Category: Kenya

AfCFTA Anchors Aweigh: Novel Pan-African Antitrust Regulator Takes Shape

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Having reported on the promise and challenges of the African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”) and its regulatory ambitions previously here, our Editor was fortunate to attend the inaugural AfCFTA conference of competition-law experts this week. Reporting from Lomé, Togo, he relayed an excellently-planned and executed meeting — cleverly scheduled adjacent to the massive annual Biashara Afrika 2026 convention taking place in the Togolese capital this year, drawing thousands of attendees from the trade and commerce world. Together, under the broader umbrella of “Powering Africa’s Economic Transformation through the AfCFTA,” the two events convened policy-makers and business leaders to push for a single market and boosting Africa’s trading position on the global stage.

Over 200 participants attended the antitrust conference, with its theme of “Harnessing Competition as a Catalyst for African Market Integration,” assembled by the leadership of Malick Diallo, Head of AfCFTA’s Competition Division and his Ghana-based team of organizers. The competition-focused meetings at the five-star Hôtel 2 Février were well attended throughout both days, covering topics ranging from the tricky subject of multi-jurisdictional mergers with regional overlaps to digital-market regulation and, importantly, listening to the private bar for their input.

In total, the meeting comprised 5 sessions and 3 keynotes over the course of two days, including speeches by NYU’s Prof. Eleanor Fox, the FCCPC legend Babatunde Irukera, Leonard Ugbajah of ERCA, and the European Commission’s DG COMP as well as OECD. Participants notably took in lessons learned from other regional enforcers (Dr. Willard Mwemba and Alexia Waweru from COMESA, Simeon Koffi, and Mor Backhoum from ECOWAS, the EAC, WAEMU and the AU) as well as National Competition Authorities. The latter ranged from Kenya, Egypt, Tanzania, Nigeria, Mauritius, South Africa, Tunisia, and others to the European Union and delegates from Switzerland and the World Bank. While David Kemei (CAK) and Florence Abebe (FCCPC) spoke on behalf of their agencies, notably absent from the discussion were representatives from the United States enforcement agencies, belying a further retrenchment of the DOJ and FTC’s prior capacity-building activities and international involvement under the current administration.

“I see the AfCFTA as perhaps the single most important building block for a truly cohesive, pan-African trade and commerce community so far,” says AAT’s Editor, Andreas Stargard, who attended the conference in his capacity as a practitioner with Primerio International. “Coming from quite a bit of EU and COMESA multi-national experience, I believe that managing those clearly unavoidable  jurisdictional conflicts in a regional body from the get-go will be crucial to its success, lending credence to the ‘Competition as Catalyst’ theme of the conference…”.

Below is the AfCFTA’s Concept Note, outlining further details surrounding the event:

THE AfCFTA INAUGURAL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW

A joint initiative of the AfCFTA Secretariat, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU)

Theme: 

“Harnessing Competition as a Catalyst for African market integration”

Lome, Togo                                                                                  19-20th May 2026

Introduction

  • Africa is entering a new phase of its economic integration journey. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) — the largest free trade area in the world by number of participating countries — has set in motion a transformation of the continent’s economic architecture. With a combined market of over 1.4 billion people and a GDP approaching USD 3.4 trillion, the AfCFTA offers an unprecedented opportunity to deepen intra-African trade, accelerate industrialisation, and position Africa as a global economic force. Realising that opportunity, however, requires more than the removal of tariffs and border barriers. It requires markets that are genuinely open, contestable, and fair — markets where competition determines outcomes, not the power of incumbents or the distortions of anti-competitive conduct.
  • That is where competition policy comes in. A dynamic, well-enforced competition framework is not a regulatory luxury; it is a foundational condition for the AfCFTA to deliver. It ensures that the gains of trade liberalisation are not captured by dominant incumbents, cartels, or anti-competitive mergers. It creates the conditions for new entrants, innovative businesses, and African SMEs to compete on merit. It underpins consumer welfare, productive investment, and the structural transformation that Africa’s integration agenda demands.
  • To support this vision, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, at its 36th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 18–19 February 2023, adopted the Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy (the “AfCFTA Competition Protocol”). The Protocol establishes a continental competition regime aimed at enhancing competition within the AfCFTA for improved market efficiency, inclusive growth, and the structural transformation of the African economies.
  • At the same time, African competition authorities and policymakers are being asked to grapple with increasingly complex issues: how to manage overlapping national, regional, and continental competition regimes; how to align competition, trade, and industrial policy objectives; how to tackle long‑standing competition problems in transport and logistics; and how to respond to the rapid rise of powerful digital platforms and new forms of market power in the digital economy. Despite significant progress, important gaps remain. A recent survey of competition frameworks conducted by the AfCFTA Secretariat and the OECD found that while 76.2% of surveyed African jurisdictions have a competition law framework in place, significant disparities persist in enforcement capacity, institutional design, and coherence between national, regional, and continental regimes.
  • The AfCFTA Conference on Competition Policy and Law  2026 is conceived as a practical, forward‑looking response to these challenges. Jointly convened by the AfCFTA Secretariat, the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, it provides a continental platform where competition authorities, trade and industrial policymakers, sector regulators, business leaders, legal practitioners, academics and development partners can think together about how competition policy can best support Africa’s integration and development ambitions.
  • The inaugural edition focuses on four interconnected themes that are shaping the continent’s competition agenda today, namely:
  • the emerging architecture of an integrated African competition regime which discusses the interplay between national, regional, and continental competition frameworks;
  • the interaction between competition, trade and industrial policies;
  • competition in the transport and logistics sector as a cornerstone of trade facilitation; and
  • competition and regulation in digital markets.

The Conference is designed not only to exchange experiences, but to generate concrete ideas on how to make these frameworks work in practice for a dynamic and integrated African market.

Conference Theme

  • The theme of the inaugural Africa Competition Conference is “Harnessing Competition as a Catalyst for African market integration”.
  • The theme captures a core belief of the Conference: that competition policy is not simply a compliance obligation, but a powerful driver of economic integration, productive investment, consumer welfare and sustainable development. It challenges participants to reflect on how competition law and enforcement can be shaped, implemented and coordinated across Africa to unlock the full integration gains of the AfCFTA.

Objectives and target audience

  • The overall objective of the Conference is to foster high-level, practical dialogue among competition authorities, regulators, policymakers, business practitioners, academics, and international experts on the key challenges and opportunities in African competition policy; and to generate concrete ideas that can inform future work under the AfCFTA.
  • More specifically, the Conference aims to:
  • Build a shared understanding of how the AfCFTA continental competition framework interacts with existing national and regional regimes, and how overlapping jurisdictions and enforcement responsibilities can be managed effectively;
  • Examine the interaction between competition, trade, and industrial policy under the AfCFTA, with a focus on practical approaches for ensuring coherence and managing tensions in key sectors;
  • Identify priority enforcement and regulatory actions to improve competition in Africa’s transport and logistics sector, with a view to reducing trade costs and facilitating intra-African trade;
  • Advance the understanding and implementation of Article 11 of the AfCFTA Competition Protocol in digital markets, including approaches to economic dependence, gatekeeper designation, and the interpretation of gatekeeper obligations;
  • Solicit practical perspectives from business leaders, legal practitioners, and in-house counsel on how African competition frameworks operate and how they can be strengthened; and
  • Lay the groundwork for a programme of future cooperation, technical work, and capacity-building under the AfCFTA, in partnership with the OECD, EU, regional economic communities, and other partners.

Conference Sessions: Background, Key Issues and Structure

Session 1: The triangle of policies – Competition, trade and industrial policy in Africa

  • Africa’s development strategy relies on an active industrial policy to build productive capacity and accelerate structural transformation, trade policy to manage market access across borders, and competition policy to discipline anti-competitive conduct. These three policy strands share the overarching goal of improving economic performance but can generate significant tensions, particularly at the sectoral level. The way in which these policies interact depends both on their underlying objectives as well as on the way in which they are designed and implemented.
  • Industrial policy instruments such as state aid, sector-specific incentives, special economic zones, and strategic procurement can create market distortions when poorly designed or captured by incumbents. Trade measures such as anti-dumping duties may protect domestic industries at the cost of consumer welfare. Conversely, aggressive competition enforcement, if not carefully attuned to development context, can undermine legitimate scale‑building and coordination efforts that industrial policy seeks to foster. Getting the balance right is one of the defining policy challenges for African integration.
  • This session draws on case studies from Africa and comparative experiences from other regions to explore practical approaches workable within the AfCFTA framework. It will examine:
  • Where competition, trade, and industrial policy are consistent and reinforce each other — and where tensions arise in practice;
  • The role of competition authorities as institutional voices  supporting a pro-competitive design or implementation of industrial and trade policy processes;How State Parties, RECs and the AfCFTA can promote policy convergence across the three domains; and
  • Lessons from jurisdictions that have successfully balanced competition and industrial policy goals.
  • Critical issues: Can African industrial policy ambitions be pursued without sacrificing the competitive market structures that drive long-term productivity? What role should competition authorities play in designing and reviewing industrial policy measures and what policy instruments should be considered to ensure industrial policies are pro-competitive? What level of convergence in competition, trade and industrial policy is realistic and desirable under the AfCFTA, and how can State Parties, RECs and AfCFTA institutions sequence this convergence over time? Which concrete experiences from other regions in aligning industrial strategy with competition rules are most transferable to African conditions, and what adaptations are required to make them fit the AfCFTA context?

Session 2: Towards an integrated African continental competition regime – The interplay between national, regional, and continental competition frameworks

  • Africa’s competition landscape is being reshaped by the AfCFTA Competition Protocol, which adds a continental layer to existing national laws and regional regimes such as those of COMESA, ECOWAS, the EAC and WAEMU. This deepens the integration architecture but also raises practical questions about overlapping jurisdictions, potentially conflicting obligations and greater regulatory complexity for businesses operating across borders. A central concern for practitioners, authorities and policymakers is how these interlocking regimes will function day to day.
  • This session will explore the emerging architecture of an integrated African competition regime. Discussions will cover:
  • The distinct features of existing supranational frameworks and their interaction with national laws and the AfCFTA regime;
  • The opportunities and challenges of cross-border enforcement, including coordinated investigations, merger control, and cooperation between national and regional bodies;
  • How businesses can navigate an evolving multi-level regulatory landscape;
  • Lessons from comparable supranational architectures, including the EU; and
  • The status of AfCFTA competition regulations and the roadmap to operationalisation.
  • Critical issues: How can concurrent jurisdiction be managed to minimise conflict and duplication, while fostering consistent outcomes? What institutional and procedural mechanisms are needed to coordinate enforcement between national authorities, REC bodies, and the future AfCFTA Competition Authority? How can the continental regime support, rather than burden, smaller jurisdictions with nascent competition frameworks?

Session 3: Levelling the playing field – Competition in Africa’s transport and logistics sector

  • The transport and logistics sector constitutes a cornerstone for the development of an integrated internal market in Africa. However, transport and logistics costs are among the highest globally, operating as a de facto tariff on intra‑African trade. Regulatory shortcomings and anti‑competitive conduct in this sector are a major part of the problem: restrictive and onerous licensing and access regimes, fragmented multi‑modal regulation across borders, cartels in road freight, concentrated control over ports and terminals and gaps in essential infrastructure access all depress trade, push up prices and undermine the competitiveness of African producers.
  • As the AfCFTA deepens tariff liberalisation, the relative importance of logistics costs as a constraint on trade increases. Sector-specific regulatory assessment and reform, complemented by robust competition enforcement, is therefore a necessary companion to trade liberalisation. This session brings together competition authorities, transport regulators, corridor agencies, and industry representatives to identify the main sources of competitive harm, share enforcement and regulatory experience, and discuss targeted reforms.
  • The session will address:
  • How existing regulatory frameworks (licensing, concessions, access rules, corridor agreements) shape market structure and entry, and where they unintentionally hinder access, increase discretionary powers and entrench monopolies or cartels;
  • The main patterns of anti‑competitive conduct in key transport and logistics markets (road freight, ports and terminals, aviation, multimodal logistics), and how they affect prices, service quality and reliability;
  • The Yamoussoukro Decision and Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) from a competition perspective;
  • Practical cooperation models between competition authorities, transport regulators and corridor institutions for investigating and remedying harmful practices;
  • The role of competition assessments and market studies in informing transport and logistics reform under the AfCFTA; and
  • How to incorporate competition objectives into ongoing regional infrastructure initiatives and corridor development programmes.
  • Critical issues: How can competition authorities and transport regulators coordinate to address practices that span their respective mandates? Which regulatory reforms would most effectively improve contestability in key transport markets? How can the AfCFTA regime support an effective and coordinated approach to removing competition barriers in logistics?

Session 4: Competing in the digital age – Digital trade, platform markets, and Article 11 of the AfCFTA Competition Protocol

  • Digital trade is reshaping African markets and will increasingly determine whether African businesses and consumers participate competitively in the broader global economy. Africa’s digital economy is characterised by fast-growing platform markets, expanding mobile and fintech ecosystems, and the rapid penetration of digital intermediaries into commerce, payments, logistics, and communications. This creates new opportunities but also new forms of market power and dependence.
  • Article 11 of the AfCFTA Competition Protocol is the continent’s primary legal tool for tackling competition concerns in digital markets. It introduces the notion of “economic dependence”, prohibits abuses of that dependence that significantly harm competition in the AfCFTA market, sets out a detailed list of forbidden practices for core platforms (such as self‑preferencing, certain parity and anti‑steering arrangements, tying, and unjustified limits on data portability and interoperability), and mandates the development of a Regulation to identify and subject “gatekeeper” platforms to these obligations.
  • At the same time, the AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol, adopted in February 2024, sets harmonised rules on e‑commerce, data flows and digital identities, making coherence between competition and digital trade rules an important implementation challenge.
  • The session will explore:
  • Defining and assessing economic dependence in African digital markets in practice; what indicators and evidence are relevant, and how this differs from standard dominance analysis;
  • The specific prohibited practices in Article 11; how they should be interpreted, which are most relevant to African market realities, and what enforcement challenges they present;
  • Options for a gatekeeper designation framework under Article 11(5), drawing on the EU Digital Markets Act and other international experience while calibrating criteria and thresholds to African conditions;
  • The enforcement capacity and institutional tools that authorities need to investigate digital platform conduct under Article 11; and
  • The interface between Article 11 and the Digital Trade Protocol on data portability, interoperability, and access to data.
  • Critical issues: How should economic dependence be assessed where multi-homing is possible but switching costs are high? What designation criteria would be both rigorous and proportionate for African digital markets? How can authorities with limited resources build capacity to investigate platform conduct? How can coherence between Article 11 and the Digital Trade Protocol be ensured?

Special Segment: The Lome Roundtable: Voices from business and the bar

  • This special segment departs from the formal panel format to provide an open forum where business leaders, legal practitioners, and in-house counsel engage directly with competition authorities and policymakers. The Lome Roundtable is designed to bring out the day‑to‑day concerns and realities of dealing with African competition regimes: compliance costs, merger clearance timelines, enforcement unpredictability, market access barriers, and the challenges of navigating multi-level competition regimes, that may not be fully visible from a purely institutional perspective.
  • The Roundtable reflects the Conference’s commitment to ensuring that competition law serves not only as an enforcement instrument but as a framework that enables businesses to operate, grow, and trade across African borders with confidence. Open and structured dialogue between enforcers and the business community is a hallmark of mature competition systems, and the Lome Roundtable is designed to institutionalise this practice at the AfCFTA level.
  • It will address:
    • Practical experience with African competition regimes: what works, what creates uncertainty, and what imposes disproportionate compliance costs;
  • How authorities can improve transparency, predictability, and responsiveness including in merger review, guidelines, and stakeholder engagement;
  • The specific challenges of operating across multiple overlapping competition jurisdictions; and
  • Practical suggestions for how the relevant stakeholder can improve competition frameworks from a business perspective.
  • Critical issues: What are the most significant compliance and enforcement challenges for businesses operating across African borders? How can merger review be made more streamlined and predictable? What kinds of guidance, tools or platforms would most help businesses navigate overlapping competition regimes?

Expected Outcomes

  • The expected outcomes of the Conference include:
  • A shared, practical understanding of how the AfCFTA continental competition framework interacts with regional and national regimes and the roadmap for its operationalisation;
  • Concrete insights and practical approaches for managing the interaction between competition, trade, and industrial policies at the national, regional, and continental levels;
  • A set of regulatory actions and priority enforcement to identify and address regulatory barriers and anti-competitive practices in Africa’s transport and logistics sector, with concrete suggestions for cooperation between competition authorities and sector regulators;
  • Key questions, indicators, and options for implementing Article 11 of the AfCFTA Competition Protocol in digital markets — including ideas for a gatekeeper designation framework and priority areas for guidance and capacity-building; and
  • Practical suggestions from business leaders and legal practitioners on improving the clarity, predictability, and accessibility of African competition frameworks.

‘Antitrust-Adjacent’: Kenya’s Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026: Building a Practical and Coherent Framework for AI Regulation and Governance

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In this new series, entitled “Antitrust-Adjacent,” AAT covers relevant developments of interest & adjacent to competition-law issues. Our first installment on AI Regulation is co-authored by Kenya Primerio Partner Fidel Mwaki and Alfred Nyaga.

By Fidel Mwaki & Alfred Nyaga

Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping Kenya’s digital economy. From financial services and telecommunications to healthcare, logistics and digital platforms, AI systems increasingly underpin critical decision-making and service delivery across both the public and private sectors.

The introduction of Kenya’s Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026 (the Bill) marks a significant milestone as the country seeks to articulate a comprehensive regulatory and governance framework for AI.

However, as Kenya moves toward formalising this framework, several foundational questions arise. Does the Bill effectively regulate AI systems? How should institutional oversight be structured? What would a practical regulatory model look like in the Kenyan context? And what governance architecture is required to ensure responsible, transparent and innovation-friendly deployment of AI?

Key Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry

To strengthen the effectiveness and practicality of Kenya’s Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026, the following considerations may be useful:

  1. Establish clear and operational risk classification criteria


Define objective and measurable criteria for determining what constitutes a high-risk AI system. This should enable developers and deployers to assess compliance obligations at the design stage and reduce regulatory uncertainty.

  • Introduce a framework for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models


Recognise the growing role of GPAI models as foundational infrastructure and consider tailored obligations around transparency, accountability and safe deployment.

  • Adopt a sector-sensitive regulatory approach


Different sectors present different AI risks. The framework should enable coordination with sector regulators such as finance, telecommunications and healthcare to ensure context-specific oversight.

  • Clarify liability and accountability across the AI lifecycle


Establish a clear allocation of responsibility between developers, deployers and users of AI systems, particularly where systems are used in decision-making with real-world consequences.

  • Strengthen institutional coordination mechanisms


Provide clear guidance on how the proposed AI Commissioner will coordinate with existing regulators, including the ODPC, CA, CBK, CAK and other sector bodies, to avoid duplication and regulatory fragmentation.

  • Provide for independent oversight and audit mechanisms


Introduce provisions for AI audits, documentation standards and oversight processes, particularly for high-risk systems and sensitive applications.

  • Embed flexibility through phased and adaptive regulation


Allow for the framework to evolve through secondary regulations, guidelines and regulatory sandboxes, ensuring responsiveness to technological developments without creating uncertainty.

These measures would help ensure that Kenya’s AI regulatory framework is practical, coordinated and capable of supporting both innovation and responsible deployment.

Understanding the Regulatory Gaps: Does the Bill Effectively Regulate AI Systems?

The Bill places considerable emphasis on high-risk AI systems. While this approach mirrors developments in jurisdictions such as the European Union, it is not immediately clear how developers or deployers are expected to determine whether an AI system falls within that category.

In practice, this classification becomes one of the most important compliance questions for organisations building or deploying AI systems. Without clear and predictable criteria, organisations may struggle to assess their obligations. This uncertainty has the potential to affect both compliance and innovation.

Equally important is the treatment of AI systems that fall outside the high-risk category. AI technologies can generate meaningful societal and economic risks even where they are not formally classified as high risk. Issues such as misinformation, manipulation, algorithmic bias and systemic economic disruption may arise from such systems.

The Bill also appears to focus significantly on public sector deployment of AI systems, yet much of the development and deployment of AI in Kenya currently occurs in the private sector. Industries such as financial services, telecommunications, logistics and digital platforms already rely heavily on AI-driven systems. A balanced regulatory approach should therefore account for both domains.

A further gap is the absence of a clear framework addressing general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, including systems capable of generating text, code, images and other forms of content. These models increasingly serve as foundational infrastructure for a wide range of downstream applications and may require tailored regulatory treatment.

Globally, regulators are beginning to address these issues more directly. The EU AI Act introduces detailed risk classification frameworks and obligations for developers and deployers of high-risk systems, while also addressing GPAI models. China’s evolving regulatory framework similarly addresses algorithmic transparency, registration of AI deployers and security assessments prior to deployment.

The Governance Question: How Should AI Oversight Be Structured?

The Bill introduces an important institutional feature through the establishment of an AI Commissioner, tasked with overseeing AI development and deployment, monitoring compliance and issuing guidance on the responsible use of AI technologies in Kenya.

The creation of a dedicated oversight authority reflects an important recognition that AI presents regulatory challenges that extend beyond traditional legal frameworks.

However, the Bill raises a broader governance question: how should this oversight function interact with Kenya’s existing regulatory institutions?

Kenya already has several regulators whose mandates intersect with AI governance, including the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC), the Ministry of ICT and Digital Economy, the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA), the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS), the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK), the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), and various sector-specific regulators.

The Bill does not yet clearly define how the proposed AI Commissioner will coordinate with these institutions. In practice, effective governance of AI will require structured collaboration across multiple regulators rather than reliance on a single oversight authority.

There are also broader concerns around transparency and accountability across the AI lifecycle. AI systems typically involve multiple actors, including developers, deployers and organisations relying on system outputs. A coherent framework must therefore clearly allocate responsibility when AI systems produce harmful or unintended outcomes.

In addition, several aspects of operational governance are left to future regulations. These include independent AI audits, organisational governance frameworks, model transparency requirements and coordination mechanisms. While this approach provides flexibility, it also means that the governance architecture remains only partially defined at the legislative stage.

Designing a Practical Regulatory Framework for Kenya

These gaps point to a broader question: what would a practical and workable AI regulatory framework look like in the Kenyan context?

AI regulation globally is still evolving. Jurisdictions such as the European Union, China and Singapore are adopting different approaches, creating an opportunity for Kenya to design a framework that reflects both international best practice and local priorities.

A practical regulatory framework would benefit from several structural elements:

  1. A clear and predictable risk classification approach


Regulatory obligations should be tied to well-defined categories, enabling developers and deployers to assess their obligations at the design stage and reducing uncertainty.

  • Recognition of general-purpose AI models


These systems increasingly function as foundational infrastructure and may require tailored transparency, accountability and safety obligations.

  • Sector-sensitive regulation


Algorithmic risks vary significantly across industries, and systems deployed in sectors such as healthcare, financial services or critical infrastructure raise different regulatory concerns. Coordination with sector-specific regulators will therefore be necessary.

  • Clear allocation of responsibility across the AI lifecycle


AI systems often involve multiple actors, and a coherent framework must assign responsibility across this lifecycle to prevent regulatory gaps.

  • Building an Effective Governance Architecture for AI Oversight

Beyond identifying the governance gaps in the Bill, a key question is how Kenya can structure an effective and coordinated AI governance architecture in practice.

The introduction of an AI Commissioner is an important step toward institutionalising AI governance. However, effective oversight will require more than the creation of a single regulatory office.

AI intersects with multiple regulatory domains, including data protection, financial regulation, competition policy, communications regulation and consumer protection. Governance of AI systems will therefore require coordination across multiple institutions.

Organisational transparency and accountability will also be critical. As organisations increasingly rely on AI in decision-making, internal governance structures such as AI risk frameworks, audit mechanisms and oversight committees may become necessary.

At the same time, governance frameworks must ensure that regulation does not unintentionally discourage innovation. Mechanisms such as regulatory sandboxes and collaborative oversight models may help strike a balance between risk management and technological development.

Conclusion

Kenya now stands at a defining moment in shaping its AI regulatory and governance framework. The Artificial Intelligence Bill, 2026 provides an important starting point. However, its effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether the regulatory and governance framework is sufficiently clear, coordinated and capable of evolving alongside technological development.

The framework will need to reflect Kenya’s economic context and development priorities, while drawing from comparative approaches where relevant.

As the Bill moves forward, the upcoming public participation process presents an important opportunity for policymakers, technologists, legal practitioners and industry stakeholders to engage constructively with these issues and help shape a framework that supports both innovation and the responsible deployment of AI in Kenya.

  • Fidel Mwaki is the Managing Partner of FMC Advocates LLP (Kenya) and In-Country Partner (Kenya) at Primerio. He advises on corporate, regulatory and governance matters, with a focus on emerging issues in digital regulation and AI governance.
  • Alfred Nyaga is a Director at Digital Ethics Hub, a platform focused on shaping policy and practice in digital rights and AI regulation.

When power meets accountability: What the Directline fine signals for Kenya’s business landscape

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By Michael-James Currie and Nicole Araujo

In May 2024, two Nairobi-based small and medium-sized automobile repair centres (the “garages”) lodged separate complaints with the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) against Directline Assurance Company Limited (“Directline”). The complaints alleged persistent delays in the payment of invoices for contracted repair work that had already been completed.

The complaints were supported by authorisation letters, invoices, customer satisfaction notes, and related correspondence. On this basis, the CAK initiated an investigation into the commercial relationship between Directline and the two garages to assess:

(i) whether Directline possessed superior bargaining power; and

(ii) whether such superior bargaining power, if established, had been abused.

At the time the complaints were filed, Directline owed the garages KSh 7.6 million and KSh 5 million, respectively. After the CAK initiated its investigation, Directline made partial payments to each garage. However, it did not respond to the CAK’s formal requests concerning the remaining outstanding balances of KSh 4.7 million and KSh 1.3 million.

Directline initially attributed the delayed payments to inaccessible bank accounts. While in the commercial world late payments are often downplayed as administrative hiccups, such as cash-flow challenges or temporary constraints, for small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) these delays translate into serious financial and operational strain. CAK Director-General David Kemei stressed that the misuse of buyer power can devastate small businesses, threatening their ability to pay staff, pay suppliers, and ultimately participate fully in the economy. Such practices not only endanger individual SMEs but also undermine broader economic inclusion.

The CAK concluded that Directline had misused its superior bargaining power position to delay payments without reasonable justification. In this regard, the CAK imposed a total penalty of Ksh85 million for two counts of abuse towards the garages. The CAK additionally ordered Directline to settle the outstanding payments in full, including the remaining balances due; amend its supplier contracts to include provisions for interest on late payments and other protections for small suppliers; and cease engaging in conduct that violates the Competition Act.

While abuse of dominance cases have traditionally focused on powerful sellers, this matter highlights the growing regulatory attention on buyer power and the risks it poses to SMEs operating in highly dependent commercial relationships. Beyond the significant administrative penalty imposed, the case raises broader questions about how buyer power should be assessed, when commercial pressure crosses the line into abuse, and whether enforcement in this area adequately balances efficiency, bargaining strength, and supplier protection.

Reshuffling deck chairs in Kenya: S. Kariuki out, C. Mahinda in

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Shaka Kariuki Ousted As Non-Exec CAK Chair

President Ruto has removed Shaka Kariuki as Non-Executive Chairperson of the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) early, instead installing Charles W. Mahinda in the role, effective December 11, 2025.

The appointment was made under Section 10(1)(a) of the Competition Act and Section 51(1) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and will last three (3) years.

Mr. David Kibet Kemei, by now an established face for the competition watchdog, will continue to be the Director-General of the agency.

Kenya Tribunal Upholds CAK’s Steel Cartel Sanction on Appeal

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By Michael Williams

Kenya’s Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) has upheld the Competition Authority of Kenya’s (the “CAK”) steelcartel decision, dismissing individual appeals brought by seven manufacturers and affirming the penalties and remedies imposed in 2023. The Tribunal rejected appeals by Tononoka Rolling Mills, Blue Nile Wire Products, Devki Steel Mills, Accurate Steel Mills, Nail & Steel Products, Corrugated Sheets and Jumbo Steel Mills, cementing the CAK’s finding of price-fixing, coordinated price adjustments and output/ import restrictions in the steel value chain. 

This ruling was handed down in two tranches: on 9 July 2025 (Accurate, Blue Nile, Devki, Nail & Steel, Tononoka) and on 11 September 2025 (Corrugated Sheets, Jumbo Steel), each time siding with the Authority. In total, the Tribunal affirmed KES 287.9 million in penalties for the seven appellants. The Tribunal further held that the CAK had afforded the parties due administrative process under Article 47 of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the Competition Act. 

The decision handed dawn on 15 October 2025 is a natural sequel to the CAK’s 23 August 2023 decision, when the CAK imposed record penalties of KES 338.8 million on nine steel producers for a cartel that, per the CAK, distorted construction-input pricing. Five firms reached settlements with the CAK, while the seven above pursued and have now lost their appeals. 

Notably, during the appeal phase Doshi & Company (Hardware) Ltd and Brollo Kenya Ltd concluded out-of-court settlements with the CAK, illustrating the CAK’s willingness to resolve matters via settlement and compliance undertakings, even mid-litigation. 

For context, the AfricanAntitrust 2023 coverage highlighted that the CAK’s original fines constituted the highest cartel penalties in the CAK’s history to that date, following a twoyear investigation that drew on search-and-seizure and market-intelligence evidence. With the Tribunal now endorsing the CAK’s analysis and process, the core liability findings stand, and the fine levels (for the seven appealing firms) are confirmed. 

Why this matters:

i) The Tribunal’s decisions strengthen precedent on price-fixing/ output restrictions in Kenya’s construction-inputs sector and validate CAK’s investigative toolkit and evidence assessment. 

ii) Appellants remain bound to cease collusion and implement internal competition-law compliance programmes.

iii) The CAK links steel-cartel conduct to higher housing and infrastructure costs, this outcome supports the CAK’sbroader enforcement narrative across the building materials market

The breakdown of the KES 287,934,697.83 penalties, as concurred by the Tribunal are as follows: 

Corrugated Sheets (86,979,378.53); Tononoka Rolling Mills (62,715,074.03); Devki Steel Mills (KES 46,296,001.25); Jumbo Steel Mills (KES 33,140,459.40); Accurate Steel Mills (KES 26,826,344.31); Nail & Steel Products (KES22,816,546.01); Blue Nile Wire Products (KES9,160,894.30). 

What’s next

Unless pursued further on points of law, the Tribunal’s decision bring this enforcement chapter close to closure. Penalties, compliance obligations remain, and CAK’s leniency and Informant Reward Schemes continue to beckon for future cartel detection. 

In conclusion, and by quoting the CAK’s Director-General, Mr. David Kemei, “The Tribunal’s findings affirm the CAK’s unwavering commitment to protect Kenyan consumers and businesses from the damaging effects of cartel conduct, and the veracity and completeness of our evidence-gathering, analysis and decision-making processes.”

“So Much Abuse”: Overhaul of Competition Law Shifts from ‘Buyer Power’ to ‘Superior Bargaining Position’ Abuse

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AAT discusses how the Kenyan antitrust watchdog, CAK, is seeking input on its recently released draft amendments

By Joshua Eveleigh

On 28 May 2024, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) published a request for public comment on its ‘Draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2024’ (the “Amendment Bill”). The Amendment Bill seeks, most notably, to broaden the scope of the Competition Act to include ‘digital activities’ and to replace the recently included ‘abuse of buyer power’ prohibition with an ‘abuse of superior bargaining position.

Digital Activities

The Amendment Bill defines ‘digital activities’ as:

“the provision of a service by means of the internet, or provision of digital content, for the benefit of business consumers or other consumers (whether paid for or otherwise and whether or not such activity is multisided), and may include —

  • online intermediation services, including online marketplaces and app stores;
  • online search engines;
  • online social networking services;
  • video-sharing platform services;
  • independent interpersonal communication services;
  • operating systems;
  • cloud computing services; and
  • online advertising services”

Moreover, the new law would broaden the assessment for effects on competition or a firm’s dominance provided for in the Competition Act to include the following:

  • in the context of digital activities, where dominance can be established even with market shares below forty percent, the Authority shall consider factors that typically grant significant market position, whether they arise from the digital activity being performed in one or multiple markets;
  • direct and indirect network effects and the entry barriers arising in connection with those network effects;
  • economies of scale and scope enjoyed by the undertaking, including with regard to the undertaking’s access to data relevant for competition;
  • switching costs for users and the ability and propensity for users to multihome; and
  • competitive pressure driven by innovation;
  • the importance of the intermediary services provided by the undertaking for accessing supply and sales market, including with reference to the size of the undertaking and the number of business and individual users it has and the period over which that level of importance has been held.

Says Andreas Stargard, a partner in Primerio’s competition-law group, “[e]vidently, the CAK is joining the global trend in regulating online marketplaces and firms. Our Kenyan colleagues expect more enforcement against firms that are active within the digital space – particularly given the CAK’s focus on the online sector in its past market studies and investigations.”

The inquiries mentioned include:

Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position

The Amendment Bill also seeks to remove the ‘abuse of buyer power’ prohibition, despite it only being included subsequent to recent amendments to the Competition Act in 2019. Interestingly, this change also comes after the CAK’s recent success in enforcing the newly-implemented buyer power provision, including:

  • the CAK’s announcement that it was able to recover reneged payments worth KES38 million from twenty motor vehicle repairers and five motor vehicle assessors in favour of 1, 000 Kenyans;[1]
  • its settlement with Unilever Kenya Limited resulting in the revision of payment terms for a number of its suppliers; and
  • the High Court of Kenya’s recent finding that Majid Al Futtaim Hypermarkets Limited had abused its buyer power in respect of its commercial relationship with Orchards Limited, confirming the finding of Kenya’s Competition Tribunal.

Now, in lieu of the perhaps more narrowly perceived Buyer-Power clause, the Amendment Bill seeks to include an entirely new section 40A to the Competition Act, prohibiting the abuse of a ‘superior bargaining position’, defining it as:

“the ability of an undertaking to control, direct, define or determine the conditions of business operations with counterparties which are favourable to itself without reference to the undertaking’s dominant market position or market power in the relevant market;” (our emphasis)

While the proposed definition is clear in that a firm need not be dominant or have market power to have a ‘superior bargaining position’, the Amendment Bill provides that the CAK must consider the following factors in determining whether a superior bargaining position in fact exists:

  • the degree of dependence by the affected undertaking or undertakings on transactions with the party under investigation;
  • the position of the undertaking in the market;
  • the possibility of the affected undertaking to change its business counterpart; and
  • whether the party under investigation is an unavoidable trading partner or a critical business partner in the relevant market.

Additionally, the Amendment Bill looks to broaden the conduct which would trigger an abuse of a superior bargaining position from what is already included in what may trigger an abuse of buyer power. These additional categories include, inter alia:

  • unilateral variation of contractual terms, conditions, or other rules associated with the transaction or service without prior notification to the counterparties;
  • unreasonable collection and/or processing of data of the counterparty;
  • imposing unduly difficult conditions for the termination of service; and
  • obstruction of business activities or interference in the counterpart’s management of its business.

Notably, an abuse of superior bargaining position attracts the same penalties as the current abuse of buyer power provision, that being a period of imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding KES 10 million shillings, or both.

Looking Ahead

“It is clear that the CAK is looking to broaden the ambit of its enforcement initiatives. In this regard, we note that the ‘abuse of superior bargaining position’ is largely identical to the current abuse of buyer power framework. It is likely, therefore, that the CAK is looking to translate its recent success against ‘buyers’ to firms at all levels of the supply chain, irrespective of whether they in a position of supplier or purchaser,” says Mr. Stargard.

Following this approach, it appears to us that the abuse of dominance provisions in the Competition Act have been given something of a ‘downgrade’. Specifically, it is not apparent to the author why a disgruntled firm (or the investigating CAK) would rely on the existing abuse of dominance provisions (and thereby needing to actually establish a firm’s dominance) when the would-be plaintiff could rely solely on the incredibly broad superior bargaining position provision — which notably does not require a showing of dominance or market power.

We are also interested to see whether the proposed superior bargaining provision will have an ‘opening the floodgates’ type effect if and when implemented. In this regard, it appears that an economic dependence argument would be relevant in determining whether a firm has a superior bargaining position. Absent a dominance requirement, the CAK may well be inundated with complaints from disgruntled contracting parties. 

[1] CAK, Newsletter Issue No.9 (2022), at 3. Available at: https://cak.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-06/CAK%20Newsletter%20Issue%209.pdf

Whose interest is it anyway? CAK stresses ‘public interest’ in merger control

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Competition Authority of Kenya emphasises the role of public interest in M&A reviews

By Joshua Eveleigh

On 05 January 2024, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) approved Nava Apparels L.L.C-FZ acquisition of the assets of Mombasa Apparel (EPZ) and Ashton Apparel (EPZ) on the condition that Nava retains all of EPZ’s 7019 employees on terms that are no less favourable than their current terms of employment.

Notably, post-transaction the merged entity would have an insignificant market share of only 3.83% in the market for the manufacture of clothing apparel for export. Accordingly, the merged entity would still face significant competitive restraint from various other market players post-transaction and, against this, the CAK found that the transaction would not result in any substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the relevant market.

Similar to South Africa’s merger control regime, the CAK is mandated to conduct a public interest assessment, in addition to the conventional competition assessment, during its merger review process. As part of its public interest assessment, the CAK has particular regard to the enhancement and sustainment of employment; the ability of SMEs to enter into and compete into a particular market; and the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. Where the CAK has a credible basis to conclude that a notified transaction will result in a public interest concern, it may prevent that particular transaction.

What is interesting in this instance, however, is that the merger decisions do not appear to include any particular period within which the retrenchment moratorium must be adhered to. Without guidance, the acquirer may find itself in the invidious position of not being able to retrench any of the 7019 employees for an extended period of time.

The CAK’s recent decision emphasises the agencies’ commitment to preventing merger specific retrenchments. Parties intending to conclude mergers in Kenya must proactively consider the effect of the proposed transaction on the public interest, as is the case in other African jurisdictions such as South Africa and be able to meaningfully engage with the CAK to proffer public interest commitments.

Fidel Mwaki, Kenyan lead partner of Primerio International, says: “An interesting decision by the CAK that highlights the need for businesses to seek legal and regulatory guidance on public interest factors that may affect their workforce retrenchment timelines when looking to conclude mergers.”

Kenyan competition watchdog launches inquiry into Animal Feeds Value Chain

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By Joshua Eveleigh

On 29 September 2023, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) announced that it will be conducting a market inquiry into the Kenyan animal feeds market (“Animal Feeds Market Inquiry”) to assess the various factors affecting competition in the animal feeds value chain.

The animal feed market is particularly important due to its impact on the pricing of essential food items, such as chicken. In this respect, the recent Essential Food Price Monitoring Report published by the South African Competition Commission found:

“The poultry industry is also the largest consumer of animal feed in the local market. Any shocks in the feed market, therefore, have a tangible and direct effect on broiler and chicken production costs and ultimately prices paid by consumers.”

Provided that there ought to be differences between the South African and Kenyan markets, the economic principles would be largely identical in that the increase of animal feed products would have an adverse impact on farmers and, ultimately, on the consumer welfare as a result of reduced supply and/or increased purchase prices.

In light of the above, the CAK has identified the following objectives of the Animal Feeds Market Inquiry:

  • the prices, costs and quantities produced, supplied and purchased at different levels from inputs supply to production and sale of different animal feed products;
  • the market shares, concentration, ownership relationships, joint ventures and marketing agreements for the different products and services related to animal feeds and its inputs;
  • different terms and conditions of supply for feed producers of different sizes;
  • barriers to entry and growth of smaller feed producers;
  • information availability, information sources, and any information exchange practices by companies, associations, and other formal or informal groupings relating to animal feed and its inputs;
  • arrangements, including licensing and other supply terms, which may affect the sourcing and supply of animal feed including breeding stock and animal feed;
  • trade flows of feed constituents, including maize, soybeans and derived products, and what may be affecting the flows from other countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”) and East African Community (“EAC”) regions, taking into account standards, permits, and other requirements in light of the existing trade agreements; and
  • the flows of demand and supply of products and services along the value chain for the main animal feed products.

In conducting the market inquiry and to gain an understanding of the above items, the CAK shall arrange and hold meetings and Key Informant Interviews (“KIIs”) and may also receive oral and/oral submissions from industry stakeholders. Importantly, section 18(6) of the Competition Act provides that “every person, undertaking, trade association or body shall be under an obligation to provide information requested by the [CAK] in fulfilment of its statutory mandate for conducting an inquiry.”

Upon the conclusion of a market inquiry by the CAK, its findings shall be used to inform policy considerations. In this respect, however, the policy recommendations of the CAK are non-binding and are handed to the Minister for appropriate legislative action.

Industry stakeholders may submit their oral or written submissions to the CAK by 20 October 2023.

Michael-James Currie, Partner at Primerio, noted: “Market inquiries are powerful investigative tools available to competition authorities and are becoming increasingly utilised across the continent. For instance, South Africa’s Competition Commission has announced its intention to conduct three market inquiries in three separate sectors in 2023 alone. While market inquiries may be disruptive for industry stakeholders, they are undoubtedly necessary for competition authorities to understand the structure, functioning and nuances of particular markets before initiating protracted and complex investigations into allegations of anticompetitive conduct”

CAK imposes highest-ever cartel fine on 9 steel producers

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After about a two-year-long investigation, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) has determined guilt and imposed record fines on nine steel manufacturing companies for their joint role in a price-fixing and output-restriction cartel. The fine — the highest-ever imposed by the CAK to date — was set at Ksh. 338,849,427 million (approx. U.S. $2.3m) in total.

Back in June 2022, Construction Kenya news outlet reported that the offices of 10 Kenyan steel suppliers had been ‘dawn-raided’ by the CAK on suspicion of price-fixing. “A number of senior officials at the companies, including chief executives, have been interrogated as part of the investigation triggered by builders who complained about excessive pricing of steel.” These raids in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu had taken place in the preceding December, and in secret, the CAK’s investigation into the steel sector had already begun in August 2020, when the Authority conducted a sua sponte nationwide “covert field screening,” which indicated the presence of illegal coordination by the steel producers.

In their defense, the manufacturers initially claimed innocence and blamed the pandemic input-price increases, via their trade group’s spokesman, Kenya Association of Manufacturers Steel Sector Chair, Bobby Johnson: “We are bearing a huge cost to cushion consumers. The prices of billets have shot up because of the supply disruptions as well as fuel for heating the furnaces.”

However, CAK enforcement and compliance manager, Mr. Mokaya, was quoted as stating that the agency had received specific and clear evidence “of certain concerted practices including agreements on pricing. We conducted market screening and launched raids in December targeting over ten companies and the investigation is ongoing.”

Andreas Stargard, an antitrust attorney with Primerio Ltd. who frequently works on COMESA-region competition matters including Kenya with his local Nairobi colleagues, noted that “this cartel case comes on the heels of the CAK’s successful prosecution of the ‘paint cartel,’ which it brought to conclusion also during COVID, in February 2021, fining Crown Paint, Basco Products Ltd., Kansai Plascon and Galaxy Paints for price-fixing. It will not be interesting to see whether firms engaged in the construction industry — that is: direct purchasers of steel products from the cartelists — will attempt to recover any of the overcharges they were burdened with by the infringers…“

In theory, a person found guilty of the offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten million shillings, or both. Kenyan billionaire Narendra Raval, whose steel firm Devki is among those found guilty of cartel conduct, will not have to see a (steel?) jail cell from the inside, however. As of now, only monetary fines have been imposed by the CAK.

Dr. Adano Wario, the CAK’s Acting Director-General, noted that these financial penalties were in proportion to the harm done by the offense: artificial increases in the cost of steel products harmed consumers by inflating construction costs of homes and state and local infrastructure projects, thus contributing further to the already high cost of living in the country:

“Cartels are conceived, executed, and enforced by businesses to serve their commercial interests, and to the economic harm of consumers. In this matter, the steel firms illegally colluded on prices and margins as well as output strategies. In a liberalized market like ours, the forces of supply and demand should signal prices, free from manipulative business practices. Agreements between competitors seek to defeat this fundamental facet of a free economy.”

Whether or not a “leniency” request was involved is unclear, but doubtful according to attorney Stargard: “We have seen conflicting reports as to the origins of this investigation: some sources point to construction firm, or developer, complaints that led to the CAK’s action. The Authority itself claims it conducted the industry investigation fully on its own accord, without prompting. Either way, there is no indication that one of the price-fixing group members cheated on its fellow cartelists by seeking amnesty from prosecution, which is most frequently the case in modern cartel cases.” He adds that the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) may also find interest in the ongoing price hikes in various markets, as the agency had previously made cautionary remarks in the paints cartel (see article above) and was almost certainly apprised by the CAK of its ongoing investigation into the steel sector during the pendency of that matter: “We know for a fact that the CAK and the CCC are working hand-in-glove when in comes to investigating anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, this statement can be expanded to include not only East-African competition enforcement agencies, but all African authorities, and in fact many international antitrust watchdogs as well, with whom the COMESA enforcer has bi- and multi-lateral cooperation agreements and MOUs. Competition-law enforcement truly has become global, and escaping the watchful eye of the agencies is getting more difficult by the day.”

The affected companies are Devki Steel Mills, Doshi & Hardware Limited, Corrugated Steel Limited, Jumbo Steel Mills, Accurate Steel Mills Limited, Nail and Steel Products Limited, Brollo Kenya Limited, Blue Nile Wire Products Limited, and Tononoka Rolling Mills Ltd.

Competition Authority of Kenya exempts MSMEs from merger control provisions to stimulate economy

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Competition Authority adds exemptions to boost economic activity

By Joshua Eveleigh and Katia Lopes

In a recent speech by Kenya’s Minister of Finance, Professor Njuguna Ndung’u, it is clear that the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) will take active steps in promoting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (“MSMEs”) in the local economy.

Firstly, to facilitate their growth and contribution, Professor Ndung’u, noted that government plans to ease the cost of doing business and to minimize compliance costs for MSMEs.  Specifically, the CAK will exempt MSMEs from having to notify otherwise mandatorily notifiable mergers to the CAK. By removing the significant regulatory hurdle of obtaining prior merger approval, and its associated costs, it is hoped that Kenya will see a promotion of start-up and digital businesses. This development is particularly important considering that Kenyan startups ranked second, in Africa, in terms of funding raised but fell behind other African jurisdictions when it came to acquisitions of MSMEs.  Fidel Mwaki, legal practitioner based in Nairobi, observes that “this is a positive move from the CAK that should hopefully bode well for MSME’s, many of whom are battling under the strain of increased taxation, inflation, and licensing requirements and will certainly benefit from the proposed waiver on merger notification fees.”  His Primerio colleague, attorney Diana Wariara, adds that “regulating buyer power remains a challenge for the agency.  A greater emphasis on audits and investigations may help strengthen the CAK’s enforcement mandate and ensure a level playing field and fair competitive practices within these sectors.”

In addition to merger exemptions and emphasising the CAK’s position as Eastern Africa’s lodestar in the enforcement of abuses of buyer power, the CAK will monitor and conduct surveillance audits, specifically in the manufacturing and agro-processing sectors, to further protect MSMEs from incidences of abuses of buyer power. Professor Ndung’u also noted that the CAK will implement codes of practice to ensure MSMEs in the retail and insurance sectors are protected from powerful buyers.

Lastly, Professor Ndung’u highlighted that the CAK will take measures to address the issues of price fixing by professional services, ensuring that fees and the quality of professional services remain competitive.

Given the pivotal role that MSMEs play in the Kenyan economy, comprising 98% of all local business entities and contributing approximately 24% of Kenya’s GDP, their promotion will be a welcome development among the local business community. In this respect, Professor Ndung’u’s speech demonstrates the CAK’s commitment towards ensuring a competitive marketplace that is free from abuses of dominance.