Category: Egypt

Egypt’s Central Bank Joins COMESA’s Competition Rules: A simple guide to what the 2026 CBE-CCCC agreement means

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By Gabriella Francesca Paolini, Matthew Freer & Holly Joubert

On 11 May 2026, the Central Bank of Egypt (“CBE”) signed an agreement with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa’s (“COMESA”) Competition and Consumer Commission (“CCCC”). COMESA is a regional trade group covering Eastern and Southern Africa. The deal was signed by the CBE Deputy Governor Mai Aboulnaga and the CCCC Chief Dr Willard Mwemba.  This development carries greater significance than it may initially appear, as it materially alters the application of competition law within Egypt’s banking sector. The Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) establishes a formal cooperation framework between CBE and the CCCC, enabling the two authorities to coordinate on merger review, share information, and jointly investigate anti-competitive conduct within Egypt’s banking and financial services sector. To understand why this agreement matters, it must be read alongside the CCCC’s newly adopted 2026-2030 Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan was published in February 2026 setting out five strategic pillars for the CCCC over its new five-year cycle. These pillars include integrating markets and regulatory harmonisation; effective enforcement and compliance; institutional innovation; contextual leadership; and strategic partnerships and stakeholder engagement. The Plan’s overarching mission is “Advancing Regional Integration through Competitive Markets and Empowered Consumers” (2026-2030 Strategic Plan of COMESA CCCC,2026). This Frames cooperation agreements such as this one not as diplomatic courtesy, but as enforcement infrastructure. This article examines the legal and practical implications of the MoU, situating it within Egypt’s broader history of cooperation with COMESA’s competition framework, and considers what the agreement means for banks, payment providers, and fintech businesses operating across the region.

The current environment

The timing of the MoU is equally significant when read against the broader evolution of COMESA’s competition framework. On 5 December 2025, the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025 came into force, introducing for the first time a dedicated regulatory architecture for digital markets, including a global transaction-value threshold of USD 250 million for mergers involving digital market operators . Fintech and payment-related transactions, by virtue of their data-intensive and multi-sided characteristics, fall squarely within this expanded scope. It is against this backdrop that Dr Willard Mwemba, CEO of the CCCC, welcomed the CBE partnership, noting that it “provides a valuable platform for both institutions to share knowledge and strengthen enforcement of competition laws across member states” (Egyptian Gazette, 2026). Read together, the new digital merger regime and the CBE MoU suggest a deliberate, two-pronged strategy: COMESA is simultaneously expanding its own substantive jurisdiction over digital and fintech transactions, while securing the institutional cooperation, through instruments such as the CBE MoU, necessary to apply that expanded jurisdiction effectively within Egypt’s financial sector specifically.

How We Got Here

Egypt’s first agreement with the CCCC dates back to 2016. The 2016 deal was signed by the Egyptian Competition Authority (“ECA”), not the CBE. It addressed matters relating to information sharing, joint investigations, and avoidance of conflicts of bodies in enforcements, whilst ensuring neither party was required to change their own domestic laws. However, the shortfall with the 2016 agreement is that it did not extend to Egypt’s financial sector. In Egypt, competition rules for the financial sector are not handled by the ECA but rather fall into the jurisdiction of the CBE alone, under the 2020 Central Bank Law. There has been a gap for ten years due to COMESA having no formal link with the regulation of competition involving Egypt’s banking sector (Gazette Staff, 2026).

What the MoU Actually Does

The MoU expressly covers six sub-sectors of Egypt’s financial industry: banking, foreign exchange, money transfers, credit ratings, payment systems, and fintech. This scope reflects both the breadth of cross-border financial activity between Egypt, other COMESA Member States, and the CCCC’s 2026–2030 strategic emphasis on digital financial infrastructure as a priority enforcement area. Operationally, the MoU provides for three core cooperation mechanisms. Firstly, the investigative coordination where the CBE and CCCC may now coordinate on competition cases that have cross-border dimensions within the financial sector. Secondly, expertise and information exchange, the two institutions may share knowledge, data, and analytical capacity on issues of common concern. Thirdly, capacity building, the MoU contemplates structured technical assistance to strengthen the CBE’s competition enforcement capabilities over time. A particularly significant operational development arising from the MoU is that the CBE will establish a dedicated internal competition unit to manage implementation. This is a meaningful institutional commitment. It signals that the CBE intends to treat competition oversight in the financial sector as an ongoing operational function, rather than an ad hoc responsibility. For regulated entities, it is a clearer interlocutory for competition-related queries and procedures within the central bank.

What the New Deal Changes

The 2026 MoU fills the gap. The CBE is now the first central bank in COMESA, and the first sector-specific regulator of any kind, to sign a deal of this nature with the CCCC. It covers banking, foreign exchange, money transfers, credit ratings, payment systems, and fintech. Officials refer to it as a step toward “regional integration” and “fair competition.” Although this is an accurate statement, it undersells the practical changes pertaining to which Egyptian authority now works with COMESA on bank-related competition issues, and what that means for any bank or fintech doing business across the region.

Why It Matters

The biggest change resulting from the MoU is how the CBE and CCCC cases now connect. Before the MoU, the two processes were completely separated: anything admitted to one authority did not affect the other. A positive consequence of this change is that it reduces the risk of the CBE and CCCC reaching different conclusions in relation to the same matters. However, this arrangement creates the possibility that adverse findings or commitments made against a party before one authority may be relied upon against that party in proceedings before another authority.

Egypt now has two agreements with COMESA, the old 2016 agreement focusing on general competition and the new 2026 agreement with the CBE, focusing on the financial sector. The CBE and ECA have collaborated informally on anti-trust and merger cases that overlap; however, it is unclear how the new agreement affects this relationship. This question is sharpened by a further point of friction regarding COMESA’s “one-stop-shop” merger review mechanism, under which the CCCC’s clearance of a qualifying regional merger can substitute for separate national notifications across Member States, but this does not apply to Egypt. If that position holds, then the CBE’s accession to a cooperative framework with the CCCC, specifically in relation to merger control in the financial sector, creates an apparent asymmetry. COMESA-level coordination on financial-sector mergers may now operate co-operatively in substance even as the ECA maintains that the formal “one-stop-shop” mechanism is inapplicable to Egyptian merger notifications generally. Reconciling these two positions, in principle and in practice, is likely to be tested in the cases that follow.

The MoU’s express inclusion of payment systems, payment service providers, and financial technology businesses is also notable, and reflects a broader regional trend of competition regulators extending their analytical frameworks to digital financial infrastructure. Fintech mergers and platform-based payment arrangements often raise competition concerns, network effects, data advantages, multi-sided market dynamics, that sit awkwardly within traditional banking competition analysis (European Parliament, 2019). By bringing this sector explicitly within the CBE-CCCC cooperative framework from the outset, the MoU positions Egypt’s central bank to engage with COMESA on what is likely to be one of the more active areas of cross-border competition enforcement in the coming years.

Closing Remarks

The 2026 MoU is more than just a symbolic step toward “regional oversight”, it is the financial-sector version of the 2016 Agreement, finally closing a gap left when Egypt’s financial sector was taken out of the ECA’s control. For lawyers working with banks and fintechs in the region, should shape how they handle admissions and commitments before both authorities going forward.

Clarifying the Suspensory Regime: Key Insights from Egypt’s 2025 Competition Q&A

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By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Holly Joubert

In June 2025, the Egyptian Competition Authority (“ECA”) released a soft-law guidance tool entitled “Q&As concerning the ex ante control of economic concentrations pursuant to Law no. 3/2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and its amendments” (the “Q&A”), which provides a number of clarifications with respect to its merger control regime. We summarise the most notable features of the Q&A below, with respect to notification thresholds and procedure.

  1. Notification Thresholds

The Q&A provides clarity as to the definition of an ‘economic concentration’ notifiable with the ECA. In this regard, an ‘economic concentration’ is defined as any ‘change of control or material influence’. The ECA’s determination of a change of control follows the ordinary standards, such as owning over half of the total voting rights or shares in a firm, the ability to use or exploit the majority of assets of another firm, any acquisition of rights which confer the ability to appoint the majority of directors or control the decisions of the board of a firm. The ECA will further consider material influence to arise where a person obtains ownership of 25% or more of the total voting rights of another person, essentially conferring special rights or veto rights in respect of a firm. The Q&A clarifies in this regard that owning less than 10% of the total rights, shares, or stocks is not likely to result in material influence.

Additionally, the ECA reaffirmed that market shares are irrelevant to the notification requirement. If parties in a transaction meet the specified threshold, a filing is a mandatory step regardless of their market position.

Helpfully, the Q&A provides helpful insight in relation to the ECA’s financial thresholds required for notification of economic transactions. Generally, the ECA prescribes both a domestic threshold and an international threshold:

DomesticWorldwide
Threshold met if the combined annual turnover or asset value (whichever is higher) of parties to the economic concentration in Egypt equals or exceeds EGP 900 million (c. USD 19 million) and individually each party exceeds turnover of EGP200 million (c. USD 4 million) in Egypt.Threshold met if the worldwide combined annual turnover equals or exceeds EGP 7.5 billion (c. USD 159 million) and the target firm exceeds turnover in Egypt of EGP 200 million. (c. USD 4 million)
  • Clarity in respect of the ECA’s simplified notification procedure  

Under the ECA’s notification procedures, it prescribes the ability of parties to notify economic concentrations under a ‘simplified procedure’. This procedure was introduced to enable low-risk transactions that will not result in substantial competition concerns, and which are capable of expeditious review to be assessed and cleared within 20 business days. Under the ordinary notification procedure, the ECA prescribes a review period of 30 business days for Phase 1 notifications and 60 business days for Phase 2 (complex) notifications. Additionally, both Phases 1 and 2 reviews are capable of being extended by a further 15 business days if remedies are proposed.

Under the simplified notification procedure, parties are required to complete a short-form notification file with the ECA, which significantly assists in the preparation and finalisation of economic concentration notifications, particularly with respect to large-scale multinational transactions.

The simplified procedure is, however, only available to parties who meet the notification thresholds prescribed above and who also fall within the following simplified financial thresholds. These are also split between a domestic and worldwide threshold:

DomesticWorldwide
Domestic threshold will be met where the combined annual turnover or asset value of the parties in Egypt does not exceed EGP 2 billion.Worldwide threshold will be met where the annual turnover or asset value in Egypt of the target does not exceed EGP 500 million. (c. USD 10.6 million)

John Oxenham, director at Primerio notes that “Importantly, prior to utilising the simplified procedure and in order to prevent delays in assessment, parties should be minded to engage with the ECA as to whether these requirements are met, particularly where it appears that parties are able to meet one of the simplified thresholds.”

CCC Celebrates ’10’ — a Decade of COMESA Competition Law

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Anniversary of CCC’s 2013 Creation to be Celebrated, Developments Discussed

Next week, African heads of state, ministers of trade and commerce, the secretary general of the 21-member state COMESA organization, Commissioners, and several heads of various competition agencies across the region, from Egypt to Eswatini & from Mauritius to Malawi, will join antitrust practitioners, legal experts, business people, and journalists in celebrating the occasion of the 10-year anniversary of the COMESA Competition Commission in Lilongwe, where the agency is headquartered.

Of course, AAT will be there to cover it.

As leaders of this august publication will know by now, our authors have followed the development of the CCC since its very beginning: from the nascent stages of having only a rudimentary staff and foundational rule documents, lacking sufficient guidance for practitioners and businesses alike, to the significant developmental stage under its first chief executive officer, Dr. Lipimile, who built out his enforcement team to coincide with the stellar growth of the CCC’s “one-stop-shop” merger notification statistics and attendant agency reviews (hiring economists and lawyers alike from across COMESA member nations) — and culminating, so far at least, in what we have come to call “CCC 2.0”: the latest iteration of the vastly successful multi-jurisdictional antitrust body, now led by its long-term member Dr. Willard Mwemba.

Under Mwemba’s aegis, the Commission has advanced well beyond a mere ‘rubber-stamping’ merger review body, as some had perceived the fledgling agency in its very early years (approx. 2013-15). The triple-C has since then begun to launch serious investigations into price-fixing, monopolization, attempted monopolization, gun-jumping, as well as market allocation schemes and secretly implemented transactions that parties had failed to notify.

While ‘antitrust is on our minds’, we note here for the record that, beyond its “competition” ambit that mostly remains in our focus at AAT, the CCC’s enforcement mission also includes a fairly large “consumer protection” brief, and the agency’s dedicated unit has investigated areas of consumer concern as broad as airline practices, imported faulty American baby powder, online ‘dark’ practices, pay-TV, and agricultural product quality disputes (milk and sugar come to mind) between Uganda and Kenya, to name only a few…

Our publication, together with several of the business journals and newspapers across the southeastern region of Africa, will report in great detail on the events, and possible news, to take place next week. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio International:

“I look forward to hearing from these leaders themselves what they have accomplished in 10 years, and more importantly what they wish to accomplish in the near to mid-term future. In addition, I have a feeling that we may be treated to some truly newsworthy developments: I could imagine there being either confirmation or denials of the circulating rumour that the COMESA merger regime will soon become not only mandatory, but also suspensory. As most attorneys practicing in this arena know by now, the current Competition Regulations are not suspensory, which may be deemed too restrictive by the group’s Secretariat and its agency leadership in terms of its enforcement powers. After all, it is much more difficult to unscramble the egg than to never let it drop in the pan from the get-go!

Also, the CCC may reveal its plans in relation to a leniency programme for cartel conduct, which is plainly in order!”

Beyond that, Stargard surmises, participants at the almost week-long event may be treated to news about the CCC’s thoughts on digital markets, sectoral investigations, and the Commission’s upcoming “beyond-mere-merger” enforcement activities.

Egyptian merger control undergoes major revamping after 17 years

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By Rostom Omar, Esq. (Primerio Ltd.)

Egypt finally adopts a new merger-control regime that would transform the system from a post-notification to a pre-approval system.

After nearly twenty years of applying Competition Law in Egypt and After several attempts from the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) to introduce a pre-merger notifications regime and several discussions with government, the parliament and sectorial regulators; on Dec 4th, 2022 the Egyptian parliament has finally approved the proposal to amend the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices No. 3 of 2005 (ECL). 

It is worth mentioning in this regard that Egypt was the only country in the region and one of the few countries in the world whose law was not adopting merger Pre- approval system; at a time when M&As increased significantly in the region during the last few years and in which Egypt occupies an advanced position.

According to article 19 of the ECL (Post notification) the acquisition of shares or assets, or joint venture that results in a change of control of an entity or material influence over such entity should be notified after 30 days of concluding the transaction if the combined turnover of the parties exceeds 100 M EGP. It is not yet clear if the non-controlling minority acquisitions would be included in the new filing requirement.

The statement by the ECA indicates that the new filing requirements would apply to merger and acquisition transaction when the annual turnover of the parties exceeds 900 million EGP (around U.S. $30m).

Under the new regime, the ECA will get to assess each reportable transaction prior to closing to decide whether to clear it or not, or impose conditions on approval. The ECA will have the authority to block a transaction that may result in “limiting, restricting, or harming competition”. According to ECA most transactions should be cleared as far as they don’t harm the market structure. The ECA will have the authority to block or to issue a conditional approval for the merger.

Two types of assessments will be included, as is the case with other legislations such as the Moroccan law, one of which is a preliminary examination of the transaction in question and the other is an in-depth examination as needed to speed up the adjudication of notifications.

The details and scope of the amendments will become clearer in the law and via ancillary regulations, and we expect there to be guidelines published in the near future as well.  We will continue to monitor the progress of the entry into force and all relevant details for companies doing business in Egypt and the region more broadly speaking.

We expect more activity from ECA in the next stage for promoting and explaining the new amendments, and we expect more transparency and clarity when dealing with the concerned persons regarding M&As files, especially in the context of the short period of time required by this type of files and their impact on the market and on investments promotion in Egypt.

Currently, parties considering future transactions that may involve businesses with revenues in Egypt should ensure compliance with the latest Egyptian merger control amendments.

Egyptian taxi saga: antitrust watchdog reverses course on $3.1 billion Uber acquisition

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Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?

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To all our Africanantitrust followers, please take note of the upcoming American Bar Association webinar on 2 July 2019 (11amET/4pmUK/5pm CET) titled:

“Beyond Pure Competition Law – Is Africa Leading the Way Forward in Antitrust Enforcement?”

In what promises to be a highly topical (telecon) panel discussion, Eleanor Fox, Andreas Stargard, John Oxenham, Amira Abdel Ghaffar and Anthony Idigbe will:

  • provide critical commentary of the most recent developments in antitrust policy across the African continent;
  • highlight the most significant legislative amendments and enforcement activities in Africa; and
  • analyze some of the key enforcement decisions.

South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, COMESA and Kenya are among the key jurisdictions under the microscope.

Practitioners, agency representatives, academics and anyone who is an antitrust enthusiast will find this webinar to be of great interest. Not to mention companies actually active or looking to enter the African market place.

For details on how to participate, please follow this Link

 

 

 

 

 

 

The African WRAP – JUNE 2017 edition

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The first half of 2017 has been an exciting one from a competition law perspective for a number of African countries. As certain agencies have taken a more robust approach to enforcement while others have been actively pursuing or developing their own domestic competition law legislation. Further, there is an increasingly prevalent interplay between domestic laws with regional competition law and policy in an effort to harmonise and promote regional integration.

In this addition of the WRAP, we highlight some of the key antitrust developments taking place across the continent. The editors at AAT have featured a number of articles which provide further insight and commentary on various topics and our readers are encouraged to visit the AAT Blog for further materials and useful updates.

AAT is indebted to the continuous support and assistance of Primerio and its directors in sharing their insights and expertise on various African antitrust related matters. To contact a Primerio representative, please see the Primerio brochure for contact details. Alternatively, please visit Primerio’s website

 

Kenya

Grocery Market Inquiry

On 27 January 2017, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) exercised its powers in terms of section 18 (1) (a) of the Competition Act, 2010, to conduct a market inquiry into the branded retail sector.

The key issues which the CAK’s will focus on during the inquiry include:

  1. the allocation of shelf space and the relative bargaining power between retailers and their suppliers;
  2. the nature of and the extent of exclusive agreements at one stop shop destinations and their effects on competition;
  3. the pricing strategies retailers employ especially in regards to responding to new entrants;
  4. whether there are any strategic barriers to entry created by incumbent firms to limit entry in the market; and
  5. the effect of the supermarkets branded products on competition

Legislative amendments

The Kenya Competition Act (Act) has undergone a number of amendments in the past year.

Most notably, however, section 24 of the Act, which deals with abuse of dominance generally, has been amended to also cater for an abuse of “buyer power”.

Without being exhaustive, a number of practices which would typically constitute an abuse of dominance include:

  1. imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices;
  2. limiting or restricting output, market access or technological advancements;
  3. tying and/or bundling as part of contractual terms; or
  4. abusing intellectual property rights.

In terms of the definition of “dominance” in the Act, a firm will be considered dominant if that firm has greater than a 50% market share.

The amendment, as drafted, raises a number of concerns as previously noted on AAT.

Botswana

Merger control – Prior Implementation

On 17 February 2017, the Competition Authority of Botswana (CA) prohibited a merger between Universal House (Pty) Ltd and Mmegi Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd.

The CA prohibited the merger on the grounds that the transaction was likely to lead to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the market. In particular, the CA held that the “market structure in the provision of commercial radio broadcasting services will be altered, and as such raises competition and public interest concerns”.

At the stage of ordering the divestiture, a suitable third party had not yet been identified and the merging parties were obliged to sell the 28.73 shares to a third party “with no business interests affiliated in any way with the acquiring entity”. The divestiture was also to take place within three months of the CA’s decisions and, should the thresholds be met for a mandatorily notifiable merger, the CA would require that the proposed divestiture also be notified.

South Africa

Follow-on Civil Liability

A second civil damages award was imposed in 2017 on South Africa’s national airline carrier, SAA, following the Competition Tribunal’s finding that SAA had engaged in abuse of dominance practices, in favour of Comair. This award comes after the first ever successful follow-on civil damages claim in South Africa (as a result of competition law violation) which related to Nationwide’s civil claim against SAA.  In the Nationwide matter, the High Court awarded, (in August 2016) damages to Nationwide in the amount of R325 million.   Comair claim for damages was based on the same cause of action as Nationwide’s claim. The High Court, however, awarded damages in favour of Comair of R554 million plus interest bring the total award to over a R1 billion (or about US$ 80 million).

Please see AAT’s featured article here for further insights into this case.

Market Inquiries

The SACC published a notice in the Government Gazette on 10 May 2017, indicating that it will conduct a market inquiry into the Public Passenger Transport sector (PPT Inquiry) which is scheduled to commence in June 2017.

The PPT inquiry, is expected to span two years and will involve public hearings, surveys and meetings with stakeholders which will cover all forms of (land-based) public passenger transport. The SACC indicated in its report that “…it has reason to believe that there are features or a combination of features in the industry that may prevent, distort or restrict competition, and / or to achieve the purpose of the Competition Act”.

Legislative amendments

The South African Competition Commission (SACC) recently published draft guidelines for determining the administrative penalty applicable for prior implementing a merger in contravention of the South African Competition Acts’ merger control provisions (the Draft Guidelines).

In terms of the penalty calculations, the Draft Guidelines prescribe a minimum administrative penalty of R5 million (USD 384 615) for the prior implementation of an intermediate merger and a R20 million (USD 1.5 million) penalty for implementing a large merger prior to being granted approval. The Draft Guidelines cater further for a number of aggravating or mitigating factors which may influence the quantum of the penalty ultimately imposed.

Egypt

Investigations

The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA), has also referred the heads of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to the Egyptian Economic Court for competition-law violations relating to certain exclusive marketing & broadcasting rights. This follows the COMESA Competition Commission also electing to investigate this conduct.

In addition, it has been reported that the ECA has initiated prosecution of seven companies engaged in alleged government-contract bid rigging in the medical supply field, relating to hospital supplies.

Mauritius

Minimum resale price maintenance

In a landmark judgment, the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) recently concluded its first successful prosecution in relation to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), which is precluded in terms of Section 43 of the Mauritius Competition Act 25 of 2007 (Competition Act).

The CCM held that Panagora Marketing Company Ltd (Panagora) engaged in prohibited vertical practices by imposing a minimum resale price on its downstream dealers and consequently fined Panagora Rs 29 932 132.00 (US$ 849,138.51) on a ‘per contravention’ basis. In this regard, the CMM held that Panagora had engaged in three separate instances of RPM and accordingly the total penalty paid by Pangora was Rs 3 656 473.00, Rs 22 198 549.00 and Rs4 007 110.00 respectively for each contravention.

Please see AAT’s featured article here for further information.

Leniency Policy

The global trend in competition law towards granting immunity to cartel whistleblowers has now been embraced by the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM). The CCM will also grant temporary immunity (during the half-year period from March 1 until the end of August 2017) not only to repentant participants but also to lead initiators of cartels, under the country’s Leniency Programme.

COMESA

The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) announced early 2017 that it will be investigating allegations of exclusionary conduct in relation to the Confederate of African Football’s (CAF) decision to extend an exclusive marketing of broadcasting rights and sponsorship agreement with Lagardère Sports in relation CAF tournaments.

Please see AAT’s featured article here for more information.

What to look out for?

Zambia

Guidelines

The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) published series of guidelines and policies during 2016. These included adopting a formal Leniency Policy as well as guidelines for calculating administrative penalties.

In addition, the CCPC also published draft “Settlement Guidelines” which provides a formal framework for parties seeking to engage the CCPV for purposes of reaching a settlement. The Settlement Guidelines present a number of practical challenges as currently drafted. One example is that the guidelines don’t cater or seem to recognise “without prejudice” settlement negotiations.

It is anticipated that the draft Settlement Guidelines will be formally adopted this year.

Please click here to read the feature article on AAT.

Namibia

In April 2017, the CEO of the Namibian Competition Commission (NCC), Mr. Mihe Gaomab II, announced that the NCC has made submissions to the Minister of Trade and Industry in relation to proposed legislation which will regulate franchise models in Namibia.

While recognising the benefits of franchise models, the NCC is, however, concerned that there are a number of franchises in Namibia which may be anti-competitive in that the franchisor-franchisee relationship creates certain barriers to entry.

The NCC has specifically identified the practice, by way of an example, whereby certain franchisors deliberately ensure that there is a lack of competition between franchisees in the downstream market. The rationale behind this commercial strategy is allegedly so that the franchisor may extract greater royalties or franchise fees from the respective franchisees, as the franchisee is assured of a lack of competition.

The NCC views this practice as well as a various similar practices as potentially anti-competitive as the structure of certain franchise models may result in collusion between franchisees.

For further commentary on this development, please see AAT’s featured article.

Nigeria

Nigeria remains, for now, one of the few powerhouse African economies without any antitrust legislation. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill of 2016, however, recently made it past the initial hurdle of receiving sufficient votes in the lower House of Representatives.  The Bill is, therefore, expected to be brought into effect during the latter part of 2017 or early 2018.

South Africa

Market inquiries

The Minister of the Department of Economic Development, who has fulfills the oversight function of the South African Competition Authorities, has announced that a market inquiry will be conducted in relation to the “high costs of Data” in South Africa.

This would be the fifth formal market inquiry since the Competition Act was amended to afford the Competition Commission with formal powers to conduct market inquiries.

Complex monopoly provisions

Both Minister Patel and the President have announced that the Competition Act will undergo further legislative amendments in order to address perceived high levels of concentration in certain industries.

In this regard, it is likely that the competition amendment act’s provisions relating to abuse of dominance and complex monopolies, which was drafted in 2009, will be brought into effect.

In terms of the provisions, as currently drafted, where five or less firms have 75% market share in the same market, a firm could be found to have engaged in prohibited conduct if any two or more of those firms collectively act in a parallel manner which has the effect of lessening competition in the market (i.e. by creating barriers to entry, charging excessive prices or exclusive dealing and “other market characteristics which indicate coordinated behavior”).

Please see AAT’s feature article here for further commentary.

Pan-African Antitrust Round-Up: Mauritius to Egypt & Tunisia (in)to COMESA

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A spring smorgasbord of African competition-law developments

As AAT reported in late February, it is not only the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC), but also the the Egyptian antitrust authorities, which now have referred the heads of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to the Egyptian Economic Court for competition-law violations relating to certain exclusive marketing & broadcasting rights.  In addition, it has been reported that the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) has also initiated prosecution of seven companies engaged in alleged government-contract bid rigging in the medical supply field, relating to hospital supplies.

Nigeria remains, for now, one of the few powerhouse African economies without any antitrust legislation (as AAT has reported on here, here, here and here).

But, notes Andreas Stargard, an antitrust attorney with Primerio Ltd., “this status quo is possibly about to change: still waiting for the country’s Senate approval and presidential sign-off, the so-called Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill of 2016 recently made it past the initial hurdle of receiving sufficient votes in the lower House of Representatives.  Especially in light of the Nigerian economy’s importance to trade in the West African sphere, swift enactment of the bill would be a welcome step in the right direction.”

The global trend in competition law towards granting immunity to cartel whistleblowers has now been embraced by the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM), but with a twist: in a departure from U.S. and EU models, which usually do not afford amnesty to the lead perpetrators of hard-core antitrust violations, the CCM will also grant temporary immunity (during the half-year period from March 1 until the end of August 2017) not only to repentant participants but also to lead initiators of cartels, under the country’s Leniency Programme.

The Executive Director of the CCM, Deshmuk Kowlessur, is quoted in the official agency statement as follows:

‘The policy worldwide including Mauritius, regarding leniency for cartel is that the initiators of cartel cannot benefit from leniency programmes and get immunity from or reduction in fines. The amnesty for cartel initiatorsis a one-off opportunity for cartel initiators to benefit from immunity or up to 100% reduction in fines as provided for under the CCM’s leniency programme. The amnesty is a real incentive for any enterprise to end its participation in a cartel. In many cases it is not clear for the cartel participant itself as to which participant is the initiator. The participants being unsure whether they are an initiator finds it too risky to disclose the cartel and apply for leniency. The amnesty provides this unique window of 6 months where such a cartel participant can apply and benefit from leniency without the risk of seeing its application rejected on ground of it being an initiator.’

 

COMESA Competition Commission logoFinally, COMESA will grow from 19 to 20 member states, welcoming Tunisia at the upcoming October 2017 summit: the official statement notes that “Tunisia first applied for observer status in COMESA in 2005 but the matter was not concluded. In February, 2016 the country formally wrote to the Secretary General making inquiries on joining COMESA. This set in motion the current process towards its admission. once successfully concluded, Tunisia will become the 20[th] member of COMESA.”

This means that within 6 months of accession to the Common Market, Tunisia’s business community will be bound by the competition regulations (including merger control) enforced by the CCC.  Speaking of the CCC, the agency also recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Mauritian CCM on March 24, facilitating inter-agency coordination.  In addition, the Zimbabwean Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) will host a national sensitisation workshop on COMESA competition policy on May 16, 2017 in Harare, purportedly as a result of “over 50 transactions involving cross-border mergers notified” to the CCC involving the Zimbabwean market.  “The main objective of the national workshop is to raise awareness among the key stakeholders and business community in Zimbabwe with regards to the provisions and implementation of COMEA competition law,” the CTC noted in a statement.

 

COMESA Competition Commission investigates football broadcasting rights

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COMESA old flag colorThe COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) recently announced that it will be investigating allegations of exclusionary conduct in relation to the Confederate of African Football’s (CAF) decision to extend an exclusive marketing of broadcasting rights and sponsorship agreement with Lagardère Sports in relation CAF tournaments.

It is not yet clear whether the CCC is investigating this matter as an ‘abuse of dominance’ case or rather, in terms of Article 16 of the CCC’s Rules, general restrictive practices.

COMESA Article 16 essentially precludes firms from implementing an agreement in the Common Market which has as its object or effect the distortion or prevention of competition in the Common Market, to the extent that it may restrict trade between member states.

The Registrar of the CCC, Meti Demissie Disasa, is quoted as saying: “The aim of the Commission’s investigation is to ensure that competition in the commercialisation and award of media and marketing rights for African Football tournaments is not undermined as a result of anti-competitive practices from market operators and that football fans can benefit from better and more coverage of the games and affordable viewing options.”

“Any agreement which contravenes Article 16 is automatically void. In light of the fact that the CAF agreement in question here is valuable and moreover only set to expire in 2028, a voiding of the contract by the CCC would likely be contested by the parties,” says competition practitioner Andreas Stargard.

cafsoccerThe CCC, which has to date largely focused on merger control, has certainly made clear strides to moving towards a greater enforcement role, as AAT first reported here. While there is still some ways to go, the current investigation follows the CCC’s announcement that it intends to conduct a market inquiry into the grocery retail sector and has also issued an announcement calling on all firms who may have exclusive agreements being implemented in the Common Market to disclose these agreements to the CCC in an effort to obtain authorisation (i.e., an exemption) from the CCC.  In 2016, Eveready applied to the CCC to have a number of distribution agreements “authorised” by the CCC.

The ECA and the CCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 2016 which envisages increased cooperation between the two agencies including information exchanges.

In relation to the CAF complaint, the CCC received the complaint by the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) who is in turn also investigating this matter. This raises an interesting question as to whether or not the CCC has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter which, in terms of the CCC’s Rules, the CCC should have but other COMESA member-state competition authorities have challenged in the past.

UPDATE: the official CCC statement seeking stakeholder input includes the following passage regarding the agreements at issue:

It is alleged that on 12th June 2015, CAF entered into an agreement with Lagardère Sports S.A.S. for the exclusive commercialization of marketing and media rights of main regional football competitions in Africa, including the Africa Cup of Nations, African Nations Championship and African Champions League, for the period 2017 to 2028. CAF and Lagardère Sports S.A.S. are alleged to have previously entered into a similar commercialization agreement for marketing and media rights of CAF tournaments for the period 2009 to 2016. Consecutively and cumulatively, the length of the alleged exclusive agreement is twenty years. It should be noted that the commencement of investigations neither presupposes that the conduct being investigated is anti-competitive nor that any of the parties to the agreement has violated the Regulations. The Commission will, in accordance with the provisions of Part 3 of the Regulations, conduct an inquiry into the agreements concluded between CAF and Lagardère Sports S.A.S. to determine whether the alleged conduct has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. In view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby gives notice to all interested stakeholders and the general public to submit their representations to the Commission … no later than 21st April 2017.

COMESA antitrust authority swears in 4 new commissioners

Posted on by andreasstargard

COMESA out of service

Four new Commissioners sworn in – while COMESA’s own site fails to make announcement

We do not commonly report on news from the Seychelles here on AAT, but today, the Office of the President of the Seychelles has in fact beat AAT (as well as the COMESA Competition Commission itself (!)) to it: as the Office reports, the 18th COMESA Summit, held on 30th March 2015 in Addis Ababa, (a city that I have fallen in love with, by the way), saw the swearing-in of four new COMESA Competition Commissioners.

The summit also saw the swearing in of Mr. George Tirant, Chief Executive Officer of the Seychelles Fair Trading Commission. Mr. Tirant was appointed as a commissioner on the COMESA Competition Commission, alongside representatives from Egypt, Uganda and Ethiopia.

We have not yet identified the other new members that were sworn in this week, but in admitting so we note in the same breath that it is surprising for the authority itself not to have this relevant item anywhere on its site, neither in the News category nor anywhere else.  Indeed, the reader looks in vain for even a cursory Press Release announcing that 4 new Commissioners were seated for a new term of 3 years each. COMESA’s site still shows the outdated list of its Commissioners (copied below the photo below).

Irregular?  Perhaps.  But then again, we are used to outages and unfortunately much worse from the COMESA Competition Commission web site.

AAT notes that, in addition to the four new competition commissioners, the 19-country IGO also welcomed new:

  • Judge President and Judges of the Appellate Division of the COMESA Court of Justice
  • Principal Judge and Judges of the First Instance Division of the COMESA Court of Justice
  • the COMESA Committee of Elders

COMESA's 18th Summit in Ethiopia
COMESA’s 18th Summit in Ethiopia

[Outdated] List of Commissioners from Comp Comm web site:

  1. Commissioner Alexander Juvensio Kububa : Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners and former Chief Executive Officer of the Competition and Tariff Commission of Zimbabwe.
  2. Commissioner Mathews Chikankheni: Vice Chairperson of the Board of Commissioner and President of the Malawi Confederation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
  3. Commissioner Ali Mohamed Afkada: Inspector General des Services Judiciarisés’ de Djibouti.
  4. Commissioner Daniel Phillip Gappy – Former Chief Executive Officer of Fair Trading Commission of Seychelles and Chief Executive Officer of Seychelles Licensing Authority.
  5. Commissioner Rajeev Hasnah: former Deputy Director of Competition Commission of Mauritius.
  6. Commissioner Francis Kariuki: Director General of Competition Authority of Kenya.Commissioner Rajeev Hasnah:  Chief Economist and Deputy Executive Director of the Competition Commission of Mauritius.
  7. Commissioner Thabisile Pearl Langa’: Chief Executive Officer of Swaziland Competition Commission.
  8.  Commissioner Rostom Omar: Former Legal Counselor of Egyptian Competition Commission.
  9. Commissioner Chilufya Sampa: Chief Executive Officer of Competition Commission of Zambia