Harmonising agricultural seed regulations across COMESA: COMSHIP Certification

COMSHIP advances bloc’s Certification Programme to next level

Announced in Lusaka by COMESA’s Assistant Secretary General in charge of Programmes, the long-awaited Regional Seed Certificates will be issued by member states’ national seed authorities, in an attempt to level the competitive playing field and establish guaranteed performance and yields of otherwise unpredictably performing seed products.  The COMESA programme requires verification that a registered seed lot in the region’s “Variety Catalogue” has been inspected to field standards and laboratory analysis.

Andreas Stargard

Andreas Stargard

“The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) having approved no less than three major agricultural mergers over the past year (Bayer/Monsanto, Dow/DuPont, and Syngenta/ChemChina) — all of which involved significant seed production and R&D elements — the Regional Seed Certificate programme represents the next step in bringing to fruition the COMESA Seed Harmonisation Implementation Plan (COMSHIP), designed to align seed regulations within the trading bloc,” says Andreas Stargard, a competition lawyer with Primerio Ltd.  “The Secretariat’s stated goal of COMSHIP is not only to assure product quality and grow intra-bloc commerce, but also increase the extra-regional competitiveness of the trade group’s substantial seed industry,” in line with COMESA’s Seed Trade Harmonization Regulations of 2014.

COMESACCAccording to its own statements, whilst only five member countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe) have fully modelled their national seed laws on the COMESA Seed System, the group’s Seed Certification system is the first such “use and distribution of seed labels and certificates as a way of improving access to quality seeds in the region” anywhere in the world, based on a model suggested by the OECD.  The system will “impact virtually all of the approximately 130 million COMESA inhabitants, who stand to benefit, according to the group, from assured-quality improved seed production and usage, as well as a de-fragmentation of the historically rather localised, national markets for seeds,” commented Stargard.

Practically speaking, the seed certification labels will incorporate machine-readability, traceability, and security features, and will be printed in the COMESA official languages: English, French and Arabic.

COMESA to Introduce Seed Labels and Certificates to Boost regional Trade


Copperweld elsewhere: Why SA is not pursuing fisheries “cartel”

The concept of single economic entities and intra-company conspiracies


Ministerial meddling in mergers

Intervention by economic ministry outside proper competition channels yields R1 billion employment fund

As reported yesterday, AB InBev has agreed to a R1bn ($69m) fund to buoy the South African beer industry and to “protect” domestic jobs.  It is widely seen as a direct payment in exchange for the blessing of the U.S. $105 billion takeover of SABMiller by InBev — notably occurring outside the usual channels of the Competition Authorities, instead taking place as behind-closed-door meetings held between the parties and the Minister for Economic Development, Ibrahim Patel, and his staff.

Patel talks.jpgAs we reported earlier this week, the previously granted extension of the competition authorities’ review was “widely suspected that the request for the extension is due to intervention by the Minister of Economic Development, in relation to public interest grounds. Although there is no suggestion at this stage that Minister Patel is opposing the deal, the proposed intervention does highlight bring into sharp focus the fact that multinational mega-deals face a number of hurdles in getting the deal done.”
AAT has reported previously on “extra-judicial factors,” as well as the interventionism by the current ministry.  This latest deal struck by Mr. Patel and the parent of famed Budweiser beer includes a promise by the parties to preserve full-time employment levels in the country for five years after closing, according to AB InBev.  Moreover, the companies pledged to provide financial help for new farms to increase raw materials production of beer inputs like hops and barley.
The minister is quoted as saying: “This transaction is by far the largest yet to be considered by the competition authorities and it’s important that South Africans know that the takeover of a local iconic company will bring tangible benefits.  Jobs and inclusive growth are the central concerns in our economy.”

The holy trinity of InBev’s beers

Our editors and contributing authors have reported (and warned) on multiple occasions that the extra-procedural behaviour of the economic minister effectively side-lines the competition agencies, thereby eroding the perceived or real authority of the Competition Commission and the Tribunal.  Says Andreas Stargard, a competition law practitioner with a focus on Africa:
“This ‘unscripted’ process risks future merger parties not taking the Authorities seriously and side-stepping them ex ante by a short visit to the Minister instead, cutting a deal that may be in the interest of South Africans according to his ministry’s current political view, but certainly not according to well-founded and legislatively prescribed antitrust principles.  The Commission and the Tribunal take the latter into account, whereas the Minister is not bound by them, by principled legal analysis, nor by competition economics.”
This is especially true as the current deal involves the takeover of SABMiller, an entity that controls 90% of South Africa’s beer market.  From a pure antitrust perspective, this transaction would certainly raise an agency’s interest in an in-depth investigation on the competition merits — not merely on the basis of job maintenance and other protectionist goals that may serve a political purpose but do not protect or assure future competition in an otherwise concentrated market.
Says one African antitrust attorney familiar with the matter, “What may be a short-term populist achievement, racking up political points for Mr. Patel and the ANC, may well turn out to be a less-than-optimal antitrust outcome in the long run.”

South Africa: Drought Highlights the Importance of the Basic Foods Sector to the Competition Commission


By Michael-James Currie

South Africa is in the midst of one of the worst droughts in decades.  The droughts impact stretches far broader than simply grass roots levels. Maize prices have recently reached a record high due to shortage of supply over the past 12 months, which, being a staple food source for the majority of the population..

It comes as no surprise that the drought has sparked interest of  the competition authorities or those wanting to use competition law as a means to promote and protect socio-economic goals.south_africa

The recent matter involving alleged price-fixing and collusion between a number of fertiliser companies (including the H Pistorius and Co. company which has strong family ties to convicted former Para-Olympian champion, Oscar Pistorius – previously reported by AAT) will be heard before the Tribunal in a month’s time.  Despite the matter laying dormant for some time, the Commission appears intent on prosecuting the respondents.  The Commission’s spokesperson stated that the fertiliser sector is viewed as a priority sector, due to the its importance as an input in the agricultural sector.  The case will undoubtedly receive additional media attention due to the heightened focus on the agricultural industry brought about by the drought, as well of course from an atmospheric perspective given the Oscar Pistorius link.

Unrelated to the fertiliser case, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has recently called on the Commission to investigate the maize sector for collusion. This call follows an investigation which was already carried out during 2006-2007 which saw a number of maize milling companies referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. A date for these complaint hearings has not yet been set.  The complaint brought by COSATU, which must be investigated by the Commission, relates to traders who are allegedly “buying and selling maize unlawfully and manipulating the price of maize taking advantage of the shortage of supply of maize as a result of the drought”.  The allegations have, however, been denied by AgriSA who insists that the price of maize has consistently being increasing from 2015 to over 50%.

EU gives Kenya until October 1 to sign Partnership Agreement


Kenya is currently at risk of losing preferential access to European markets

As of next year, this risk will expose the country’s exporters of flowers, fish, fruits and vegetables to high tariffs and logistical problems.

Lodewijk Briët, the European Union Ambassador has indicated that the bloc would remove Kenya from the preferential list again, if the East African Community fails to ratify the new Economic Partnership Agreements by October 2015. The removal of Kenya from the list would result in Kenya accessing the European Union market under the Generalised System of Preferences which results in tariffs of up to 15 per cent.  The deadline is apparently not a “must-beat” time limit, according to a quote from the Daily Nation article on the topic:

Negotiations between EU and EAC started in 2002, culminating in the two trading blocs signing an interim EPA in 2007 that ensured duty-free, quota-free access for its products under the Market Access Regulation that will end in October.

Kenya exports flowers to the European Union worth Ksh46.3 billion and vegetables worth Ksh26.5 billion annually resulting in the horticulture sector being one of the most important contributors of foreign exchange. The European Union takes about 40 per cent of Kenya’s fresh produce exports. The horticulture industry has also created job opportunities for about 90 000 Kenyans.

In October 2014, the European Union removed Kenya from its list of duty-free exporters after the East African Community failed to meet the Economic Partnership Agreements deadline which subjected fresh produce to levies of Ksh100 million per week.

Pistorius family embroiled in Ag price-fixing cartel

The Pistoriuses refuse to stay out of the media (Ag-)limelight

Starting in late 2009, the South African Competition Commission had suspected cartel activity in the Agricultural Lime (“AgLime”) industry.  Notably, one of the participants in the alleged price-fixing scheme was the Hendrik Pistorius Trust and its Pistorius-family trustee members, all of whom are respondents (defendants) in the action now referred by the CompComm to the S.A. Competition Tribunal (official referral document here).

The connection of this antitrust case with now-infamous Olympic runner Oscar Pistorius is obviously only a family link (based on some quick research, it seems as though one of Oscar’s cousins is involved, namely Arnoldus Pistorius, the son of yet another respondent, Leo Pistorius who is apparently known as an elephant hunter).

It is interesting to note that the Commission requests a 10% penalty, however, they do not explicitly state that it is for the period of the contravention (page 10).

On 16 January 2015, the South African Competition Commission filed a complaint against Hendrik Wilhelm Carl Pistorius N.O., Leo Constantin Pistorius N.O., Hermine Pistorius N.O., Arnoldus Kurt Pistorius,  Kalkor (Pty) Ltd, CHL Taljaard & Son (Pty) Ltd, PBD Boerdedienste (Pty) Ltd, Grasland Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd and Fertiliser Society of South Africa.


The Commission alleges that the respondents were engaged in a prohibited practice from 1995 until 2008, by agreeing or entering into a concerted practice to fix the commissions payable by each of them to fertiliser companies who employ agents to market, sell and distribute agricultural lime, which is crushed / pulverised limestone or dolomite used for soil treatment in order to reduce the acidity of the soil.  This alleged practice is in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the South African Competition Act, which provides the following:

An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if –

(a) it has the effect of substantially preventing, or lessening, competition in a market, unless a party to the agreement, concerted practice, or decision can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect; or

(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:

(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition;

(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods or services; or

(iii) collusive tendering.


Commission’s fisheries merger conditions upheld on review by Tribunal


Competition Tribunal confirms Commission’s ruling on Oceana and Foodcorp merger

Johannesburg-listed Ocean Group Limited is the largest fishing company in South Africa, whose fishing activities include inter alia the catching, processing, marketing and distribution of canned fish, fishmeal and fish oil and mid-water and deep-sea fishing.

Foodcorp Limited is a food producer and manufacturer with eight production divisions, one of which is a fishing division. Foodcorp’s fishing business comprises a pelagic division, a hake division and a lobster division.

The Competition Commission said its investigation into the proposed transaction showed that the proposed transaction would substantially affect competition in the market for canned pilchards to the detriment of competition and customers. Following implementation of the transaction, Oceana will hold 80% of the market, while its closest competitor would hold less than 10%. Furthermore, the Commission was concerned that the transaction, without the conditions, would remove an efficient competitor to Oceana’s Lucky Star brand from the market, as Glenryck would not be able to provide competition to Lucky Star without its own fishing quota.

Both Oceana and Foodcorp contended that the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had approved the transfer of Foodcorp’s small pelagic fishing rights to Oceana, which includes the consideration of public interest issues regarding black economic empowerment.

The merging parties had taken the conditional approval of the intermediate merger on review before the Competition Tribunal. The conditions which the Competition Commission had imposed entailed that the merging parties are to sell the Glenryck canned-pilchards brand to an independent third party, as well as the small pelagic fish quota allocated to it by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The condition was imposed as a means that would deprive Oceana of Foodcorp’s fishing quota, thereby preventing market dominance.

The Competition Tribunal approved the transaction on the same conditions initially imposed by the Competition Commission. The Tribunal will issue its reasons for the decision in due course.

Worrying trends in South African merger control – Government’s abuse of process continues unabated


Secret deals sideline competition authorities

In what can only be described as a significant step backwards in ensuring that the more established of the emerging economies enforce the application of sound and established (e.g., ICN) best practices in relation to merger remedies, AAT has discovered that the much publicised acquisition of South Africa’s AFGRI by international private investment group AgriGroupe has recently been subjected to a private side deal between the South African Government and the merging parties, sidestepping the Commission’s jurisdiction and decision-making competence.  According to its terms, Afgri is obligated to make available R90 million (US$9m, over four years) to certain South African farmers & enrol emerging farmers in development programmes and assist poultry farmers.

Minister’s side deal replaces Competition Act merger remedies

There is little doubt that these forced conditions constitute matters best handled by the relevant antitrust regulator as proper remedies in a merger-control proceeding. At the outer limit, relevant departments such as the Department of Water, Forestry and Fisheries might have input into them.  Yet, it appears that these conditions are purely negotiated by the Minister of Economic Development – the same office that sacked the prior chairman of the Competition Commission, Shan Ramburuth, and which has been subjected to criticism of meddling in the independent authority’s affairs.

Minister Patel

Following the questionable intervention of various South African Government departments in Walmart’s acquisition of Massmart (which is, as we have previously noted, the origin of the non-competition merger remedies), it appears that the same departments have in effect sought to force the merging parties into agreeing to perform services on behalf of the Government in exchange for the departments’ non-intervention before the Competition Tribunal proceedings.

Following a pattern…

Heather Irvine, counsel for the merging parties, confirmed that the “merger was approved (with the agreement as a condition) after the Tribunal hearing yesterday.”  She points out that “this agreement was voluntarily entered into by the merging parties in a spirit of goodwill and as a demonstration of Afgri’s commitment to growing the African food sector, not because of concerns about any public interest issues in terms of the Competition Act,” pointing to the transcript to be made available shortly.  We appreciate counsel’s confirmation that the side agreement was reached entirely outside the confines of the SA Competition Act between the ministry and the parties.

It is apparent that since Minister Patel has assumed his role as Minister of Economic Development (an “activist, interventionist and micromanaging minister,” according to the former Competition Tribunal chairman David Lewis), the competition authorities’ independence has been undermined (see some of our prior articles here and here).   In particular, the merger process is little more than a means by which the South African Government seeks to extract from merging parties a series of additional unwarranted (industrial policy) conditions. It is in our view a highly problematic development.  In sum, the S.A. merger review process remains a highly contentious issue and while the parties in this case sought to placate Government, others may not be as willing.

COMESA merger stats: January ’14 outperforms first 6 months of 2013

COMESA Competition Commission logo
Three merger notifications in one month set new record for COMESA Competition Commission.

After commenting on the rather lackluster statistics of the first 11 months A.D. 2013, we observed that some deal-making parties might be “flying under the radar” and asked the question:

Combine Point 4 above (low filing statistics) with the zero-threshold and low nexus requirements that trigger a COMESA merger notification, and the following question inevitably comes to mind: With such low thresholds, and the certain existence of commercial deal activity going on in the COMESA zone, why are there so few notifications?

Well, the young agency’s stats have picked up some steam in 2014, it would seem: based on a review of its online document repository, the CC has received a whopping three notifications in January alone.  They are, in chronological order:

  1. Mail & courier services: FedEx / SupaSwift – a transaction involving the acquisition of a South African courier with operations in multiple COMESA member states, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia.
  2. Agricultural distribution and financial services: AgriGroupe / AFGRI Ltd. – Mauritian SPV AgriGroupe seems to be taking AFGRI (listed on the JSE) private.  The target has operations in multiple COMESA countries.
  3. Generic pharmaceuticals: CFR Inversiones SPA / Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd. – Chilean CFR is buying all of South African off-patent pharmaceuticals manufacturer Adcock’s shares. Notably, the buyer has no COMESA activities; target is active in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
(c) AAT

Merger notification stats for COMESA as of Feb. 2014


  • Activity has increased dramatically.  Is it a coincidence & a statistically irrelevant blip on the radar screen?  This remains to be seen. The parties are – unlike last year’s – not “repeat parties” and therefore the increase in notifications seems to be natural/organic growth, if you will, rather than a case of the same bear falling into the same honey-trap multiple times…
  • The Competition Commission has listened to its critics (including this blog). Notably, the CC now clearly identifies the affected member-state jurisdictions in the published notice – a commendable practice that it did not follow in all previous instances, and which AAT welcomes.

Post-scriptum: Adding up the total 2013 tally of notifications, the Tractor & Grader Supplies Ltd / Torre Industrial Holdings transaction (notified after our prior statistics post in November 2013) brought the sum-total of COMESA merger filings to 11 for FY2013.

How to (almost) gut an agency – the final twist in the maize seeds case?

How to (almost) gut an agency – the final twist in the maize seeds case?

By Patrick Smith

On 18 December 2013, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“Constitutional Court”) handed down its decision in an appeal by the Competition Commission (“Commission”) against an unprecedented costs order imposed by the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”).  The costs order related to the CAC’s decision to overturn the decisions of the Commission and the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) to prohibit the merger between Pioneer Hi-Bred International and Pannar Seeds.

The Commission had originally prohibited the proposed merger on 7 December 2010,[1] following a three-month investigation.  In the Commission’s assessment, the transaction amounted to a 3 to 2 concentration amongst producers of seeds for the staple food in South Africa, if not much of sub-Saharan Africa.  Quite apart from the substance, this sector fell squarely within the Commission’s prioritisation programme, and so was always likely to receive close scrutiny.[2]  On the Commission’s assessment, the transaction would give rise to significant unilateral effects, removing an important competitor from the market.  The Commission considered the merging parties’ submissions that the transaction would lead to efficiencies from a combination of the two parties’ breeding programmes, but found the claimed benefits unconvincing and unlikely to outweigh the anti-competitive harm.

Following an extensive discovery process and a three-week hearing involving nine witnesses, the Tribunal also decided to prohibit the merger, on 9 December 2011.[3]  The Tribunal considered the potential for anti-competitive effects (concluding that the parties were close and effective competitors, and that the transaction would accordingly give rise to very significant anticompetitive effects),[4] and the likelihood of significant efficiencies (concluding that the Parties’ assumptions were “either grossly exaggerated or totally unrealistic”, and that any potential merger-specific efficiencies would lie beyond a 5 year time horizon)[5].  Despite the parties’ characterisation of the industry as a “dynamic innovation market”, maize seeds improve by 1-2% per annum (not exactly Moore’s law)[6] and the wide variety of different growing conditions (and the use of seeds adapted for each region), mean that any particular innovation is unlikely to be universally applied; the Tribunal highlighted the need to account for anticipated non-merger specific innovation as a benchmark against which the parties’ claims should be measured.

Notably, the Tribunal focussed substantial attention on assessing the relevant counterfactual against which the merger should be assessed.  While it was common cause that the target firm did not meet the requirements of the failing firm defence, in the course of the Tribunal hearing the parties had argued that the target firm, Pannar, would decline as a competitive force, most rapidly in relation to one specific product area (so-called irrigated region hybrids), but also more generally across its whole product range.  Considering local and international approaches to the counterfactual, the Tribunal found that there was no compelling evidence of the certain decline of the target firm (which was still the market leader in relation to the irrigated region hybrids), and concluded that there was no reason not to accept the status quo as the relevant counterfactual.

Following two days of oral argument, the CAC overturned the Tribunal’s prohibition, instead deciding on 28 May 2012[7] that the merger should be allowed subject to conditions, including the imposition of restrictions on price increases on existing Pannar varieties to the level of consumer price inflation for three years, and agreeing to license a list of Pannar varieties for breeding by third parties.  The CAC’s reasoning was based on an assumption that the decline of the target firm was “inevitable”[8] albeit uncertain in its timing, although it was again universally accepted that Pannar failed to meet the requirements of a failing firm.  On that assumption, the CAC appeared to reverse the onus that would have applied with a failing firm defence, and stated that the Commission[9] had failed to establish the likelihood of an alternative transaction that might preserve Pannar’s assets, in the event of a prohibition.  The CAC placed an unusually heavy weight on the interests of private shareholders,[10] as opposed to consumers, which is in distinction to the strict requirements of the failing firm defence, as applied internationally.[11]  The CAC ultimately concluded that the relevant counterfactual was the continued decline, eventual demise and exit by Pannar,[12] and against that benchmark, approved the transaction, subject to conditions.

It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Appeal denied the Commission leave to appeal on the substance, as the CAC’s approach to the counterfactual has created some uncertainty that may need to be resolved in another case.  In any event, the Constitutional Court was only asked to consider the CAC’s costs award.[13]

The CAC had awarded costs against the Commission, not only in respect of the CAC proceedings, but also those before the Tribunal.  The Constitutional Court first clarified that the Tribunal has no power to award costs against the Commission (thereby distinguishing the Commission, as a “party”, from a private “complainant” in Tribunal proceedings).[14]  Furthermore, the Constitutional Court determined that the CAC is similarly unable to award costs in relation to Tribunal proceedings.[15]  Finally, while the CAC has discretion to award costs against the Commission in respect of CAC proceedings, it must properly exercise this discretion.[16]  The Constitutional Court noted that while the “Unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious pursuit of a particular stance” may justify a costs order against the Commission, the vigorous pursuit of its case would not.  The Court highlighted the distinction between an ordinary civil litigant and the Commission, which is required to pursue its statutory mandate vigorously, often where there is no opposing party or amicus.  Ultimately, the Constitutional Court concluded that the lack of reasoning behind the costs award, and the lack of any evidence of “mala fides, irregularity, or unreasonable conduct” by the Commission meant that the costs order had to be set aside.

This is clearly an important result for the Commission’s ongoing activities.  The Commission had argued before the Constitutional Court that a costs order would have a serious effect on its budget and its stance in defending similar investigations and findings before the CAC.  Ideally, competition enforcement should aim to strike a balance between sufficiently robust enforcement to achieve policy objectives and the need to avoid imposing undue or disproportionate costs on the businesses that ultimately drive competition, growth and job creation.  Particularly in a developing country context, a certain degree of prioritisation can be helpful in building institutional capability and making the most effective use of limited resources, as well as minimising the burden of investigations.  By focussing the most resources and attention on those cases most likely to cause harm, an agency might maximise the benefits of enforcement, while minimising the potential for any inefficiency caused by the investigation process.

In this case, while the CAC took a different view from the Tribunal (and the Commission), it would be difficult to label the Tribunal’s decision (and hence the Commission’s defence at the CAC) as unreasonable or vexatious.  In a nutshell, this was a 3 to 2 combination between direct (“horizontal”)[17] competitors in a priority sector, in an industry that, while increasingly influenced by innovation, is slow moving in comparison with “innovation markets” such as those in the ICT sector.

South African merger control is not characterised by many prohibition decisions.  Amongst intermediate and large mergers, this is the most recent prohibition decision issued by the Tribunal.  There have been around 500 decisions since the previous prohibition, Telkom/BCX in August 2007.[18]  Few prohibitions may well point to the outstanding deterrent effect of the Commission’s historical enforcement efforts, but it seems a stretch to consider that the Commission’s (albeit vigorous) defence of the only large/intermediate prohibition decision by the Tribunal in the past 6 years is an indication of a vexatious or overly aggressive approach.

While the Commission will no doubt be heartened by this decision, it will be interesting to see whether the clarifications provided by the Constitutional Court will have any bearing on the Commission’s stance on contentious matters before the CAC in future, in particular those involving more complex theories of harm.  Arguably more important will be the anticipated clarification of the approach to mergers involving declining firms in the light of the CAC’s approach to the counterfactual.

Patrick Smith, RBB, author

Patrick Smith, RBB, author (South Africa)

[2]     See Roberts, Simon (2008) “South African Competition Policy in 2008: Key Priorities of the Competition Commission” Global Competition Policy, April 23rd, 2008.  Prioritisation might justify closer scrutiny, or even firmer enforcement, in particular sectors or industrial areas.  For an example of where enforcement might depend on sector characteristics, see EdF/British Energy, European Commission Case No COMP/M.5224, 22/12/2008, at para 31, cited in http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-Competition-Law-Conferece/Session-4B/100812-PS-Paper-for-SACC-conference-DRAFT.pdf.

[3]     Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc and Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and the African Centre for Biosafety, CT CASE NO: 81/AM/DEC10 (“Tribunal Decision”), http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/81AMDec10.pdf

[4]     Tribunal Decision paragraphs 282 to 284.

[5]     Tribunal Decision paragraphs 317 and 327.

[7]     Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc and Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and the African Centre for Biosafety, CAC CASE NO.: 113/CAC/NOV11, (“CAC Decision”), http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/113CACNov11-Pioneer-Pannar.pdf

[8]     CAC Decision paragraphs 3 and 29.

[9]     CAC Decision paragraph 26.

[10]    CAC Decision paragraphs 21-26.

[12]    CAC Decision paragraph 28.

[13]    The Competition Commission v Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc, Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd, and the African Centre for Biosafety, Case CCT 58/13 [2013] ZACC 50, (“Constitutional Court Decision”), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/50.html

[14]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 40.

[15]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 43.

[16]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 46-47.

[17]    More precisely, producers of substitutes.