Category: COVID-19

Competition Exemptions in South Africa: Evolving Tools for Balancing Competition and Public Interest

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By Olivia Höll

A Shifting Landscape in Competition Policy

In South Africa, exemptions under the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) provide a critical mechanism for firms to engage in conduct that might otherwise breach the Act’s prohibitions, where such conduct supports broader policy goals. Exemptions are considered under section 10, with block exemptions specifically authorised under section 10(10). These exemptions aim to promote efficiencies, support government policy, safeguard employment, or advance small businesses and historically disadvantaged individuals.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a visible evolution in the types and objectives of exemptions granted by the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), reflecting South Africa’s shifting economic priorities and ongoing structural challenges.

From Pandemic Emergency to Structural Interventions

The COVID-19 pandemic saw the SACC issue urgent exemptions, such as those for private healthcare providers, banks, retail landlords, and hospitality businesses to enable crisis cooperation. These exemptions were time-bound, tightly monitored, and have since expired. They remain useful precedent for how competition law can be flexibly applied in national emergencies.

However, more recent exemptions illustrate a pivot towards structural or developmental goals. Notable recent examples include:

  1. Ports and Rail Exemption (May 2025)

This exemption directly tackles one of the most significant drags on the South African economy, its dysfunctional logistics system. Chronic inefficiencies at Transnet-owned ports and on the freight rail network have cost the economy billions in lost export revenue. This isn’t merely about allowing cooperation, it’s an explicit attempt to use competition law to solve a market failure.

The exemption encourages private terminal operators (such as those in Durban and Ngqura) and private rail operators to collaborate in ways that would normally be considered anti-competitive (such as coordinating schedules, sharing infrastructure planning data, jointly investing in solutions) to optimise the entire supply chain from mine and factory to port.

This means exporters in sectors like mining and agriculture can anticipate reduced delays and owner spoilage rates, enhancing their global competitiveness. For the operators themselves, it allows for unprecedented cooperation with competitors to optimise the entire supply chain, though they must vigilantly avoid any discussion that veer into product pricing or market allocation, which remain strictly illegal.[1]

  • Sugar Industry Exemption (May 2025)

Functioning as a structured rescue plan formalised through the Sugar Master Plan, this exemption is designed to ensure the survival and transformation of a critically important industry. It permits stakeholders across the value chain, from lager growers to millers, to coordinate on production levels, collectively plan for diversification into biofuels, and present a unified front in negotiations.

For sugar businesses, this means a chance to stabilise the industry and protect livelihoods, particularly for small-scale cane farmers. The practical compliance imperative is stringent, participants must meticulously document that all coordinated activities are for industry restructuring and not for illicit profit-maximisation at the expense of consumers.[2]

  • SMME Block Exemption (January 2025)

This block exemption is a powerful tool for levelling the playing field for Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (“SMMEs”). It recognises that these players often cannot challenge established market structures alone and allows them to band together to achieve scale.

This means SMMEs can legally form buying groups to negotiate bulk purchase discounts, create joint ventures to bid for large tenders, and collaborate on shared logistics and marketing networks to drastically reduce costs. For larger corporations, this necessitates preparedness to engage with more organised and powerful SMME consortiums. The critical compliance rule is that the exemption only protects qualifying SMMEs, larger firms cannot use an SMME partner as a shield for cartel conduct.[3]

  • Energy and Industrial Exemptions

These exemptions represent a critical tool for addressing broad-based economic constraints, with a particular focus on the ongoing energy crisis and its ripple effects. They provide a collaborative framework for firms within key supply chains and strategic industrial sectors to coordinate in ways that would normally be prohibited.

This could mean manufacturers and suppliers in a critical industry such as steel, chemicals, or automative components being permitted to collaborate on optimising energy usage during load-shedding, sharing logistics for essential inputs, or jointly securing raw materials to ensure continued production and prevent factory closures.

For businesses, this exemption is designed to enhance economic stability and prevent a decline in productive capacity by allowing a degree of crisis management and operational coordination that safeguards entire value chains vital to South Africa’s industrial policy and recovery. The essential compliance imperative is that any cooperation must be directly linked to overcoming the identified supply chain or energy constraints and must not be used as a cover for market division, price-fixing, or other blatantly anti-competitive conduct.[4]

  • Banking and Insurance Exemption (July 2025)

This is a forward-looking exemption that aligns competition policy with national climate goals, acknowledging that financing a ‘just transition’ is a collective action problem. It permits banks and insurers to collaborate on developing common standards, definitions, and data-sharing frameworks for sustainable finance.

This means financial institutions can pool data on climate-related risks and develop a common South African taxonomy for ‘green’ assets without fear of prosecution, which should lead to more available and affordable financing for businesses seeking loans for renewable energy or ESG projects. The crucial limitation is that collaboration is restricted to framework development, any coordination on interest rates, premiums, or customer allocation remains absolutely prohibited.

  • Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports (August 2025)

In August 2025, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition published a Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports. This exemption, still under consultation, seeks to facilitate collaboration among exporters and industry players to overcome structural barriers to accessing foreign markets. It is framed under section 10(10) of the Act and recognises that South Africa’s export competitiveness is often constrained by high logistics costs, fragmented industry structures, and limited bargaining power in international markets.

The exemption is intended to permit cooperative initiatives around joint marketing, shared logistics, standard-setting, and market development, provided that such conduct demonstrably enhances South Africa’s export performance without undermining domestic competition. If finalised, this exemption could become a key instrument to support government’s broader trade and industrial policy agenda, including the drive to increase manufactured exports and deepen regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”).[5]

Understanding Block Exemptions under Section 10(10)

Section 10 of the Act allows firms to apply to the SACC to exempt them from horizontal agreements typically regulated by section 4 of the Act, or vertical agreements regulated by section 5 of the Act where the agreement contributes towards the following objectives:

  1. maintenance or promotion of exports;
  2. promotion of effective entry, participation in or expansion in the market by small and medium enterprises or firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons;
  3. change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an industry;
  4. economic development, growth, transformation or stability of any regulated industry; or
  5. competition and efficiency gains that promote employment or industrial expansion.

The recent SMME Block Exemption echoes earlier block exemptions issued during COVID-19 but represents a shift towards more enduring tools that facilitate inclusive growth. Other possible future candidates for block exemptions include sectors under Master Plans, such as poultry, automotive, and steel, where coordinated action may be needed to meet transformation or industrial policy targets.

Evolving Patterns: Then and Now

While COVID-era exemptions demonstrated the SACC’s agility during crisis management, current exemptions highlight a maturing approach. The SACC increasingly uses exemptions to:

  1. Tackle persistent structural inefficiencies;
  2. Strengthen value chains aligned with industrial policy;
  3. Support small and historically disadvantaged firms; and
  4. Balance economic competitiveness with sustainability and localisation goals.

Risks and Compliance Imperatives

Nonetheless, exemptions remain the exception, not the rule. Historic concerns persist that exemptions, if poorly designed or inadequately monitored, may entrench collusive behaviour or dampen competition. The SACC’s use of clear conditions, sunset clauses, and robust reporting obligations is therefore critical.

Looking Ahead

South Africa’s competition law framework continues to evolve in response to new economic realities. For firms seeking exemptions, the message is clear: any coordination must demonstrably advance the public interest and remain tightly circumscribed within the legal safeguards of the Act.

With the recent wave of block exemptions and sector-specific approvals, businesses, advisors, and stakeholders should actively monitor exemption trends, sector-specific conditions, and the SACC’s enforcement approach ensuring that collaboration serves national priorities without eroding competitive markets in the long term.

[1] Government Gazette No. 52624

[2] Government Gazette No. 52625

[3] Government Gazette No. 52000

[4] Government Gazette No. 52111

[5] Government Gazette No. 53147

Competition Commission releases impact report of the results from enforcement initiatives during the COVID-19 pandemic

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By Gina Lodolo

On the 25th of April 2021 the Competition Commission (“Commission”) released a media statement pertaining to its now final report titled “the impact of the COVID-19 block exemptions and commissions enforcement during the pandemic” (“Report”).

At the onset of the pandemic, the Minister of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition  (“DTIC”) established block exemptions, which would exempt practices usually falling foul of section 4 and 5 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”). The block exemptions were granted to the Healthcare Sector, the Retail Property Sector, and the Banking Sector. Further, the Commission noted that the pandemic required a particular focus on potential price-gouging by enhancing the advocacy, investigation and prosecution thereof.

The DTIC was empowered to create the block exemptions by Section 78 read with section 10(10) of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018 (“Amendment Act”) which states that “The Minister may, after consultation with the Competition Commission, and in order to give effect to the purposes of this Act as set out in section 2, issue regulations in terms of section 78 exempting a category of agreements or practices from the application of this Chapter”. Further the Commission had a chance to test Section 8 of the Amendment Act which provides a broader discretion to the Commission in testing whether there has been a violation of the Act through excessive pricing.

The Report highlights that due to the uncertainty of the pandemic and the need to act quickly, the block exemptions created the possibility for unpredictable results. As such, to limit the scope of the block exemptions, collaboration needed to be at the request of the Ministers and only granted, upon motivations to respond to the pandemic.

These block exemptions showed their benefits in the Health Care Sector, which allowed cooperation and discussions regarding, inter alia, medical supplies, capacity for testing, sharing of resources, testing cost reduction and coordination of pharmaceuticals and other PPE resources.

Through these collaborative efforts the price of testing became a standardised R850, as opposed to ranging from R1 000-R1 500. As the pandemic started, hospital capacity became a forefront of concern. To this end, the Report states that private hospitals and public hospitals shared data which related to capacity, enabling  hospital beds and staff in all the respective hospitals to be known. Accordingly, the Report states that “South Africa managed the pandemic effectively such that the health system was not overwhelmed in the first wave of the pandemic. As such, very few public sector patients were treated at private facilities”. This cooperation will be beneficial in aiding in a potential third wave of the pandemic, which may very well require more hospital beds, of which, availability between the various hospitals is now known.

However, stakeholders with less bargaining power were bound to those with bigger bargaining power and found that they had little choice on the agreed prices by the larger players. Further, according to the Report “certain provincial departments of health and public sector hospitals” refused to collaborate due to the voluntary nature of the exemptions and therefore, the Report notes suggestions for compulsory exemptions in future. Further, criticism has been levied in that block exemptions could have been granted to enable medical aid schemes to participate in the COVID-19 roll out discussions through agreements on prioritisation, access, sourcing and side-effect reporting. The Report notes that in the future advocacy work will be increased to ensure that smaller stakeholders who feared a violation of the Competition Act, are informed and encouraged to participated in these collaborative  efforts.

In the Retail Sector, collaborative rental arrangements were required due to Level 5 Lockdown, which necessitated the closing of non-essential retail outlets. Collaboration was allowed by limiting evictions, payments holidays and adjusted lease agreements. However, only payment holidays were utilised. These payment holidays were not uniformly agreed between landlords, but rather agreed individually between landlords and their tenants. Nonetheless, the Report notes that the block exemptions purpose of “relief” was met by creating the “platform for discussions” as opposed to landlords agreeing upon a coordinated relief. Further, all retailors were able to benefit from the payment holidays, regardless of their size.

Michael Currie, a partner with competition boutique firm Primerio Ltd., highlights that the Report notes criticism in that the lack of uniformity in the granting of payment holidays, created an opportunity for potential anti-competitive tactics and “cartel-like” behaviour from landlords who “collectively decided to require 100% rental payment in one instance and to require 70% rental payment in another instance”. Accordingly, the Report notes from the minority feedback received, that in the future, frameworks for negotiation “should have been coupled with tools for mediation between landlords and retailers, to ensure synergy”.  

Similarly to the Retail Sector, in the Banking Sector the Report notes that collaboration was only found in bilateral agreements between banks and debtors in the granting of debt relief or payment holidays, as opposed to blanket relief for all debtors. Stakeholders recommended that “future exemptions or industry solutions that target the sector must not be limited to banks only but include all lenders to ensure a level playing ground” and further that “some of the conditions set should be maintained post the pandemic” as debtors may need longer to recover from the adverse economic effects of the lockdown.

Importantly, the pandemic created opportunities for price-gouging of hygiene, food and medical products. To this end, the Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster Management Regulations and Directions (“Regulations”) were published by the DTIC. According to the Report, the Commissions initiatives included advocacy initiatives through “enforcement letters” and visible enforcement, which ensured that suppliers susceptible to price-gouging  were aware of the possible prosecution and penalties thereof. Further, price-gouging reporting initiatives were increased by the establishment of a consumer hotline, which created the opportunity for consumers to report via SMS/Whatsapp, which yielded a total of 1199 investigations.

Importantly, the Report highlights the precedent set by the decisions in Competition Commission v Babelegi Workwear and Industrial Supplies CC (“Babelegi”) and  Competition Commission of South Africa v Dis-Chem Pharmacies Limited (“Dis-Chem”) where it was held by the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) that price-gouging in terms of section 8(1)(a) of the Amendment Act can be determined in cases where market power is not sustained over a longer period of time. The Tribunal found that firms who were seen to have temporary market power had engaged in price-gouging. The Report states that it “established precedent for a simplified test to determine whether price gouging occurred”.  Accordingly, The South African team at Primerio International is of the view that this application of Section 8(1)(a) of the Amendment Act is flawed in that the traditional economic tests in establishing excessive pricing were watered down to provide for the circumstances of the pandemic, without relying on the Regulations, but rather the legislation. Thus, as noted in the Report, creating precedent of a now simplified price-gouging test. [For an in depth discussion click here: https://academic.oup.com/jeclap/article/11/9/524/5917388 ]

Further, the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) in Babelegi went to great lengths to emphasis the flaws in the Tribunals decision. The CAC emphasised the competition law principle of durability, which requires that for a determination of market power to be reasonable, the pricing must be sustained for a long period of time. Durability is an important factor, because it becomes inevitable that other firms will display opportunistic behaviour during a crisis such as COVID-19, which will then create a new equilibrium as competitors once again become constrained to have better prices than their competitors. Accordingly, the context of the pandemic does not warrant short cuts in decision making, such that a small firm, who sold a few masks at an excessive price, should be considered to be dominant. The CAC decided that the consumers were still capable of purchasing masks from other firms, therefore, although the pricing was excessive, consumer harm cannot be assumed simply because the excessive prices were in the context of a health crisis. Following the CAC’s criticism of the Tribunal’s decision, The CAC did not overturn the Tribunal’s decision. This bazar decision potentially finds reasoning in the Report which states that “A failure to uphold these judgements would have hindered the Commission’s ability to respond to the conduct in question, making price gouging more widespread”.  This statement is concerning as it alludes to decision making which was made to fit a desired outcome of low prices for consumers, potentially creating unnecessary intervention in competition, which would have naturally found an equilibrium. To this end, the Report states that “a total of R16 532 105 was paid in fines”, which, coupled with advocacy initiatives, deterred price increases.

To conclude, although the Tribunal may have erred in its utilisation of Section 8(1)(a) of the Amendment Act instead of utilising the Regulations, as a whole, and according to the Report the block exemptions granted served their purpose and had an overall positive effect in mitigating against the harsh effects of the pandemic.

Podcast explores latest developments across Africa

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The latest episode #122 of Sheppard Mullin’s popular NOTA BENE podcast features Primerio’s Andreas Stargard, exploring “Africa Q2 Check In: Economic Growth and Relevance.”

Africa continues to strive for economic growth through various trade partnerships and foreign investments, but long-standing challenges remain an impediment in certain respects. Is Twitter’s decision to open an African base in #Ghana any indication of the continent’s economic potential? We’re joined by #Africa competition and markets expert, Andreas Stargard, a co-founding senior member of Primerio Ltd., as he shares insights on Africa’s economic outlook in Q2 of 2021.

You can listen to it for free on all major ‘podcatchers,’ including here:

Healthy foods & price-gouging during Pandemic?

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High ginger, garlic and lemon prices have left a sour taste in mouths of South Africans

By Gina Lodolo and Jemma Muller

The exorbitant and rapid increase in prices of ginger, garlic and lemon, that which spans up to 300%, has been the source of much public outcry and regulatory concern over the past few months. The question remains whether the price increases by massive retailers can be justified or whether they should be considered as excessive?

The Consumer and Customer Protection and the National Disaster Regulations and Directions (the “Regulations”), which came into effect in March 2020, were put in place to consider inter alia when a price is excessive.  They empower the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) and National Consumer Commission (“NCC”) to investigate and prosecute cases of price-gouging.  Contraventions may result in penalties of up to ZAR 1 million or 10% of annual turnover. According to the NCC, price gouging is defined as “an unfair or unreasonable price increase that does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the cost of providing that good or service.”

The NCC has launched an investigation under the Consumer Protection Act into potential contraventions of the COVID-19 Regulations against major retailers such as Woolworths, Pick ‘n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Food Lovers market, Cambridge Foods and Boxers Superstores. According to the Regulations, and in terms of section 120(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, a price increase of a goods, including inter alia “basic food and consumer items”, which does not correspond to the increase in cost of supplying such goods, or increases in the net margin or mark-up on the good(s) which exceeds the average margin or mark-up on the said good in the three month period before 1 March 2020 is “unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and unjust and a supplier is prohibited from effecting such a price increase”.

The preferred tools of the COVID-19 Regulations relating to excessive pricing seem to be predominantly similar to competition policy and its associated institutions. Upon assessing an increase in pricing to determine whether the increase is excessive, the test would be whether the prices were increased due to cost-based increases (such as reduced supply due to an increase in import costs as the domestic currency get weaker) as opposed to price increases only due to a demand increase (such as more consumers buying ginger as an immune booster during the COVID-19 pandemic). When assessing exploitative conduct, it is more likely to establish that there has been an abuse of dominance when a firm is dominant or enjoys great market power.

It has appeared that the trend in the increase of ginger and garlic retail prices is that the allegedly exploitative conduct no longer originates from only one dominant player as such (eg. only Spar) but rather affects shops in the whole of South Africa. The price increases have sparked outrage with consumers who are driving shop-to-shop in an attempt to purchase ginger or garlic at a lower, or somewhat ‘standard’ pre-COVID-19, price.

As stated above, increasing prices will be seen as excessive when the increase is due only to an increase in demand. Retailers have claimed that the increase is not only because of rising demand but also due to an actual decrease in the product supply.  It is therefore pertinent to determine the extent to which the supply has been reduced in relation to the increased demand. This would require a proportionality balance, as shops would have to prove to the competition authorities that the increase of pricing is only due to the decrease in supply. Extortionary pricing above and beyond that would demonstrate an increase of pricing due to the increase of demand, and as such would fall foul of the  Competition Act and the Regulations cited above.

The rising prices in garlic and ginger have been on the SACC’s radar since July 2020, when it concluded a consent agreement with Food Lovers Holdings whereby the retailer agreed to immediately halt excessively pricing its ginger products at one of its stores. Notwithstanding this fact, the subsequent regulation and enforcement of ginger and garlic prices by the SACC under Regulations has become somewhat tricky due to the fact that the products are not considered to be essential products under the COVID-19 Regulations.

The SACC previously found that the increases in prices were largely attributed to the rise in costs experienced by retailers and they found no evidence of price gouging targeted at taking advantage of the constrained mobility of consumers or shortages during the pandemic. What the SACC found to be concerning, however, were the high pre-disaster margins on products such as ginger and garlic, which have largely been maintained throughout the pandemic by retailers raising their prices for the goods as the costs were increasing. Accordingly, as mentioned above, although the SACC did not find evidence of price gouging, it did find possible contraventions of the Consumer Protection Act and as such, referred the potential contraventions to the NCC to investigate further.

A spokesperson for the SACC, Siyabulela Makunga has stated the following:

“We also appreciate the changes in demand for garlic and ginger, but it is our view the price of ginger and garlic have [sic] increased astronomically at retailers. We don’t think that the increased demand in ginger justified the price of up to R400 a kilogram…”

John Oxenham, an R.S.A. competition lawyer with Primerio Ltd., notes that “the prosecution of the matter demonstrates the respective authorities’ commitment to priority sectors and an unbridled effort to root out any form of price-gouging.”

To conclude, market power of the implicated retailors has likely been increased due to the reduced availability of substitutes for customers as a majority of retailers have introduced a dramatic price increase. The investigation launched by the NCC is, however, a step in the right direction to protect consumers who have been left with very limited choices in the widespread steep increase in price of ginger and garlic.

Antitrust enforcer to allow self-assessment of competitor collaborations amidst pandemic

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Following the (thus far rarely used) “Block Exemption” procedure under Section 30 (2) of the Kenyan Competition Act, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) has proposed a new set of draft Guidelines as to competitor collaborations during the COVID-19 pandemic, so as to assist with the country’s economic recovery efforts. It specifies five (5) focus sectors, namely Manufacturing, Private Healthcare, Aviation, Travel & Hospitality, and Health Research. The Guidelines are ostensibly inapplicable to firms that engage in economic activity outside these five sectors.

Download the draft version of the PCBEG hereDownload

In issuing its soon-to-be finalized guidance, the CAK wishes to provide “direction to undertakings in making a self-assessment as to whether the agreements, decisions or practices which they intend entering into will qualify for block exemption within the Covid-19 Economic Recovery Context without the need to seek the Authority’s intervention.” (A.(4))

A key aspect, in the view of antitrust litigator Andreas Stargard, is the renewed attention given to “public-interest factors” in competition law.

He believes that this concession to non-traditional competition-law theory is “necessitated by the broad economic havoc COVID-19 has wrought, including on historically peripheral-to-antitrust aspects such as overall employment, public health, en masse business closures, and the like, which would normally not be highly relevant factors in the strict sense of conducting a rigorous competition-law analysis.”

Stargard continues that “Condition III of the CAK’s so-called ‘Self-Assessment Principles‘ expressly highlights this element, namely forcing firms to evaluate whether their proposed collaboration with competitive entities is ‘in the public interest, such as creation of employment’,” citing para. 11(vii) of the draft Block Exemption Guidelines on Certain Covid-19 Economic Recovery Priority Sectors.

The CAK’s proposal thus strongly echoes what its regional sister authority, the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) openly discussed as early as July of last year. As we wrote in our assessment of the official CCC staff’s thoughts on competition enforcement amidst the pandemic in 2020:

The concept of non-competition factors (i.e., the public-interest element) was also raised, as there is a “growing debate on whether the pandemic may necessitate changes in [the] substantive assessment of mergers, e.g., towards more lenient consideration of failing firms.”

As Andreas Stargard observes, “just as COVID-19 is truly global, Kenya and COMESA are likewise not alone in their quest to master the difficult balancing act between sufficiently enforcing their domestic or regional antitrust laws versus allowing reasonable accommodations to be made for necessary competitor collaborations in light of the pandemic’s impact. Indeed, other enforcers have also made accommodations for such unusual collaborative efforts, given the emergency nature of the pandemic.”

In the U.S., the federal antitrust agencies have issued analogous guidance for competitors, issuing a joint guidance document specifically on health-care providers collaborating on necessary public-health initiatives. What stands out is the agencies’ express invitation for health-care players to take advantage of the (now-expedited to 7 days’ turnaround time) business-review/opinion-letter procedures.   Mr. Stargard notes however that, unlike the Kenyan proposal of “self-assessment“ by the affected entities, the American approach still necessitates an affirmative approach of the enforcers by the parties, seeking official sanctioning of their proposed cooperation by submitting a detailed explanation of the planned conduct, together with its rationale and expected likely effects.

By way of further example, in Canada, as the OECD notes, the government “has developed a ‘whole-of-government action’ based on seven guiding principles including collaboration. This principle calls on all levels of government and stakeholders to work in partnership to generate an effective and coherent response. These principles build on lessons learned from past events, particularly the 2003 SARS outbreak, which led to dedicated legislation, plans, infrastructure, and resources to help ensure that the country would be well prepared to detect and respond to a future pandemic outbreak.”

Apres webinar – “Calling out COVID corruption…”

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Thank you to our panelists for putting on a spectacle that gripped the audiences attention, breathing life into what it seems has quickly become a somewhat de rigeur medium. The commoditizing of the WEBINAR surely has come about due to expedience and the overlooking of a crucial point – the passion of the speakers.

John, Bill, Johannes, Mary and Khadiya (sadly Glynnis could not attend), effortlessly shepherded by moderator Andreas, effused on a topic that is by no means brand new but this time sublimely unpacked by experts.

The plea for urgent updating of legislation governing whistleblowing came through strongly, with several speakers advocating the inclusion of a whistleblower reward a la the SEC reward scheme. Johannes’ recount of his harrowing experiences after blowing

the whistle in the now notorious “Fishrot” case only served to re-affirm the vagaries surrounding legislation to adequately protect whistleblowers. Amazingly still not priority in developing and many developed countries. And there is more of course!

A quick request, please leave us your details and if you have another spare moment please leave a message about the webinar or anything whistle blower related!

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Thursday webinar: Calling Out COVID Corruption & Why We Need Whistleblower Regimes

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“Calling Out COVID Corruption: Why the pandemic requires robust Whistleblower regimes to combat corruption – lessons from abroad”

Primerio Ltd. and Constantine Cannon LLP are pleased to invite you to what promises to be a lively & informative seminar on whistle-blowing, corruption, and lessons learned from the pandemic.

REGISTER HERE FOR FREE: https://lnkd.in/dW_FjY8

With Panelists Zanele Mbuyisa – Counsel PPLAAF, John Oxenham- director Primerio, Mary Inman – partner Constantine Cannon Llc, Bill Kovacic – GWU Professor and non-executive director of the UK Competition and Markets Authority, Glynnis Breytenbach – former prosecutor for the South African National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) & a member of parliament for the Democratic Alliance (DA), Johannes Stefansson – “Fish Rot” Whistleblower.

This webinar is part of a 2 part series dedicated to whistleblowing, fraud and corruption during COVID 19: the panels will include politicians, lawyers and whistleblowers. The discussion will touch on all aspects of the importance of instilling a whistleblowing regime in corporate, government and other pertinent spheres of society.

COMESA antitrust enforcer holds COVID seminar

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Willard Mwemba
Dr. Mwemba of the CCC

The COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) hosted a live webinar today on the impact of COVID-19 on merger regulation and enforcement within the common market in the COMESA region.  The seminar was aptly sub-titled “Challenges and Way Forward,” and the CCC representatives, in particular Dr. Willard Mwemba, did indeed lay out the problems faced by them and the measures proposed and taken to alleviate them.

COVID-related business and national competition agency closures have led to “significant delays in information gathering” from NCAs, third parties, and merger parties themselves.

CCC has relaxed the hard-copy filing requirements for merger notifications.

The concept of non-competition factors (i.e., the public-interest element) was also raised, as there is a “growing debate on whether the pandemic may necessitate changes in [the] substantive assessment of mergers, e.g., towards more lenient consideration of failing firms.”

That said, the CCC emphasized that its adjustment to enforcement actions should not be construed as any weakening of competition principles taking place.  The harmonization and coordination among the COMESA member countries’ agencies and the CCC remain a critical element of the operation of the single market.

South African Competition Enforcement: a Juxtaposition.

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AAT has previously reported on the South African “Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster Management Regulations and Directions” (Pricing Regulations) which came into force on 19 March 2020.

The Pricing Regulations provide the temporary framework within which excessive or unfair price increases will be assessed during the national state of disaster. Further, to give effect to the Pricing Regulations, the South African Competition Commission (SACC) and Competition Tribunal (Tribunal), both made specific provision to prioritize and prosecute matters arising out of the Pricing Regulations, on an urgent basis.

Following the publication of the Pricing Regulations, the SACC has reportedly received a myriad of complaints arising out of alleged breaches of the Pricing Regulations and, in order to effectively respond, has allocated its resources almost exclusively to dealing with such cases.

Notably, a large majority of these have not been referred to the Tribunal and, in some instance, the SACC has opted to, instead, resolve such allegations through direct and informal engagement with the relevant parties. In this regard, the SACC has taken the approach of liaising with industry players proactively, in order to greenlight pricing and other potentially anticompetitive conduct. This can be compared to the efforts of other international agencies who have undertaken to, on an expedited basis, consider and approve ‘waiver requests’. While firms may take comfort in the fact that the SACC will not prosecute firms who have cooperated in this informal manner, balancing cooperation with the right against self-incrimination may be a risky exercise for firms, particularly where such engagement takes place informally, without the advice of counsel.

Even so, there can be little doubt that the SACC, like its international counterparts, are wearing two hats, presenting firms with temporary but valuable measures to successfully navigate the uncertainty of a national state of disaster. The various exemptions published in terms of the Competition Act is a further such example.

In wearing the hat of enforcement, the SACC has concluded various settlements by way of consent orders, with small independent retailers and pharmacies emanating from the Pricing Regulations.

The most notable of these include a consent order, reached with face mask and protective gear distributor, Matus, following an investigation undertaken by the SACC which found that Matus increased the prices of dust masks (FFP1 and FFP2) for the relevant period, causing its gross profit margins to be markedly inflated. Matus, in the consent order, admitted to inflating its gross profit margins although it denied having contravened any laws (likely on the basis that it may not be dominant in any specific market, as required for a contravention of Section 8 of the Competition Act) and agreed to:

  • Pay an administrative penalty of R5.9 million;
  • Contribute R5 million to the Covid-19 Solidarity Fund;
  • Reduce its gross profit margin on dust masks to an acceptable level for the national disaster period (linked to an assurance that its gross profit margins for essential products will not be increased above that which was applicable on 16 February 2020).

The SACC has also, to date, referred and litigated two complaints before the Tribunal in terms of the Tribunal’s expedited Rules for Covid-19 Excessive Pricing Complaint Referrals (Tribunal Rules). These are:

Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers & Industrial Supplies CC (Babelegi) – The SACC alleged that Babelegi increased the prices of facial masks for the period, earning a mark-up of over 500%, in contravention of the Pricing Regulations (and section 8 of the Competition Act).

Dis-Chem Pharmacies Limited (Dis-Chem) – The SACC alleged that Dis-Chem increased prices on surgical face masks (with increases between 43% and 261%) for the period February 2020 to March 2020, in contravention of the Pricing Regulations (and section 8 of the Competition Act).

The Dis-Chem matter has been interesting for a variety of reasons and is considered to be the ‘seminal case’ on prosecution in terms of the Pricing Regulations, with the SACC openly declaring that a “clear message must be sent that deters all other firms and Dis-Chem again from engaging in the same conduct”.

Dis-Chem is disputing its dominance in the relevant markets as well as the lawfulness of its decision to raise prices, arguing that it faced increased input costs and supply shortages which led to temporary price increases from all of its competitors and that Dis-Chem’s price adjustment was lower than that of other retailers.

From a procedural perspective, the matter has re-emphasized the need for compliance with the temporary Tribunal Rules, which provides for significantly reduced time periods, including that a respondent has 72 hours from service of the complaint referral in which to file a copy of their answering affidavit. Dis-Chem requested a one week extension for filing its answering affidavit, citing prejudice as a result of the complex nature of cases of excessive pricing and the severity of the penalty which may ultimately be imposed. The request was opposed by the SACC and Dis-Chem was forced to adhere to the shortened time period. Judgment is currently pending.

Competition agencies and advisors, globally, have stressed the pitfalls and advantaged of competition law during the state of disaster. A quick glance at enforcement statistics both now and following, for example the 2008 global financial crises, show that firms which have attempted to take advantage of consumers by flouting competition compliance during these times, have faced severe and endured consequences; economic and financial conditions cannot be used ex post to justify otherwise anticompetitive conduct.

Having said that, the proactive role played by the SACC also present opportunities for firms to utilize and take advantage of the temporary measures put in place by the SACC to green-light conduct which may otherwise be considered problematic.

The rules of the game have most certainly changed and, with it, there will be both winner and losers. A proactive approach to competition law compliance during these times, when perhaps firms are faced with more pressing concerns, may make all the difference.

Pandemic Antitrust Exemptions, or: “The Virus Let Me Do It!”

Posted on by Editor

In antitrust circles, the term “Competitor Collaboration” may refer to quite an innocent practice, but is perhaps more often used as a euphemistic reference for good old-fashioned collusion: namely, a cartel by any other name.  Antitrust enforcers around the globe attempt to harness its “good side” during the viral pandemic…

In the COVID-19 world, several competition-law enforcers, including those in the United States and in South Africa, have tried to act swiftly to create express “safe harbours” for certain types of permissible conduct between (otherwise horizontal and direct) competitors.  The goal of these (usually temporary) exemptions from the strictures of antitrust prohibitions against collaboration, information exchanges, and the like, is to enable medical-supply providers to ensure that urgently-needed products and services can be delivered most expediently to the affected areas, patients, and hospitals.

Andreas Stargard
Andreas Stargard

In the United States, notes Andreas Stargard, an antitrust attorney, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the federal antitrust agencies are capable of proceeding with speed when it comes to signing off on such allowable “competitor collaborations”, which are in the best interest of facilitating an efficient health-care industry response to the crisis.  The FTC and DOJ are now swiftly, within one week of the submission of a detailed request for review, sanctioning proposed cooperation agreements by firms that would otherwise compete to supply medicines or equipment.  Applicants for a business-review letter (“BRL”) must provide a detailed explanation of the planned conduct, together with its rationale and expected likely effects, to the agencies.

The first of these opinion letters was issued on April 4th, 2020, under the expedited procedure to McKesson, Cardinal Health and others.  It allows them to collaborate on PPE production, following the call for such action by FEMA and other federal agencies, and pursuing the coordinated response under their supervision for a limited time period (namely the duration of the crisis).  What could be deemed anti-competitive effects, such as an undue price increase, output reduction or the like, is expressly excluded from the permissible conduct.

Applying the “same analytical framework” as the DOJ’s approval of the PPE-related collaboration between McKesson, Cardinal Health, Owens & Minor, Medline Industries and Henry Schein Inc., the Department’s Antitrust Division has now issued a second BRL, dated April 20th, to AmeriSource Bergen and others, approving their similarly designed scheme to distribute medicinal products jointly across the country.  AmerisourceBergen sought the agency’s blessing of the proposal pursuant to the expedited review procedure outlined in the March 24th joint FTC and DOJ guidance on health-care providers collaborating on necessary public-health initiatives, in which the dual antitrust enforcers announced their goal to answer COVID-19-related BRL requests within one week of receiving the BRL applicants’ detailed description of the proposed collaborative conduct.

Mr. Stargard counsels that those firms seeking a BRL exemption should consult with a competent antitrust specialist lawyer.  He notes that the federal agencies have expressly invited providers to take advantage of the expedited BRL procedure, which is temporary in nature and only available during the time of the declared COVID-19 pandemic.

In South Africa, the South African Minster of Trade and Industry and Competition (“Minister”) has taken a similar tack, having published Regulations under Section 78 of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Competition Act”).  Unlike the U.S., however, these Regulations go well beyond the medical industry.  John Oxenham, a Johannesburg-based competition lawyer, observes that “these Regulations exempt industry players in certain sectors from prosecution for conduct in contravention of Sections 4 and 5, also known as Block Exemptions.”  They also apply to the prohibition of excessive pricing (and ensuring sufficient supply) by firms selling key supplies.  Related to the exemption process in terms of the Competition Act are the powers of the Minister to publish directions under the recent Regulations issued under section 27 (2) of the Disaster Management Act (GN 318 of 18 March 2020). In this regard, Regulation 10(6) provides that the Minister may issue directions to “protect consumers from excessive, unfair, unreasonable or unjust pricing of goods and services during the national state of disaster; and maintain security and availability of the supply of goods and services during the national state of disaster.”

Block Exemptions

John Oxenham
John Oxenham

Block Exemptions have been published by the Minster in terms of section 10(10) of the Competition Act which provides that the Minister may, after consultation with the Competition Commission (SACC), issue regulations in terms of section 78, exempting a category of agreements or practices from the application of sections 4 and 5 of the Competition Act. As at the date of writing, Block Exemptions have been granted to the Healthcare Sector, the Banking Sector and Retail Property Sector.

Health Care Sector

The exemption include a range of industry players, including healthcare facilities, pharmacies, medical suppliers, medical specialist, pathologists and laboratories, and healthcare funders.  The Block Exemption will similarly allow industry players to coordinate on procurement of supplies, transferring equipment and coordinating the use of staff. In effect, the Block Exemption extends and broadens the scope of the exemption enjoyed by the NHN to include state and private healthcare. While this move is certainly a welcome one to ensure that South Africa is able to effectively deal with the spread of COVID-19, its effect on competition in this market will be most interesting. The health care sector, and particularly large private sector players (Private Health Care), has long been in the cross-hairs of the SACC, with many enforcement actions, heavily contested merger control proceedings and most recently, the market inquiry into the private healthcare sector conducted and concluded by the SACC. Concentration and Coordination has been key to the debate. While the Exemptions will apply only for so long as the state of disaster remains in effect, the effects of these measures on the industry is likely to endure for some time and will reform the debate around the future of health care in South Africa.  On the 8th of April the Block Exemption was amended to additionally cater for the following:

(i)         Those agreements which are exempt can only be undertaken at the request of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition or the Department of Health. Furthermore, either of these departments may impose further conditions on the agreements or practices; and

(ii)        The Exemption now caters for agreements or practices between manufacturers and suppliers of medical and hygiene supplies.

Banking Sector

The Block Exemption published in favour of the Banking Sector is aimed at exempting a category of agreements or practices between Banks, the members of the Banking Association of South Africa and/or Payments Association of South Africa from application of sections 4 and 5 of the Act and promoting cooperation between these industry participants to mitigate damages and to ensure the effective continuance of banking infrastructure. In this regard, industry participants are to coordinate and agree on, inter alia:

operation of payment systems and the continued availability of notes at ATMs, branches and businesses; debtor and credit management to cater for payment holidays and debt relief (including limitations on asset recovery and the extension of further credit terms).

Retail Property Sector

The Block Exemption in respect of the Retail Property Sector applies only to retail landlords and designated retail tenants (required to shut down in terms of the national shut down currently in place) and aims to provide a framework for cooperation between industry participants in respect of payment holidays and rental discounts and limitations on the eviction of tenants. The Block Exemptions also seek to cater for cooperation on limitations to the restrictions placed on tenants to protect their viability during the nation disaster, likely to allow tenants to alter of expand their product or service offerings to fall within the category of businesses or services exempt from the restrictions currently enforced by Government, thereby ensuring alternative income and increased capacity on key products and services.

Hotel Sector

The Exemption granted to hotel industry operators seeks to enable the hotel industry to collectively engage with various Government departments with respect to identifying and providing appropriate quarantine facilities. The Exemption applies to agreements or practices pertaining to the identification and provision of quarantine facilities, and cost reduction measures in providing accommodation for persons in quarantine.

Block Exemptions have not been widely utilised in South Africa. To the extent that the measures introduced by the Block Exemptions are effectively implemented, however, the use and application of the process of exemptions under the Competition Act may become a more prominent feature of the South African competition law process. The nature of emergencies are such that they expedite the implementation of historical process which were otherwise untouched or contested as the counterfactual has changed.

It is already evident that more and more industries affected by the COVID-19 will apply for or be granted block exemptions to ensure that they are able to effectively avert the negative effects associated with disruptions caused to the business and economy. Examples of these include the Grocery Retail and/or Fast Moving Consumable Goods Sectors, Security Sector and more.

Price Regulation

The Pricing Regulations, are published in terms of a combination of the Competition Act, the Consumer Protection Act 61 of 2008 (2008) and the Disaster Management Act (2002) and apply only to the ‘key supplies identified in the Pricing Regulations and will remain in effect only for so long as COVID-19 remains a ‘national disaster’.  Section 8(3)(f) of the Competition Act provides that in determining whether a price is an excessive price (for purposes of section 8(1)),  it must be determined whether that price is higher than a competitive price and whether such difference is unreasonable, determined by taking into account any regulation published by the Minister in terms of Section 78.  In terms of the Pricing Regulations a price will be considered an excessive price for purposes of Section 8(1) of the Competition Act where, during this period of national disaster, a price increase: does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the costs of providing that goods or service; or increases the net margin or mark-up on that good or service above the average margin or mark-up for that good or service in the three month period prior to 1 March 2020.

Notably, Section 8 applies only to dominant firms.

In addition to the above, the Pricing Regulations contain a similar assessment for the consideration of what is termed unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and unjust price increases in the Consumer Protection Act. While it is likely that what constitutes an excessive price under the Competition Act will also constitute an unreasonable price increase for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act, the opposite may not be true. The Consumer Protection Act is enforced by a different authority in South Africa and case precedent has been quite limited, compared to the competition authorities.

The Pricing Regulations also cover quantities and the restrictions on sale to maintain equitable distribution and curb stockpiling. No mention is made of the Competition Act or Consumer Protection Act in these paragraphs, although they should also be considered in the broader context of competition policy and what the Pricing Regulations seek to achieve. Although South African competition policy is not ordinarily concerned with discrimination at the final consumer level, in terms of the Pricing Regulations, retailers are effectively required to ration the quantity sold, as the normal economic mechanism, whereby suppliers sell to those parts of the demand curve with a sufficient willingness to pay, is suspended.

The penalty provisions of the Pricing Regulations require prosecution in terms of the underling legislation, being the Competition Act and Consumer Protection Act respectively as these sanctions exceed the powers given to the Minister in the Disaster Management Act. The Pricing Regulations state that subject to the further specific provisions of the respective pieces of legislation, a failure to comply with the Pricing Regulations may attract a fine of up to R1 000 000 and/or a 10% of a firms turnover and imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months (depending on the applicable legislation). In terms of the Competition Act, only cartel conduct under section 4(1)(b) attracts criminal liability.

The Minister has recently announced that a number of firms are under investigation for allegedly contravening the provisions of the Competition Act and/or Consumer Protection Act in a manner prohibited by the Pricing Regulations.

The Disaster Management Act provides that the declaration of a national state of disaster can terminate after the expiry of 3 months or upon notice in the Government Gazette by the Minister before the expiry of 3 months. The Minister can nonetheless extend such a period for one month at a time.

Accordingly, the Disaster Management Act offers little certainty on how and when the measures implemented will come to an end.