On 7 February 2018 the Competition Authority of Botswana (“The Competition Authority”) approved, with conditions, the acquisition by Bradleymore’s Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“Bradleymore’s”), which is incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Botswana (a joint venture between Vivo Energy Africa Holdings Limited and Baobab Khulisani South Africa (Pty) Ltd) of KFC franchises in Botswana, namely VPB Propco (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), QSR Food Company (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), Boitumelo Dijo (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) and Greenax (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation).
The Competition Authority determined that the Proposed Transaction is not likely to result in the prevention or substantial lessening of competition, or endanger the continuity of the services offered in the market for quick-service or fast food restaurants.
Section 60 of the Competition Act No 17 of 2009 (“the Competition Act”) allows the Competition Authorities to approve a merger “subject to such conditions as it considers appropriate” and “contain such directions as the Authority considers necessary, reasonable and practicable to remedy, mitigate or prevent any adverse effects of the merger”.
Furthermore, section 61 of the Competition Act provides for either of the parties to a merger to offer an undertaking to the Competition Authority to address any concerns that may arise or be expected to arise during the Competition Authorities consideration of the notified merger and the Competition Authority may make determinations in relation to the merger on the basis of such an undertaking.
Pursuant to the provisions of section 60 and 61 of the Competition Act; the Competition Authority approved the Proposed Transaction with the following conditions:
- Bradleymore’s shall source a significant portion of their input requirements locally by continuing to source from existing suppliers that were engaged by VPB, provided they are YUM accredited; as well as consider sourcing from any other YUM accredited suppliers based in Botswana who are currently not supplying KFC;
- Bradleymore’s shall ensure that local suppliers are assisted in penetrating or meeting YUM’s standards of accreditation with the aim of sourcing from these suppliers; and
- The Parties shall not retrench any employees of the target entities as a result of the acquisition for a period of three (3) years from the implementation date. For the sake of clarity, retrenchments do not include: voluntary separation; voluntary early retirement; unreasonable refusal to be deployed in accordance with the provisions of the labour laws of Botswana; resignations or retirements in the ordinary course of business; terminations in the ordinary course of business; dismissals as a result of misconduct of poor performance.
In order for the Competition Authority to properly monitor compliance with the above conditions, the Competition Authority shall require Bradleymore’s to adhere to the following:
- Bradleymore’s shall annually (for a period of three years from the implementation date) submit to the Competition Authority, a detailed report indicating:-
- Any changes to its employment records in the country and the reasons thereof;
- A list of its existing and new locally based suppliers (including the type of inputs they supply). This information can be captured in the supply agreements KFC has with such suppliers; and
- A copy of the strategy to be employed in building capacity of local suppliers in ensuring they meet YUM accreditation standards. That copy should be availed to the Authority within a period of twelve (12) months from the implementation date. The parties need to demonstrate to the Authority efforts made in identifying potential suppliers in line with their expansion strategy.
Stephany Torres, a competition lawyer, believes such a decision is indicative of the Competition Authorities’ tendency to give public interest considerations a prominent role in merger review.
In terms of section 59(1) of the Competition Act, “[i]n assessing a proposed merger, the Authority shall first determine whether the merger (a) would be likely to prevent or substantially lessen competition or to restrict trade or the provision of any service or to endanger the continuity of supplies or services; or (b) would be likely to result in any enterprise, including an enterprise which is not involved as a party in the proposed merger, acquiring a dominant position in a market”.
In addition to considering the effect of a merger on competition, in terms of section 59(2) of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority may consider any factor which it considers bears upon the broader public interest, including the extent to which “(a) the proposed merger would be likely to result in a benefit to the public which would outweigh any detriment attributable to a substantial lessening of competition or to the acquisition or strengthening of a dominant position in a market; (b) the merger may improve, or prevent a decline in the production or distribution of goods or the provision of services; (c) the merger may promote technical or economic progress, having regard to Botswana’s development needs; (d) the proposed merger would be likely to affect a particular industrial sector or region; (e) the proposed merger would maintain or promote exports or employment; (f) the merger may advance citizen empowerment initiatives or enhance the competitiveness of citizen-owned small and medium sized enterprises; or (g) the merger may affect the ability of national industries to compete in international markets”.
Torres believes the Competition Authorities’ willingness to push public-interest considerations even in instances such as the proposed transaction, where no competition issues arise, is indicative of them trying to address unemployment issues in Botswana through their merger review. This willingness to let public interest take centre stage is often seen in countries with new competition law regimes. She expressed concern that public interest considerations may possibly be the deciding factor when making decisions regarding mergers as these are particularly difficult to quantify or objectively assess.