#COMESA21: New member states, new commissioners

#COMESA21

In a milestone enlargement of the (now formerly) 19-member COMESA region, Tunisia and Somalia have acceded to the trade bloc at the 20th COMESA Summit on 19th July 2018, creating #COMESA21 – Africa’s largest free trade region.

Their application to join had been pending since 2016.  Under the Treaty, the new members will be bound by the provisions of the Treaty and must deposit their formal instrument of acceptance of the terms of admission with the Secretary General, together with an instrument of accession pursuant to Articles 194 and 195 of the Treaty with regard to a State admitted to full membership.  Says Primerio’s Andreas Stargard, “with the privilege of membership comes the obligation of agreeing to abide by the antitrust rules promulgated under the COMESA Treaty.  This includes the Competition Commission’s procedural and substantive rules and notably its merger regulations.  It remains to be seen how the still weakened bureaucratic structure of the Somali Republic will be able to implement the strictures of a working competition-law regime…

Indeed, the CCC’s recent Notice No. 2/2018 provides that “the provisions of the COMESA Competition Regulations of 2004, and its accompanying rules, shall be enforceable in the territories of the Republic of Tunisia and the Federal Republic of Somalia with immediate effect.”

Personnel News 2018

In addition to gaining two new member states, COMESA also underwent personnel changes, adding an experienced antitrust practitioner, Zimbabwean Competition and Tariff Commission director, Ellen Ruparanganda, as one of the nine CCC commissioners, for a term of three years.  Besides Ms. Ruparanganda, Francis Lebon (Seychelles), Ali Hamadou Ali Kako (Djibouti), Thembelihle Dube (Eswatini, formerly Swaziland), Danson Buya Mungatana (Kenya), Michael Teklu Beyene (Ethiopia), Charlotte Wezi Malonda (Malawi), Islam Tagelsir Ahmed Alhasan (Sudan), and Brian Muletambo Lingela (Zambia) were also sworn in.

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Business community embraces COMESA competition law: First-ever #CCCworkshop at full capacity

The first-ever COMESA-sponsored competition law workshop focussed solely on the business community, currently underway in Nairobi, Kenya, stretches the capacity of the Hilton conference room where it is being held.

The event’s tag line is “Benefits to Business.” Especially now, with the African continent sporting over 400 companies with over $500m in annual revenues, the topic of antitrust regulation in Africa is more pertinent than ever, according to the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC).

The head of the Zambian competition regulator (CCPC), Dr. Chilufya Sampa, introduced the first panel and guest of honour. He identified the threats of anticompetitive last behaviour as grounds for he need to understand and support the work of he CCC and its sister agencies in the member states.

With COMESA trade liberalisation, the markets at issue are much larger than kenya or other national markets. The effects of anticompetitive conduct are thus often magnified accordingly.

The one-stop shop nature of the CCC’s merger notification system simplifies and renders more cost-effective the transactional work of companies doing business in COMESA.

The Keynote speaker, Mr. Mohammed Nyaoga Muigai, highlighted the exciting future of the more and more integrated African markets, offering new challenges and opportunities. He challenged the audience to imagine a single market of over 750 million consumers. Companies will have to think creatively and “outside the box” in these enlarged common markets.

His perspective is twofold: for one, as a businessman and lawyer, but also as a regulator and board chairman and member of the Kenyan Central Bank. Effective competition policy (and access to the legal system) allows to prepare the ground for the successful carrying out of business in the common market. Yet, businesses must know what the regulatory regime actually is. Therefore, the duty of lawyers is to educate their clients about the strictures and requirements of all applicable competition law, across all COMESA member states.

After a group photo, the event continued with an informative presentation by Mr. Willard Mwemba on key facts that “companies should know” on merger control in the (soon enlarged to 21 member states, with the imminent addition of Tunisia and Somalia) COMESA region, starting with its historical roots in COMESA Treaty Article 55 and continuing through the current era since 2013 of the CCC’s regulatory oversight.

Willard Mwemba, Head of M&A at the CCC

He provided relevant merger statistics, jointly with Director of Trade affairs, Dr. Francis Mangeni, which were of great interest to the audience, followed by a discussion of substantive merger review analysis as it is undertaken by the Commission. The benefits of the “one-stop-shop” characteristic of CCC notification versus multiple individual filings were extolled and individual past M&A cases discussed.

AAT will live-update the blog as the event progresses.

Dr. Sampa, CCPC executive

Dr. Sampa, as head of the Zambian CCPC and a former CCC Board member, emphasized the importance for companies to have functioning and well-implemented antitrust compliance programmes in place.

A spirited discussion was had relating to the 30% market share threshold the Commission utilises to evaluate triggers for launching antitrust conduct investigations. Primerio’s Andreas Stargard argued for COMESA’s consideration of an increase in this trigger threshold to 40%, proposing that:

“Especially in an already concentrated market (where players possess majority shares anyway), a low initial share threshold is of little to no additional enforcement value. On the contrary, a low threshold may hamper vigorous competition by smaller to midsize competitors or newer entrants, who wish to grow their (previously innocuous) smaller share of the market but are simultaneously held back in their growth efforts by trying not to cross the 30% barrier so as not to attract the attention of the Commission.”

There was also an issue raised regarding private equity and non-profit / “impact investors” and the like having to bear the burden of notifications and ancillary fees in cases that are otherwise unobjectionable almost by definition (since the investors are not present on the market of the acquired entities in which they invest). Dr. Mangeni indicated that the CCC will investigate and consider whether a proposed change in the applicable Rules to account for this problem may be advisable in the future.

Mary Gurure, head of legal (CCC)

The CCC’s chief legal advisor, Ms. Mary Gurure, presented on conflict of laws issues within the COMESA regime, harmonisation of laws, and CCC engagements with individual member states on these issues.

Crucially, she also mentioned a novel initiative to replicate a COMESA-focused competition enforcer network, akin to the ECN and ICN groupings of international antitrust agencies.

Business panel #CCCworkshop 2018

The conference concluded with a business lawyer panel, in which outside counsel and in-house business representatives voiced their perspectives, largely focusing on the issue of merger notifications. These topics included the (1) burdens of having to submit certified copies of documents, (2) high filing fees (particularly in light of relatively low-value deals being made in the region), (3) comparatively low notification thresholds (e.g., the $10m 2-party turnover limit), (4) remaining, if minimal, confusion over multiple filing obligations, (5) questions surrounding the true nature of the “public interest” criterion in the CCC’s merger evaluation, which could benefit from further clarification via a Guideline or the like, and (6) the importance of predictability and consistency in rulings.

Panellists also commented on the positive, countervailing benefits of the one-stop-shop nature of the CCC, as well as highlighting the friendly nature of the COMESA staff, which permits consensus-building and diplomatic resolutions of potential conflicts.

Mr. Mwemba concluded the event by responding to each of the panel members’ points, noting that forum-shopping based on the costs of filing fees reflected a misguided approach, that the CCC may consider increasing filing thresholds, and that the CCC’s average time to reach merger decisions has been 72 (calendar) days.

The African WRAP – JUNE 2017 edition

The first half of 2017 has been an exciting one from a competition law perspective for a number of African countries. As certain agencies have taken a more robust approach to enforcement while others have been actively pursuing or developing their own domestic competition law legislation. Further, there is an increasingly prevalent interplay between domestic laws with regional competition law and policy in an effort to harmonise and promote regional integration.

In this addition of the WRAP, we highlight some of the key antitrust developments taking place across the continent. The editors at AAT have featured a number of articles which provide further insight and commentary on various topics and our readers are encouraged to visit the AAT Blog for further materials and useful updates.


AAT is indebted to the continuous support and assistance of Primerio and its directors in sharing their insights and expertise on various African antitrust related matters. To contact a Primerio representative, please see the Primerio brochure for contact details. Alternatively, please visit Primerio’s website


 

Kenya

Grocery Market Inquiry

On 27 January 2017, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) exercised its powers in terms of section 18 (1) (a) of the Competition Act, 2010, to conduct a market inquiry into the branded retail sector.

The key issues which the CAK’s will focus on during the inquiry include:

  1. the allocation of shelf space and the relative bargaining power between retailers and their suppliers;
  2. the nature of and the extent of exclusive agreements at one stop shop destinations and their effects on competition;
  3. the pricing strategies retailers employ especially in regards to responding to new entrants;
  4. whether there are any strategic barriers to entry created by incumbent firms to limit entry in the market; and
  5. the effect of the supermarkets branded products on competition

Legislative amendments

The Kenya Competition Act (Act) has undergone a number of amendments in the past year.

Most notably, however, section 24 of the Act, which deals with abuse of dominance generally, has been amended to also cater for an abuse of “buyer power”.

Without being exhaustive, a number of practices which would typically constitute an abuse of dominance include:

  1. imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices;
  2. limiting or restricting output, market access or technological advancements;
  3. tying and/or bundling as part of contractual terms; or
  4. abusing intellectual property rights.

In terms of the definition of “dominance” in the Act, a firm will be considered dominant if that firm has greater than a 50% market share.

The amendment, as drafted, raises a number of concerns as previously noted on AAT.

Botswana

Merger control – Prior Implementation

On 17 February 2017, the Competition Authority of Botswana (CA) prohibited a merger between Universal House (Pty) Ltd and Mmegi Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd.

The CA prohibited the merger on the grounds that the transaction was likely to lead to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the market. In particular, the CA held that the “market structure in the provision of commercial radio broadcasting services will be altered, and as such raises competition and public interest concerns”.

At the stage of ordering the divestiture, a suitable third party had not yet been identified and the merging parties were obliged to sell the 28.73 shares to a third party “with no business interests affiliated in any way with the acquiring entity”. The divestiture was also to take place within three months of the CA’s decisions and, should the thresholds be met for a mandatorily notifiable merger, the CA would require that the proposed divestiture also be notified.

South Africa

Follow-on Civil Liability

A second civil damages award was imposed in 2017 on South Africa’s national airline carrier, SAA, following the Competition Tribunal’s finding that SAA had engaged in abuse of dominance practices, in favour of Comair. This award comes after the first ever successful follow-on civil damages claim in South Africa (as a result of competition law violation) which related to Nationwide’s civil claim against SAA.  In the Nationwide matter, the High Court awarded, (in August 2016) damages to Nationwide in the amount of R325 million.   Comair claim for damages was based on the same cause of action as Nationwide’s claim. The High Court, however, awarded damages in favour of Comair of R554 million plus interest bring the total award to over a R1 billion (or about US$ 80 million).

Please see AAT’s featured article here for further insights into this case.

Market Inquiries

The SACC published a notice in the Government Gazette on 10 May 2017, indicating that it will conduct a market inquiry into the Public Passenger Transport sector (PPT Inquiry) which is scheduled to commence in June 2017.

The PPT inquiry, is expected to span two years and will involve public hearings, surveys and meetings with stakeholders which will cover all forms of (land-based) public passenger transport. The SACC indicated in its report that “…it has reason to believe that there are features or a combination of features in the industry that may prevent, distort or restrict competition, and / or to achieve the purpose of the Competition Act”.

Legislative amendments

The South African Competition Commission (SACC) recently published draft guidelines for determining the administrative penalty applicable for prior implementing a merger in contravention of the South African Competition Acts’ merger control provisions (the Draft Guidelines).

In terms of the penalty calculations, the Draft Guidelines prescribe a minimum administrative penalty of R5 million (USD 384 615) for the prior implementation of an intermediate merger and a R20 million (USD 1.5 million) penalty for implementing a large merger prior to being granted approval. The Draft Guidelines cater further for a number of aggravating or mitigating factors which may influence the quantum of the penalty ultimately imposed.

Egypt

Investigations

The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA), has also referred the heads of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to the Egyptian Economic Court for competition-law violations relating to certain exclusive marketing & broadcasting rights. This follows the COMESA Competition Commission also electing to investigate this conduct.

In addition, it has been reported that the ECA has initiated prosecution of seven companies engaged in alleged government-contract bid rigging in the medical supply field, relating to hospital supplies.

Mauritius

Minimum resale price maintenance

In a landmark judgment, the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) recently concluded its first successful prosecution in relation to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), which is precluded in terms of Section 43 of the Mauritius Competition Act 25 of 2007 (Competition Act).

The CCM held that Panagora Marketing Company Ltd (Panagora) engaged in prohibited vertical practices by imposing a minimum resale price on its downstream dealers and consequently fined Panagora Rs 29 932 132.00 (US$ 849,138.51) on a ‘per contravention’ basis. In this regard, the CMM held that Panagora had engaged in three separate instances of RPM and accordingly the total penalty paid by Pangora was Rs 3 656 473.00, Rs 22 198 549.00 and Rs4 007 110.00 respectively for each contravention.

Please see AAT’s featured article here for further information.

Leniency Policy

The global trend in competition law towards granting immunity to cartel whistleblowers has now been embraced by the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM). The CCM will also grant temporary immunity (during the half-year period from March 1 until the end of August 2017) not only to repentant participants but also to lead initiators of cartels, under the country’s Leniency Programme.

COMESA

The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) announced early 2017 that it will be investigating allegations of exclusionary conduct in relation to the Confederate of African Football’s (CAF) decision to extend an exclusive marketing of broadcasting rights and sponsorship agreement with Lagardère Sports in relation CAF tournaments.

Please see AAT’s featured article here for more information.

What to look out for?

Zambia

Guidelines

The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) published series of guidelines and policies during 2016. These included adopting a formal Leniency Policy as well as guidelines for calculating administrative penalties.

In addition, the CCPC also published draft “Settlement Guidelines” which provides a formal framework for parties seeking to engage the CCPV for purposes of reaching a settlement. The Settlement Guidelines present a number of practical challenges as currently drafted. One example is that the guidelines don’t cater or seem to recognise “without prejudice” settlement negotiations.

It is anticipated that the draft Settlement Guidelines will be formally adopted this year.

Please click here to read the feature article on AAT.

Namibia

In April 2017, the CEO of the Namibian Competition Commission (NCC), Mr. Mihe Gaomab II, announced that the NCC has made submissions to the Minister of Trade and Industry in relation to proposed legislation which will regulate franchise models in Namibia.

While recognising the benefits of franchise models, the NCC is, however, concerned that there are a number of franchises in Namibia which may be anti-competitive in that the franchisor-franchisee relationship creates certain barriers to entry.

The NCC has specifically identified the practice, by way of an example, whereby certain franchisors deliberately ensure that there is a lack of competition between franchisees in the downstream market. The rationale behind this commercial strategy is allegedly so that the franchisor may extract greater royalties or franchise fees from the respective franchisees, as the franchisee is assured of a lack of competition.

The NCC views this practice as well as a various similar practices as potentially anti-competitive as the structure of certain franchise models may result in collusion between franchisees.

For further commentary on this development, please see AAT’s featured article.

Nigeria

Nigeria remains, for now, one of the few powerhouse African economies without any antitrust legislation. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill of 2016, however, recently made it past the initial hurdle of receiving sufficient votes in the lower House of Representatives.  The Bill is, therefore, expected to be brought into effect during the latter part of 2017 or early 2018.

South Africa

Market inquiries

The Minister of the Department of Economic Development, who has fulfills the oversight function of the South African Competition Authorities, has announced that a market inquiry will be conducted in relation to the “high costs of Data” in South Africa.

This would be the fifth formal market inquiry since the Competition Act was amended to afford the Competition Commission with formal powers to conduct market inquiries.

Complex monopoly provisions

Both Minister Patel and the President have announced that the Competition Act will undergo further legislative amendments in order to address perceived high levels of concentration in certain industries.

In this regard, it is likely that the competition amendment act’s provisions relating to abuse of dominance and complex monopolies, which was drafted in 2009, will be brought into effect.

In terms of the provisions, as currently drafted, where five or less firms have 75% market share in the same market, a firm could be found to have engaged in prohibited conduct if any two or more of those firms collectively act in a parallel manner which has the effect of lessening competition in the market (i.e. by creating barriers to entry, charging excessive prices or exclusive dealing and “other market characteristics which indicate coordinated behavior”).

Please see AAT’s feature article here for further commentary.

New Zambian Settlement Guidelines: A Risky Reprieve

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie & Mweshi Mutuna, Pr1merio competition advocate (Zambia)

The Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (‘CCPC’) has recently published draft settlement guidelines (‘Draft Guidelines’) for respondents who have allegedly engaged in conduct in contravention of the domestic Competition and Consumer Protection Act (‘Act’).

zambiaThe Draft Guidelines have been published in addition to the ‘Leniency Programme’ as well as the ‘Fines Guidelines’ published earlier this year (as well as the 2015 Merger Guidelines), and essentially sets out a framework within which respondent parties may engage the CCPC for purposes of reaching a settlement agreement for alleged contraventions of the Act.

Notably, the Draft Guidelines will be binding on the CCPC which is an important aspect of ensuring a transparent and objective approach to settlement negotiations. Furthermore, the Draft Guidelines emphasise that respondents should be fully informed of the case against them prior to settling. In this regard, the Draft Guidelines provide for an initial stage of the settlement negotiations (essentially an expression of interest) which follows from a formal request by a firm expressing an interest to settle.

Should the CCPC decide to proceed with settlement negotiations, the CCPC must, within 21 days, provide the respondent party with information as to the nature of the case against the respondent. This includes disclosing the alleged facts and the classification of those facts, the gravity and duration of the alleged conduct, the attribution of liability (which we discuss further below) and the evidence relied on by the CCPC to support the complaint.

currie2

The authors, Mr. Currie & Ms. Mutuna

The purpose of disclosing these facts to a respondent is to afford a respondent the opportunity to meaningfully consider and evaluate the case against it in order to make an informed decision whether to settle or not.

Assuming that an expression of interest in settling the matter is established by both parties, the CCPC will then proceed by requesting that the respondent provide a formal “settlement submission” within 15 days of the CCPC’s request. Included in the settlement submission, must be a clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of liability (which includes a summary of the pertinent facts, duration and the respondent’s participation in the anticompetitive conduct) and the maximum settlement quantum which the respondent is prepared to pay by way of an administrative penalty.

Should the CCPC accept the settlement submission, the CCPC will then commence with drafting and ultimately publishing a statement of objections (‘SO’) which essentially captures the material terms of the settlement submission. This is largely a necessary procedural step although the respondent party may object to the SO should it not correctly record the terms of the settlement agreement.

Following the publication of the SO, the CCPC will, subject to any challenges to the SO, proceed formally to make the settlement agreement a final decision as required by the Act.

Risky Business?

The above framework appears to be relatively straightforward and balanced, assuming that the parties in fact do reach a settlement agreement. The position is somewhat different in the event that settlement negotiations breakdown, particularly if the negotiations are already at a relatively advanced stage.

Most notably, settlement negotiations in terms of the Draft Guidelines are not conduced on a “without prejudice” basis. To the contrary, the Draft Guidelines states that the CCPC has the right to adopt a SO which does not reflect the parties’ settlement submission. In this event, the normal procedures for investigating and prosecuting a complaint as set out in the Act will apply.

In the event that the CCPC elects not to accept a settlement submission submitted by a respondent, the Draft Guidelines specifically state that “the acknowledgements provided by the parties in the settlement submission shall not be withdrawn and the Commission reserves the right to use the information submitted for its investigation”.

This paragraph is controversial as it places a substantial risk on a party making a settlement submission with no guarantee that the settlement proffer will be accepted by the CCPC, while at the same time, the respondent party exposes itself by making admissions which may be used against it in the course of a normal complaint investigation and determination by the CCPC.

Whether or not the financial incentive to respondents would entice a respondent to, nonetheless, engage in settlement discussions in terms of the Draft Guidelines is sufficient, only time will tell. In this regard, however, the Draft Guidelines state that a firm who settles with the CCPC prior to the matter being referred to the Board will be limited to a maximum penalty of up to 4% of the firm’s annual turnover. Should the firm settle after the matter has been referred to the Board, the maximum penalty will be capped at 7% of the firm’s annual turnover.

Multi-Party Settlements: the More the Better?

A further interesting and rather novel aspect to the Draft Guidelines is the provision made for tripartite settlement negotiations. In this regard, the Draft Guidelines cater for a rather unusual mechanism by which multiple respondents in relation to the same investigation may approach the CCPC for purposes of reaching a settlement agreement.

Although referred to as “tripartite” negotiations, the Draft Guidelines state that when the CCPC initiates proceedings against two or more respondents, the CCPC will inform a respondent of the other respondents to the complaint. Should the respondent parties collectively wish to enter into settlement negotiations, the respondents should jointly appoint a duly authorised representative to act on their behalf. In the event that the respondent parties do settle with the CCPC, the fact that the respondents were represented by a jointly appointed representative will not prejudice them insofar as the CCPC making any finding as to the attribution of liability between the respondents is concerned.

While joint representation may be suitable in the case of merger-related offences (which may have been what was envisaged by the drafters hence the reference to “tripartite” negotiations), we believe that it is hard to imagine that the drafters anticipated that, should respondents to a cartel be invited to settle the complaint against them, the cartelists would then be required to embark on further collaborative efforts: this time to engage collectively in formulating a settlement strategy and decide how they are ultimately going to ‘split the bill’ should a settlement agreement be reached.

The issue of a multi-party settlement submission is further complicated in the event that a settlement proffer is not accepted by the CCPC following a multiparty settlement submission. As mentioned above, the settlement submission must contain an admission of liability which, in the case of cartel conduct, would invariably amount to the parties to the settlement proposal admitting to engaging in cartel conduct by fixing prices or allocating markets, by way of example, between each other.

Although, the Draft Guidelines is a welcome endeavour to provide respondents with a transparent and objective framework to utilise when engaging with the CCPC for purposes of reaching a settlement, the uncertainty and risk which flows from a rejection of the settlement proffer may prove to be an impediment in achieving the very objectives of the Draft Guidelines.

In this regard, we understand that the CCPC is currently considering revised guidelines which hopefully address the concerns raised above.

 

“The WRAP” — our monthly summary of antitrust developments across the continent

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Competition-Law Developments: a WRAP from the Comp-Corner

Issue 2 – August 2016

The editors and authors at AAT welcome you to the second edition of “The WRAP.”

We look at the most recent developments and updates in respect of competition law and enforcement which has taken place across the African continent in recent months.

As always, thank you for reading the WRAP, and remember to visit us at AAT for up-to-date competition-law news from the African continent.

         –Ed. (we wish to thank our contributors, especially Michael James Currie, for their support)

New Penalty Guidelines Provide Incentive to Apply for Leniency

Zambia: New Penalty Guidelines may Incentivise Firms to Apply for Leniency

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.

At the recent International Competition Network conference held in Singapore, the International Competition Network (ICN), in conjunction with the World Bank, named the Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) as one of the best Competition Authorities in advocating competition in key domestic markets.

The CCPC, as a competition agency, is making significant strides to ensure that the Zambian market is competitive to ensure greater consumer benefit.

In particular, the CCPC has, in recent years, strengthened its efforts to detect cartel conduct. This includes carrying out search and seizure operations, initiating investigations and introducing a corporate leniency policy (Zambian CLP) for whistle-blowers.

The Zambian CLP affords a firm who has engaged in cartel conduct, who is ‘first through the door’ in disclosing the cartel and who provides the CCPC with sufficient evidence to prosecute the cartel total immunity from an administrative penalty.

Unlike its South African counter-part, the Zambian CLP also caters for a ‘leniency plus’ whereby the ‘second through the door’ may qualify for up to a 50% reduction in respect of a potential administrative penalty.

In spite of leniency policies being regarded as arguably the most effective tool by which competition agencies detect and prosecute cartel conduct, we are not aware of the CCPC having yet received an application in terms of its CLP (as at March the CPCC had confirmed that it had not yet received such an application).

The reluctance by firms to come forward and expose cartel conduct in Zambia may be due to the fact that the Zambian CLP only extends immunity in respect of administrative liability and does not protect a whistle-blower from potential criminal or civil liability.

Despite the lack of success which the Zambian CLP has achieved thus far, the policy has only been in effect for just over a year. Furthermore, the CCPC has strengthened its efforts in initiating and concluding investigations in various sectors (which includes the stockbroker, frozen fish and milling industries, the latter of which is still on-going).

Accordingly, and in light of the recently published Draft Guidelines for the Issuance of Fines (Guidelines) (now for public comment), there may well be more activity in so far as the CLP is concerned.

zambiaThe Guidelines are clear in that administrative penalties should be punitive and should have a sufficient deterrent effect. The CCPC has expressly stated that it does not want administrative penalties to merely be considered as a ‘cost of doing business’ in Zambia.

Unsurprisingly, the Guidelines confirm that in respect of cartel conduct, “the fines to be imposed will be the highest due to the seriousness of the conduct”. Furthermore, the Guidelines state that “preceding such fines may be conviction for criminal culpability by a Court of Competent jurisdiction”.

In terms of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”), a firm’s potential liability is capped at 10% of its turnover derived within or from Zambia (similar to the EU’s 10% turnover cap), although the implementation of this cap is uncertain as we indicate below.

The Guidelines state that the 10% cap should be based on the latest audited financial years. While the CCPC will accept management accounts in certain circumstances, it should be noted that the CCPC will add 5% to the total as reflected in the management accounts.

Importantly, while the Guidelines recognise that an administrative penalty may be adjusted depending on aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the Guidelines provide, as a starting point, a ‘base fine’ which will be calculated in accordance with the nature of the contravention. We set these out below.

Base (%)

Conduct

7 Cartels
4 Resale Price Maintenance
4 Abuse of Dominance
3 Mergers
5 Restrictive Business Practices

 

John Oxenham, an African competition law practitioner, notes that the ‘base fine’ is “calculated utilising a firm’s aggregated turnover generated in or from Zambia, irrespective of the relevant market. In other words, the CCPC considers a firm’s total turnover in Zambia as the affected turnover, which can cause fines to mushroom in the case of diversified conglomerates with large revenues even where the affected, cartelised product market is de minimis.”

Importantly, in relation to prohibited horizontal or vertical conduct, the CCPC will impose a fine based on each year in which the parties contravened the Act, up to a maximum of five years. While the Guidelines as noted above, expressly state that the total penalty will be capped at the statutory cap of 10%. In light of the fact that the base fines start at 4% (which would in any evet exceed the statutory cap after only 2.5 years) it seems that the CCPC is of the view that each year in which a firm engaged in cartel conduct should be viewed as a separate contravention (i.e. that the statutory cap only applies per contravention). This will need to be clarified as a firm who is found to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct (including vertical restrictive practices) may be subjected to an exorbitant administrative fine.

It remains to be seen whether the significant administrative liabilities which is contemplated in terms of the Guidelines is indeed permissible and in accordance with the Act, and secondly, whether it will incentivise firms to take advantage of the CLP.

Cooperation, handshakes & MoUs: all the rage in African antitrust?

AAT the big picture

Significant Strides made to Promote Harmonisation across African Competition Agencies

By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.

In the past 12 months there has been a steady drive by competition law agencies in Africa to promote harmonisation between the respective jurisdictions.

The African regional competition authority, the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC), has entered into memorandum of understandings with a number of its nineteen member states. On 5 June 2016, it was announced that the CCC has further concluded MoU’s with the Swaziland Competition Commission as well as the Fair Trade Commission of the Seychelles.

On 7 May 2016, it was announced that nine members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have also entered into and MoU. These member states include South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Seychelles, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia.

The SADC MoU was based on the 2009 SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation and Consumer Policies.

SADC MoUAccording to the South African Competition Commissioner, Mr Tembinkosi Bonakele, the MoU creates a framework for cooperation enforcement within the SADC region.  “The MoU provides a framework for cooperation in competition enforcement within the SADC region and we are delighted to be part of this historic initiative,” said Bonakele.

Interestingly, although a number of the signatories to SADC MoU are not member states of COMESA (that is, South Africa and Namibia, who in turn, have a MoU between their respective competition authorities), Swaziland, Malawi and the Seychelles have existing MoU’s with the COMESA Competition Commission. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio Ltd., “it will be interesting to see, first, whether there may be conflicts that arise out of the divergent patchwork of cooperation MoUs, and second, to what extent the South African Competition Authorities, for example, could indirectly benefit from the broader cooperation amongst the various jurisdiction and regional authorities.”

Part of the objectives of the MoUs to date has largely been to facilitate an advocacy role. However, from a practical perspective, the SADC MoU envisages broader information exchanges and coordination of investigations.

While the MoU’s are a positive stride in achieving cross-border harmonisation, it remains to be seen to what extent the collaboration will assist the respective antitrust agencies in detecting and prosecuting cross border anticompetitive conduct.

There may be a number of practical and legal hurdles which may provide challenges to the effective collaboration envisaged. The introduction of criminal liability for cartel conduct in South Africa, for example, may provide challenges as to how various agencies obtain and share evidence.

Dawn raids on the increase across Africa

By Michael-James Currie and Jenna Foley

March 2016 has been a busy month for the competition agencies of South Africa and Kenya respectively. Both agencies carried out search and seizure operations as a result of alleged collusion within various sectors of the economy. While the March dawn raids are not connected, the South African Competition Authority, as part of its advocacy outreach, provided training to the Competition Authority of Kenya relating to inter alia, search and seizure operations.

South Africa

On 23 March 2016, the South African Competition Commission carried out search and seizure operations in the automotive glass fitment industry, as part of its continued investigation into alleged collusion within this sector.

Accordingy to the SACC, the raid was carried out “at the Gauteng premises of PG Glass, Glasfit, Shatterprufe and Digicall as part of its investigation of alleged collusion. PG Glass and Glasfit are automotive glass fitment and repair service providers; Shatterprufe supplies PG Glass and Glasfit with automotive glass while Digicall processes and administers automotive glass related insurance claims on behalf of PG Glass and Glasfit.”

John Oxenham, founding director of Pr1merio, notes that “[t]his most recent dawn raid follows on from those carried out towards the latter part of 2014 and 2015 and confirms that the SACC has adopted a more robust approach to investigating alleged anti-competitive practices.” In this regard, Commissioner, Tembinkosi Bonakele, confirmed at the 9th Annual Competition, Law, Economics and Policy Conference in November last year that the Competition Commission has in the past two years, “conducted more dawn raids than those conducted in preceding years since the Competition Commission came into existence” (nearly 16 years ago).

For an overview of dawn raids and cartel investigations in South Africa, please see the following GCR Article.

Kenya

This month the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) conducted its first dawn raid. The search and seizure operations were carried out in respect of two fertiliser firms, Mea Limited and the Yara East Africa, based on the CAK’s suspicion of price fixing occurring between these two firms, who together control approximately 60% of the fertiliser market.   The CAK conducted the raid in accordance with Section 32 of the Competition Act, 2011 which provides for the Authority to enter any premises in which persons are believed to be in possession of relevant information and documents and inspect the premises and any goods, documents and records situated thereon. This follows an inquiry which was launched last year by Kenyan competition authorities into what the CAK termed “powerful trade associations exhibiting cartel-like behaviour specifically targeting banks, microfinance institutions, forex bureaus, capital markets as well as the agricultural and insurance lobbies”.  The fact that the CAK has carried out its first dawn raid demonstrates its growing stature.

The fertiliser industry appears to be a priority sector for a number of African jurisdictions as the CAK’s investigation into this sector follows the South African Competition Commission’s investigation into the fertiliser industry (which resulted in a referral before to the South African Competition Tribunal for adjudication some years back). In this regard, the South African Competition Commission’s spokesperson stated that the “fertiliser sector is viewed as a priority sector, due to the its importance as an input in the agricultural sector” (as reported here on African antitrust)

Zambia

Interestingly, the Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“CCPC”) had, in 2012, conducted dawn raids at the premises of two fertiliser companies, as a result of alleged collusion within the industry.

On a Path to Harmonisation?

While there are a number of practical and legislative hurdles to effectively carrying out cross border search and seizure operations, it appears that cross border investigations may not be too far off. This is particularly so as the various agencies within the Southern African Region have identified similar priority sectors (as evidenced by both the investigations into the fertiliser sectors as well as the various market inquiries into the grocery retail sector).

The Big Picture: Market-Sector Inquiries in Africa

AAT the big picture

Market Inquiries in Africa – An Overview

By AAT guest author, Michael-James Currie.

Most African jurisdictions with competition laws have included provisions in their respective legislations that allow the competition authorities to conduct market inquiries.

Market inquiries have proved to be useful tools for competition agencies in numerous jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, and is becoming a common and increasingly popular tool amongst an number of African agencies as well.

Despite the benefits that may flow from a market inquiry, it is important that competition agencies appreciate and have due regard to the costs associated with such inquiries. Market inquiries are very time consuming and onerous for market participants and should be used sparingly. Having said that, the focus of market inquiries in most African jurisdictions tend to be on markets which the relevant authorities have identified as having a large impact on consumers.

In other words, socio-economic considerations appear to be a significant factor during the screening process used in deciding whether to institute a market inquiry. Sectors such as food, healthcare and banking (at an individual consumer level) are some of the common industries which have been ‘prioritised’ or identified as important sectors.

While the number of market inquiries which have been concluded on the African continent is limited, as competition agencies gain more expertise and confidence in their mandates, there is likely to be a significant increase in the number of market inquiries instituted and firms conducting business in Africa, particularly within ‘priority’ sectors, should be cognisant of this.

We set out below a brief overview of the market inquiries which are currently being conducted in the various African jurisdictions.

South Africa

There are currently three market inquiries which are underway, one into the private healthcare sector and the other into the grocery retail market. The third market inquiry is in the liquefied petroleum gas sector.

The private healthcare inquiry was launched on the basis that cost of private health care in South Africa is a concern to the competition authorities. A revised statement of Issues for public comment was announced on 11 February 2016 and comments are to be submitted by 11 March 2016.

The grocery retail inquiry is focussed largely on the stricture of the market and the ability of smaller or informal retailers to compete, but will also address issues such as “long term lease” clauses (which has already been adjudicated upon by the Competition Tribunal).

The third market inquiry is into the LPG which was launched in August 2014 is expected to conclude in March 2016.

The only previous market inquiry concluded in South Africa was into the banking sector. This inquiry was conducted on an informal basis as there were no formal legislative powers bestowed on the competition authorities to conduct market inquiries.

Swaziland

The Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) announced in January 2016 that a market inquiry has been launched into the retail banking sector. The SCC stated that retail banking service offered to consumers, micro and medium enterprises remained the most important sub-sector of banking. It is, however, the ‘current account’ which is the central product to be used as the starting point for the inquiry.

Zambia

On 1 February 2016, the Zambian Competition Authority (CCPC) announced that it will be conducting a market inquiry into the vehicle towing industry. While the CCPC indicated that it wishes to understand the “conditions of competition in the market”, although the inquiry came about as the CCPC had received numerous complaints from consumers that emergency towing operators were charging high prices. It remains to be seen whether this inquiry is focused predominantly on competition-law issues, or rather consumer-protection laws.

Botswana

The Competition Authority in Botswana (CA) is currently underway with a market inquiry into the grocery retail sector, focusing on shopping malls and in particular, the impact of long term exclusivity leases on competition in the market.

COMESA

Consistent with the competition authorities of South Africa and Botswana, the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) has also launched an investigation into the impact that shopping malls have on competition. The CCC announced that it will carry out their inquiry by taking samples from the member states.

We have previously published articles on the announcement of this market inquiry on AAT which can be accessed by clicking on the following link: https://africanantitrust.com/category/market-study/

COMESA to media reps: “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”

COMESA Competition Commission logo

Zambia hosts COMESA Competition Commission workshop to sensitize journalists to antitrust

As many African news outlets are reporting, their journalists were recently invited to take part in a competition-law “sensitization workshop” hosted by high-ranking CCC personnel in Livingstone, Zambia.

In light of COMESA’s currently lackluster merger enforcement and virtually non-existing merger notifications (none since 19 March 2014), this “media sensitization” public relations effort on the part of the CCC leadership comes as no surprise.

Here, we quote from the Seychelles Nation:

 


The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) competition commission recently organised a regional sensitisation workshop for business reporters.

The aim of the workshop, held in Livingstone, Zambia, was to enhance the role of the media in exposing anti-competitive business practices and promoting a competition culture in markets. 

The media was explained the role of good reporting on the competition policy within the Comesa, whose prime objective is to promote consumer welfare through encouraging competition among businesses. This objective is achieved by instituting a legal framework aimed at preventing restrictive business practices and other restrictions that deter the efficient operation of the market, thereby enhancing the welfare of consumers in the common market. 

Comesa is a regional economic grouping composed of 19 member states namely; Republic of Burundi, Union of Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Djibouti, Arab Republic of Egypt, State of Eritrea, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Kenya, Libya, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland, Republic of Uganda, Republic of Zambia and Republic of Zimbabwe.  The grouping’s objective is for a full free trade area guaranteeing the free movement of goods and services produced within Comesa and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

But only journalists from Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were present at the workshop. Seychelles was represented by journalist Marylene Julie from the Seychelles NATION newspaper.

The Comesa competition law is, in this regard, a legal framework enforced with the sole aim of enabling the common market attain the full benefits of the regional economic integration agenda by affording a legal platform for promoting fair competition among businesses involved in trade in the common market and protecting consumers from the adverse effects of monopolisation and related business malpractices.

Among the topics discussed at the meeting were the definition and scope of competitive policy;  the relevance of competition policy in ensuring market efficiency and the protection of consumer welfare; overview of the Comesa competition regulations, its legal basis and implementation modalities.

Mergers and acquisitions were also explained and why competition authorities regulate them. 

The media representatives also learned about their role in ensuring businesses notify transactions with competition authorities to avoid the dangers of anti-competitive business.

Hosting the workshop were the director and chief executive of the Comesa competition commission, George K. Lipimile; the manager for enforcement and exemptions Vincent Nkhoma and Willard Mwemba, manager (mergers & acquisitions).

In a message from the secretary general of Comesa Sindiso Ngwenya which was read by Mr Lipimile, Mr Ngwenya welcomed all media guests in Livingstone for the sensitisation workshop.

He said the gathering means that Comesa is reaching out to one of the most important key stakeholders in the region – the media. 

He also said the media plays a great role in advancing the group’s advocacies in the regions and through it Comesa is creating awareness surrounding the current regional trade order and the need for a competition policy for the region.

“Today our specific governments as well as other economic operators and the general public are appreciating that competition policy has a key role to play in creating conditions of governance for the national, regional and global market place,” read the message.

Explaining why the competition policy is an important instrument, Mr Lipimile said it forces companies to run themselves efficiently, ensures a level playing field, forces economic operators to adjust changes and encourages innovation. Competitions lead to lower prices, greater dynamism in industry and most important of all greater job creation.

He added that competitive markets are needed to provide strong incentives for achieving economic efficiency and goods that consumers want in the quantities they want.

Regarding mergers and acquisitions and why competition authorities should regulate mergers, Mr Mwemba said the regulation of mergers is one of the most important components of any competition legislation and policy. 

He explained that sometimes mergers are effected to eliminate competition. 
“Therefore mergers need to be regulated so as not to injure the process of competition and harm consumers,” said Mr Mwemba.

He highlighted that firms merging just to eliminate competition is detrimental to consumers as it results in poor quality goods, high prices, and fewer choices to them.

He also stressed the media’s role in ensuring firms notify their mergers so that they do not merge for ulterior motives. 

The media can also avoid situations where firms  keep the merger a secret as they are mindful competition authority may reject their application. 
“The media should act as watchdog by reporting mergers that have happened in the country,” said Mr Mwemba.

As for Mr Nkhoma, he said there are several ways in which anti-competitive business practices can harm consumer welfare and derail the gains of intra regional trade. 

He said this during his presentation on anti-competitive business practices and the role of the media in enhancing the competition culture. 

He gave examples of two well established firms in a country or region which are engaged in fierce competition with each other. Such competition leads them to independently introduce innovations aimed at outwitting each other on the market such as offering lower prices, discounts, rebates, etc.  The consumer benefits from this rivalry in terms of low prices, high quality, etc. 

He explained the scenario where two firms decide that rather than compete, they agree on what quantities to supply on the market and at what price and quality.  The two firms will end up maximising profits at the expense of consumer welfare. 

“This is what is described as a cartel, a situation where businesses rather than compete, seek to collude to exploit high prices from the market. Markets dominated by cartels will ultimately become complacent in their business decisions and as a result, consumers lose out by way of poor quality products, high prices, etc.,” said Mr Nkhoma.

He also said consumers may also have experienced scenarios where a firm or a collection of firms become so dominant in the market to the extent of behaving without effective constraints from existing competitors or potential competitors. Such dominant firms have an incentive to charge excessive prices knowing that consumers have no alternative of getting similar goods or services anywhere feasible. 

In Seychelles the competition regulator is the Fair Trading Commission (FTC). In a recent press release, FTC said it is setting up a National Competition Policy which comes at a time when Comesa is seeking to harmonise the Comesa competition regulations with domestic competition law. 

The National Competition Policy aims at guiding governments on applying laws, regulations, rules of policies that will allow businesses to compete fairly with one another in order to foster entrepreneurship activity and innovation. 

The policy will also guide the commission in the enforcement of the Fair Competition Act 2009 and will provide a platform upon which national policies can be harmonised with the existing competition law.