Author: Editor

Editorial staff of AAT

A new era of antitrust in Zimbabwe: National Competition Policy moves ahead

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Having recently hosted a national sensitisation workshop on COMESA competition policy in Harare, as we reported here, Zimbabwe is expected to enact a revised competition law.  The country’s Cabinet has reportedly approved the National Competition Policy.  One element of the NCP is to reduce the time it takes the Zimbabwean Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) to review mergers and acquisitions from 90 to 60 days, thereby encouraging “brownfield” investments, according to a minister.

Zimbabwean Industry and Commerce Minister Dr. Mike Bimha spoke at the mentioned workshop, emphasising the need for “a level playing field”: “We are now working to ensure that we have a new Competition Law in place which will assist the CTC in dealing more effectively with matters related to abuse of dominant positions and cartels,” he said.

The NCP is part of a larger project to encourage investment and is closely linked with the country’s industrial and trade policies, known as Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (a.k.a. “Zim-ASSET”).

The Zimbabwean NCP is not merely domestically focussed, however.  Andreas Stargard, a competition-law practitioner, highlights the more international aspects that also form part of the revised competition bill awaiting enactment by the President:

Not only does the NCP contain the usual  focus of levelling the playing field among domestic competitors under its so-called Zim-ASSET programme.  It also undergirds the so-called ‘domestication’ of the broader regional COMESA competition rules, as well as the Ministry’s bilateral agreements.  For example, Zimbabwe recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government, designed to enhance cooperation on competition and consumer protection issues between Zimbabwe’s CTC and the PRC’s MOFCOM.

The risks of seeking antitrust leniency

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‘Excusing yourself from the dinner table’ – the risk in applying for immunity in terms of the Competition Act

By Mitchell Brooks, AAT guest author

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After reading David Lewis’ ‘Thieves at the Dinner Table’, a must read for any aspiring competition lawyer, Lewis refers to his negotiations with various cartel members as the head of the Competition Commission. Highlighting that anticompetitive conduct essentially robs the consumer of competitive pricing, hence the reference to thieves, and often this is done during informal dinners between top execs.

The question begs, what are some of the inherent risks in applying for immunity for contravening the Competition Act (“the Act”) and, in essence, excusing yourself from the dinner table.

In Brief

For purposes of this discussion, the composition of the Competition process can be described as follows:

  • The Competition Commission (“the Commission”) investigates anticompetitive conduct in contravention of the Act
  • The Commission then refers the potential perpetrator to the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”);
  • The Tribunal adjudicates the matter and determines whether the Act is contravened and whether a fine is imposed.
  • In order for the Commission to investigate a potential perpetrator, either an outside party (like you and I) must submit a complaint to the Commission or the Commission must initiate a complaint itself.

What is the Corporate Leniency Policy “CLP”?

The CLP is a mechanism utilised by the Commission to uncover cartel practices, the most notorious form being price fixing. The CLP is a policy developed by the Commission and possesses no legal status. Rather, it is an expression of how the Commission will handle leniency applications. In brief, the CLP provides for the granting of “immunity” by the Commission to perpetrators who contravene the Competition Act. However, the CLP operates on a “first to the door” principle meaning that only the first member of the cartel to come clean will qualify for immunity. However, in my humble opinion this principle might not find much support in the context of hub-and-spoke collusion whereby the supplier in the upstream market facilitates collusion between competitors in the downstream market (an increasing phenomenon globally). In other words, is it acceptable that the facilitator qualifies for immunity despite being the orchestrator of the collusion?

What does immunity entail?

According to the CLP, “immunity” means that a successful applicant (otherwise a perpetrator) will not be subject to adjudication or a fine. In turn, “adjudication” entails a referral of a contravention of a chapter two provision (cartel conduct for example) by the Commission. However, Wallace JA in AgriWire (Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd and Another v Commissioner of the Competition Commission and Others (660/2011) [2012] ZASCA 134) stressed that immunity is a much broader concept insofar as the successful applicant would not be referred to the Tribunal along with the other cartel members. In essence, an agreement is concluded between the Commission and the applicant to not refer the applicant to the Tribunal. In other words, the Tribunal has no discretion to impose a fine and the Tribunal does not grant a consent order in terms of the Act (my emphasis added).

What are the risks involved?

Higher fines

First, the applicant is still exposed to adjudication despite not being subject to the discretion of the Tribunal. If the Commission decides against referring a complaint brought by an outside party, the outside party may refer the complaint to the Tribunal itself and bypass the requirement that the Commission make a referral.

Furthermore, if the Commission decides against taking a self-initiated complaint further, nothing in the Competition Act prevents an outside party from submitting a new complaint and referring the matter themselves. This means that there is still a risk of a higher fine being imposed on the perpetrator. In order to achieve greater certainty, the applicant should seek a Consent Order by the Tribunal, which will ensure no outside party may refer the matter for adjudication. This Consent Order should reduce the risk of a fine, greater than the agreed amount as per the immunity agreement, being imposed.

Civil damages

Second, the CLP does not provide leniency against civil damages, however the process as explained in Agriwire creates the perception that immunity is granted against civil claims as well. This perception is apparent in Premier Foods v NormanManoim 2015 (SCA).

In brief, Premier Foods received immunity for its involvement in the notorious bread cartel. Subsequently, private parties sought civil damages. However, section 65(6) of the Competition Act only allows civil damages claims if the party is found in contravention of the Act. A certificate was issued by the Tribunal on the basis that Premier Foods’ conduct had been referred to the Tribunal and thus a finding was made. However, the SCA in Premier Foods disagreed with this finding, instead the SCA held that Premier Foods was not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal, it had not been referred and therefore the certificate was unlawful. As a result, the private parties were barred from a civil claim.

Therefore, according to Premier Foods, a successful applicant would not be exposed to civil damages because there can be no finding against a perpetrator who is not referred to the Tribunal. In summary, the granting of immunity guards the perpetrator against a civil damages claim, even though the CLP’s objective is not to prevent civil damages.

Contrary to the perception created by this unfortunate precedent, successful applicants are arguably still exposed to civil damages by means of a section 58(1)(a)(v) declaration by the Tribunal that the Act was contravened despite the granting of leniency. Nothing in the Act suggests that a complaint procedure be followed in order to obtain a declaration. A private party should be able to approach the Tribunal to ask for a declaration that the Act was contravened based on the immunity agreement, which will not amount to an adjudication as per Judge Wallace’s interpretation but will still amount to a finding. Although there have been no cases relying on 58(1)(a)(v) since Premier Foods, nothing suggests that this avenue cannot be re-opened.

Criminal prosecution

Lastly, a new amendment to the Companies Act provides for criminal liability against directors who engage in cartel conduct. The CLP and the Competition Act are completely silent on the impact of the CLP on criminal liability. It might well be possible for a managing director to be exposed to criminal prosecution despite the granting of immunity to the perpetrating company. Therefore, the directors would need to communicate with the National Prosecuting Authority and coordinate accordingly.

Conclusion

In light of the above, the CLP will be less effective until the above uncertainties are addressed and it is advisable that when one is faced with cartel conduct, it is important that one seek professional legal advice due to the complexity of the immunity application process.

South Africa- Market Inquiry Transport Sector

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The amendments to the South African Competition Act, (the Act) in 2009 granted the South African Competition Commission (SACC) formal powers to conduct market inquiries. Since then South African business has witnessed a sharp increase in market inquires including: private health care sector, liquefied petroleum gas sector (LPG) as well as the grocery retail market sector.

Fresh off the SACC’s recent conclusion of its market inquiry into the LPG sector, the SACC published a notice in the Government Gazette on 10 May 2017, indicating that it will conduct an inquiry into the Public Passenger Transport sector (PPT Inquiry) which is scheduled to commence on 7 June 2017.

The PPT inquiry, is expected to span two years and will involve public hearings, surveys and meetings with stakeholders which will cover all forms of (land-based) public passenger transport. The SACC indicated in its report that “…it has reason to believe that there are features or a combination of features in the industry that may prevent, distort or restrict competition, and / or to achieve the purpose of the Competition Act”.

Andreas Stargard, who has followed the sector closely since 2013 (when Uber first entered the market), notes that the “SACC’s decision to initiate an inquiry into the PPT sector comes as no surprise”..

As African Antitrust (AAT) had previously reported ‘the “taxi and bus” industry is riddled with collusive behaviour. In light of the fact that most of South Africa’s indigent are fully dependent on taxis for transportation in South Africa and spend a significant portion of their disposal income on taxi fees, this is an issue which needs to be addressed urgently by the competition agencies by acting “without fear, favour or prejudice”’.

From the SACC’s perspective, conducting the PPT inquiry without “fear favour or prejudice” will certainly present its challenges as the sector is renowned for its aggressive operators in what is considered to be a “conflict ridden” industry.

Although the SACC has identified various concerns within this sector, which is complex, there can be no doubt that the SACC’s investigation will have to deal with Uber’s entry into the sector and the hostile and violent resistance which Uber has faced from the ‘metered taxi industry’. Accordingly, it will be most interesting to see how the SACC deals with the broader socio-political issues culminating in physical intimation and violent protests which have plagued the taxi industry.

Andreas Stargard notes further, “this inquiry will be crucial within the current South African context as the effects of rising public transport costs is largely experienced and absorbed by the most marginalized members of the South African society”. It is reported that the costs of public transport is estimated to have more than doubled between 2003 and 2013, with half of the workers using public transport suffering a 40% or more reduction in their hourly wage due to transport costs.

Furthermore, the SACC pointed out, in its report, that only 29.8% of South African households own a motor vehicle, which means that the majority of the population (between 70% and 80%) relies on the PPT sector to get them to and from work, school etc. Accordingly, the PPT sector plays an imperative role in providing meaningful mobility to the majority of the population, which is essential in promoting the broader South African development plan of inclusive economic participation.

Although only the LPG market inquiry is the only formal inquiry to have been concluded to date, a question mark remains over whether market inquiries are yielding effective results sufficient to justify the significant resources which accompany such an inquiry.

Market inquiries are extremely burdensome on the relevant market participants and there does appear to be a risk that market inquiries and the SACC’s resources are being used to promote industrial policies at the expense of promoting competition in the market.

South African Competition Commission Publishes Draft Penalty Guidelines for Prior Implementation

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  • By Michael-James Currie

The South African Competition Commission (SACC) recently published draft guidelines  for determining the administrative penalty applicable for prior implementing a merger in contravention of the South African Competition Acts’ merger control provisions (the Draft Guidelines).

Although the SACC has published guidelines for the determination of administrative penalties in respect of cartel conduct, the SACC has recognised that different considerations apply when calculating the appropriateness of a penalty for ‘gun-jumping’.

South Africa has a suspensory merger control regime and transactions which fall within the ambit of the Competition Acts merger definition, and which meet the mandatorily notifiable financials thresholds, may not be implemented until approval has been obtained by the Competition authorities.

The financial thresholds distinguish between intermediate mergers and large mergers. Both are mandatorily notifiable. Transactions which do not meet the notification thresholds are considered small mergers and may either be voluntarily notified or must be notified at the insistence of the SACC.

In relation to ‘intermediate mergers’ the Competition Commission is mandated with considering and approving (or prohibiting) an intermediate merger whereas in the case of large mergers, the Competition Tribunal is tasked with evaluating the proposed transaction.

Regardless of whether the merger is an intermediate or large merger, the Competition Act provides for an administrative penalty of up to 10% of the firms’ respective South African generated turnover to be imposed on the merging parties for failing to notify the merger.

In terms of the penalty calculations, the Draft Guidelines prescribe a minimum administrative penalty of R5 million (USD 384 615)  for the prior implementation of an intermediate merger and a R20 million (USD 1.5 million) penalty for implementing a large merger prior to being granted approval. The Draft Guidelines cater further for a number of aggravating or mitigating factors which may influence the quantum of the penalty ultimately imposed.

The Draft Guidelines also provide useful guidance as to when a transaction may amount to a ‘prior implementation’. Some of the examples listed in the Draft Guidelines include:

  • The acquisition of 49% of the issued share capital of a company coupled with control in the form of section 12(2)(c) i.e. the right to appoint the majority of the directors in the company.
  • The acquisition by two wholly-owned subsidiaries of certain properties and the failure to notify those acquisition due to the mistaken belief that the transactions amounted to two small mergers.
  • Where a senior executive of the acquiring firm had been engaging in the day-to-day operations of the target firm and the merging parties were already marketing themselves as a single entity.
  • Where the acquiring firm becomes involved in the strategic planning of the target firm, identifies target markets, develops new products or services, takes charge of ordering raw materials, amends procurement policies or becomes involved in customer relations.
  • Where the merging firms cease marketing in order not to compete with each other.
  • Acquiring firms appointing directors to the board of the target firm as the appointment of even one or two directors might give material influence and thus control.

The above instances are only a few of the examples listed and are based mostly on case precedent before the Competition Authorities. This list is, however, in no way exhaustive.

Importantly, the Draft Guidelines, in their current form appears to draw a distinction between “prior implementation” and a “failure to notify”. In relation to latter, the Draft Guidelines indicate that:

A contravention of failure to notify is committed where:

  1. the transaction constitutes a merger under the Act;
  2. the transaction meets the thresholds for notification under the Act; and
  3. the parties have failed to notify the Commission of the transaction.

Technically, a failure to notify does not amount to a contravention in of itself. A contravention only arises if the transaction was not notified and the transaction was subsequently implemented. In other words, merging parties would not be in breach of the Competition Act if a merger agreement has been concluded, but the parties are yet to notify the SACC thereof. Unlike a number of other jurisdictions, there is not a specified time period in which a transaction which meets the thresholds must be notified. A contravention only arises in the event that such a transaction is implemented prior to approval having been granted. We trust that this technical anomaly will be addressed in the final draft.

In light of recent case precedent, the South African Competition Authorities are increasingly less sympathetic to firms who ‘inadvertently’ fail to notify a mandatorily notifiable merger. The SACC’s decision to adopt specific guidelines for contravening the merger control provisions is clear affirmation that the competition authorities expect firms to familiarise themselves with the precise ambit and scope of the Competition Act.

 

New Frontiers of Antitrust – Paris conference

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Concurrences Review will hold the 8th edition of its annual conference “New Frontiers of Antitrust” on Monday 26 June, from 8:30am to 7:00pm, at the Maison du Barreau, Rue de Harlay, Paris, France.

Marc van der Woude, Judge, Vice-President, General Court of the European Union, Luxembourg, will deliver the opening keynote speech.

AAT readers can use the following promotional code to sign up: NFA2017PartnersBlogs at the following site: https://newfrontiersofantitrust2017.eventbrite.fr


 Speakers include:

– Eric Barbier de La Serre, Partner, Jones Day

– Cristina Caffarra, Vice President, Head of European Competition Practice

– Andrea Coscelli, Acting Chief Executive, Competition & Markets Authority

– Isabelle de Silva, Chairperson, Autorité de la concurrence

– Kaarli Eichhorn, Global Executive Counsel – Competition Law & Policy, General Electric

– Carles Esteva Mosso, Deputy Director-General for mergers, DG COMP

– Justus Haucap, Director, Institute for Competition Economics

– Mathew Heim, Vice President and Counsel, Qualcomm

– Laurence Idot, Professor, University Paris II Panthéon-Assas

– Gert-Jan Koopman, Deputy Director-General State aid, DG COMP

– Frédéric Jenny, Chairman, OECD Competition Committee

– Cecilio Madero, Deputy Director-General Antitrust, DG COMP

–  Franck Maier-Rigaud, Professor, IÉSEG School of Management, Paris | Head of Competition Economics Europe, NERA,

– Robert McLeod, Co-Founder & Chief Executive Officer, MLex

– Damien Neven, Senior Consultant, Compass Lexecon

– Mélanie Thill-Tayara, Partner, Dechert

– Wouter Wils, Hearing Officer, European Commission, Visiting Professor, King’s College London

The conference will focus on 4 topics:

– Competition authorities: Towards more independence and prioritisation?
– Mergers and innovation: Do mergers foster innovation?
– State aid and tax ruling: Is there really a competition issue?
– Exploring the politics of competition regulation: How political is competition law?

 

CITIBANK EXECUTIVES FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR ALLEGEDLY ENGAGING IN “CORRUPT” COLLUSIVE CONDUCT

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In the wake of Citibank entering into a R69 million settlement agreement with the South African Competition Commission (SACC), the Bank’s executives now face the threat of criminal sanctions as well.

Citibank’s settlement follows the SACC’s complaint referral in which it is alleged that up to 18 banking entities had engaged in collusive conduct in contravention of the Competition Act by allegedly manipulating the Rand/Dollar exchange rate through forex trading.

Citibank was one of the first respondents to settle their case with the SACC, however, on 21 April 2017, an independent organisation, the Black Empowerment Foundation (BEF), formally laid criminal charges against Citibank’s top executives at a South African Police station.

The allegations by the BEF include, inter alia, that Citibank had engaged in corrupt activities resulting in Citibank having “generated profits at the expense of ordinary South Africans”.

The BEF have also indicated that they would write to the President and the National Prosecuting Authority in an effort to elevate and expedite this case.

Importantly, as of 1 May 2016, the Competition Act was amended in order to criminalise cartel conduct – as prohibited in section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. It is not yet clear whether the criminal complaint laid by the BEF is based on a section 4(1)(b) contravention or a broader complaint of ‘corruption’ which is dealt with by other legislation, such as the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act.

The introduction of criminal liability for contravening the Competition Act has, however, been contentious. There have been a number of concerns raised by competition law practitioners regarding the manner in which a criminal investigation would be conducted. In this regard, it is important to note that the competition authorities are not responsible for investigating or adjudicating criminal matters. This function is reserved for the National Prosecuting Authority and the criminal courts (i.e. the High Courts).

Furthermore, section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act prohibits cartel conduct per se (meaning that there is no rule of reason defence available to a respondent) which means that the threshold of contravening the Competition Act is relatively low. It is unlikely that this low threshold would suffice in respect of a criminal case.

It is further unclear to what extent any evidence gathered by the SACC may be used by the National Prosecuting Authority in a subsequent criminal complaint.

It is understood that there is currently a Memorandum of Understanding that is busy being drafted between the SACC and the National Prosecuting Authority which may provide greater clarity in relation to certain of the procedural aspects surrounding a criminal prosecution. To date, however, this MoU has not been published and little guidance has been provided by the respective agencies as to how they intend conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions.

Although it remains to be seen whether the criminal charges laid by the BEF will ultimately be prosecuted by the National Prosecuting Authority, the case is likely to take centre stage in the next few weeks as the entire investigation and referral of the banks by the SACC has been questioned and concerns regarding political influence has dogged the SACC since the decision was taken to refer the matter earlier this year.

It is also not yet clear why the BEF elected only to lay criminal charges against Citibank and not the other respondents. Collusive conduct by its very nature necessitates more than one party to be implicated.  The BEF may simply be waiting until additional banks enter into settlement agreements (in which an admission of liability is generally a requirement) with the SACC before laying further complaints. Regardless, the BEF’s complaint is likely to have a significant impact on other respondents who may be considering settling with the SACC.

With the threat of a maximum prison sentence of up to 10 years and/or a fine of up to R500 000, this complaint will not be taken lightly by Citibank and all eyes will not only on Citibank, but also on the respective enforcement agencies to see how they will respond to the criminal charges brought by the BEF.

Namibia Competition Commission: New Franchise Laws to Address Anti-Competitive Concerns

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By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie

The CEO of the Namibian Competition Commission (NCC), Mr. Mihe Gaomab II, recently announced that the NCC has made submissions to the Minister of Trade and Industry in relation to proposed legislation which will regulate franchise models in Namibia.

Currently, there is no specific ‘franchise law’ in Namibia and moreover, franchisees are not required to apply to the Minister of Trade and Industry for registration of an ‘approval’ licences. Accordingly, there is minimal regulatory oversight in respect of franchise models.

While recognising the benefits of franchise models, the NCC is, however, concerned that there are a number of franchises in Namibia which may be anti-competitive in that the franchisor-franchisee relationship creates certain barriers to entry.

The NCC has specifically identified the practice, by way of an example, whereby certain franchisors deliberately ensure that there is a lack of competition between franchisees in the downstream market. The rationale behind this commercial strategy is allegedly so that the franchisor may extract greater royalties or franchise fees from the respective franchisees, as the franchisee is assured of a lack of competition.

The NCC views this practice as well as a various similar practices as potentially anti-competitive as the structure of certain franchise models may result in collusion between franchisees.

Unlike a number of jurisdictions, including South Africa, however, collusive conduct is not prohibited per se and a franchise agreement or model will, therefore, only amount to a contravention of the Namibia Competition Act if there is (or likely to be) an anti-competitive effect which cannot be justified or outweighed by other pro-competitive or efficiency arguments (i.e. rule of reason arguments).

The rule of reason analysis also extends to ‘minimum resale price maintenance’ (MRPM) under Namibian competition law. Again, unlike the position in South Africa, MRPM is not a per se prohibition (i.e. there is rule of reason defence available to a respondent). MRPM in terms of the South African Competition Act is a controversial topic as in many instances, the very success of a franchise model is dependent on uniformity in pricing across all franchisees. Furthermore, issues such as protecting brand reputation are also generally acceptable commercial practices which may amount to a contravention due to the strict application of the MRPM provisions under South African law.

In Namibia, franchisors therefore have somewhat more flexibility when recommending minimum resale prices than their South African counterparts. It should be noted, however, that the NCC is monitoring franchise models closely to ensure that franchisors do not overstep the mark by implementing a franchise model which has as its object or effect, the lessening of competition in the market.

Pan-African Antitrust Round-Up: Mauritius to Egypt & Tunisia (in)to COMESA

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A spring smorgasbord of African competition-law developments

As AAT reported in late February, it is not only the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC), but also the the Egyptian antitrust authorities, which now have referred the heads of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to the Egyptian Economic Court for competition-law violations relating to certain exclusive marketing & broadcasting rights.  In addition, it has been reported that the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) has also initiated prosecution of seven companies engaged in alleged government-contract bid rigging in the medical supply field, relating to hospital supplies.

Nigeria remains, for now, one of the few powerhouse African economies without any antitrust legislation (as AAT has reported on here, here, here and here).

But, notes Andreas Stargard, an antitrust attorney with Primerio Ltd., “this status quo is possibly about to change: still waiting for the country’s Senate approval and presidential sign-off, the so-called Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill of 2016 recently made it past the initial hurdle of receiving sufficient votes in the lower House of Representatives.  Especially in light of the Nigerian economy’s importance to trade in the West African sphere, swift enactment of the bill would be a welcome step in the right direction.”

The global trend in competition law towards granting immunity to cartel whistleblowers has now been embraced by the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM), but with a twist: in a departure from U.S. and EU models, which usually do not afford amnesty to the lead perpetrators of hard-core antitrust violations, the CCM will also grant temporary immunity (during the half-year period from March 1 until the end of August 2017) not only to repentant participants but also to lead initiators of cartels, under the country’s Leniency Programme.

The Executive Director of the CCM, Deshmuk Kowlessur, is quoted in the official agency statement as follows:

‘The policy worldwide including Mauritius, regarding leniency for cartel is that the initiators of cartel cannot benefit from leniency programmes and get immunity from or reduction in fines. The amnesty for cartel initiatorsis a one-off opportunity for cartel initiators to benefit from immunity or up to 100% reduction in fines as provided for under the CCM’s leniency programme. The amnesty is a real incentive for any enterprise to end its participation in a cartel. In many cases it is not clear for the cartel participant itself as to which participant is the initiator. The participants being unsure whether they are an initiator finds it too risky to disclose the cartel and apply for leniency. The amnesty provides this unique window of 6 months where such a cartel participant can apply and benefit from leniency without the risk of seeing its application rejected on ground of it being an initiator.’

 

COMESA Competition Commission logoFinally, COMESA will grow from 19 to 20 member states, welcoming Tunisia at the upcoming October 2017 summit: the official statement notes that “Tunisia first applied for observer status in COMESA in 2005 but the matter was not concluded. In February, 2016 the country formally wrote to the Secretary General making inquiries on joining COMESA. This set in motion the current process towards its admission. once successfully concluded, Tunisia will become the 20[th] member of COMESA.”

This means that within 6 months of accession to the Common Market, Tunisia’s business community will be bound by the competition regulations (including merger control) enforced by the CCC.  Speaking of the CCC, the agency also recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Mauritian CCM on March 24, facilitating inter-agency coordination.  In addition, the Zimbabwean Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) will host a national sensitisation workshop on COMESA competition policy on May 16, 2017 in Harare, purportedly as a result of “over 50 transactions involving cross-border mergers notified” to the CCC involving the Zimbabwean market.  “The main objective of the national workshop is to raise awareness among the key stakeholders and business community in Zimbabwe with regards to the provisions and implementation of COMEA competition law,” the CTC noted in a statement.

 

MAURITIUS COMPETITION AUTHORITY PENALIZES FIRM FOR ENGAGING IN RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

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By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie

In a landmark judgment, the Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) recently concluded its first successful prosecution in relation to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), which is precluded in terms of Section 43 of the Mauritius Competition Act 25 of 2007 (Competition Act).

The CCM held that Panagora Marketing Company Ltd (Panagora) engaged in prohibited vertical practices by imposing a minimum resale price on its downstream dealers and consequently fined Panagora Rs 29 932 132.00 (US$ 849,138.51) on a ‘per contravention’ basis. In this regard, the CMM held that Panagora had engaged in three separate instances of RPM and accordingly the total penalty paid by Pangora was Rs 3 656 473.00, Rs 22 198 549.00 and 4 007 110.00 respectively for each contravention.

The judgment is important as it not only demonstrates the CCM’s increasing enforcement efforts and risk of non-compliance with the Competition Act (this decisions follows on CCM’s recent findings against firms for engaging in abuse of dominance conduct) but has created a particularly strict threshold on firms in relation to what constitutes price maintenance in terms of Mauritius competition law. RPM is a prohibited vertical practice, in which suppliers restrict or prescribe the manner in which customers resell the relevant products or services. Minimum resale price maintenance is prohibited in most jurisdictions. Whether the contravention is a “per se’ contravention (i.e. that there is no rule of reason defence available to a respondent) or whether proving an anti-competitive effect is a necessary requirement to prove a contravention is generally the key difference in the manner in which competition agencies enforce RPM.

In relation to Panagora,  the company was found to have contravened the Competition Act as a result of having affixed the resale price on two of its ‘Chantecler’ branded chicken products (chilled and frozen), without affixing the words ‘recommended price’ next to the stated price.

In addition, Panagora engaged in promotional sales to dealers  utilising a ‘deal sheet’ which contained the following clause “Le fournisseur se reserve le droit d’annuler le tariff promotionnel au cas ou certains produits sont vendus en dessous du prix normal” (the supplier reserves the right to cancel the promotional price in the event that certain products are sold below the normal price).

Importantly, in reaching its determination, the Executive Director held that although foreign case law, particularly Australian, UK and EU legal precedent serves as a useful guideline. The Mauritius Competition Act (in so far as it relates to RPM), differs vastly from its international counter-parts. In this regard, the Competition Act merely requires evidence supporting the contention that there was an object or effect of directly or indirectly establishing a fixed or minimum price or price level to prove a contravention. The Mauritius Competition Act  does not require that the conduct in any way prevented, restricted or distorted competition in the market.

Andreas Stargard, a competition practitioner with Africa boutique firm Primerio Ltd., notes that ‘[a] further important aspect of the CCM’s ruling is that sanction (or threat of a sanction) is not a requirement to prove a contravention of the RPM prohibition. Accordingly, the inquiry did not consider whether the downstream customer retained the discretion to price below the “stated price”.’

The legal precedent created by the CMM’s ruling provides much needed clarity as to how the CMM will evaluate resale price maintenance cases and firms need to be particularly cautious in relation to the terms of engagement with customers who on-sell their products.

 

South Africa: Dawn Raids on fresh produce markets

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By AAT Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie

The South African Competition Commission (SACC) conducted yet another set of dawn raids, this time on the premises of nine of South Africa’s largest fresh produce market agents.

SAgrocery.jpgThe agents raided, which had operations at the Tshwane Market in Pretoria and the Joburg Market in Johannesburg, include the Botha Roodt Group (Botha Roodt); Subtropico (Pty) Ltd (Subtropico); RSA Group (Pty) Ltd (RSA Group); Dapper Market Agents (Pty) Ltd (Dapper); DW Fresh Produce CC (DW Fresh); Farmers Trust CC (Farmers Trust); Noordvaal Market Agents (Pty) Ltd (Noordvaal); Marco Fresh Produce Market Agency (Marco); and Wenpro Market Agents CC (Wenpro).

Although South Africa has about 30 fresh produce markets agents, the 6 largest agents allegedly account for approximately 80% of the fresh produce intermediaries. This means that the SACC included 3 agents in its raid which would not ordinarily be regarded as ‘large agents’.

The raid, according to the SACC’s media release, follows from a complaint which the SACC received from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The media release alleges that the agents engaged in prohibited cartel conduct, in contravention of Section 4(1)(b) of the South African Competition Act, in that they:

  • entered into an agreement and/or engaged in a concerted practice to fix the price and trading conditions for the supply of freshly produced fruits and vegetables in South Africa;
  • are involved in prohibited coordinated activities aimed at undercutting the prices charged by smaller intermediaries by charging way below the market price for certain agreed periods of a trading day;
  • keep their prices unsustainably low during these periods where after they (by agreement) quickly increase prices significantly as soon as the smaller agents run out of stock. Accordingly, certain volumes of fresh produce are sold during the late hours of trading with the sole aim of manipulating prices;
  • further make decisions regarding the actual timing of the price increases; and
  • reserve certain fresh produce grades for particular buyers, therefore, engaging in price discrimination based on the identity of buyers.

These agents facilitate the selling of fresh produce on behalf of farmers, for a commission (which rate they have allegedly also fixed over the years), to wholesalers, retailers and hawkers. Accordingly, the alleged conduct is considered particularly harmful as it affects the most vulnerable households. Additionally, SACC Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele stated that “…cartel activities in this sector serve to keep out emerging black farmers and agents out of the market. It is for these reasons that this sector ranks high in our priority list, and cartels, big or small, will be rooted out”.

Notably, the SACC in its statement indicated that the alleged conduct is believed to be ongoing. This may raise serious issues for the agents concerned as the SACC has not yet clarified how they intend on dealing with ongoing conduct for purposes of constituting an offence under section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act (In terms of the section 73A, any director or person with management authority may be held criminally liable for ‘causing’ or ‘knowingly acquiescing’ in cartel conduct). Accordingly, how this uncertainty will impact on the SACC’s corporate leniency policy remains to be seen. For more info on this, see South African Competition Commission… More Dawn Raids!

In conclusion, the timing of this dawn raid coincides with the SACC’s recent (ongoing) Market Inquiry into the Grocery Retail Market Sector. However, to what extent, if any, the Market Inquiry has had any relevance or impact on this dawn raid is unclear and remains a matter of mere speculation.