Category: COMESA

Malawi Revamps its Antitrust Laws: Suspensory Merger Control and More

Posted on by Editor

Not only did the Malawian government revise its 26 year-old competition law, but it effectively repealed the old statutory regime under the “Competition and Fair Trading Act”, and it has now enacted its replacement, the so-called “Competition and Fair Trading Act of 2024.”

Says Andreas Stargard, who practices competition law with Primerio Intl., “the new regime had been in the works for several years, with input from the broader international and pan-African competition communities, both private and academic, as well as from fellow antitrust enforcers across the globe. We are pleased to see this revision effort come to fruition in the form of the CFTA 2024, which notably introduces a suspensory merger-control provision — meaning companies that meet the Malawian thresholds for notifying their M&A activity must put on hold the closing of their deal until it is cleared by the authority, the CFTC.”

Parties considering entering into transactions affecting the Malawian market should note, Stargard observes, that Malawi is part of the COMESA competition-law area, “which would require firms to consider whether or not there is a COMESA community dimension to their transaction, thereby possibly negating one or more domestic filings with [National Competition Authorities], and instead making a ‘one-stop-shop’ notification to the CCC.” Coincidentally, the COMESA Competition Commission is also headquartered in the Malawian capital, Lilongwe, so “parties can expect there to be extensive collaboration between the supra-national CCC enforcement teams and the CFTC’s domestic-focussed antitrust lawyers,” Mr. Stargard surmises.

The in-depth text of the Malawian press release is as follows:

 ENTERING INTO FORCE OF THE NEW COMPETITION AND FAIR TRADING ACT 

You will recall that the Competition and Fair Trading Commission (CFTC) has been reviewing the Competition and Fair Trading Act (CFTA) of 1998 in order to fill the existing gaps and enhance its effective enforcement. The CFTC is pleased to announce that the process of repealing the CFTA of 1998 was completed and it has been replaced with a new legislation, the Competition and Fair Trading Act of 2024. 

The new legislation was passed by Parliament on 5th April, 2024, and was assented to by the State President, His Excellency, Dr Lazarus Chakwera on 19th May 2024. In accordance to Section 1 of CFTA of 2024, The new Act shall come into force on a date to be appointed by the Minister, by notice published in the Gazette. The Competition and Fair Trading Act of 2024, therefore, comes into force today, 1st July, 2024, following the gazetting of the notice, signed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Hon. Sosten Gwengwe, MP, which appoints this date. 

CFTC is extremely pleased with this development as it signals an end to some of the enforcement challenges the institution was facing with regard to the enforcement of the old Act due to the gaps in some of the key provisions in the law. In addition, the CFTA needed to be aligned with the recent developments in the enforcement of competition 

and consumer protection law, reflective of the current market dynamics in the economy. Furthermore, the CFTA required to be aligned with international best practices in the enforcement of competition and consumer protection. 

In order to address these gaps, there are several changes that have been made to the CFTA of 2024. Below is a highlight of some of the key changes: 

i. Competition Regulation 

The major change that has been brought in is on Suspensory Merger Notification. The 1998 CFTA provided for voluntary notification of mergers and acquisitions; which meant that mergers having potential harm to competition process and consumer welfare could be effected without seeking authorisation from the CFTC. The new CFTA has made notification of mergers and acquisitions mandatory, based on determined thresholds. 

The new Act has also expanded on the provisions on anticompetitive business practices, to make it very encompassing but also effective to regulate and enforce. These areas include: restrictive business practices; collusive conducts (cartels); abuse of market power; but also mergers and acquisitions. 

ii. Consumer Protection 

The CFTA of 1998 narrowly defined the term “Consumer”. The definition under the old Act left out some stakeholders that are equally affected by unfair trading practices, which include: consumers of technology, consumers of digital products, beneficiary consumers, but also other users of goods or services for purposes of production of other goods or services. For this reason, various vulnerable groups that did not fall within that narrow definition were not effectively protected from unfair trading practices 

The CFTA of 2024 has also brought in several types of unfair trading practices that were not included in the CFTA of 1998. Among others, these include the following: 

 failure to give warranty or guarantee on goods for long term use; 

 improper or insufficient labelling of products; 

 failure to disclose material information about the products supplied; 

 engaging in excessive or exploitative pricing of the products. 

 imposition and implementation of unfair terms in consumer contracts. 

iii. Abuse of Buyer Power 

The CFTC of 1998 focused on abuse of supplier (seller) power and not the abuse that may arise from powerful or dominant buyers. This made it difficult to deal with malpractices by buyers, including those involved in buying farm produce from farmers. 

The CFTA of 2024 has included various provisions to redress malpractices resulting from abuse of buyer power. The Act has expressly prohibited the powerful and dominant companies that purchase agriculture produce from the farmers not to engage in any anticompetitive and exploitative conducts. For example, the Act prohibits, among others, the following conducts: 

 delays in payment of suppliers, without justifiable reason, in breach of agreed terms of payment; 

 unilateral termination or threats of termination of a commercial relationship, without notice or on an unreasonably short notice period, and without an objectively justifiable reason; 

 refusal to receive or return any goods or part thereof without justifiable reason, in breach of the agreed contractual terms; 

 transfer of commercial risks meant to be borne by the buyer to the suppliers; 

 demands for preferential terms unfavourable to the suppliers; 

 demanding limitations on supplies to other buyers; 

 reducing prices by a small, but significant, amount where there is difficulty in substitutability of alternative buyers or reducing prices below competitive levels; or 

 bidding up prices of inputs by a buyer enterprise with the aim of excluding competitors from the market. 

iv. Penalties for Violations 

Under the CFTA of 1998, when the Commission found a business enterprise in breach, it had been imposing fines, which were provided for under Section 51. However, in 2023, in the matter of CFTC v Airtel Malawi Plc, the Court ruled that the said provision does not empower the CFTC to impose fines, on the grounds that the violations were designated as being criminal in nature. Specifically, under section 51 of the CFTA of 1998, the provision for imposing the fines was combined with sanctioning of an imprisonment sentence of up to 5 years. The ruling in the CFTC v Airtel Malawi Plc case, thus weakened the regulatory mandate of the CFTC. In addition, the 1998 CFTA did not provide for aggravating and mitigation factors for the Commission to consider in coming up with fines and/or orders. 

The CFTA of 2024 gives express powers to the CFTC to issue Administrative Orders, which include imposing fines on errant enterprises. Under the new Act, the fines to be imposed will be (i) up to 5% of annual turnover if it is an individual; or (ii) up to 10% of annual turnover if it is a company. The determination of the fines will depend on the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. There are also various Orders that the CFTC can impose which are meant to redress the malpractices. These include orders to: give refunds, return or exchange defective products, withdraw false advertisements, supply the advertised/promised goods and services, and cancel unfair and exploitative contracts. 

v. Suitability and Independence of Commissioners for the CFTC 

As adjudicators of cases, the Commissioners of the CFTC are required to be sufficiently scrutinized for their qualification and suitability for their functions, but also guarantee utmost independence. Under the provisions of the CFTA of 1998, the Commissioners were not thoroughly subjected to scrutiny of Parliament once appointed, to determine their qualification and suitability for their office. Similarly, the Commissioners independence as adjudicators was not guaranteed under the old law. The CFTA of 2024 has provided that, as a way of ascertaining the Commissioners’ suitability and ensuring independence, their appointment and removal from office will be subjected to the scrutiny of the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament. 

In view of the foregoing, the CFTC would like to call upon business enterprises, consumers and the general public to take notice of the new legislation, and particularly take consideration of the provisions that have been brought into the CFTA of 2024. Furthermore, the CFTC would like to advise the business enterprises to adopt voluntary compliance with competition and fair trading laws at all times, so as not to be found in breach of the law. 

For media enquiries on this statement, contact Innocent Helema on 0880725075 or email innocent.helema@cftc.mw. 

LLOYDS VINCENT NKHOMA 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 

Prohibiting a Merger Long in the Making: CCC’s First M&A Prohibition

Posted on by Editor

The COMESA Competition Commission Issues Its First Partial Refusal to Grant Merging Parties Permission to Consummate Merger

By Tyla Lee Coertzen

On 2 September 2023, the COMESA Competition Commission released its decision to prohibit the proposed acquisition by Akzo Nobel N.V (“AkzoNobel”) of Kansai Plascon East Africa Proprietary Limited (“KPEA”) and Kansai Plascon Africa Limited (“KPAL”) (the “Target Firms”). The CCC’s decision in this merger represents the first merger prohibition it has issued since its inception in 2013.

In terms of the proposed acquisition, AkzoNobel was set to acquire 83.31% of the issued share capital of KPAL and 100% of the issued share capital of KPEA from Kansai Paint Co. Ltd.

AkzoNobel is a Dutch multinational company active in the manufacture and sale of paints and coatings, with a presence in Egypt, Mauritius, Tunisia and Zambia and Zambia. In addition, AkzoNobel supplies paints to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

The Target Firms are also active in the manufacture and supply of coating products. KPEA maintains a presence in Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zanzibar and operates five manufacturing plants, four of which are located within the Common Market (namely in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia). KPAL also has manufacturing plants in the Common Market, namely in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and derives turnover in Eswatini.

This would-be transaction has a somewhat convoluted history and was, by some observers’ interpretations, many years in the making.  As Andreas Stargard notes regarding our prior reporting, “this very publication has analysed the COMESA competition troubles of the merging paints makers of the recent past.  These have included failure-to-file mandatory notifications (and also here), as well as a paints cartel-conduct inquiry by the CCC, after Akzo and Kansai’s acquisitive hunger had initially begun in 2013 with disputes over use of the Sadolin brand in Uganda and elsewhere — coincidentally the same year the CCC became functional.”

In addition, notably, the same transaction was prohibited by the South African Competition Commission in late 2022 (which decision is currently being determined by the South African Competition Tribunal). The merger is also currently being assessed by the Namibian Competition Commission.

In its assessment of the market for the manufacture and supply of decorative paints, the CCC identified several competition concerns arising from the proposed merger. Specifically, it identified that the merger would result in a combination of two strong paint brands (namely Plascon and Dulux) and that there were no effective competitors present who would pose a real ability to counter the undue market power and unilateral conduct arising thereof.

While the merging parties proffered a number of commitments, the CCC found that such commitments would not sufficiently remedy the decrease in competition in the market (particularly in Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The CCC thus outright prohibited the merger in these three Member States.

The CCC approved the merger in certain other jurisdictions subject to conditions proffered by the parties. Specifically, the parties are obliged to divest the Sadolin brand owned by AzkoNobel to an independent third-party competitor in Uganda within 6 months of the date of the CCC’s decision. In Malawi, the CCC approved the merger subject to a condition that the merging parties continue productions in the Malawi manufacturing plant for a period of three years after the CCC’s decision, in order to remedy the plant’s potential closure and job losses resulting thereof.

The CCC’s decision over this merger is a clear indication of the approach it will take to mergers which it believes will pose significant anti-competitive harm and competitive loss within the Common Market. Thus, the decision is an indication of CCC’s powers, adjudicative authority as well as its willingness to enforce its powers.

COMESA @ 10: CCC Keynote address by Bill Kovacic

Posted on by andreasstargard

The booming voice of eminent antitrust scholar and GW Law professor Bill Kovacic easily surmounted the small technical microphone glitches at COMESA’s celebration of its Competition Commission’s first 10 years in Malawi (#CCCat10years), giving the keynote address.

His accessible speech, given in front of a diverse audience comprised of senior ministers and policy makers, lawyers, enforcers, and media representatives, focused on practical examples covering three key topics of public expenditures, subsidies, and the removal of entry barriers.

On state spending, he noted the attendant “global epidemic of collusion and corruption”, in areas as simple, but important to development, as transportation infrastructure. “We don’t always need to debate ‘digital markets’ or ‘big tech’, we can also highlight the importance of basic road-building on increasing trade and measurably growing economies” across Africa. But these areas of public expenditures are invariably hampered by corrupt or collusive tendering and similar cartel conduct — important focus areas for the COMESA CCC to enforce.

In the area of public subsidies, Kovacic proposed a future collaborative working relationship between antitrust enforcers, legislators, and those ministries that allocate state subsidies, ideally to non-incumbents (giving the NASA vs. Space-X example to make his point) so as to enhance market entry.

The CCC should enhance market access by making barriers to entry “more porous” for newer small competitors, with Kovacic using the famous 1982 Bell Telephone/AT&T U.S. antitrust precedent to highlight the practical value of competition law to society and innovation of new, better, and cheaper products and services.

Breaking: COMESA expected to become suspensory merger regime by 2024

Posted on by andreasstargard

At today’s CCC Business Reporter Workshop, Senior M&A Analyst Sandya Booluck presented major plans to amend the regional trading bloc’s merger-control regime.

The most notable part of this “complete overhaul” of the CCC regime will be the likely change from the current non-suspensory to a suspensory merger notification scheme.

Says Primerio Ltd. antitrust counsel Andreas Stargard: “This change is, of course, still subject to approval by the CCC Board and the COMESA Secretariat Council of Ministers, but it is likely to pass in my personal opinion. This is especially true since, as former CCC Head Lipimile pointed out at today’s session, this change was in fact demanded by several of the NCAs of the COMESA member states, also in view of the Art. 24(8) referral procedure. It thus presumably enjoys broad support from the bloc’s leadership and will obtain a passing vote before the end of 2023!”

Ms. Sandya Booluck, Senior Analyst M&A

COMESA stats update: 367+ M&A deals, yielding a healthy revenue stream for the CCC’s operations

Posted on by andreasstargard

A brief note from the “front lines” of the COMESA Competition Commission’s 10-year anniversary event: Isaac Tausha, chief economist for research policy and advocacy, provides the following statistics — notably for the entire duration of the CCC’s life decade so far.

In short: Gone are the meager days of fledgling notifications to the CCC.

Statistics Since Inception

369 mergers and acquisitions assessed. (Total COMESA revenues of merging parties: US$210bn)

Over 40 Restrictive Business Practices assessed

Over 44 Consumer Protection cases handled

More than 12 market screenings and studies undertaken

3 businesses fined for non-compliance with the Regulations

Doing a “back of the envelope” estimate, we at AAT are calculating the total merger filing fees resulting from those 367 notified deals to be possibly north of $75 million $65 million, so on average $6.5m “income” for the CCC per year (half of which goes to the 21 member states, of course, under the Regulations). This is notably without taking into account fines, e.g., a recent $102,000+ fine for failure to notify (as in our reporting on the Helios Towers / Malawi case).

Dr. Chris Onyango (Dir. Trade, Customs and Monetary Affairs, COMESA)
Dr. Lipimile (former CCC CEO). Mary Gurure (Head of Legal, CCC). Andreas Stargard (Editor, AAT).

CCC Celebrates ’10’ — a Decade of COMESA Competition Law

Posted on by Editor

Anniversary of CCC’s 2013 Creation to be Celebrated, Developments Discussed

Next week, African heads of state, ministers of trade and commerce, the secretary general of the 21-member state COMESA organization, Commissioners, and several heads of various competition agencies across the region, from Egypt to Eswatini & from Mauritius to Malawi, will join antitrust practitioners, legal experts, business people, and journalists in celebrating the occasion of the 10-year anniversary of the COMESA Competition Commission in Lilongwe, where the agency is headquartered.

Of course, AAT will be there to cover it.

As leaders of this august publication will know by now, our authors have followed the development of the CCC since its very beginning: from the nascent stages of having only a rudimentary staff and foundational rule documents, lacking sufficient guidance for practitioners and businesses alike, to the significant developmental stage under its first chief executive officer, Dr. Lipimile, who built out his enforcement team to coincide with the stellar growth of the CCC’s “one-stop-shop” merger notification statistics and attendant agency reviews (hiring economists and lawyers alike from across COMESA member nations) — and culminating, so far at least, in what we have come to call “CCC 2.0”: the latest iteration of the vastly successful multi-jurisdictional antitrust body, now led by its long-term member Dr. Willard Mwemba.

Under Mwemba’s aegis, the Commission has advanced well beyond a mere ‘rubber-stamping’ merger review body, as some had perceived the fledgling agency in its very early years (approx. 2013-15). The triple-C has since then begun to launch serious investigations into price-fixing, monopolization, attempted monopolization, gun-jumping, as well as market allocation schemes and secretly implemented transactions that parties had failed to notify.

While ‘antitrust is on our minds’, we note here for the record that, beyond its “competition” ambit that mostly remains in our focus at AAT, the CCC’s enforcement mission also includes a fairly large “consumer protection” brief, and the agency’s dedicated unit has investigated areas of consumer concern as broad as airline practices, imported faulty American baby powder, online ‘dark’ practices, pay-TV, and agricultural product quality disputes (milk and sugar come to mind) between Uganda and Kenya, to name only a few…

Our publication, together with several of the business journals and newspapers across the southeastern region of Africa, will report in great detail on the events, and possible news, to take place next week. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Primerio International:

“I look forward to hearing from these leaders themselves what they have accomplished in 10 years, and more importantly what they wish to accomplish in the near to mid-term future. In addition, I have a feeling that we may be treated to some truly newsworthy developments: I could imagine there being either confirmation or denials of the circulating rumour that the COMESA merger regime will soon become not only mandatory, but also suspensory. As most attorneys practicing in this arena know by now, the current Competition Regulations are not suspensory, which may be deemed too restrictive by the group’s Secretariat and its agency leadership in terms of its enforcement powers. After all, it is much more difficult to unscramble the egg than to never let it drop in the pan from the get-go!

Also, the CCC may reveal its plans in relation to a leniency programme for cartel conduct, which is plainly in order!”

Beyond that, Stargard surmises, participants at the almost week-long event may be treated to news about the CCC’s thoughts on digital markets, sectoral investigations, and the Commission’s upcoming “beyond-mere-merger” enforcement activities.

COMESA clarifies merger procedure

Posted on by Editor

COMESA Competition Commission’s Revised Guidance Note provides much-needed clarity to parties in avoiding fines for late merger notifications

By Tyla Lee Coertzen

On 20 February 2023, the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) published its “Revised Guidance on Engagement with the COMESA Competition Commission on Merger Filings”[1] (“Revised Guidance Note”), replacing the “Notice of Interim Measures in Merger Review of the COMESA Competition Commission due to the COVID-19 Pandemic”[2] (“Interim Measures Note”).

As per Article 24(1) of the CCC’s Competition Regulations, merging parties must notify proposed transactions to the CCC within 30 days of a ‘decision to merge’. The CCC’s Merger Assessment Guidelines further describe a ‘decision to merge’ to either be:

  • a joint decision taken by the merging parties and so comprise of the conclusion of a definitive, legally binding agreement to carry out the merger (which may or may not be subject to conditions precedent); or
  • the announcement of a public bid in the case of publicly traded securities.

Where merging parties do not provide the CCC with a notification within the above specified time, they are at risk to penalties of up to 10% of the merging parties’ combined turnover in the Common Market.[3] In contemplation of a fine, the CCC will consider the following factors for purposes of determining an appropriate penalty:

  • the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention;
  • any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention;
  • the behaviour of the parties concerned;
  • the market circumstances in which the contravention took place;
  • the level of benefits derived from the contravention;
  • the degree to which the parties have co-operated with the CCC; and
  • whether the parties have previously been found in contravention of the CCC’s Competition Regulations.

Where the CCC has found parties to have contravened this Article, the CCC has imposed penalties of 0,05% of the merging parties’ combined turnover in the Common Market. However, where parties derive large turnovers in a number of COMESA Member States, even the lower end of the threshold could result in a hefty fine.

The above provisions have caused uncertainty and adverse effects against companies involved in lengthy deal negotiations and execution of large multinational mergers and acquisitions. Often, preparing a merger notification within 30 days of initial decisions to merge places results in large administrative burdens on merging parties who may meet the requirements of a ‘decision to merge’ even before the drafting or execution of important agreements relating to the merger.

The Interim Measures Note was published during the Covid-19 pandemic as a result of uncertainties relating to the timing of merger notifications submitted to the CCC upon recognition of “unprecedented, uncertain and challenging times.” The Interim Measures Note allowed for a relaxation of various rules related to merger notifications to the CCC, such as an allowance for parties to deliver hard copies of their filings after the prescribed 7-day period.

The Interim Measures Note provided guidance to parties who, as a result of the uncertainty posed by the pandemic, were unable to provide a complete notification to the CCC within the 30-day period as required by Article 24(1). In this regard, the CCC allowed parties to proactively engage with it during the 30-day period at the beginning of the merger notification process. Thereafter, the CCC would consider the filing complete after all information required is submitted. The Interim Measures Note provided that “as long as the parties have engaged the Commission on the notification process, they shall not be penalized for failure to submit complete information within 30 days of the parties’ decision to merge.”

However, the Interim Measures Note seemingly only applied during the ‘temporal period’ where the Covid-19 pandemic was rife.

As a result of the relaxation of Covid lockdown regulations and restrictions worldwide, the CCC has now provided further guidance on parties’ options where merging parties are unable to provide the CCC with a complete filing within the strict 30 day time period.

The Revised Guidance Note replaces and overrides the Interim Measures Notice released in 2020. The Revised Guidance Note recognised that in relation to the approach it took for Article 24(1) prohibitions, the Interim Measures Notice was “widely utilized by merging parties” and that the ‘initial engagement approach’ adopted by the CCC had proven “beneficial for both merging parties and for the CCC in monitoring non-compliance with Article 24(1) of the Regulations.”

As a result of the above, the Revised Guidance Note confirms that the CCC will maintain the ‘initial engagement’ approach until further notice and possible amendment to the Competition Regulations. As such, where parties are uncertain as to the conclusion of a proposed transaction within the strict timer period and fear being penalised for an Article 24(1) contravention as a result, they are advised to engage the CCC on the notification process within the 30-day period and shall therefore avoid being penalised. Importantly, the Revised Guidance Note provides that this approach will not apply where there are “unreasonable and unexplained delays in the parties’ submission of a complete notification.”

The Revised Guidance Note provides useful direction to parties who are engaging in proposed transactions within the Common Market and certainly provides clarity on how merging parties who are in good faith unable to provide a complete merger notification within the period prescribed by the CCC may prevent a fine for non-compliance of Article 24(1).

[1] CCC-Notice-2-of-2023.

[2] CCC-Notice-4-of-2020.

[3] Namely, the COMESA Member States, which comprise of the following jurisdictions: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eswatini, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Do antitrust settlements require an admission of guilt? Appellate body says “no”, overrules CID

Posted on by Editor

Barring an application for review to the community’s highest court, decisions by the COMESA Competition Commission and its CID (Committee for Initial Determinations) are reviewed by the COMESA Appeals Board (“CAB”). In other words, the CAB is the crucial mid-layer of appellate review in antitrust matters across the COMESA region.

The CAB recently published its important December 2022 ruling in the CAF / Confédération Africane de Football matter. The CAF case is noteworthy in at least 3 respects, says Andreas Stargard, a competition attorney with Primerio International:

“For one, it deals with one of the CCC’s very first cases involving anti-competitive business practices; heretofore, virtually all decisions by the Commission involved pure merger matters.

Second, the CAB ruling is important in that it lays the groundwork for future settlements (or commitments) between the Commission and parties accused (but not yet found guilty) of violations of the COMESA competition regulations.

Lastly, the Appeals Board highlights the importance of issuing well-reasoned, written decisions, on which the parties (and others) can rely in the future. The CAB has made clear what we at Primerio have long advocated for: a competition enforcer must articulate clearly and state fully all of the reasons for its findings and ultimate decision(s). This is necessary in order for readers of the written opinion to evaluate the factual and legal bases for each. The CAB has now expressly held so, which is a welcome move in the right direction for COMESA litigants!”

In an ironic twist in the 5-year saga of the CAF investigation by the CCC, the Commission and the parties themselves had reached an agreed settlement, according to whose terms the parties did not admit guilt, yet agreed to (and in fact anticipatorily did) cease and desist from performing under their sports-marketing contract, which was essentially torn up by the commitment decision. Yet, to the surprise of the CCC and the private parties under investigation, in the summer of 2022 the CID refused to sign off on the settlement, due to the sole (otherwise unexplained) reason that there was a lack of an admission of guilt. The parties sought reconsideration on various grounds, which the CID again refused a second time. These rulings were then appealed — successfully — to the CAB, which quashed the CID’s unsubstantiated determinations and gave effect to the parties’ previously-reached settlement agreement with the CCC.

The full decision — which deals in detail with the CAF’s distribution agreements for the commercialization of marketing and media rights in relation to sports events — can be accessed on AAT’s site, see below.

comesa-appeals-board-decision-in-caf.pdfDownload

“We won’t compete on price!” — Telco CEO makes blatant antitrust admission

Posted on by Editor

Today, the East African reported on a stunning admission by the Chief Executive Officer of Kenyan mobile telco heavyweight Safaricom (itself no stranger to AAT telco competition reporting and proprietor of the massive M-Pesa mobile money network across East Africa). In the article, fittingly entitled “Safaricom rules out price war in Ethiopian market“, the business report quotes Mr. Peter Ndegwa as saying:

“From a pricing perspective, our pricing strategy is generally to be either in line or just slightly at a premium, but not to go for any price competition. The intention is actually generally to be closer to what the main operator is offering, especially on voice.”

Safaricom’s senior exec made his curious confession on a recent investor call. Says Andreas Stargard, a competition attorney with Primerio: “On these investor conference calls, there are usually several analysts and reporters on the line, listening in, and they commonly are also recorded. This would mean there exist clear prima facie evidence and several witnesses to these statements, as reported by the East African source.” He adds: “It remains to be seen whether any of the several competent authorities will investigate Safaricom’s express statement of a de facto ‘non-compete’ between the Ethiopian incumbent and the Kenyan upstart,” with the former (Ethiotel) boasting 54m subscribers, as opposed to the latter’s mere 1m users in-country.

POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIONS

When asked which government authorities would be authorized to investigate Safaricom’s “no price war” policy expressed by Mr. Ndegwa, according to the newspaper, Mr. Stargard noted that, beyond the domestic Ethiopian telecoms regulator, there existed at least two (2) competent antitrust bodies with jurisdictional authority: “For any potentially anti-competitive conduct occurring in Ethiopia that may have a cross-border effect (as mobile telephony usually does — especially with a foreign, here Kenyan, operator involved as well), I could see either the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (“TCCPA”) or the supra-national COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC“) under Dr. Mwemba’s reinvigorated leadership stepping in.”

As the latter has made clear in several public pronouncements recently, the CCC is poised to continue its non-merger enforcement streak, that is: investigating and prosecuting restrictive business practices, such as cartels and cartel-like behaviour. “We call it, CCC 2.0,” Stargard adds half-jokingly. He notes that both the TCCPA and CCC have all the necessary legislative instruments in hand to proceed with a preliminary investigation on the basis of the above quotes published by the East African:

In Ethiopia, the TCCPA could argue that “expressly avoiding a price war” is possibly in violation of Article 7(1) of the Ethiopian Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation (“Article 7(1)”), which provides that “(1) An agreement between or concerted practice by, business persons or a decision by association of business persons in a horizontal relationship shall be prohibited if:…(b) it involves, directly or indirectly, fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition, collusive tendering or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers territories or specific types of goods or services”.

For COMESA, the CCC has conceivably two legislative tools at its disposal: First, Art. 16 of the Regulations (“Restrictive Business Practices”) prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which (i) may affect trade between member states, and (ii) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Provision is then made (in Art. 19(4)) for the Article to be “declared inapplicable” if the agreement, decision or concerted practice gives rise to efficiencies and the like. Importantly, even though Art. 16 also applies to by-object practices, provision is made for an efficiency defence. Second, the CCC could resort to Art. 19 (“Prohibited Practices”), which focusses on “hard-core” cartel-like practices. Art. 19(2) provides that Art. 19 applies to agreements, arrangements and understandings, while sub-sections (1) and (3) provide that it is an offence for (actual or potential competitors) to fix prices, to big-rig or tender collusively, to allocate markets or customers, and the like. 

DEFENCES

Safaricom and its domestic competitor (the government-owned, former absolute monopolist, Ethiotel) may of course offer — preemptively or otherwise — a pro-competitive explanation for their alleged “non-compete” agreement. However, in attorney Stargard’s view, such defences must be well-founded, non-pretextual, and they would be well-advised to have contemporaneous business records supporting any such defences at the ready, should an antitrust investigation indeed ensue.

“Indeed, it may appear to the authorities that Mr. Ndegwa’s quoted concession of ‘We won’t compete on price’ may be a sign of capitulation or at least a ‘truce’ between Safaricom and Ethiotel,” he surmises, “because as recently as mid-December [2022], the incumbent monopolist [Ethiotel] had threatened legal action against the Kenyan newcomer, claiming that Safaricom had ‘harrassed’ the incumbent’s customers and caused loss of service due to its actions.” An incoming competitor’s attempt at avoiding a civil lawsuit between it and would-be competitors would, of course, not constitute a legal defence to forming a (formal or informal) non-compete agreement on pricing, he adds.

“We have extensive experience counseling clients on how to successfully — and aggressively — defend against accusations of price-fixing, whether the allegations involve tacit collusion or express price or market-allocation cartel behaviour. While the parties here would likely not have a formalistic statute-of-limitations argument at their disposal, given the recent nature of the conduct at issue, I could imagine there being eminently reasonable ways of showing the harmless nature of the conduct underlying the, perhaps misleading, investor-call statements made by the executive,” he concludes.

Zimbabwean leader lauds antitrust efforts

Posted on by Editor

Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa recently exalted the benefits of antitrust law at a joint COMESA-CTC (Competition and Tariff Commission of Zimbabwe) conference for sitting judges, held in Victoria Falls. Below is an excerpt of his oral remarks, given at the opening of the event:

“Competition and consumer protection laws, are therefore, key enablers of free, open and liberalised trade between countries and foreign regional integration. Against this backdrop, these laws must continue to enhance consumer interests and the realisation of our country’s development aspirations as set out in the National Development Strategy and Vision 2030. To this end, under the radar are the cartels, and all those who collude in promoting unjustified price increases, illicit activities and currency manipulation for the purposes of realising super profits.

Andreas Stargard, a competition partner at Primerio Ltd., notes that President Mnangagwa was once a practicing attorney himself, prior to his political ascent within the ZANU-PF party, although the precise history of the president’s legal studies and degrees remains somewhat murky. “As a former legal practitioner himself, Mnangagwa knows that an educated judge is a better judge. Thus, his admonition to the members of the judiciary present at the conference (at whom the event was aimed in the first place) to better acquaint themselves with competition law & economics was timely and meaningful,” he said. Stargard adds: “There is hardly anything more frustrating than presenting an antitrust case — which is usually difficult in its own right — to an uninformed judicial decision-maker, who shows little understanding or interest in the subject-matter, or who dismisses economics as extraneous; you cannot practice competition law without an understanding of economics.”

The president concluded: “In our case as Zimbabwe, competition law and the attendant robust policy frameworks are important towards the speedy realisation of Vision 2030, of becoming a prosperous and empowered upper middle income economy. This aspiration will be attained through an effective empowered and agile judicial system, which strives for fairness and increased efficiencies across all the productive sectors of the economy. It is, therefore, most opportune that this workshop is taking place at the stage when our economy is transitioning from stabilisation to growth. To this end judicial staff must be kept updated and knowledgeable about activities taking place in industry and commerce. Undoubtedly, judges and other related stakeholders remain key to the interpretation of competition and consumer protection laws. The intricate nexus between the interpretation and enforcement of laws across sectors of the economy cannot be overemphasised. The judiciary should also address competition issues that arise in disputes before the judicial system. This is pertinent more so that competition law intersects with many fields hence training such as this one is an essential requirement in modern day competition law.”