AAT, cartels

South Africa: Motor vehicle finance institutions referred to the Competition Tribunal for alleged collusion

By Gina Lodolo

On 3 February 2022, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), released a press statement confirming that the SACC has made a referral to the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) to prosecute FirstRand Bank Limited (“First Rand”), Wesbank, and Toyota Financial Services South Africa Limited (“TFS”) (jointly “Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions”) for allegations of a violation of Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended (“Act”).

In this regard, Section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that :

an agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if-(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: (ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services”

Generally, once the SACC has initiated a complaint and found that a prohibited practice has  been established, it must refer the complaint to the  Competition Tribunal. Wesbank (as a division of FirstRand) and TFS allegedly prevented competition by entering into a shareholders agreement containing non-compete clauses. The SACC press statement provides that the Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions allocated markets because they are ‘suppose to compete’, which means that they are firms in a horizontal relationship.  In particular, the shareholders agreement included clauses ‘that prohibit[ed] WesBank from offering vehicle finance to customers seeking to purchase vehicles at authorised Toyota dealerships’. Further, Wesbank was also prohibited from financing specific vehicles, being ‘the “new” TOYOTA, LEXUS and HINO vehicles and any “used” vehicles sold through any authorised Toyota dealership, except McCarthy Group’.

Should the Competition Tribunal indeed find that the Motor Vehicle Finance Institutions violated the Act, Section 59 of the Act provides that the Competition Tribunal can impose an administrative penalty of up to 10% of the firm’s annual turnover for engaging in a prohibited practice. Further, if the same firms are found to repeat the conduct, an administrative penalty for a repeat offence can be up to 25% of the firm’s annual turnover.  

Primerio Director Michael-James Currie notes that cartel conduct in South Africa constitutes a criminal offence and respondents found liable are also potentially at risk of follow-on civil damages.

To view the full press statement click here

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AAT exclusive, cartels, COMESA, commissioners, exclusivity, Meet the Enforcers, RPM

New CCC Chief addresses World Competition Day, lays out future of COMESA antitrust policy

As we previously reported, long-time COMESA Competition Commission executive, Dr. Willard Mwemba, was recently promoted to his new role of permanent CEO of the CCC, after having been appointed Acting Director in February of this year. In this new capacity, he recently gave a thus-far unreported speech on the occasion of “World Competition Day” on December 5th, 2021.

In his short address, Dr. Mwemba lays out the mid-term future he envisions for the antitrust policy under his aegis in the Common Market, as follows.

Highlighting the importance of competition law for efficient and fair markets, with the goal of benefiting businesses (as opposed to being perceived as an impediment to business interests), Mwemba mentions key building blocks of the CCC’s enforcement going forward. These include resale-price maintenance and exclusive-dealing enforcement (around 1-1:30 in the little-known video, which has thus far only garnered two dozen views on the YouTube platform and is not yet published on the CCC’s own web site). He then moves on to merger regulation (2:45 onward), and further discusses the importance of the effectiveness of the actual competition law itself — noting that the CCC plans to amend its Regulations and Guidelines within the next year (3:40). Noting that the CCC cannot undertake this process very well alone, Mwemba highlights the cooperative approach of the Commission, partnering with and relying on other groups and stakeholders (such as the COMESA Women in Business group, OECD, and others).

Mwemba notes that the CCC’s “focus for the year 2022 will be on strict enforcement, especially against blatant anti-competitive conduct and blatant violations of the COMESA Competition Regulations, and in this case I mean cartels.  It is said that cartels are the supreme evil of antitrust … because it robs consumers, government, and businesses of huge sums…  So in line with this theme, our focus for 2022 shall be on cartels, and we shall make sure that we weed out all possible or potential cartels operating in the Common Market.”

The CCC chief concludes his address by saying that competition authorities “are not there to frustrate businesses, we are not the enemy of business”; instead, he sees the CCC’s role to ensure that markets operate fairly for all — a welcome reminder to the southern and eastern African business community to understand and embrace the precepts of antitrust law as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism for trading in the Common Market.

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cartels, collusion, COMESA, Kenya

Single Brush Stroke Stops Paints Cartel in its Tracks

Three years after an intricate East-African antitrust saga involving global European and Asian paint manufacturers, the industry is in the region’s competition-law news again.

Upon receiving allegations of cartel-like practices between paint makers and undisclosed distributors in 2018, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) launched an investigation into the suspected companies. The investigations later uncovered that four firms, namely: Crown Paints, Basco Products Limited, Kansai Plascon and Galaxy Paints (Companies) were guilty of collusion and price fixing which subjected the purchaser to unreasonably high prices for various paint brands. The CAK has since revealed this to Parliament and handed down its finding on the alleged ant-competitive behavior.

Crown Paints has a flagship brand called DuraCoat, which includes paint products for both interior and exterior finishing (painting and waterproofing). Dura Brands’ exposed collusion with the other three companies sparked fears that consumers have been buying these products at largely inflated prices. This is particularly significant given that Crown Paints is listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange and is a heavyweight in the local paints market, with subsidiaries in Uganda and Tanzania.

Ruth Mosoti, Primerio Ltd.’s Kenyan competition practitioner, notes that the “CAK ultimately found that all four companies were in direct contravention of section 31 of the Competition Act, which addresses restrictive trade practices that prohibit companies from colluding with one another in order to determine product prices, as well as control when and to whom they will offer pricing discounts. CAK alleges that these are all anti-competitive behaviors that are to the detriment of the consumer as well as other, outside competitors.”

The authority making preliminary findings that the parties were involved in anti-competitive agreements on price fixing, discount structure and transport charges.” – Stated by the CAK in its latest report tabled before parliament.

In line with section 36(c) and (d) of the Act, the CAK is entitled to impose financial penalties “to remedy or reverse the infringement or the effects thereof” which may span “up to ten percent of the immediately preceding year’s gross annual turnover in Kenya of the undertaking or undertakings in question”.

Of the four Companies, Basco Products Limited was the only company that did not challenge the CAK’s preliminary ruling and paid the penalty amount of Sh20.799 million for the infringement. The company further agreed to abstain from committing any similar breach in the future. While the other companies initially appealed the decision handed down by the CAK, AAT staff have now learned that up to 3 of the accused firms have opted to settle, having withdrawn their appeals.

COMESA

It is also pivotal to note that on the 25th of February 2021, the COMESA Competition Commission (Commission) issued a cautionary note specifically pertaining to the consequences of forming barriers to trade.

The Commission made reference to Article 16 of the Regulations which prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which: (a) may affect trade between Member States; and (b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market”.

The abovementioned contravention is evident in the case at hand, with the Commission going on to state that it “…will work closely with the national competition authorities in the Member States to ensure that offenders are detected, investigated and punished”. Furthermore, there is particular focus on “hard enforcement through screening, detection, investigation and punishment of offenders”.

The detrimental consequences arising from the conduct of these firms is not only prejudicial towards the customer due to the fact that price-fixing also excludes rival organizations that do not agree to the collusive setting of prices from competing in the same market. Therefore, the steps taken by the CAK and COMESA are paving the way to a healthy and competitive marketplace.

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AAT exclusive, cartels, collusion, East Africa, Kenya, leniency, leniency / amnesty, Price fixing, Whistleblower reward

New Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Scheme: Are ‘Paltry’ Rewards & Anonymity Enough?

As of January 1st, 2021, Kenya’s competition-law enforcer, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK), started benefitting from its new “Informant Reward Scheme” (IRS). The IRS encourages “confidential informants” — often also referred to as “whistleblowers” — privy to inside information about antitrust offenses to come forward and report the illicit conduct to the Authority.

The IRS incentivizes informants with promises of anonymity as well as — rather modest, as we will see — monetary rewards: the CAK vows to maintain the confidentiality of the informant’s identity, and provides for up to Sh1,000,000 (approximately US$9,100 at today’s Fx rate).

Andreas Stargard, a competition lawyer active on the African continent, has delved more deeply into the CAK’s enabling “Guidelines” document, trying to ascertain the precise contours of the IRS program. He reports as follows:

AfricanAntitrust.com: “Who is eligible to participate in the IRS?”

Andreas Stargard: “What we know from the implementing Guidelines, and also from Director General Kariuki‘s speech on the IRS, is that only third parties or those individuals playing merely a remote and peripheral role in relation to the anti-competitive conduct are eligible to benefit from the IRS. This means that a 3rd-party customer, or a non-executive employee such as a secretary or copy clerk of the offending company, may report wrongdoing under the IRS.”

AAT: “What about insiders with executive authority, then?”

Stargard: “Similar to Western countries’ antitrust regimes, those individuals can still report illicit conduct by their employers, but they would have to resort to the Kenyan leniency process as opposed to the Informant Reward Scheme.”

AAT: “Understood. Are there other, similar whistleblower schemes in existence?”

Stargard: “Yes. We recently held a very timely webinar with leading international and African experts on the topic of whistleblowing, which I moderated. A recording of it is available on the web. Whistleblowing has become an important piece of the enforcement puzzle for many governmental authorities around the globe, not only on competition issues. In Kenya, specifically, President Kenyatta recently doubled the rewards for tax-fraud whistleblowers, who are now entitled to receive up to Sh5,000,000 ($45,000), and the country’s revenue service implemented the so-called iWhistle portal to allow informants to report tax fraud anonymously.”

AAT: “Speaking of money, what is your take on the amount of the offered reward under the terms of the IRS?”

Stargard: “Frankly speaking, one million Kenyan shillings is a paltry sum. I cannot comprehend how reporting a competition-law violation such as a price-fixing cartel that may cost the Kenyan economy and its consumers billions in losses is deserving of 5-times less reward than an informant reporting an individual’s tax fraud to the revenue service, which may cause significantly less injury to the government purse than an international cartel of corporates…”

AAT: “Strong words.”

Stargard: “I’m serious. Compare and contrast the meager sum of not even US$10,000 maximum IRS reward with the potential 5-year prison sentence liability for executives convicted of collusion! There is simply no comparison…”

AAT: “In a perfect world, what would you change about the Kenyan whistleblower scheme?”

Stargard: “If I had had any input into the process of devising the IRS Guidelines, I would have ensured that the maximum reward amount be commensurate with the economic harm and financial damage done by cartels — in short, I would raise the IRS reward to an un-capped straight-up percentage portion of the fines recovered by the CAK. The more, the better for everyone.”

AAT: “Do you have any parting words or final observations on the IRS program for our readers?”

Stargard: “Well, for starters, it is not too late to implement changes to the regime. The CAK (and the legislature, to the extent necessary) can easily increase the maximum reward, as I proposed earlier. I am certain that it would yield better results than the current Sh1m cap, which can easily be ‘outbid’ by an already-corrupt employer, seeking to ‘buy’ its employees’ loyalty! So, Mr. Kariuki, if you’re reading this interview, I’d strongly suggest considering an increase in the reward.

Secondly, from our international experience, we know one thing about ‘secret’ informant schemes: One key element of any successful whistleblower regime (besides ensuring adequate rewards) is the strictest maintenance of confidentiality of the informant’s identity. I realize that section ‘F’ of the Guidelines assures the public that anonymity will be guaranteed and that the CAK will ‘take utmost care to ensure that the identity of the confidential informant is not disclosed.’ However, as an attorney, I can only say that the proof is in the pudding. We will have to wait for the first proceedings pursuant to IRS-provided reports, in order to determine whether or not the whistleblowers’ anonymity will indeed be preserved successfully in practice. That said, I look forward to advising clients on the many issues that are likely going to arise from the Scheme!”

AAT: “Thank you for your time and insights on this new development!”

CAK Director General Wang’ombe Kariuki
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AAT exclusive, cartels, collusion, COMESA, Malawi, meddling, Price fixing, Unfair Competition

Abusing antitrust enforcement for personal gain? Malawi’s Competition Agency Misled by Textbook Competitor

textbooks

As it turns out, some savvy ‘entrepeneurs’ have been able to use competition-law enforcement on the African continent to their personal gain, namely by making misleading — if not outright false — accusations against their competitors, thereby triggering an antitrust investigation, and even causing this venerable publication to report on such.  We have been made aware by the initial “target” company (now, as it turns out, the actual “victim”) of the Malawi investigation that one of its competitors in the textbook market had essentially weaponized the CFTC’s investigative powers by launching direct and indirect accusations against Mallory International that triggered the probe.  In the end, the CFTC concluded that none of the purported cartel conduct actually occurred.

To be clear and to avoid any doubt: Mallory International was cleared of any misconduct allegation.  The Editor has reviewed conclusive evidence of the CFTC’s closure of this investigation in August of 2018.  “What remains to be seen is whether or not the agency might use its powers to pursue the perpetrators of this inherently anti-competitive attack of false accusations (which coincidentally also wasted government resources) any further,” says AAT Editor Andreas Stargard, pointing to the underlying nature of such false claims as “quintessential unfair competition that should neither enjoy immunity from prosecution nor escape government scrutiny.”

For background, in our original reporting on this case (entitled “CFTC Investigates Foreign Textbook Supplier in Cartel Probe“), we had written as follows:

In a potential first, Malawi’s Competition and Fair Trade Commission’s (CFTC) Chief Executive Officer, Ms Charlotte Malonda, recently announced that the CFTC is investigating a UK-based supplier of textbooks, Mallory International, for alleged cartel conduct.  Mallory had partnered up with a local company, Maneno Books Investments, as part of a joint venture, called “Mallory International JV Maneno Enterprise”.  In addition, other companies also being investigated include Jhango Publishers, South African based Pearson Education Africa, Dzuka Publishing Company and UK based Trade Wings International.  
The investigation follows complaints received by the Human Rights Consultative Committee as well as a number of its constituent civil society organisations and NGOs.  The allegations include price fixing and collusive tendering vis-à-vis tenders issued by the Malawian government for the supply of pupils’ text books.  [Editor’s Note: “Contrary to the statements in our original article, the actual complaint by HRCC and FND alleged neither price fixing nor collusive bidding. Its main allegation was that unjustified objections were made to contract awards in Malawi, and that attempts were made to dissuade publishers from issuing authorisation letters to particular bidders. Neither of these allegations was true, and no evidence to support either of them was ever produced. The complaint was dismissed by CFTC in August 2018.”]
The Nyasa Times quoted the CFTC head as confirming that the agency had “received a few complaints about allegations of a cartel and other procurement malpractices, hence our commencement of the investigations to get the bottom of the matter.”
Based on the language of Section 50 of the Act suggests that the sanctions for committing an offence in terms of the Act requires the imposition of both a penalty and a five year prison sentence. Although not aware of any case law which has previously interpreted this provision, the wording of the Act is particularly onerous, particularly in light of the per se nature of cartel conduct.
Section 33 of the Competition and Fair Trade Act prohibits collusive tendering and bid rigging per se. Furthermore, a contravention of section 33 is an offence in terms of the Act carries with it not only the imposition of an administrative penalty, which is the greater of the financial gain generated from the collusive conduct or K500 000, but also criminal sanctions, the maximum being a prison sentence of five years, notes Andreas Stargard, a competition attorney:
“The Malawian competition enforcer, under Ms. Malonda’s leadership, has shown significant growth both in terms of bench strength and actual enforcement activity since her involvement began in 2012.”
The Act is not clear what “financial gain” means in this instance and whether the penalty is based on the entire revenue generated by the firm for the specific tender (allegedly tainted by collusion) or whether it applies only to the profit generated from the project. Furthermore, it is unclear how this would apply to a co-cartelist who did not win the tender. The Act may be interpreted that the “losing bidder” is fined the minimum amount of K500 000 which equates to appox. USD 700 (a nominal amount) while the “winner” is penalised the value of the entire tender value (which would be overly prejudicial, particularly if turnover and not profit is used as the basis for financial gain).
Although the investigation has only recently commenced and no respondent has admitted to wrong doing nor has there been a finding of wrongdoing, this will be an important case to monitor to the extent that there is an adverse finding made by the CFTC. Unless the Malawian authorities adopt a pragmatic approach to sentencing offending parties, section 50 of the Act may significantly undermine foreign investment as a literal interpretation of the Act would render Malawi one of the most high risk jurisdictions in terms of potential sanctions from a competition law perspective.
It may also result in fewer firms wishing to partner up with local firms by way of joint ventures as JV’s are a particularly high risk form of collaboration between competitors if there is no clear guidance form the authorities as to how JV’s are likely to be treated from a competition law perspective.

 

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AAT, cartels, dominance, energy, Namibia, South Africa, Uncategorized

Namibia: High Court declares Competition Commission’s search and seizure unlawful

On 9 November 2018, the High Court in Namibia declared a dawn raid conducted by the Namibian Competition Commission (NaCC) in September 2016 to be unlawful. The NaCC raided the premises of PUMA Energy on the basis of alleged abuse of dominance conduct in relation to the sale of aviation fuel at two airports in Namibia.

namibiaPUMA Energy challenged the validity of the search warrant and successfully argued that there was no basis for granting the search warrant. Consequently, the NaCC is obliged to return all documents seized during the raid to PUMA Energies.

In June 2018, the South African Competition Commission also lost a High Court challenge where the validity of a search warrant was at issue. The Pietermaritzburg High Court set aside the search warrant on the basis that the SACC failed to demonstrate that there was a bona fide “reasonable belief” that a prohibited act had been engaged in by the respondents in that case.

Competition lawyer, Michael-James Currie says that the use of search and seizure operations as an enforcement tool is being increasingly used across a number of African jurisdictions. Dawn raids have recently been conducted in Egypt, Kenya and Zambia in addition to Namibia and South Africa.

Currie says while dawn raids have been used effectively by well-established antitrust agencies, search and seizure operations are particularly burdensome on the targets and should only be used in those instances were no other less intrusive investigative tools are available. If competition authorities’ powers are not kept in check there is a material risk that search and seizure powers may be used as “fishing expeditions”.

Primerio director, John Oxenham, points out that the evidentiary threshold required in order to obtain a search warrant is relatively low. It is, therefore, concerning if enforcement agencies subject respondent parties to such an intrusive and resource intensive investigative tool without satisfying the requirements for obtaining a search warrant.

Despite these recent challenges to search warrants, Andreas Stargard, also a partner at Primerio, corroborates Oxenham and Currie’s view that the South African and Namibian competition agencies will continue utilising dawn raids as an investigative tool and in light of the increasingly robust enforcement activities, particularly by the younger competition agencies, companies should ensure that they are well prepared to handle a dawn raid should they be subjected to such an investigation.

 

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CCC workshop participants
AAT exclusive, agriculture, cartels, COMESA, East Africa, event, Extra-judicial Factors, full article, Kenya, Media, mergers, monopsony, Nigeria, Uganda

COMESA competition workshops underway (#CCCworkshop)

Events focus on media & business community’s understanding of competition rules and practical workload of CCC

Media

For two days this week, COMESA will hold its 5th annual “Regional Sensitization Workshop for Business Reporters“, focussed on provisions and application of the COMESA competition regulations and trade developments within the 19-country common market.

Over 30 journalists from close to a dozen countries are expected to participate in the event, held in Narobi, Kenya, from Monday – Tuesday.

AfricanAntitrust.com will cover all pertinent news emerging from the conference.  We will update this post as the conference progresses.

Speakers include a crème de la crème of East African government antitrust enforcement, including the CCC’s own Willard Mwemba (head of M&A), the CCC’s Director Dr. George Lipimile, and the Director and CEO of the Competition Authority of Kenya, Francis Wang’ombe Kariuki.  Topics will include news on the rather well-developed area of of mergerenforcement, regional integration & competition policy, as well as the concept of antitrust enforcement by the CCC as to restrictive business practices, an area that has been thus far less developed by the Commission in terms of visibility and actual enforcement, especially when compared to M&A.  We previously quoted Director Lipimile’s statement at a 2014 conference that, since the CCC’s commencement of operations “in January, 2013, the most active provisions of the Regulations have been the merger control provisions.”

Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner, notes:

“We have been impressed with the Commission’s progress to-date, but remain surprised that no cartel cases have emerged from the CCC’s activities.  We believe that the CCC has sufficient capacity and experience now, in its sixth year of existence, to pursue both collusion and unilateral-conduct competition cases.

Personally, I remain cautiously optimistic that the CCC will, going forward, take up the full spectrum of antitrust enforcement activities — beyond pure merger review — including monopolisation/abuse of dominance cases, as well as the inevitable cartel investigations and prosecutions that must follow.”

The media conference will conclude tomorrow evening, June 26th.

Business Community

COMESA Competition Commission logoThe second event, also held in Nairobi, will shift its focus both in terms of attendees and messaging: It is the CCC’s first-ever competition-law sensitization workshop for the Business Community, to take place on Wednesday.  It is, arguably, even more topical than the former, given that the target audience of this workshop are the corporate actors at whom the competition legislation is aimed — invited are not only practicing attorneys, but also Managing Directors, CEOs, company secretaries, and board members of corporations.  It is this audience that, in essence, conducts the type of Mergers & Acquisitions and (in some instances) restrictive, anti-competitive business conduct that falls under the jurisdiction of Messrs. Lipimile, Mwemba, and Kariuki as well as their other domestic African counterparts in the region.

The inter-regional trade component will also be emphasized; as the CCC’s materials note, “we are at a historical moment in time where the Tripartite and Continental Free Trade Area agreements are underway. The objective of these agreements is to realize a single market. Competition law plays a vital role in the realization of this objective, therefore its imperative that journalists have an understanding of how competition law contributes to the Agenda.”

#LiveUpdates from the #CCCworkshop

Kenya perspective

Boniface Kamiti, the CAK representative replacing Mr. Kariuki at the event, noted that Africa in general and including the COMESA region “has a weak competition culture amongst businesses — which is why cartels are continuing in Africa, and the level of M&A is not at the level one would expect.”  This is why media “reporting on competition advocacy is very important, to articulate the benefits of competition policy and how enforcement activities further its goals, so the COMESA countries may be able to compete with other countries, including even the EU members, at a high level.”

He also highlighted — although without further explanation — the “interplay between the COMESA competition laws and those of the member countries; most people are not aware of that!”  This comment is of particular interest in light of the prior jurisdictional tension that had existed between national agencies and the CCC in the past regarding where and when to file M&A deals.  These “teething issues are now fully resolved”, according to Dr. Lipimile, and there are neither de iure nor any de facto merger notification requirements in individual COMESA member states other than the “one-stop shop” CCC filing (which has, according to Mr. Mwemba, reduced parties’ M&A transaction costs by 66%).

On the issue of restrictive trade practices (RTP), the CAK reminded participants that trade associations often serve to facilitate RTP such as price-fixing cartels, which are subject to (historically not yet imposed, nor likely to be) criminal sanctions in Kenya. It also observed that (1) manufacturers’ resale price maintenance (RPM) would almost always be prosecuted under the Kenyan Competition Act, and that (2) since a 2016 legislative amendment, monopsony conduct (abuse of buyer power) is also subject to the Act’s prohibitions.

Concluding, the CAK’s Barnabas Andiva spoke of its “fruitful” collaboration with the CCC on ongoing RTP matters, noting the existing inter-agency Cooperation Agreement. Added Mr. Mwemba, “we have approximately 19 pending RTP cases.”

CCC leadership perspective:  Nudging Uganda and Nigeria towards competition enforcement

CCC_Director

George Lipimile, CEO, COMESA Competition Commission

Dr. Lipimile took up Mr. Kamiti’s “weak African competition culture” point, noting the peculiar regional issue that “between poverty and development lies competition” to enhance consumer welfare.

He took the audience through a brief history of antitrust laws globally, and encouraged journalists to explain the practical benefits of “creating competitive markets” for the population of the COMESA region at large.

He called on Uganda and Nigeria to — finally — enact a competition law.  (AAT has independently reported on Uganda and also the EAC’s emphasis on its member nations having operational antitrust regimes.  We observe that Uganda does have a draft Competition Bill pending for review; a fellow Ugandan journalist at the conference mentioned that there has been some, undefined, progress made on advancing it in the Ugandan legislature.)  Dangote — the vast Nigerian cement conglomerate (see our prior article here) — and Lafarge played exemplary roles in Lipimile’s discourse, in which he commented that “they do not need protecting, they are large”, instead “we need more players” to compete.

Importantly, Dr. Lipimile emphasized that protectionism is anti-competitive, that “competition law must not discriminate,” and that its goal of ensuring competitive market behaviour must not be confused with the objectives of other laws that are more specifically geared to developing certain societal groups or bestow benefits on disadvantaged populations, as these are not the objectives of competition legislation.

The CCC also called on the press to play a more active role in the actual investigation of anti-competitive behaviour, by reporting on bid rigging, unreported M&A activity, suspected cartels (e.g., based on unexplained, joint price hikes in an industry), and the like.  These types of media reports may indeed prompt CCC investigations, Lipimile said.  Current “market partitioning” investigations mentioned by him include Coca Cola, SABMiller, and Unilever.

He concluded with the — intriguing, yet extremely challenging, in our view — idea of expanding and replicating the COMESA competition model on a full-fledged African scale, possibly involving the African Union as a vehicle.

CCC workshop participants

2018 CCC workshop participants

COMESA Trade perspective

The organisation’s Director of Trade & Commerce, Francis Mangeni, presented the ‘competition-counterpart’ perspective on trade, using the timely example of Kenyan sugar imports, the cartel-like structure supporting them, and the resulting artificially high prices, noting the politically-influenced protectionist importation limitations imposed in Kenya.

Dr. Mangeni opined that the CCC “can and should scale up its operations vigorously” to address all competition-related impediments to free trade in the area.

CCC Mergers

Director of M&A, Mr. Mwemba, updated the conference on the agency’s merger-review developments. He pointed to the agency’s best-of-breed electronic merger filing mechanism (reducing party costs), and the importance of the CCC’s staying abreast of all new antitrust economics tools as well as commercial technologies in order to be able to evaluate new markets and their competitiveness (e.g., online payments).

As Mr. Mwemba rightly pointed out, most transactions “do not raise competition concerns” and those that do can be and often are resolved via constructive discussions and, in some cases, undertakings by the affected companies. In addition, the CCC follows international best practices such as engaging in pre-merger notification talks with the parties, as well as follow-ups with stakeholders in the affected jurisdictions.

Key Statistics

Year-to-date (2018), the 24 notified mergers account for approximately $18 billion in COMESA turnover alone. Leading M&A sectors are banking, finance, energy, construction, and agriculture.

In terms of geographic origination, Kenya, Zambia, and Mauritius are the leading source nations of deal-making parties, with Zimbabwe and Uganda closely following and rounding out the Top-5 country list.

The total number of deals reviewed by the CCC since 2013 amounts to 175 with a total transaction value of US $92 billion, accounting for approximately $73.7 billion in COMESA market revenues alone. (The filing fees derived by the Commission have totaled $27.9 million, of which half is shared with the affected member states.)

All notified deals have received approval thus far. Over 90% of transactions were approved unconditionally. In 15 merger cases, the CCC decided to impose conditions on the approval.

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BRICS, cartels, civil action, collusion, South Africa

Shipping cartels: BMW Pursues Civil Damages Claim against certain Carriers

By Stephany Torres

BMW plans to lodge a claim in South Africa for damages against international car-carriers and shipping companies which have been found guilty or have pleaded guilty to competition law contraventions, including Japanese-based Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (“MOL”) and K-Line Shipping South Africa, the local subsidiary of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-Line”), Norway’s Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics AS (“WWL”) and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (“NYK”).  BMW is seeking compensation for the losses it alleges to have suffered as a result of the anti-competitive price-fixing arrangements between the car carriers.

BMWship.jpgBMW’s case stems from an amnesty application, by which MOL approached the South African Competition Commission (“the Commission”) in terms of its Corporate Leniency Policy (“CLP”), which outlines a process through which the Commission may grant a self-confessing cartel member, who approaches the Commission first, immunity for its participation in cartel activity upon the cartel member fulfilling specific requirements which includes providing information and cooperating fully with the Commission’s investigation.  Says John Oxenham, a South African competition lawyer, “if the Commission grants an applicant what is called ‘conditional immunity’, a possible outcome is the complete avoidance of a fine, which could otherwise be calculated at up   to 10% of domestic revenues, including exports.”  That said, conditional antitrust immunity, does not offer full exoneration from potential other liability in respect of the conduct for which the Competition Commission granted immunity.

It is notable that MOL, NYK and WWL subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Commission in prosecuting K-Line.

On further investigation by the Commission it found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL fixed prices, divided markets and tendered collusively in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 in respect of the roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ocean transportation of Toyota vehicles from South Africa to Europe, the Mediterranean Coast of North Africa and the Caribbean Islands via Europe, West Africa, East Africa and the Red Sea.

The Commission’s investigation found that from at least 2002 to 2013 K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL colluded on a tender issued by Toyota SA Motors (“TSAM”) to transport Toyota vehicles from South Africa abroad by sea.  The Commission further found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the number of vessels that they were to operate on the South Africa to Europe routes at agreed intervals or frequencies.

In addition, the Commission found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the freight rates that they were to charge TSAM for the shipment of Toyota vehicles.

International competition authorities including authorities in the US, Canada, Japan, China and Australia investigated this case and, in recent years, imposed large fines on the respective cartelists for engaging in market division and price fixing.  In February 2018, Wallenius Wilhelmsen agreed to pay a large fine to the EU.  Höegh Autoliners has reportedly been summoned to a court meeting in South Africa in March 2018.

 

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cartels, collusion, Media, settlement, South Africa

Media cartel exposed and fined

By AAT Senior Contributor Stephany Torres

Print media companies Independent Media and Caxton & CTP Publishers and Printers (“Caxton”) have agreed to pay an administrative penalties as well as an amount to the Economic Development Fund of over R8 million as part of two separate settlement agreements with the Competition Commission (“The Commission”) after admitting to fixing prices and trading conditions in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act no. 89 of 1998 (“The Competition Act”).

Caxton owns local print media, including the Citizen newspaper and magazines Bona, Rooirose and Farmer’s Weekly, among others.  Independent owns newspapers The Star, Cape Times, Sunday Independent, among others and magazines GQ and GQ Style.

Attorneys from African competition law firm Primerio Ltd. report that this development follows from a 2011 investigation by the Commission into the matter where they found that, through the facilitating vehicle of the Media Credit CoOrdinators (“MCC”) organization, various media companies agreed to offer similar discounts and payment terms to advertising agencies that place advertisements with MCC members.  MCC accredited agencies were offered a 16.5% discount, while non-members were offered 15%.  In addition, the Commission found that the implicated companies employed services of an intermediary company called Corex to perform risk assessments on advertising agencies for purposes of imposing a settlement discount structure and terms on advertising agencies.  “The Commission found that the practices restricted competition among the competing companies as they did not independently determine an element of a price in the form of discount or trading terms”.

In a media release, the Competition Commission confirmed Caxton will pay a fine of R5 806 890.14, and R2 090 480.45 to the Economic Development Fund over three years.  It will also provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies for three years, capped at R15 000 000 per annum.

Independent Media will pay an administrative penalty of R2 220 603 and will contribute R799 417 to the Economic Development Fund over a three-year period, and provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies, over three years and capped at R5 000 000. Independent has also said it would obtain its own credit insurance so small agencies are not required to commit any securities or guarantees in order to book advertising space.

The Economic Development Fund is designed to develop black-owned small media or advertising agencies, which require assistance with start-up capital and will assist black students with bursaries to study media or advertising.

The agreements were confirmed as orders of the Competition Tribunal.

 

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cartels, collusion, legislation, leniency, leniency / amnesty, Mauritius

Enforcement Alert: MU Competition Commission to Permit Cartel Initiators to Seek Leniency

The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) has announced changes to its leniency programme. Though the CCM did have a functioning leniency programme in place since its inception in 2009, the it was often criticised as being inadequate.

Competition lawyer John Oxenham notes that under the existing programme, firms which were found to be cartel ‘initiators’ (an enterprise which has coerced others into a collusive agreement) did not qualify to receive any immunity or other benefit.

John Oxenham

John Oxenham

Oxenham believes that this had led to uncertainty and prevented companies from applying for leniency (which required full disclosure of anti-competitive conduct), as firms may be unsure whether or not they would be considered to be ‘instigators’ (and so be disqualified from receiving immunity from prosecution). This meant that firms often had to weigh the risk of being considered an ‘initiator’ against the risk of prosecution to ultimately decide on whether to apply for leniency.

The CCM had previously identified this aspect as a potential area of concern, which led to the temporary special amnesty programmes under which firms who believed themselves to be ‘initiators’ could apply for leniency. This, according to the CCM, led to various successful leniency applications and related prosecutions.

In its media release of 23 January 2018, CCM executive director Deshmuk Kowlessure stated that “[w]ith respect to leniency programmes, we have observed that several advanced competition authorities have adopted leniency for cartel initiators and coercers…” “Likewise, the CCM has taken a step beyond traditional leniency programmes and we are now extending the possibility for initiators or coercers to apply for leniency.”

The recent amendment, therefore, seeks to formalise the CCM’s previous (temporary) amnesty programme for ‘initiators’ by allowing them to approach the CCM for leniency in return for a 50% reduction in the administrative penalty otherwise payable, says fellow Primerio Ltd. antitrust attorney Andreas Stargard.  “This level of fine reduction is in line with what the CCM has been offering in the past to leniency applicants who were not ‘first through the door’.  Unlike certain other countries, such as the United States, where the Department of Justice offers leniency benefits only to the first successful applicant, Mauritius allows for successive, reduced penalties to subsequent amnesty seekers.”

Corporate leniency policies are widely considered to be the most effective tool in the prosecution of cartel conduct. The CCM’s decision to include ‘initiators’ among those eligible to participate, therefore, not only strengthens its leniency programme but is also a significant step towards the prosecution and enforcement of cartel conduct in Mauritius, as more leniency applications directly imply more prosecutions of fellow cartelists.

Oxenham notes that the inclusion of initiators into the CCM’s official corporate leniency policy is welcomed from a business perspective, as it alleviates the concerns prospective leniency applicants may have previously had: “It will certainly lead to an increase in the amount of leniency applications received by the CCM”.

According the CCM’s media release, its guideline for leniency applicants will be amended accordingly and an explanatory note will be made available on its website in due course.

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