer, “if the Commission grants an applicant what is called ‘conditional immunity’, a possible outcome is the complete avoidance of a fine, which could otherwise be calculated at up   to 10% of domestic revenues, including exports.”  That said, conditional antitrust immunity, does not offer full exoneration from potential other liability in respect of the conduct for which the Competition Commission granted immunity.

It is notable that MOL, NYK and WWL subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Commission in prosecuting K-Line.

On further investigation by the Commission it found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL fixed prices, divided markets and tendered collusively in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 in respect of the roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ocean transportation of Toyota vehicles from South Africa to Europe, the Mediterranean Coast of North Africa and the Caribbean Islands via Europe, West Africa, East Africa and the Red Sea.

The Commission’s investigation found that from at least 2002 to 2013 K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL colluded on a tender issued by Toyota SA Motors (“TSAM”) to transport Toyota vehicles from South Africa abroad by sea.  The Commission further found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the number of vessels that they were to operate on the South Africa to Europe routes at agreed intervals or frequencies.

In addition, the Commission found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the freight rates that they were to charge TSAM for the shipment of Toyota vehicles.

International competition authorities including authorities in the US, Canada, Japan, China and Australia investigated this case and, in recent years, imposed large fines on the respective cartelists for engaging in market division and price fixing.  In February 2018, Wallenius Wilhelmsen agreed to pay a large fine to the EU.  Höegh Autoliners has reportedly been summoned to a court meeting in South Africa in March 2018.

 

Media cartel exposed and fined

By AAT Senior Contributor Stephany Torres

Print media companies Independent Media and Caxton & CTP Publishers and Printers (“Caxton”) have agreed to pay an administrative penalties as well as an amount to the Economic Development Fund of over R8 million as part of two separate settlement agreements with the Competition Commission (“The Commission”) after admitting to fixing prices and trading conditions in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act no. 89 of 1998 (“The Competition Act”).

Caxton owns local print media, including the Citizen newspaper and magazines Bona, Rooirose and Farmer’s Weekly, among others.  Independent owns newspapers The Star, Cape Times, Sunday Independent, among others and magazines GQ and GQ Style.

Attorneys from African competition law firm Primerio Ltd. report that this development follows from a 2011 investigation by the Commission into the matter where they found that, through the facilitating vehicle of the Media Credit CoOrdinators (“MCC”) organization, various media companies agreed to offer similar discounts and payment terms to advertising agencies that place advertisements with MCC members.  MCC accredited agencies were offered a 16.5% discount, while non-members were offered 15%.  In addition, the Commission found that the implicated companies employed services of an intermediary company called Corex to perform risk assessments on advertising agencies for purposes of imposing a settlement discount structure and terms on advertising agencies.  “The Commission found that the practices restricted competition among the competing companies as they did not independently determine an element of a price in the form of discount or trading terms”.

In a media release, the Competition Commission confirmed Caxton will pay a fine of R5 806 890.14, and R2 090 480.45 to the Economic Development Fund over three years.  It will also provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies for three years, capped at R15 000 000 per annum.

Independent Media will pay an administrative penalty of R2 220 603 and will contribute R799 417 to the Economic Development Fund over a three-year period, and provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies, over three years and capped at R5 000 000. Independent has also said it would obtain its own credit insurance so small agencies are not required to commit any securities or guarantees in order to book advertising space.

The Economic Development Fund is designed to develop black-owned small media or advertising agencies, which require assistance with start-up capital and will assist black students with bursaries to study media or advertising.

The agreements were confirmed as orders of the Competition Tribunal.

 

Enforcement Alert: MU Competition Commission to Permit Cartel Initiators to Seek Leniency

The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) has announced changes to its leniency programme. Though the CCM did have a functioning leniency programme in place since its inception in 2009, the it was often criticised as being inadequate.

Competition lawyer John Oxenham notes that under the existing programme, firms which were found to be cartel ‘initiators’ (an enterprise which has coerced others into a collusive agreement) did not qualify to receive any immunity or other benefit.

John Oxenham

John Oxenham

Oxenham believes that this had led to uncertainty and prevented companies from applying for leniency (which required full disclosure of anti-competitive conduct), as firms may be unsure whether or not they would be considered to be ‘instigators’ (and so be disqualified from receiving immunity from prosecution). This meant that firms often had to weigh the risk of being considered an ‘initiator’ against the risk of prosecution to ultimately decide on whether to apply for leniency.

The CCM had previously identified this aspect as a potential area of concern, which led to the temporary special amnesty programmes under which firms who believed themselves to be ‘initiators’ could apply for leniency. This, according to the CCM, led to various successful leniency applications and related prosecutions.

In its media release of 23 January 2018, CCM executive director Deshmuk Kowlessure stated that “[w]ith respect to leniency programmes, we have observed that several advanced competition authorities have adopted leniency for cartel initiators and coercers…” “Likewise, the CCM has taken a step beyond traditional leniency programmes and we are now extending the possibility for initiators or coercers to apply for leniency.”

The recent amendment, therefore, seeks to formalise the CCM’s previous (temporary) amnesty programme for ‘initiators’ by allowing them to approach the CCM for leniency in return for a 50% reduction in the administrative penalty otherwise payable, says fellow Primerio Ltd. antitrust attorney Andreas Stargard.  “This level of fine reduction is in line with what the CCM has been offering in the past to leniency applicants who were not ‘first through the door’.  Unlike certain other countries, such as the United States, where the Department of Justice offers leniency benefits only to the first successful applicant, Mauritius allows for successive, reduced penalties to subsequent amnesty seekers.”

Corporate leniency policies are widely considered to be the most effective tool in the prosecution of cartel conduct. The CCM’s decision to include ‘initiators’ among those eligible to participate, therefore, not only strengthens its leniency programme but is also a significant step towards the prosecution and enforcement of cartel conduct in Mauritius, as more leniency applications directly imply more prosecutions of fellow cartelists.

Oxenham notes that the inclusion of initiators into the CCM’s official corporate leniency policy is welcomed from a business perspective, as it alleviates the concerns prospective leniency applicants may have previously had: “It will certainly lead to an increase in the amount of leniency applications received by the CCM”.

According the CCM’s media release, its guideline for leniency applicants will be amended accordingly and an explanatory note will be made available on its website in due course.

Ethiopia Competition Agency Files Charges against Fourteen Metal Producers

By AAT Senior Contributor Stephany Torres

On 28 January 2018 the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (“TCCPA”) filed charges against fourteen Ethiopian rebar, corrugated sheet, steel tube and pipe producers and seven rebar importers respectively for allegedly fixing prices in contravention of Article 7(1) of the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation (“Article 7(1)”), which provides that “(1) An agreement between or concerted practice by, business persons or a decision by association of business persons in a horizontal relationship shall be prohibited if:…(b) it involves, directly or indirectly, fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition, collusive tendering or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers territories or specific types of goods or services”.

It is worth mentioning that in most jurisdictions, which have an active competition law enforcement regime in place, ‘cartel conduct’ (i.e. price fixing, market allocation and/or collusion) is a per se prohibition in that the conduct is prohibited outright, without an examination of the actual effects on competition and without permitting a showing of net efficiency or other pro-competitive defensive arguments.

Where cartel conduct is prohibited per se, the relevant competition authorities require no further proof other than the existence of the agreement or concerted practice which underpins the conduct.  The conduct is simply presumed to have negative effects on the relevant market.

Article 7(1) of the TCCPA, however, is not a per se prohibition and is based on the ‘rule-of-reason’ standard – effectively permitting respondents to lead evidence demonstrating that the alleged conduct can be justified by pro-competitive, technology or efficiency gain justifications which outweigh any anti-competitive effect.

From a policy perspective, Africa competition lawyer Michael-James Currie notes that the permissibility of the ‘rule of reason defence’ is largely due to the fact that a respondent who is found to have contravened Article 7(1) of the TCCPA is liable to a penalty calculated at fifteen percent of the respondent’s annual turnover. This is a prescribed penalty. For non-cartel conduct, the penalty ranges between 5-10%.

Of the aforementioned fourteen Ethiopian steel producers; three manufacture reinforcement bars, namely East Steel PLC, Habesha Steel Mills PLC and Saint Nail PLC.  Six are involved in manufacturing corrugated sheets namely; Ethiopian Steel Profile, Ethiopian Steel PLC, Kombolcha Steel Products Industry PLC (KOSPI), a subsidiary of MIDROC Technology Group and Bazeto PLC and amongst the five manufacturers of steel tubes and pipes are Walia Steel Industry PLC and Mame Steel PLC.

The seven rebar importers accused of price fixing include Dag Trading PLC, Aberus PLC, Berhe Hagos PLC, Marka Trading, Beranea Yeshene and Haileselassie Amabye PLC.

Andreas Stargard, competition counsel with Primerio Ltd. notes that the trigger event for engaging in the alleged price fixing was the fifteen percent devaluation of the birr by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) in October 2017 which may have influenced retailers and wholesalers to look for ways of recouping losses by raising prices for their goods and services.

It is, however, in fellow Primerio Director John Oxenham’s view, unlikely for a well-executed price-fixing cartel to be created ad hoc without any pre-existing information exchange structure.  Therefore, pre-existing trade association, interest groups or other vehicles are commonly used as the enabling platform for competitors to engage in collusive conduct.

The defendants are scheduled to submit their response to the Tribunal on February 20, 2018.

The metal and related products sector is a priority sector in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian government is investigating a greater number of business entities involved in the production and importation of metal and metal related products who are also suspected of allegedly fixing prices.

Adverse effects of price-fixing: East Africa recognises drawbacks

It is not really news, but worth mentioning as it is literally happening simultaneously: As the most developed antitrust enforcement jurisdiction in Africa, South Africa, charges ahead with heavy-handed actions, such as denying alleged currency manipulators “access to file” in the investigative process, or accusing two livestock-feed processors of colluding in the sales and pricing of animal feed ‘peel pulp’, the East African nations lag behind.

What is news, however, is that they have begun to recognise the shortcoming and the adverse effects of collusion and other anti-competitive conduct on their economies: Andreas Stargard, an antitrust lawyer with Primerio Ltd., notes that the head of the East African Community (EAC), Mr. Liberat Mfumukeko, recently addressed ongoing antitrust violations in the EAC: “The Secretary denounced anti-competitive practices (cartels and the like) as serious obstacles to obtaining foreign direct investment in the region.  Moreover, he recognised the violations as ‘impeding effective competition’ and thereby directly hurting African consumers,” says Stargard.

Mr Mfumukeko is quoted as stating: “The EAC markets pose challenges to investors and consumers including the charging of high prices arising from anti-competitive practices such as cartels. These practices impede effective competition in the markets.”

Within the EAC, Stargard notes, the primary jurisdictions with operational antitrust regimes are Kenya and Tanzania, with others such as Uganda lagging behind even farther, having no competition legislation or only having draft bills under review.  Most other nations lag behind, although, as Mr. Stargard observes, many are part of the broader COMESA competition regime.  “The COMESA rules, however, have thus far been enforced with a primary objective of merger regulation,” he says, “effectively failing to police any collusive conduct in the close to two dozen member states at all, despite the explicit prohibition thereof in the COMESA regulations.”

South African Competition Commission charges furniture removal company with record number of charges

by Meghan Eurelle

The South African Competition Commission has charged Stuttaford Van Lines, a furniture removal company, with 649 counts of collusive tendering related to hundreds of tenders to transport government furniture. This the largest number of charges faced by a single company in the history of anti-cartel enforcement by the Commission.

The tenders include those issued by the Presidency, Parliament, the National Prosecuting Authority, the South African Secret Service, the South African Police Service, the South African Revenue Services and the Public Protector, among others.

It is likely that the case emanates from the 2010 complaint against the industry that uncovered widespread and deep rooted anti-competitive and collusive conduct in the furniture removal market. The Commission’s investigation revealed Stuttaford colluded with its competitors from at least 2007 through cover quotes.

All the companies alleged to have colluded with Stuttafords, such as JH Retief Transport, Cape Express Removals, Patrick Removals and De Lange Transport, have subsequently settled with the Commission but the case against Stuttaford has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication.

The Commission is asking the Tribunal to fine the furniture removal company 10 percent of its annual turnover on each of the 649 charges. The Commission’s approach of seeking an administrative penalty in respect of each alleged contravention means that the 10% statutory cap will be applied, on the Commission’s version, for each contravention.

Namibian Supreme Court rules Competition Commission has no Jurisdiction Over Medical Aid Fund Members

By AAT contributors Charl van der Merwe and Aurelie Cassagnes

On 19 July 2017, the Namibian Supreme Court, was tasked with settling a long standing dispute (not the first of its kind) as to whether or not the Respondents fell within the jurisdiction of the Namibian Competition Commission (NCC) in terms of the Namibian Competition Act of 2003 (Namibian Act). The case was brought on appeal by the Namibian Medical Aid Funds (NAMAF) and its members (collectively referred to as the Respondents).

After an investigation lasting a couple of years, the NCC announced in November 2015 that it had considered the behaviour of the Respondents in setting a “benchmark tariff” and found that the practice amounted to Price Fixing in contravention of section 23 of the Namibian Act. The Respondents, in pre-empting the commission’s planned litigation, disputed the NCC’s jurisdiction. The High Court found in favour of the NCC which led to the appeal by the Respondents to the Namibian Supreme Court.

Benchmark tariffs, in short, is a recommended fee, payable to doctors, at which medical aid expenses and consultations are covered. The issues surrounding benchmark tariffs has sparked debate across Africa with ‘those for’ arguing that without them, the medical profession would be “nothing short of economic lawlessness” whilst critics argue that it is “quietly killing off the health-care profession”.

The Namibian High Court, in finding against the Respondents, confirmed the NCC’s jurisdiction over the matter and ruled that determining and recommending a benchmark tariff for medical services was unlawful because it amounted to fixing a selling price. The court, in making its decision, held that “The funds’ activities in formulating a benchmark tariff were not ‘designed to achieve a non-commercial socioeconomic objective’. Rather, it was to produce and distribute wealth.” (Own emphasis)

The main issue to be decided on appeal by the Namibian Supreme Court, however, was not whether the benchmark tariff amounted to a contravention of the Namibian Act, but rather, whether the NCC had jurisdiction over the matter. In other words, whether the Respondents were included under the definition of ‘undertakings’ in terms of the Namibian Act.  Chapter 1 of the Namibian Act provides that:

An “’undertaking’ means any business carried on for gain or reward by an individual, a body corporate, an unincorporated body of persons or a trust in the production supply or distribution of goods or the provision of any service”

The Namibian Supreme Court found that the Respondents were not a “business carried on for gain or reward” and, therefore, were not subject to the provisions of the Namibian Act. As such, the Namibian Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s decision, leaving NAMAF and its members to continue the use of benchmark tariffs.

The South African Competition Tribunal (SACT) had similarly dealt with this issue in a series of Orders during the course of 2004 and 2005 (see the Hospital Association of South Africa and the Board of Healthcare Funders of Southern Africa). In this regard, the SACT found that the relevant medical schemes (the Respondents) fell within the ambit of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 (South African Act) and, accordingly, imposed an administrative penalty on the Respondents for “benchmarking tariffs”.

In its consent orders, the South African Competition Commission (SACC), despite mentioning that the Respondents were “an association incorporated not for gain in terms of the company laws in South Africa”, held that the Respondents are an association of firms that “determines, recommends and published tariffs to and/or for its members; and which recommendations has the effect of fixing a purchase price

Furthermore, the SACC, condemned the ‘benchmarking tariffs system’ put in place by the Respondents and argued, despite the fact that the health care professionals were still largely free to determine their own fees, publishing these recommendations amounted to price-fixing which is a per se contravention in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the South African Competition Act.

Accordingly, the differing approaches in Namibia and South Africa come down to the interpretation of what entities fall within the umbrella of the respective Competition Acts.