Kenya’s Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) has upheld the Competition Authority of Kenya’s (the “CAK”) steelcartel decision, dismissing individual appeals brought by seven manufacturers and affirming the penalties and remedies imposed in 2023. The Tribunal rejected appeals by Tononoka Rolling Mills, Blue Nile Wire Products, Devki Steel Mills, Accurate Steel Mills, Nail & Steel Products, Corrugated Sheets and Jumbo Steel Mills, cementing the CAK’s finding of price-fixing, coordinated price adjustments and output/ import restrictions in the steel value chain.
This ruling was handed down in two tranches: on 9 July 2025 (Accurate, Blue Nile, Devki, Nail & Steel, Tononoka) and on 11 September 2025 (Corrugated Sheets, Jumbo Steel), each time siding with the Authority. In total, the Tribunal affirmed KES 287.9 million in penalties for the seven appellants. The Tribunal further held that the CAK had afforded the parties due administrative process under Article 47 of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the Competition Act.
The decision handed dawn on 15 October 2025 is a natural sequel to the CAK’s 23 August 2023 decision, when the CAK imposed record penalties of KES 338.8 million on nine steel producers for a cartel that, per the CAK, distorted construction-input pricing. Five firms reached settlements with the CAK, while the seven above pursued and have now lost their appeals.
Notably, during the appeal phase Doshi & Company (Hardware) Ltd and Brollo Kenya Ltd concluded out-of-court settlements with the CAK, illustrating the CAK’s willingness to resolve matters via settlement and compliance undertakings, even mid-litigation.
For context, the AfricanAntitrust 2023 coverage highlighted that the CAK’s original fines constituted the highest cartel penalties in the CAK’s history to that date, following a twoyear investigation that drew on search-and-seizure and market-intelligence evidence. With the Tribunal now endorsing the CAK’s analysis and process, the core liability findings stand, and the fine levels (for the seven appealing firms) are confirmed.
Why this matters:
i) The Tribunal’s decisions strengthen precedent on price-fixing/ output restrictions in Kenya’s construction-inputs sector and validate CAK’s investigative toolkit and evidence assessment.
ii) Appellants remain bound to cease collusion and implement internal competition-law compliance programmes.
iii) The CAK links steel-cartel conduct to higher housing and infrastructure costs, this outcome supports the CAK’sbroader enforcement narrative across the building materials market
The breakdown of the KES 287,934,697.83 penalties, as concurred by the Tribunal are as follows:
Corrugated Sheets (86,979,378.53); Tononoka Rolling Mills (62,715,074.03); Devki Steel Mills (KES 46,296,001.25); Jumbo Steel Mills (KES 33,140,459.40); Accurate Steel Mills (KES 26,826,344.31); Nail & Steel Products (KES22,816,546.01); Blue Nile Wire Products (KES9,160,894.30).
What’s next
Unless pursued further on points of law, the Tribunal’s decision bring this enforcement chapter close to closure. Penalties, compliance obligations remain, and CAK’s leniency and Informant Reward Schemes continue to beckon for future cartel detection.
In conclusion, and by quoting the CAK’s Director-General, Mr. David Kemei, “The Tribunal’s findings affirm the CAK’s unwavering commitment to protect Kenyan consumers and businesses from the damaging effects of cartel conduct, and the veracity and completeness of our evidence-gathering, analysis and decision-making processes.”
In South Africa, exemptions under the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) provide a critical mechanism for firms to engage in conduct that might otherwise breach the Act’s prohibitions, where such conduct supports broader policy goals. Exemptions are considered under section 10, with block exemptions specifically authorised under section 10(10). These exemptions aim to promote efficiencies, support government policy, safeguard employment, or advance small businesses and historically disadvantaged individuals.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a visible evolution in the types and objectives of exemptions granted by the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), reflecting South Africa’s shifting economic priorities and ongoing structural challenges.
From Pandemic Emergency to Structural Interventions
The COVID-19 pandemic saw the SACC issue urgent exemptions, such as those for private healthcare providers, banks, retail landlords, and hospitality businesses to enable crisis cooperation. These exemptions were time-bound, tightly monitored, and have since expired. They remain useful precedent for how competition law can be flexibly applied in national emergencies.
However, more recent exemptions illustrate a pivot towards structural or developmental goals. Notable recent examples include:
Ports and Rail Exemption (May 2025)
This exemption directly tackles one of the most significant drags on the South African economy, its dysfunctional logistics system. Chronic inefficiencies at Transnet-owned ports and on the freight rail network have cost the economy billions in lost export revenue. This isn’t merely about allowing cooperation, it’s an explicit attempt to use competition law to solve a market failure.
The exemption encourages private terminal operators (such as those in Durban and Ngqura) and private rail operators to collaborate in ways that would normally be considered anti-competitive (such as coordinating schedules, sharing infrastructure planning data, jointly investing in solutions) to optimise the entire supply chain from mine and factory to port.
This means exporters in sectors like mining and agriculture can anticipate reduced delays and owner spoilage rates, enhancing their global competitiveness. For the operators themselves, it allows for unprecedented cooperation with competitors to optimise the entire supply chain, though they must vigilantly avoid any discussion that veer into product pricing or market allocation, which remain strictly illegal.[1]
Sugar Industry Exemption (May 2025)
Functioning as a structured rescue plan formalised through the Sugar Master Plan, this exemption is designed to ensure the survival and transformation of a critically important industry. It permits stakeholders across the value chain, from lager growers to millers, to coordinate on production levels, collectively plan for diversification into biofuels, and present a unified front in negotiations.
For sugar businesses, this means a chance to stabilise the industry and protect livelihoods, particularly for small-scale cane farmers. The practical compliance imperative is stringent, participants must meticulously document that all coordinated activities are for industry restructuring and not for illicit profit-maximisation at the expense of consumers.[2]
SMME Block Exemption (January 2025)
This block exemption is a powerful tool for levelling the playing field for Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (“SMMEs”). It recognises that these players often cannot challenge established market structures alone and allows them to band together to achieve scale.
This means SMMEs can legally form buying groups to negotiate bulk purchase discounts, create joint ventures to bid for large tenders, and collaborate on shared logistics and marketing networks to drastically reduce costs. For larger corporations, this necessitates preparedness to engage with more organised and powerful SMME consortiums. The critical compliance rule is that the exemption only protects qualifying SMMEs, larger firms cannot use an SMME partner as a shield for cartel conduct.[3]
Energy and Industrial Exemptions
These exemptions represent a critical tool for addressing broad-based economic constraints, with a particular focus on the ongoing energy crisis and its ripple effects. They provide a collaborative framework for firms within key supply chains and strategic industrial sectors to coordinate in ways that would normally be prohibited.
This could mean manufacturers and suppliers in a critical industry such as steel, chemicals, or automative components being permitted to collaborate on optimising energy usage during load-shedding, sharing logistics for essential inputs, or jointly securing raw materials to ensure continued production and prevent factory closures.
For businesses, this exemption is designed to enhance economic stability and prevent a decline in productive capacity by allowing a degree of crisis management and operational coordination that safeguards entire value chains vital to South Africa’s industrial policy and recovery. The essential compliance imperative is that any cooperation must be directly linked to overcoming the identified supply chain or energy constraints and must not be used as a cover for market division, price-fixing, or other blatantly anti-competitive conduct.[4]
Banking and Insurance Exemption (July 2025)
This is a forward-looking exemption that aligns competition policy with national climate goals, acknowledging that financing a ‘just transition’ is a collective action problem. It permits banks and insurers to collaborate on developing common standards, definitions, and data-sharing frameworks for sustainable finance.
This means financial institutions can pool data on climate-related risks and develop a common South African taxonomy for ‘green’ assets without fear of prosecution, which should lead to more available and affordable financing for businesses seeking loans for renewable energy or ESG projects. The crucial limitation is that collaboration is restricted to framework development, any coordination on interest rates, premiums, or customer allocation remains absolutely prohibited.
Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports (August 2025)
In August 2025, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition published a Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports. This exemption, still under consultation, seeks to facilitate collaboration among exporters and industry players to overcome structural barriers to accessing foreign markets. It is framed under section 10(10) of the Act and recognises that South Africa’s export competitiveness is often constrained by high logistics costs, fragmented industry structures, and limited bargaining power in international markets.
The exemption is intended to permit cooperative initiatives around joint marketing, shared logistics, standard-setting, and market development, provided that such conduct demonstrably enhances South Africa’s export performance without undermining domestic competition. If finalised, this exemption could become a key instrument to support government’s broader trade and industrial policy agenda, including the drive to increase manufactured exports and deepen regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”).[5]
Understanding Block Exemptions under Section 10(10)
Section 10 of the Act allows firms to apply to the SACC to exempt them from horizontal agreements typically regulated by section 4 of the Act, or vertical agreements regulated by section 5 of the Act where the agreement contributes towards the following objectives:
maintenance or promotion of exports;
promotion of effective entry, participation in or expansion in the market by small and medium enterprises or firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons;
change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an industry;
economic development, growth, transformation or stability of any regulated industry; or
competition and efficiency gains that promote employment or industrial expansion.
The recent SMME Block Exemption echoes earlier block exemptions issued during COVID-19 but represents a shift towards more enduring tools that facilitate inclusive growth. Other possible future candidates for block exemptions include sectors under Master Plans, such as poultry, automotive, and steel, where coordinated action may be needed to meet transformation or industrial policy targets.
Evolving Patterns: Then and Now
While COVID-era exemptions demonstrated the SACC’s agility during crisis management, current exemptions highlight a maturing approach. The SACC increasingly uses exemptions to:
Tackle persistent structural inefficiencies;
Strengthen value chains aligned with industrial policy;
Support small and historically disadvantaged firms; and
Balance economic competitiveness with sustainability and localisation goals.
Risks and Compliance Imperatives
Nonetheless, exemptions remain the exception, not the rule. Historic concerns persist that exemptions, if poorly designed or inadequately monitored, may entrench collusive behaviour or dampen competition. The SACC’s use of clear conditions, sunset clauses, and robust reporting obligations is therefore critical.
Looking Ahead
South Africa’s competition law framework continues to evolve in response to new economic realities. For firms seeking exemptions, the message is clear: any coordination must demonstrably advance the public interest and remain tightly circumscribed within the legal safeguards of the Act.
With the recent wave of block exemptions and sector-specific approvals, businesses, advisors, and stakeholders should actively monitor exemption trends, sector-specific conditions, and the SACC’s enforcement approach ensuring that collaboration serves national priorities without eroding competitive markets in the long term.
On 18 August 2025, pan-African competition-law boutique firm Primerio continued its “African Antitrust Agencies – In Conversation” series, casting a light on the Tanzanian Fair Competition Commission (“FCC”) in a dynamic exchange which analysed merger control practices, regional competition enforcement and regulatory reform. The discussion featured Director of Research, Mergers, and Advocacy at the FCC, Zaytun Kikula, in conversation with Primerio Director, Andreas Stargard, Primerio Associate Tyla Lee Coertzen, and Advocate at Mwebesa Law Group, Monalisa Mushobozi. You can watch a recording of this session here.
Ms. Kikula highlighted that the FCC’s focus has thus far mainly been on mergers, as well as investigating the dominance of abuse and cartels. She also points out that the FCC have been very active in its merger control regime, handling between 50 and 70 filings annually. Most of the notified transactions are smaller, spanning across sectors from telecommunication, finance, manufacturing, mining and insurance. Ms. Kikula stated that the recent amendments made to the Fair Competition Act 2024, have created a shift in merger reviews. Before these changes, the focus was only market share, whereas now mergers are being evaluated through a broader lens.
Monalisa noted an amendment to the Act now allows for a merger to be approved even it is strengthens the position of a dominant firm, provided the transaction yields a demonstratable public interest benefit. Ms. Kikula further explained that while the FCC has not received a transaction which triggers the above-mentioned amendment, notified transactions are subject to a 14-day notice period which invites commentary in order to ensure that the concerns of the public are adequately considered.
The FCC has encountered numerous instances of unnotified mergers, some voluntarily disclosing these transactions to the FCC, after the fact and others through investigation by the FCC. The FCC engages with these firms and lets them know that if they do not notify the Commission and proceed, this will constitute an offence which is punishable by a fine of between 5% and 10% annual turnover. Ms. Kikula mentioned the FCC assumes the role of a business facilitator and encourages settlements where the firms pay a filing fee as well as an additional settlement fee for instances of non-compliance. Filing fees are determined by the structure of the transaction, for instance, when dealing with a global entity the fees are calculated based on global turnover. When the transaction is domestic fees are calculated based on local turnover. She also pointed out the fact that this fee calculation is unconditionally governed by law and that there is no room for negotiation.
Monalisa mentioned that the law stipulates that the Commission has 60 days to approve the merger and inquired whether there have been cases where this timeframe has been shortened or extended. Ms. Kikula explained that non-complex merger reviews can extend between 30 to 45 days, however, in some cases can extend to 90 days. Noting that it may go up to 135 days, the statutory maximum. With regards to remedies, the FCC typically imposes behavioural conditions which are tailored to the specific sector involved.
The regional integration of competition law across Africa was a key theme which was highlighted. Andreas brought to the listeners attention that the East African Community Competition Authority (“EACC”) will be coming online in November of this year and will be open to receiving merger notifications. She further expressed that dual filings should be avoided in order to lessen confusion, emphasising the importance of confidentiality under a Memorandum of Understanding in order to protect information. Ms. Kikula discussed the two upcoming regulatory reforms which the FCC is in the process of introducing, with the first being a leniency program and the second being specific regulation for the assessment of dominance. She further noted that the threshold for market share has increased from 35% to 40%. This expansive discussion highlights the FCC’s ability to balance application with facilitation, making it a driving force in East African competition law.
The Competition Commission of South Africa (“the Commission”) released a Cost-of-Living Report (“The Report”) on 4 September 2025, setting out a structured, data-driven assessment of affordability pressures faced by South African households, with particular focus on those low-income consumers predominantly impacted by consistently high inflation rates. Its aim is to provide insights into the affordability of basic goods and services so that individuals, households, businesses, and policymakers can assess financial capacity and understand how price movements affect living standards. This is in alignment with the Presidency’s Strategic Plan that identifies tackling the high cost of living as a priority.
The current cost-of-living crisis is framed against entrenched domestic challenges, rising food, fuel and electricity prices against the backdrop of an ongoing energy crisis and interest rate increases that have lifted debt servicing costs in an environment where growth in household income has maintained the same pace.
Background and Goal of the COL Report
The COL Report stems from the Commission’s earlier Essential Food Price Monitoring(“EFPM”) programme, first published in July 2020 to track the prices of staple foods across the value chain, from farm to retail, and to analyse price transmission between producers, processors and retailers. Recognising shifting expenditure patterns and growing inequality, the Commission has expanded the scope of the EFPM, rebranding it as the COL Report. The new format retains essential food price monitoring while including those key non-food items that have a significant impact on lower income households.
As James Hodge, the chief economist at the Commission said:
“This analysis plays a crucial role in identifying the economic pressures various socio-economic groups, particularly low-income households, experience in a time of fluctuating prices and growing inequality.”[1]
The COL Report’s overarching intent is to highlight the affordability of basic goods and services in South Africa and to identify the underlying drivers of the cost-of-living crisis.
The COL Report tracks non-food necessities (e.g., electricity, water, rentals, healthcare, minibus taxi fares and petrol, funeral policies, public school fees, and internet usage costs) alongside essential food items such as pilchards, eggs, IQF chicken, brown bread, sunflower oil, maize meal. It further illustrates interest-rate effects by comparing owner’s rent as an equivalent to bond repayments on a standard mortgage. This structured monitoring enables the Commission to highlight where inflation is concentrated, where pricing appears sticky during cost reductions, and where spreads are widening.
COL Report and South African competition law
While the COL Report does not draw conclusions in respect of anticompetitive conduct, it does have notable implications for competition oversight by continuing to apply the Consumer’s International Early-Warning System (“Early-Warning System”) and evidentiary baseline for price transmission across essential value chains.[2] Several features are salient for competition law practice and policy, as drawn directly from the Report’s findings and methodology:
A broadened monitoring mandate across non-food essentials, expands the EFPM’s food focus to include electricity, water, rentals, transport, primary healthcare, funeral policies, education, and internet costs, the Commission positions itself to trackpersistent inflation drivers where administered pricing or sectoral structures may entrench affordability constraints. Assisting in the prioritisation and policy engagement across markets that shape consumer welfare, even where formal competition enforcement is not immediately implicated.
It presents clear analytical boundaries that respect competition law standards. It expressly cautions that the analysis of spreads (aggregate spread between retail and producer prices) is not an inference of anticompetitive conduct. Instead, spreads are diagnostic of price transmission and places in the chain where margins are expanding. The Commission’s reliance on the Early-Warning System underscores that the COL Report is an intelligence and monitoring tool, useful for triage and prioritisation, rather than a determinative finding of collusion or abuse. This delineation aligns with competition law’s evidentiary requirements while still highlighting areas that may merit closer scrutiny.
The Report identifies pricing patterns relevant to oversight, documenting patterns in essential staples where input costs fell or stabilised, but retail prices remained elevated. An example of this is, for instance, the discussion of eggs, sunflower oil, and maize meal, where price stickiness and widening retail margins are observed at various points. In brown bread, producer-level margins rose as wheat prices declined, and retail margins fluctuated as retailers alternated between absorbing and passing through cost movements. Such documented patterns inform areas where the Commission may, in being consistent with its mandate, monitor for potential strategic pricing behaviour over time.
The contextualisation of administered prices as structural inflation drivers, by the Report identifies evidence that electricity prices rose 68% and water prices rose 50% over the last 5 years. This is well above headline inflation and provides a policy context for sustained consumer-facing cost pressure. Although administered tariffs are not set through ordinary market dynamics, persistent increases affect downstream markets and household welfare, which are central concerns of the Commission’s broader public-interest and competition policy ecosystem.
The Report recalls that, following the Commission’s Data Services Market Inquiry in 2019, mobile data prices fell significantly in 2020 and 2021 and have remained comparatively stable. This illustrates how evidence-based monitoring and market inquiries can produce effective outcomes, a tool that the Commission may use in other sectors flagged by the COL Report.
The Report uses an interest rate lens to complement the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) measures of housing costs, by comparing bond repayments (up 28% over the period 2022 to March 2025) with owner’s equivalent rent, shows how debt-servicing costs meaningfully diverge from CPI’s treatment of owner-occupied housing. This perspective assists competition authorities and policymakers to understand consumer budget constraints that can interact with the market.
Collectively, these features show that the COL Report is intended to guide monitoring and policy dialogue, highlight potential risk zones, without asserting contraventions and maintain an evidentiary base for any future work within the Commission’s statutory toolkit such as market inquiries.
Key Findings Highlighted in the Report
To ground the above effects in the Report’s data, the COL Report records the following notable movements over the past 5 years for the period of 2020 to March 2025:
Key non-food items:
Administered prices: Electricity up 68% and water up 50%, both outpacing headline inflation.[3]
Rentals: Actual rentals for houses and flats up 12%, well below headline inflation (28%).[4]
Primary healthcare (General Practitioners): Cumulative increase 33%, with the latest 6.6% annual rise noted against slowing general inflation.[5]
Transport: Minibus taxi fares increased sharply in mid-2022 following the petrol price spike; fares have been “sticky downwards”, though subsequent increases have trailed CPI, narrowing the gap.[6]
Funeral policies: Up 9% over the period, significantly below headline inflation.
Public education: Primary +37% and secondary +42%, both above headline inflation. [7]
Internet usage costs: Wireless +1%; wired +14%, with a notable step-up in 2022 linked to certain higher priced fibre offerings.[8]
Interest rates vs CPI housing proxy: Bond repayments +28% versus more moderate owner’s equivalent rent growth, illustrating the load from higher interest rates on household budgets.[9]
Essential foods:
Pilchards: Retail margins declined over time; early 2025 spreads narrowed to 15% as retailers showed restraint amid rising producer prices.[10]
Eggs: Producer prices fell into early 2025 but retail prices were slow to normalise; later producer-price increases reduced retail margins, with the Report monitoring recovery trajectories post-avian flu.[11]
IQF chicken: Producer prices stable and retail margins held under 40% in 2025 after earlier pressure. [12]
Brown bread: Farm-to-producer spread 77% in 2025 (above historic highs); retail margins fell to 15%, as retailers absorbed later producer increases.[13]
Sunflower oil: Producer margins settled around 25% since late 2023; retail margins elevated (40–45%) due to slow pass-through of producer-price declines.[14]
Maize meal: Producer margins rose rapidly in late 2023 after white maize price drops; retail prices increased in 2025 despite relatively stable producer prices, pushing retail margins to the high end of historic levels.
These findings supply concrete price-formation signals, where margins compress, where they expand, and how quickly costs are transmitted, which are central to the Commission’s ongoing monitoring orientation.
In Conclusion, the COL Report documents a pronounced squeeze on South African households, especially the poorest, driven by elevated inflation in essential services and persistent cost pressures. It demonstrates that while certain categories (e.g., rentals, funeral policies) have increased less than headline inflation, others (e.g., electricity, water, education, and several staple foods) are coming down hard on budgets. In parallel, the COL Report records instances of sticky pricing and widening spreads, and it maintains a clear line between diagnostic monitoring and legal inference.
For competition law and policy, the COL Report delivers three practical gains, by widening the scope to include key essentials beyond food, showing the spreads and pass through clearly, and a continuation of the Early-Warning System. Furthermore, it assists the Commission in fulfilling its mandate by flagging areas which may need attention, guiding debate on administered prices, and grounding future market work in carefully, publicly sourced data.
In a long-anticipated move towards deeper regional integration and harmonised competition oversight, the East African Community Competition Authority (“EACCA”) has formally announced that it will begin receiving and reviewing merger and acquisition notifications with cross-border effects as of 1 November 2025.
This marks a significant implementation milestone under the East African Community Competition Act, 2006, which established the EACCA as the supranational body responsible for enforcing competition policy among the eight EAC Partner States. These Partner States are the Republic of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of South Sudan, the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.
Notably, on 10 June 2025, the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) and the EACCA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) aimed at strengthening collaboration between the two agencies. With six of the eight East African Community (“EAC”) Partner States also being members of COMESA, the MOU seeks to minimise potential duplication in enforcement, while promoting joint advocacy efforts and an enhanced legal certainty and predictability for businesses operating across the region.
Under the newly effective merger control framework, a transaction must be notified to the EACCA if the combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the merging entities in the EAC equals or exceeds USD 35 million, and at least two of the undertakings have a combined turnover or assets of USD 20 million in the EAC, unless each achieves at least two-thirds of its aggregate turnover or assets in the same Partner State.
Importantly, once a qualifying transaction is notified to the EACCA, there is no requirement to file with national competition authorities, thereby streamlining the merger review process for regional transactions. Merger notifications will be subject to fees ranging from USD 45 000 to USD 100 000, based on the size of the transaction.
While the EACCA’s enforcement powers have been active in areas such as restrictive business practices, the operationalisation of merger control fills a long-standing gap in this regional competition regime. It also brings the EAC in line with other regional economic communities like the CCC and ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (“ERCA”), which already exercise merger control functions.
Firms with pending or planned transactions in the region should prepare to engage with the Authority under this new regime, ensuring timely filings and compliance from November onwards.
On 12 of November 2024, the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) granted an interim relief order in favour of Lottoland South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Lottoland”) against Google Ireland Limited (“Google”) and Google South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Google SA”). The Tribunal, sitting with a full panel of three members, provided substantive reasons in favour of Lottoland for their complaint lodged in December 2022, regarding the contravention of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) by Google SA against Lottoland in 2020. The matter before the Tribunal involved Lottoland obtaining an interim relief order against Google SA for a period of six months or until the finalisation of the complaint, whichever occurs first, ordering Google SA to restore Lottoland’s access to Google advertisements (“Google Ads”) after Google SA terminated Lottoland’s access to Google Ads claiming that Lottoland had breached Google SA’s internal policies.[1]
Google brought a review against the decision by the Tribunal, arguing that the Order provided by the Tribunal is irregular because of its failure to adhere to Section 31(2)(a) of the Act. Section 31(2)(a) of the Act requires that the Chairperson of the Tribunal ensure that that at least one member of the panel is a person who has legal training and experience. Google argued that because the Order by the Tribunal was not signed by Adv Tembeka Ngcukaitobi SC (“the Presiding Member”), the appointed member with such legal training and experience, the Order by the Tribunal is irregular.
Google’s legal representatives addressed a letter to the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal advising that the Presiding Member did not sign the decision and that this contravenes section 31(2)(a) of the Act. Google requested that the decision be withdrawn due to the Competition Tribunal acting beyond the powers conferred onto it by the Act.
Despite Google’s contention that the Order should be withdrawn, both the Chairperson of the Tribunal, and Lottoland, responded to Google, stating that the proceedings have been concluded and that the Order is in accordance with the Act, referencing Section 31(4) and 31(6) of the Act. This stance adopted by Lottoland, as well as the Chairperson of the Tribunal, caused Google to launch their review to the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa (“the Appeal Court”).
Does an irregular decision amount to no decision?
Lottoland argued that the decision taken by the Tribunal was in fact a valid decision, as it was in compliance with Section 31 of the Act. However, Lottoland argued that, while maintaining that there is a valid decision taken, on Google’s own version the Appeal Court would not have jurisdiction to hear the review, as there would have been no decision taken by the Tribunal.
On this version, Lottoland contested whether the Appeal Court has jurisdiction to hear the review matter, stating that the decision itself is not in fact a decision of the Competition Tribunal, as it did not carry the Presiding Member’s express endorsement. In this regard, Lottoland argued that the requirements for the Appeal Court to exercise its review powers in terms of Section 37(1)(a) were not present, as it does not have the power to decide whether a decision is in fact a decision of the Competition Tribunal, or declare a decision invalid, which is not a decision. In support of its argument, Lottoland contended that Google should have pursued its remedies in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000, to set aside the decision of the Tribunal.
Google argued that the ‘decision’ taken by the Tribunal is ultra vires, as the Tribunal’s failure to have all three members of the panel contribute to the proceedings and exercising its functions in terms of Section 27 of the Act, led to the Tribunal’s failure to comply with Section 31(2)(a) of the Act. They further contended that Lottoland’s misinterpretation of their argument is wrong, as Google did not argue that the failure by the Presiding Member to contribute and sign the Order resulted in ‘no decision’ by the Tribunal, but that such ‘decision’ does not comply with Section 31(2)(a) of the Act. Google proffered the argument that the Appeal Court has the authority to review the decision made by the Tribunal in terms of Section 37(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, Google did not request the Appeal Court to determine whether a decision was taken, or whether such decision was unlawful, Google argued that the rendering of the decision is procedurally irregular as it did not comply with section 31(2)(a) of the Act. This is because the Presiding Member did not sign it, and that such a decision should be reviewed and set aside.
It was ultimately found that the Appeal Court has the jurisdiction to hear the review matter.
Procedural Irregularities
It is agreed that the interim relief matter was heard before a properly constituted panel and was properly assigned, however the review application seeks to investigate whether the Presiding Member’s failure to sign the Order caused an irregularity in the decision.
Google argued that the Act empowers three members of the panel to deliberate a matter, acting jointly and their failure to do so results in the panel not acting in accordance with the Act. To this extent, it was argued that the Presiding Member’s failure to participate in the proceedings until the matter is finalised is detrimental, as the interpretation of the Act requires a member with legal training and experience to signal finality. This failure resulted in the two members issuing the decision, which was against the provisions of the Act, as the Tribunal making the decision is an authoritative body encompassed by three members, and the failure to adhere thereto renders their decision irregular.
Lottoland argued that the two-panel member’s decision is in accordance with Section 36(6) of the Act and constituted a lawful decision. Relying on the matter between JSC v Cape Bar[2], Lottoland contested that the authority supports the argument that the members of the panel did not have to act jointly when having regard to the statutory provisions, because when there is a decision made by two-members, this renders a majority decision made by the panel members. Lottoland adopted the approach that the Presiding Member’s failure to render a decision as being “exceedingly passive”, and that the two-member decision is sufficient.
However, the matter brought before the Tribunal was assigned to three members but when reasons for the decision were circulated, no comments were received from the Presiding Member, with no explanation. The Appeal Court answered this question by putting forth that the Presiding Member did not participate in the proceedings, therefore the panel did not act jointly with no explanation for his failure to participate. The Appeal Court held that the decision falls to be reviewed and set aside.
The Appeal Court also considered whether to remit the decision back to the Tribunal or substitute the Order. As confirmed in Glaxo Welcome (Pty) Ltd and Others v Terblanche N O and Others, [3] the Appeal Court can correct the decision of the Tribunal where the result is a foregone conclusion or when further delay would cause undue prejudice. The Appeal Court that there was not a foregone decision but there was delay that has prejudiced Lottoland that Google has not addressed. However, the Appeal Court expressed its concerns and difficulty in granting a substitution order when the skills and expertise of the Tribunal are for the purpose of making these decisions mindfully. Thus, the Appeal Court was not satisfied that a substitution order should be granted as such a solution would be impractical when considering the brief period left in which the interim order will still be in effect.
The decision of the Appeal Court reviewed and set aside the decision of the tribunal.
Implications of the Tribunal’s Decision
This matter again highlights the importance that correct procedure is followed as to avoid decisions from being set aside once handed down. The administrative error of the Tribunal has resulted in more questions than answers.
Lottoland’s complaint, lodged in December 2022, was set down for hearing on 19 July 2023, despite the procedural directives after the hearing, the Tribunal only provided its decision on 12 November 2024, approximately 16 months after the initial hearing. Despite this delay, the Tribunal and its Presiding Member failed to ensure that its Order was compliant with the Act. As a result, and while acknowledging Lottoland’s own failure to launch the interim relief proceedings earlier, Lottoland was prejudiced by severe delays and, according to the Tribunal’s now set aside decision, were being harmed in the market by Google SA’s conduct, restricting Lottoland from making use of Google Ads.
It is worth noting that no reason was given for the lack of the Presiding Member’s participation and signature, only that he failed to do so. The seemingly insignificant act of signing an Order to comply with formalities, alternatively, a member’s failure to contribute, carries substantial weight, this is seen in the setting aside of the decision all because the one panel member with legal training and experienced failed to sign it.
This, unfortunately, resulted in further resources being expended by both Lottoland, Google, the Tribunal, and the Appeal Court. Proper procedure should always be followed to benign topics from evolving into a long, lengthy and costly process.
This judgement sets precedent for the setting aside of a decision of what can be labelled as administrative errors due to an appointed Presiding Member’s lack of participation, leading to procedural irregularities. As the Appeal Court rightfully stated, the Act regulates and controls proceedings and the functions of the authoritative bodies exercising their duties. Failure to comply with the Act should not be disregarded as an exceedingly passive point to take, but a failure to extinguish your duties for which you were appointed in terms of the Act, which causes harm and prejudice to the litigating parties.
[2]Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and Another (818/2011) [2012] ZASCA 115; 2012 (11) BCLR 1239 (SCA); 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA); [2013] 1 All SA 40 (SCA) (14 September 2012)
[3]Glaxo Welcome (Pty) Ltd and Others v Terblanche N O and Others [2001-2002] CPLR 48 (CAC).
The COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”), released its 2024 Annual Report on 23 July 2025, outlining a narrative of both increased institutional maturity and a growing assertiveness in market regulation. This, against a backdrop of economic turbulence such as regional inflationary pressures, tightened global credit conditions and slowing GDP growth in Member States, the CCC pressed forward, making notable strides in their enforcement, policy advocacy and institutional development.
M&A Activity and a shift in sectoral dynamics
Dr. Willard Mwemba, COMESA Competition Commission Chief Executive
A notable metric from the year under review is the number of merger notifications, the CCC recorded receiving 56 transactions, a 47.4% increase from the previous year (2023). This spike may, in part, be a response to post-COVID19 economic restructurings and macroeconomic volatility prompting consolidation across various sectors. It is also likely that it points to a growing awareness among firms of their obligations to notify under the COMESA Competition Regulations, alongside the CCC’s increasing presence in regulatory enforcement within the region.
A large portion of these notified mergers in 2024 came from the banking and financial services sector, at 7 notified mergers, followed by energy and petroleum with 6 notified mergers, and ICT and agricultural sectors having 4 notified mergers each. Notably, each of these sectors can be linked to economic resilience and infrastructure development across the Member States. Countries like Kenya and Zambia showed the highest levels of enforcement with respect to mergers, affirming their roles as key economic nodes within the COMESA region.
The CCC continued to apply the subsidiarity principle in their merger assessments, deferring to national authorities where appropriate. With this, there were still 43 determinations finalised within stipulated time frames, unconditionally cleared with no mergers being blocked or subject to conditions. This contrasts with 2023, where four such interventions occurred. This unblemished record may suggest procedural compliance and benign effects, it does raise the question of whether these competitive harms are being sufficiently interrogated or whether transactions are being proactively structured to avoid scrutiny.
Restrictive Practices: Building a Hard Enforcement Reputation
Here, the CCC pursued 12 investigations in 2024, increased from 9 in 2023. These investigations touched sectors ranging from beverages, to wholesale and retail, ICT, pharmaceuticals and transport and logistics. The CCC’s increasing use of ex officio powers, particularly in the transport and non-alcoholic beverages sectors is noteworthy, reflecting a strategic pivot from a reactive enforcement regime to a more intelligence-led and proactive regime.
The CCC bolsters this enforcement strategy with an acknowledgement that behavioural change often requires more than deterrence. It maintains research and advocacy at its core focus for market engagements. The CCC’s involvement in collaboration with the African Market Observatory project in the food and agricultural sector highlights the market and policy failures that arise in these areas. This research has spurred dialogue at both national and international levels, including involvement from the OECD and International Competition Network.
Reform and Capacity Building
The CCC has initiated a long-overdue review of its legal framework, seeking to modernise its 2004 Regulations and Rules. These revised instruments, once adopted, are expected to cover emerging regulatory concerns, which includes climate change, and digital markets. These are areas where the intersection between competition and broader public policy goals are becoming more pronounced.
The CCC has scaled up technical assistance across the region, including providing support to legal reform processes in jurisdictions such as Eswatini, Egypt and Djibouti. The CCC also presented training for competition authority officials in Member States such as Comoros, Zimbabwe and Zambia. These capacity building efforts are critical for the CCC to realise its vision of a harmonised and integrated regional competition regime.
The Year Ahead: A Cartel Crackdown and Consumer-Centric Focus
Looking ahead to 2025, the CCC has signalled a decisive focus on cartel enforcement. There has been a growing recognition that undetected and entrenched cartel operations remain one of the most damaging forms of anti-competitive conduct in the Common Market, resulting in raised priced, limitations to innovation and a stifling of regional integration. The CCC intends to ramp up their detection tools, build cross-border enforcement partnerships, and enhance leniency and whistleblower frameworks. This is a complex undertaking, but does provide the potential to yield transformative results should it be executed effectively.
Alongside this, the CCC intends to intensify its efforts on the consumer protection front, particularly in those sectors that have been flagged through its market intelligence efforts. The digital economy is one such priority sector, the CCC has received anecdotal evidence of exploitative practices in this sector and is positioned to clarify its understanding of the competitive dynamics at play in this sector. Similarly, product safety in the fast-moving consumer goods sector is expected to receive closer scrutiny.
Conclusion
If 2024 was the year of consolidation, 2025 promises to be the year of forward momentum. The CCC has shifted its weight towards deeper enforcement, increased research and the implementation of a regulatory framework that has the ability to meet and address modern market realities. From cartel detection to digital market fairness and food sector resilience, the CCC has an ambitious agenda for the year ahead.
As regional integration efforts gather pace under the AfCFTA, the CCC’s role as a guardian of market fairness and consumer protection within Member States will only become more central. With this groundwork having been laid, it is time for the harder, but more rewarding task: “building markets that work for everyone”.
On 5 June 2025, Primerio hosted the latest instalment of its African Antitrust Agencies – in Conversation series. This session featured Primerio’s Managing Associate, Joshua Eveleigh, alongside Carole Bamu, Primerio’s in-country lead partner for Zimbabwe, and Calistar Dzenga, Head of Mergers at the Zimbabwe Competition and Tariff Commission (“CTC”). Their wide-ranging conversation offered a rare window into Zimbabwe’s merger control regime, recent enforcement developments, and anticipated legislative reforms, thus providing valuable insight into how the regulator is intensifying oversight and sharpening enforcement.
Calistar Dzenga explained that any transaction meeting the combined turnover or asset threshold of USD 1.2 million in Zimbabwe is notifiable under the Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]. Notably, this includes foreign-to-foreign mergers, the activities of which have an appreciable effect within Zimbabwe’s market, a critical point as Zimbabwe becomes an increasingly active jurisdiction in African dealmaking. The CTC’s review process starts with notification and payment of fees capped at USD 40,000, followed by detailed engagement including market research and stakeholder consultations.
Mergers are classified as either “small” or “big,” with smaller transactions typically decided within 30 days, while larger or complex deals taking up to 90 to 120 days.
While the CTC uses indicators like the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as screening tools, the CTC confirmed that market shares are not determinative on whether a transaction will have anticompetitive effects. Instead, the CTC focuses on, and considers, barriers to entry, countervailing buyer power, and the historical context of collusion. Zimbabwe’s framework embeds public interest considerations within competition analysis, differing from South Africa’s dual-stream approach.
Public interest concerns, particularly employment protection and local industry support, are increasingly central to merger decisions. These conditions often require maintaining junior-level employment for at least 24 months post-merger and increasing local procurement. Industrial development goals also shape decisions, including mandates for mineral beneficiation in sectors such as lithium processing.
One of the most significant recent cases involved CBZ Holdings’ attempt to acquire a controlling stake in ZB Financial Holdings. The proposed merger raised alarms over market concentration in banking, reinsurance, and property, as well as risks to consumer choice. After extensive engagement, the Commission proposed strict conditions, from divestitures in related markets to commitments to maintain separate brands. Ultimately, the merging parties walked away, demonstrating that Zimbabwe’s regulator has the resolve to stand firm even on high-profile deals.
Joshua and Carole explored how Zimbabwe’s CTC collaborates with other African authorities. Calistar highlighted the strong relationships the CTC has with theCOMESA Competition Commission, the South African Competition Commission, as well as the relevant competition authorities in Zambia and Botswana. Such cross-border collaboration plays a crucial role in ensuring that mergers do not slip through regulatory gaps and that decisions are coordinated across the region. The CTC also uses memoranda of understanding with other national regulators, such as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and the Reserve Bank, to detect transactions which have not been notified to the CTC.
A major theme of the conversation was the long-awaited Competition Amendment Bill, which is set to overhaul Zimbabwe’s 1996 Act. As Calistar explained, the Amendment Bill will:
(i) give the CTC powers to impose harsher administrative penalties for restrictive practices and cartels;
(ii) introduce clearer rules on public interest considerations;
(iii) allow the CTC to conduct proactive market inquiries rather than just reactive investigations;
(iv) enable anticipatory decisions for failing firms to speed up urgent cases; and
(v) provide leniency frameworks for companies disclosing collusion.
The reforms are expected to give the CTC more enforcement capability and help align Zimbabwe with international practices. Joshua mentioned that these changes would give the CTC “more teeth to bite,” a phrase Calistar repeated, showing how the regulator wants to align with global standards.
Right now, Zimbabwe is seeing more merger activity, especially in the financial services and manufacturing sectors. This is predominantly due to consolidation pressures, along with large infrastructure projects. With regulatory scrutiny picking up speed, companies really have to stay on the front foot when it comes to managing clearance risks and be ready for stricter enforcement.
Joshua also pointed out that it’s an exciting period for competition law in Zimbabwe. He believes businesses should start preparing now for the significant changes that are on the horizon. For Primerio’s African antitrust team, this conversation really highlights how important it is to guide clients through an evolving and complex enforcement landscape.
To view the recording of this session, please see the link here.
South Africa’s logistics and freight infrastructure stands at a critical crossroads, with persistent inefficiencies in the rail, port, and road sectors posing a significant threat to the country’s economic competitiveness and growth. In response to this crisis, the government has introduced the Block Exemption for Ports, Rail and Key Feeder Road Corridors which came into effect on 8 May 2025, a landmark regulatory intervention under the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”), spearheaded by Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau (Government Gazette No. 6182, 2025). This block exemption represents one of the most substantial reforms in South Africa’s competition law landscape, specifically designed to enable greater collaboration among firms operating in the logistics value chain, while still safeguarding against anti-competitive conduct.
The exemption, notable for its 15-year duration, signals the Government’s commitment to long-term, structural support for revitalising the country’s logistics backbone. It allows companies in the transport infrastructure and logistics sectors to apply to the Competition Commission for permission to coordinate efforts aimed at addressing operational inefficiencies, infrastructure capacity shortages, and systemic breakdowns in port and rail infrastructure, all while complying with relevant sector laws and policies. This marks a decisive shift from the traditional competition law approach, which generally prohibits coordination among competitors, to recognise that South Africa’s logistics crisis requires extraordinary, collective action.
Minister Parks Tau’s role has been pivotal, as he gazetted the exemption to promote collaboration that can reduce costs, improve service levels, and minimise losses caused by years of underinvestment and mismanagement in the logistics sector. There is a clear and urgent economic basis for the intervention supported by the fact that South Africa is estimated to lose as much as R1 billion per day due to freight system failures, with follow on effects across production, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and export sectors (“A billion a day – that’s what SA loses through freight failures”, Freight News, 21 May 2024). Congestion at major ports, a deteriorating rail network, and poorly maintained road corridors have not only undermined daily business operations but have also eroded the country’s position in the broader global trade industry.
By enabling coordinated, pro-competitive solutions-subject to strict oversight and clear exclusions for cartel conduct, the block exemption aims to unlock investment, restore critical infrastructure, and lay the foundation for a more resilient, efficient, and globally competitive logistics system.
Background/History
South Africa’s ports and rail infrastructure have historically suffered from inefficiencies and significant decay, impacting the country’s logistics and economic performance. The rail network, largely completed by 1925, faced underinvestment from the late 20th century onwards, leading to deteriorating rolling stock, signalling, and track conditions. This decline was arguably caused by theft, vandalism, and outdated systems, most notably within Transnet Freight Rail, which has struggled with equipment shortages and infrastructure damage, including cable theft and adverse weather events such as the 2022 KwaZulu-Natal floods (Dr Mitchell, The Rise and Fall of Rail, Chapter 4). Ports like Durban and Cape Town, originally designed for mostly rail cargo, now face congestion and aging infrastructure challenges, with cranes and gantries exceeding their intended lifecycle, further slowing cargo handling and export throughput. These events trigger a bottleneck for resources waiting to be exported.
To address these challenges, privatisation is often proposed as a solution. However, previous reform efforts including partial privatisation and initiatives to involve the private sector in infrastructure management have largely failed. These failures were primarily due to poor project management, cost overruns, and user resistance, as demonstrated by the Gauteng electronic tolling system. Recognising these shortcomings, the Government now seeks to mobilise private sector financing and expertise through public-private partnerships and concessions, with the goal of enhancing infrastructure delivery and operational efficiency (P Bond and G Ruiters, South Africa’s Failed Infrastructure Privatisation and Deregulation).
Previous key policy milestones that are aimed at addressing these problems include the Transnet Network Statement, which promotes open access reforms to rail infrastructure, the transport ministry’s Request for Information (“RFI”) to explore private sector involvement and innovative solutions, and now the Government Notice issued by Trade, industry & competition minister Parks Tau.
Legal Framework: The Competition Act
The Act ordinarily prohibits agreements between competitors that substantially prevent or lessen competition, with Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibiting price-fixing, market division, and collusive tendering (Competition Act 89 of 1998, s 4(1)(b)). However, under Section 10(10) of the Act, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition may issue exemptions in the public interest Competition Act 89 of 1998, s 10(10). The newly gazetted 15-year Block Exemption for Ports, Rail and Key Feeder Road Corridors, is one such intervention. It permits limited coordination among firms in the logistics value chain to address critical inefficiencies, while maintaining prohibitions on core cartel conduct such as fixing selling prices or excluding small and historically disadvantaged market participants.
The exemption allows for collaboration on operational matters such as joint use of transport infrastructure, coordinated scheduling, and shared logistics data, activities that would typically contravene the Act’s per se prohibitions under Sections 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii). Importantly, each form of collaboration must be reviewed and approved by the Competition Commission, which retains oversight to ensure that such cooperation is pro-competitive, time-bound, and aligned with Competition Commission’s broader transformation and public-interest objectives. The exemption explicitly requires that such collaboration does not exclude new entrants or small, medium, and micro enterprises (“SMMEs”) and instead encourages inclusive participation.
However, the regulations expressly exclude cartel conduct. Section 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act prohibits price-fixing, tender collusion, and market division, and these sections remain intact. Any coordination must be submitted for review to the Competition Commission, which will assess whether the collaboration is genuinely pro-competitive and in line with sector-specific goals and transformation mandates.
Rationale: Tackling a Logistics Crisis
The rationale behind the 15-year block exemption lies in its capacity to enable coordinated responses to mounting inefficiencies across the country’s rail, port, and road freight infrastructure, systems upon which the economy’s competitiveness rests.
A recent report by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) estimates that freight logistics failures cost the economy up to R1 billion per day, affecting production schedules, increasing costs, and undermining export reliability (“A billion a day – that’s what SA loses through freight failures”, Freight News, 21 May 2024). These issues are particularly acute in port terminals such as Durban and Cape Town, where backlogs have resulted in vessel queuing, delayed shipments, and significant demurrage charges.
The rail network, operated largely by Transnet Freight Rail, continues to degrade due to rolling stock shortages, cable theft, signalling issues, and adverse weather events (Transnet Integrated Report 2023). Following the 2022 KwaZulu-Natal floods, major lines experienced months-long disruptions, highlighting the vulnerability of logistics infrastructure (Presidential Climate Commission Brief on the 2022 KZN Floods, 2022). Moreover, a 2024 National Treasury report identified inadequate investment, operational inefficiency, and governance issues as long-standing contributors to the sector’s decline (National Treasury Annual Report 2023/24 (2024). In light of these challenges, the block exemption provides a legal framework through which firms can engage in limited coordination on logistics operations, such as the sharing of transport assets or the synchronisation of delivery schedules, without breaching competition laws.
The decision to set the exemption for 15 years rather than the more typical short-term period reflects a deliberate strategy to create regulatory certainty. Such long-term clarity is essential to attract private sector investment into joint ventures, infrastructure upgrades, and concessioning models. By providing a legally protected framework for collaboration, the exemption seeks to catalyse systemic reform and reduce South Africa’s long-standing overreliance on inefficient, state-controlled freight logistics.
Competition Analysis: Risk vs Reward
The exemption, while pragmatic, raises legitimate questions from a competition law perspective. One of the key risks is that, under the guise of coordination, dominant firms could entrench their market position and SMMEs and historically disadvantaged persons (“HDPs”). This concern is echoed by academic literature, which warns that crisis-driven exemptions, if not tightly monitored, can facilitate collusion and market foreclosure.
The block exemption also contains an explicit requirement that the collaborative measures must not undermine the participation of new entrants or black-owned logistics firms. In fact, they are encouraged to be integrated into these collective solutions, thereby aligning with the broader objectives of the Act, which focuses on inclusive growth and reducing economic concentration.
Internationally, temporary exemptions have been deployed during times of sectoral distress. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission issued Temporary Frameworks allowing certain forms of cooperation in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, food distribution, and energy, provided they were transparent, necessary, and time-limited (European Commission, Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures, 2020: 1–9). Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) granted exemptions in retail supply chains during 2020, illustrating how temporary coordination can maintain essential operations under stress (UK Competition and Markets Authority, Approach to Business Cooperation in Response to COVID-19, 2020).
Therefore, while there are inherent risks, the reward, a more functional, cost-effective, and inclusive logistics sector which outweighs the downsides if strict oversight is maintained. The exemption represents a calculated, legally bounded exception to orthodox competition principles, in the service of restoring one of the country’s most vital economic sectors.
Conclusion
The 15-year Block Exemption for Ports, Rail and Key Feeder Road Corridors represents a pivotal recalibration of South Africa’s competition law in response to an unprecedented logistics crisis. By permitting targeted, supervised coordination among industry participants, the exemption offers a legal mechanism to address inefficiencies without compromising core competition rules. It reflects a pragmatic shift in recognising that structural reform and economic recovery in the logistics sector require more than individual market forces can deliver.
While the exemption creates opportunities for collaboration and investment, its success will hinge on rigorous oversight by the Competition Commission to prevent anti-competitive abuse and to ensure inclusive participation by SMMEs and historically disadvantaged groups. Ultimately, if implemented with discipline and accountability, the exemption has the potential to catalyse a more efficient, resilient, and equitable logistics ecosystem, one that supports South Africa’s broader goals of economic transformation and global competitiveness.
African Antitrust & Competition Law 