Slippery Business: COMESA Court Invalidates Mauritius’ Edible Oil Tariff

By Matthew Freer

Introduction

On 4 February 2025, the First Instance Division (the “FID”) of the COMESA Court of Justice (the “CCJ”) delivered a landmark judgment in Agiliss Ltd v. The Republic of Mauritius and Others (Reference No. 1 of 2019). This case examined the legality of a safeguard measure imposed by Mauritius on edible oil imports from COMESA member states, raising fundamental questions about trade remedies, due process, and compliance with the COMESA Treaty and its subsidiary legislation.

The judgment is significant as it clarifies the procedural and substantive requirements for imposing safeguard measures under the COMESA Treaty (the “Treaty”) and the COMESA Regulations on Trade Remedy Measures, 2002 (the “2002 Regulations). It reinforces the principle that such measures cannot be used arbitrarily or as disguised trade barriers but must follow due process, including proper investigation, consultation, and notification requirements.

Background

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”) is a regional economic organization established in 1994 to promote economic integration and development among its member states. It has a primary goal of creating a large, integrated economic area through the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of cooperation in areas such as trade, industry, and agriculture. COMESA comprises 21 member states, including countries like Kenya, Egypt, Zambia, and Ethiopia, and focuses on fostering intra-regional trade through the harmonisation of customs procedures and the elimination of tariffs between member states. Article 46 of the Treaty specifically states that Member States of COMESA are required “to eliminate customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect imposed on goods eligible for Common Market tariff treatment” (COMESA Treaty, Art 46). This common market was ultimately formed to enhance trade and economic stability within the region, improve competitiveness, and encourage sustainable development through collective economic policies and regional cooperation.

Agiliss Ltd, a Mauritian based, imports various basic commodities which includes pre-packaged edible oils, from Egypt, a fellow COMESA Member State. Agiliss Ltd is “principally an importer and distributor of staple food in the Republic of Mauritius with the edible oil segment representing some 30% of its business” (para 11). In 2018, the Government of Mauritius (the “Government”), after seeing an increase in edible oil imports, invoked Article 61 of the Treaty to impose a 10% customs duty on edible oils imported from COMESA countries (para 12). This safeguard measure was said to be necessary to protect Mauritius’ domestic edible oil industry from serious economic disturbances.

Agiliss, however, raised its concern that the measure was imposed without proper notification, consultation, or investigation, violating various COMESA legal frameworks. After unsuccessful engagements with the Government, Agiliss Ltd filed a Reference before the CCJ, challenging the legality of the safeguard measure and requesting an order to prohibit its enforcement.

Findings of the Court

In this case, Ms. Ramdenee, CEO of Agiliss Ltd, and her expert witness, Mr. Paul Baker, presented a case to challenging the decision by the Government to impose a safeguard measure on edible oil imports from Egypt, a COMESA Member State, using Article 61 of the Treaty (para 151). Article 61 of the Treaty states, In the event of serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a Member State following the application of the provisions of this Chapter, the Member State concerned shall, after informing the Secretary-General and the other Member States, take necessary safeguard 79 measures” (COMESA Treaty, Art 61).

The central claim was that Government violated the Treaty and the 2002 Regulations by not adhering to required processes, particularly in terms of the investigation and consultations related to the imposition of the safeguard measure.

The key issue was whether the Government conducted the investigation required by the 2002 Regulations and the Treaty before imposing the safeguard measure. The Government’s report on “Investigation on Imports of Oil” was deemed insufficient and non-compliant (para 163). Although the report referenced Regulation 7.1 of the 2002 Regulations, which allowed for safeguard measures due to “serious injury” caused by increased imports, it failed to comply with the more detailed procedural requirements of Regulation 8 of the 2002 Regulations, which mandates that investigations must include public notice, hearings, and the opportunity for stakeholders to provide evidence (para 162). Ms. Ramdenee argued that her company, as a major importer, was not consulted, and that this lack of due process would severely impact her business (para 157).

Moreover, the investigation was criticized for not being thorough or adequately substantiated. Mr. Baker pointed out inaccuracies, such as the failure to compare oil prices internationally, and argued that the alleged “surge” in imports was not supported by data (para 165). He further noted that the report’s conclusions about the link between import increases and the domestic industry’s decline lacked comprehensive evidence, specifically disregarding other relevant factors affecting the industry. The Government did not provide rebuttal evidence to counter these criticisms (para 165).

Additionally, the Government’s failure to notify the COMESA Committee on Trade Remedies as required by Regulation 15 of the 2002 Regulations was a significant violation (para 168). Although the Government argued that the Trade Remedies Committee did not exist at the time, the Court found that the absence of the Committee did not absolve the Government from conducting the investigation as required by Regulation 8 of the 2002 Regulations, which was not dependent on the Committee’s existence (para 171).

Lastly, the Court examined whether the safeguard measures imposed were necessary and proportionate. The proposed safeguard measure, which included a 10% customs duty on oil imports above a 3,000-tonne quota, lacked justification. There was no explanation provided for why these specific thresholds were chosen, and Mr. Baker suggested that the 10% rate appeared arbitrary and unsupported by any modelling or analysis of the impact on imports (para 177). Furthermore, the application of a quota and tariff did not align with Regulation 10.1 of the 2022 Regulations, which demands a careful analysis of market conditions to ensure that safeguard measures are not overly restrictive (para 178).

Ultimately, the Court found that the investigation carried out by the Government did not comply with the provisions of the Treaty and 2002 Regulations, and the proposed safeguard measure was not justified by sufficient evidence or proper procedures. In the final analysis, the Court has issued several key orders. First, the decision of the Government to impose the safeguard measure, along with all consequential steps taken, is declared a nullity (para 227(a)). In terms of costs, the Court has ordered the Government to pay half of the Agiliss Ltd’s costs incurred in this Reference (para 227 (c)).

Key aspects of the case

This case marks a significant milestone for the COMESA Court of Justice due to its critical examination of safeguard measures within the context of Common Markets. The FID’s ruling highlights key aspects of trade remedy procedures, particularly emphasising the importance of compliance with the COMESA Treaty and the 2002 Regulations. The Court’s findings reinforce that safeguard measures cannot be applied arbitrarily; they must adhere to proper investigation, consultation, and notification processes.

Furthermore, the judgment serves as a reminder that such measures must be substantiated with sufficient evidence to avoid being used as disguised trade barriers. The ruling clarifies procedural expectations for all COMESA member states, ensuring that trade remedies are transparent, fair, and justifiable in line with regional economic integration goals. Although safeguards are a vital tool for shielding domestic industries, the ruling underscores that they must not be applied without the proper investigations and Member State consultation processes. This case establishes a key precedent for future trade disputes within COMESA and emphasises the Court’s essential role in upholding the rule of law and interpreting the Treaty and its related regulations.

COMESA Competition Chief Approves of FDI, M&A Transactions

Lipimile Advocates for Foreign Direct Investment, Encouraging Acquisition-Hungry Multi-Nationals in Recent COMESA Trade Remarks

In a comment on the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime (STR) regional programme, recently being implemented locally in the border region between Rwanda and the DRC, George Lipimilie, the Chief Executive Officer of the COMESA Competition Commission, stated that the regional body’s “focus on free movement of goods has generally paid dividends resulting in [] a lot of cross-border mergers and acquisitions,” according to an article in the Rwanda New Times.

George Lipimile of the COMESA Competition Commission

It appears that the CCC chief is expressly favouring foreign direct investment into the region by way of mergers (or perhaps more accurately, acquisitions).  “This is particularly so where the ‘foreign’ (presumably implying non-COMESA) multi-national entity brings with it novel technologies or R&D to improve the market position of the local competitor,” according to Andreas Stargard, a Pr1merio Ltd. competition-law practitioner.

Of interest to M&A practitioners, Mr. Lipimile is quoted as saying: “There are situations when foreign companies use acquisitions to enter the market where you find a multinational company buying a local company which is good because it comes with a lot of technology.” (Emphasis added).

Mr. Lipimile was also rather specific about encouraging FDI in the region’s raw-materials sector from nation states other than the PRC: said Lipimile, “[w]e have seen China taking advantage of our raw materials and we hope more countries can follow suit.”

We note that the domain of international trade — specifically tariffs as barriers to trade — has historically not been within the jurisdictional purview of the COMESA Competition Commission, which was designed to be a competition-law enforcement body.  Technically, there exists the post of COMESA Director for Trade, Customs & Monetary Affairs, held by Dr. Francis Mang’eni and not by Mr. Lipimile.  The CCC, however, “has recently emerged to take a more active role within the COMESA architecture of regional enforcement institutions,” Mr. Stargard says.  He notes that Article 4 of the COMESA Treaty expressly provides that “[i]n the field of trade liberalisation and customs co-operation [the Member States shall] (a) establish a customs union, abolish all non-tariff barriers to trade among themselves”, and that the regional Competition Regulations expressly bestow the CCC with the authority to investigate and abolish all “anti-competitive practices affecting COMESA regional and international trade.”

Trade & Competition in Africa: Opportunity Beckons

Trade & Competition in Africa: Opportunity Beckons

By Peter O’Brien

Continuing the original AAT series, ECONAfrica, Peter O’Brien addresses the WTO’s upcoming MC10 conference.

From 15-18 December Nairobi will host the 10th Ministerial Conference (MC10) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This will be a meeting of many firsts. Till now, no sub-Saharan African country had hosted a Ministerial Conference organised by the WTO. Nairobi will bring into force the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), the first occasion in the now 21 year history of WTO that a new agreement has been signed (all others were established at the inception of WTO). This is the first MC to take place against the backdrop of an agreement in Africa, concluded this year, to work for a continent wide area of free trade. Today more than one quarter (43 countries in total) of all WTO Members (more than 160) are African. Moreover, the  Accession Package for Liberia was agreed in Geneva on 6 October, and it can be expected that it too will join in the course of 2016.

Apart from celebrating the firsts, are there any reasons for business in Africa to pay attention to events in Nairobi? The answer is an emphatic yes:

  • The TFA is the one WTO agreement that promises real advantages on the logistics of trade. Detailed studies have shown that, on average, the sheer movement of goods within Africa accounts for roughly one fifth of all costs. Serious steps to cut those costs, which is what TFA is about, represent a win/win for producers, traders, consumers and indeed the public authorities. Since Africa is the region of the world where intra-trade (transactions among African countries themselves) is by far the lowest, and where most national markets are small, the gains from logistics savings are potentially huge.
  • The TFA will commit WTO Members to help the least developed countries, a group of over 30 States of whom the majority are African. For the first time, there are straight advantages to be obtained without a condition of reciprocity. Funding, technical assistance, streamlining of trade administration, are just some of the things that can be expected. The TFA allows governments and business together to formulate their requests, so this is the chance to utilize an organized offer of support.
  • MC10 will seek to reinforce the whole network of disciplines concerned with non-discrimination and competition that constitute the core of WTO agreements. That progress is very positive for the growth of competitive markets on the continent.
  • The meeting will be attended by numerous international and regional observer organizations from the private sector, as well as by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose normal activities are overwhelmingly directed towards improving trade and welfare in African countries. Their presence serves to strengthen the lobby for growth and welfare improvement.

In the world of yesterday, tariffs and quantitative limitations dominated trade negotiations. In tomorrow’s world, the critical subjects are technical barriers to trade (meaning formal legal resolutions that control trade for purposes of national security, public health and so on), voluntary norms and standards (which in practice frequently acquire a market force equivalent to a legal provision), and a host of other regulatory issues that determine who will be best placed in the market.

More or less all African countries, with the partial exception of South Africa, have always been on the receiving end of these instruments. Africa has thus far played a very minor role in shaping “the rules of the international competitive game.” But with the continent now the fastest-growing region in the world economy, with the race for its natural resources continuing (despite the current lows in resource prices), with the ongoing investments (from within the continent and without), and the steady improvements in governance observable in the majority of countries, Africa is well placed to make its voice heard.

Nairobi and the MC10 offer the ideal stage on which the continent can begin its future path as one of the designers of competitive change.