Category: excessive pricing

The Intersection Of Cost-Of-Living Pressures and South African Competition Law

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By Michael Williams

Introduction

The Competition Commission of South Africa (“the Commission”) released a Cost-of-Living Report (“The Report”) on 4 September 2025, setting out a structured, data-driven assessment of affordability pressures faced by South African households, with particular focus on those low-income consumers predominantly impacted by consistently high inflation rates. Its aim is to provide insights into the affordability of basic goods and services so that individuals, households, businesses, and policymakers can assess financial capacity and understand how price movements affect living standards. This is in alignment with the Presidency’s Strategic Plan that identifies tackling the high cost of living as a priority. 

The current cost-of-living crisis is framed against entrenched domestic challenges, rising food, fuel and electricity prices against the backdrop of an ongoing energy crisis and interest rate increases that have lifted debt servicing costs in an environment where growth in household income has maintained the same pace. 

Background and Goal of the COL Report

The COL Report stems from the Commission’s earlier Essential Food Price Monitoring (“EFPM”) programme, first published in July 2020 to track the prices of staple foods across the value chain, from farm to retail, and to analyse price transmission between producers, processors and retailers. Recognising shifting expenditure patterns and growing inequality, the Commission has expanded the scope of the EFPM, rebranding it as the COL Report. The new format retains essential food price monitoring while including those key non-food items that have a significant impact on lower income households. 

As James Hodge, the chief economist at the Commission said:

“This analysis plays a crucial role in identifying the economic pressures various socio-economic groups, particularly low-income households, experience in a time of fluctuating prices and growing inequality.”[1]

The COL Report’s overarching intent is to highlight the affordability of basic goods and services in South Africa and to identify the underlying drivers of the cost-of-living crisis. 

The COL Report tracks non-food necessities (e.g., electricity, water, rentals, healthcare, minibus taxi fares and petrol, funeral policies, public school fees, and internet usage costs) alongside essential food items such as pilchards, eggs, IQF chicken, brown bread, sunflower oil, maize meal. It further illustrates interest-rate effects by comparing owner’s  rent as an equivalent to bond repayments on a standard mortgage. This structured monitoring enables the Commission to highlight where inflation is concentrated, where pricing appears sticky during cost reductions, and where spreads are widening.

COL Report and South African competition law

While the COL Report does not draw conclusions in respect of anticompetitive conduct, it does have notable implications for competition oversight by continuing to apply the Consumer’s International  Early-Warning System (“Early-Warning System”) and evidentiary baseline for price transmission across essential value chains.[2] Several features are salient for competition law practice and policy, as drawn directly from the Report’s findings and methodology: 

A broadened monitoring mandate across non-food essentials, expands the EFPM’s food focus to include electricity, water, rentals, transport, primary healthcare, funeral policies, education, and internet costs, the Commission positions itself to track persistent inflation drivers where administered pricing or sectoral structures may entrench affordability constraints. Assisting in the prioritisation and policy engagement across markets that shape consumer welfare, even where formal competition enforcement is not immediately implicated. 

It presents clear analytical boundaries that respect competition law standards. It expressly cautions that the analysis of spreads (aggregate spread between retail and producer prices) is not an inference of anticompetitive conduct. Instead, spreads are diagnostic of price transmission and places in the chain where margins are expanding. The Commission’s reliance on the Early-Warning System underscores that the COL Report is an intelligence and monitoring tool, useful for triage and prioritisation, rather than a determinative finding of collusion or abuse. This delineation aligns with competition law’s evidentiary requirements while still highlighting areas that may merit closer scrutiny. 

The Report identifies pricing patterns relevant to oversight, documenting patterns in essential staples where input costs fell or stabilised, but retail prices remained elevated. An example of this is, for instance, the discussion of eggs, sunflower oil, and maize meal, where price stickiness and widening retail margins are observed at various points. In brown bread, producer-level margins rose as wheat prices declined, and retail margins fluctuated as retailers alternated between absorbing and passing through cost movements. Such documented patterns inform areas where the Commission may, in being consistent with its mandate, monitor for potential strategic pricing behaviour over time. 

The contextualisation of administered prices as structural inflation drivers, by the Report identifies evidence that electricity prices rose 68% and water prices rose 50% over the last 5 years. This is well above headline inflation and provides a policy context for sustained consumer-facing cost pressure. Although administered tariffs are not set through ordinary market dynamics, persistent increases affect downstream markets and household welfare, which are central concerns of the Commission’s broader public-interest and competition policy ecosystem. 

The Report recalls that, following the Commission’s Data Services Market Inquiry in 2019, mobile data prices fell significantly in 2020 and 2021 and have remained comparatively stable. This illustrates how evidence-based monitoring and market inquiries can produce effective outcomes, a tool that the Commission may use in other sectors flagged by the COL Report. 

The Report uses an interest rate lens to complement the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) measures of housing costs, by comparing bond repayments (up 28% over the period 2022 to March 2025) with owner’s equivalent rent, shows how debt-servicing costs meaningfully diverge from CPI’s treatment of owner-occupied housing. This perspective assists competition authorities and policymakers to understand consumer budget constraints that can interact with the market.  

Collectively, these features show that the COL Report is intended to guide monitoring and policy dialogue, highlight potential risk zones, without asserting contraventions and maintain an evidentiary base for any future work within the Commission’s statutory toolkit such as market inquiries.  

Key Findings Highlighted in the Report 

To ground the above effects in the Report’s data, the COL Report records the following notable movements over the past 5 years for the period of 2020 to March 2025:

Key non-food items: 

  • Administered prices: Electricity up 68% and water up 50%, both outpacing headline inflation.[3]
  • Rentals: Actual rentals for houses and flats up 12%, well below headline inflation (28%).[4]
  • Primary healthcare (General Practitioners): Cumulative increase 33%, with the latest 6.6% annual rise noted against slowing general inflation.[5]
  • Transport: Minibus taxi fares increased sharply in mid-2022 following the petrol price spike; fares have been “sticky downwards”, though subsequent increases have trailed CPI, narrowing the gap.[6]
  • Funeral policies: Up 9% over the period, significantly below headline inflation. 
  • Public education: Primary +37% and secondary +42%, both above headline inflation. [7]
  • Internet usage costs: Wireless +1%; wired +14%, with a notable step-up in 2022 linked to certain higher priced fibre offerings.[8]
  • Interest rates vs CPI housing proxy: Bond repayments +28% versus more moderate owner’s equivalent rent growth, illustrating the load from higher interest rates on household budgets.[9]

Essential foods:

  • Pilchards: Retail margins declined over time; early 2025 spreads narrowed to 15% as retailers showed restraint amid rising producer prices.[10]
  • Eggs: Producer prices fell into early 2025 but retail prices were slow to normalise; later producer-price increases reduced retail margins, with the Report monitoring recovery trajectories post-avian flu.[11]
  • IQF chicken: Producer prices stable and retail margins held under 40% in 2025 after earlier pressure. [12]
  • Brown bread: Farm-to-producer spread 77% in 2025 (above historic highs); retail margins fell to 15%, as retailers absorbed later producer increases.[13]
  • Sunflower oil: Producer margins settled around 25% since late 2023; retail margins elevated (40–45%) due to slow pass-through of producer-price declines.[14]
  • Maize meal: Producer margins rose rapidly in late 2023 after white maize price drops; retail prices increased in 2025 despite relatively stable producer prices, pushing retail margins to the high end of historic levels. 

These findings supply concrete price-formation signals, where margins compress, where they expand, and how quickly costs are transmitted, which are central to the Commission’s ongoing monitoring orientation. 

In Conclusion, the COL Report documents a pronounced squeeze on South African households, especially the poorest, driven by elevated inflation in essential services and persistent cost pressures. It demonstrates that while certain categories (e.g., rentals, funeral policies) have increased less than headline inflation, others (e.g., electricity, water, education, and several staple foods) are coming down hard on budgets. In parallel, the COL Report records instances of sticky pricing and widening spreads, and it maintains a clear line between diagnostic monitoring and legal inference. 

For competition law and policy, the COL Report delivers three practical gains, by widening the scope to include key essentials beyond food, showing the spreads and pass through clearly, and a continuation of the Early-Warning System. Furthermore, it assists the Commission in fulfilling its mandate by flagging areas which may need attention, guiding debate on administered prices, and grounding future market work in carefully, publicly sourced data.

[1] https://www.citizen.co.za/business/personal-finance/new-cost-of-living-report-shows-battle-of-being-a-consumer-in-sa/

[2] https://www.consumersinternational.org/what-we-do/good-food-for-all/fair-food-price-monitor/

[3] https://www.nersa.org.za/electricity/pricing.

[4] Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) Consumer Price Index: Sources and Methods. February 2025. Available [Online] https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-01-41-01/Report-01-41-012025.pdf.

[5] https://iol.co.za/mercury/news/2024-10-08-big-increases-in-sa-medical-aid-fees-causes-alarm/.

[6] https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/taxi-alliance-says-fuel-price-maintenance-costs-contributed-to-latest-fare-hike/.

[7] https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/buckle-up-parents-school-fee-hikes-outpace-inflation/.

[8] Bi-Annual-Tariffs-Analysis-Report-Q2-2022-23- Abridged.pdf

[9] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 17.

[10] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 20.

[11] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 21.

[12] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 22.

[13] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 23.

[14] Competition Commission South Africa Cost of Living Report – August 2025, page 25.

4th CCC diplomatic conference on competition law places focus on inflation, food security, and poverty eradication 

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Senior diplomats from the COMESA region gathered in Livingstone, Zambia, for the fourth in a series of diplomatic antitrust-focused conferences that began in 2016 but were halted due to the coronavirus pandemic in 2019.

At today’s formal resumption of the recurring event, Dr. Willard Mwemba, CEO of the COMESA Competition Commission, introduced the conference session by calling out the importance of the agricultural sector to the people residing in the region, especially the very poorest of citizens.

He stated in unmistakable terms that his agency would prioritize this and related markets for heightened antitrust enforcement, to ensure the sector operates efficiently and competitively. “Accessibility (and affordability) of food is one of the most fundamental human rights. $2 per day are spent by the poorest people on average, and the majority of those two dollars is spent on food,” noted Mwemba.

Says Andreas Stargard, who attended the session, “it is clear that the view of the Commission is that agricultural markets in COMESA are not functioning as they should, based on studies the agency has undertaken with outside assistance.  The massive foodstuffs price inflation levels COMESA residents have suffered in recent years are not merely natural consequences of irreversible climate change but rather represent mostly economic profit to the manufacturers and traders, to the detriment of consumers, based on what Dr. Mwemba presented today.”

COMESA Secretary General, Chileshe Mpundu Kapwepwe, summarized the stark importance of the AG sector to the region, its people, and the economic zone in sobering statistical terms: “The agriculture sector is one of the key sectors for most Member States as it contributes more than 32% to the Gross Domestic Product of COMESA, provides a livelihood to about 80% of the region’s labour force, accounts for about 65% of foreign exchange earnings and contributes more than 50% of raw materials to the industrial sector.”

In light of this crucial importance of the agricultural and food markets, food security is high on the list of action items that COMESA must address practically and effectively, she concluded.  COMESA evaluates supply and demand levels across all 21 member states to assist with market assessment and planning.

The Diplomatic Conference’s guest of honour, Zambian Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Hon. Chipoka Mulenga, noted in prepared remarks delivered by his deputy and permanent secretary to COMESA that, while “food production must be profitable for farmers, it must not be exploitative.”

In this regard, the famous Adam Smith quote referenced by Dr. Mwemba at a prior antitrust session comes to mind: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.”

Beyond the immutable wisdom of the Wealth of Nations from two and a half centuries ago, the (1) CCC’s increased competition law enforcement in the agricultural and food sectors, as well as (2) national member states are assisting the effort of ensuring wide and secure availability to all COMESA residents by creating and strengthening cross-border value chains in the food sectors with overlaps across member state borders, the Zambian minister observed.

CAK imposes highest-ever cartel fine on 9 steel producers

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After about a two-year-long investigation, the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) has determined guilt and imposed record fines on nine steel manufacturing companies for their joint role in a price-fixing and output-restriction cartel. The fine — the highest-ever imposed by the CAK to date — was set at Ksh. 338,849,427 million (approx. U.S. $2.3m) in total.

Back in June 2022, Construction Kenya news outlet reported that the offices of 10 Kenyan steel suppliers had been ‘dawn-raided’ by the CAK on suspicion of price-fixing. “A number of senior officials at the companies, including chief executives, have been interrogated as part of the investigation triggered by builders who complained about excessive pricing of steel.” These raids in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu had taken place in the preceding December, and in secret, the CAK’s investigation into the steel sector had already begun in August 2020, when the Authority conducted a sua sponte nationwide “covert field screening,” which indicated the presence of illegal coordination by the steel producers.

In their defense, the manufacturers initially claimed innocence and blamed the pandemic input-price increases, via their trade group’s spokesman, Kenya Association of Manufacturers Steel Sector Chair, Bobby Johnson: “We are bearing a huge cost to cushion consumers. The prices of billets have shot up because of the supply disruptions as well as fuel for heating the furnaces.”

However, CAK enforcement and compliance manager, Mr. Mokaya, was quoted as stating that the agency had received specific and clear evidence “of certain concerted practices including agreements on pricing. We conducted market screening and launched raids in December targeting over ten companies and the investigation is ongoing.”

Andreas Stargard, an antitrust attorney with Primerio Ltd. who frequently works on COMESA-region competition matters including Kenya with his local Nairobi colleagues, noted that “this cartel case comes on the heels of the CAK’s successful prosecution of the ‘paint cartel,’ which it brought to conclusion also during COVID, in February 2021, fining Crown Paint, Basco Products Ltd., Kansai Plascon and Galaxy Paints for price-fixing. It will not be interesting to see whether firms engaged in the construction industry — that is: direct purchasers of steel products from the cartelists — will attempt to recover any of the overcharges they were burdened with by the infringers…“

In theory, a person found guilty of the offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten million shillings, or both. Kenyan billionaire Narendra Raval, whose steel firm Devki is among those found guilty of cartel conduct, will not have to see a (steel?) jail cell from the inside, however. As of now, only monetary fines have been imposed by the CAK.

Dr. Adano Wario, the CAK’s Acting Director-General, noted that these financial penalties were in proportion to the harm done by the offense: artificial increases in the cost of steel products harmed consumers by inflating construction costs of homes and state and local infrastructure projects, thus contributing further to the already high cost of living in the country:

“Cartels are conceived, executed, and enforced by businesses to serve their commercial interests, and to the economic harm of consumers. In this matter, the steel firms illegally colluded on prices and margins as well as output strategies. In a liberalized market like ours, the forces of supply and demand should signal prices, free from manipulative business practices. Agreements between competitors seek to defeat this fundamental facet of a free economy.”

Whether or not a “leniency” request was involved is unclear, but doubtful according to attorney Stargard: “We have seen conflicting reports as to the origins of this investigation: some sources point to construction firm, or developer, complaints that led to the CAK’s action. The Authority itself claims it conducted the industry investigation fully on its own accord, without prompting. Either way, there is no indication that one of the price-fixing group members cheated on its fellow cartelists by seeking amnesty from prosecution, which is most frequently the case in modern cartel cases.” He adds that the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) may also find interest in the ongoing price hikes in various markets, as the agency had previously made cautionary remarks in the paints cartel (see article above) and was almost certainly apprised by the CAK of its ongoing investigation into the steel sector during the pendency of that matter: “We know for a fact that the CAK and the CCC are working hand-in-glove when in comes to investigating anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, this statement can be expanded to include not only East-African competition enforcement agencies, but all African authorities, and in fact many international antitrust watchdogs as well, with whom the COMESA enforcer has bi- and multi-lateral cooperation agreements and MOUs. Competition-law enforcement truly has become global, and escaping the watchful eye of the agencies is getting more difficult by the day.”

The affected companies are Devki Steel Mills, Doshi & Hardware Limited, Corrugated Steel Limited, Jumbo Steel Mills, Accurate Steel Mills Limited, Nail and Steel Products Limited, Brollo Kenya Limited, Blue Nile Wire Products Limited, and Tononoka Rolling Mills Ltd.

African antitrust authority edges closer to becoming price regulator

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The South African Competition Commission warns against unjustifiable price increases of basic foods, particularly edible oil

By Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard

Recent increases in the prices of edible oils have been the focus of news reports. Some retailers have been garnering particular attention for limiting the amount of oil that can be purchased per consumer.

The Chief Economist of the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), James Hodge, highlighted the price of oil increasing by 42% over a year. This is significant as it reflects 3%-5% of poorer households’ food budget. It has been reported that, although there were already market factors last year affecting the price of oil, the Russia-Ukraine war has certainly exacerbated the situation. Hodge warns, however, that retailers and edible oil companies alike should not unreasonably use the Russia-Ukraine war to raise prices to unjust levels by inflating their price increases more than necessary, thereby seeking to earn ‘excessive profits’.

The SACC will look into the issue more closely. If and when the SACC comes to the conclusion that companies profiteer from their customers, they will act accordingly.

Where costs go up, there may be justifiable increases in prices, however, its recent warning against unjustifiable increases indicates that it will act where prices increase beyond justifiable cost-increase levels. Accordingly, the SACC is considering items that indicate unusual increases, even when taking into consideration the prevailing inflationary environment.

To this effect, Hodge emphasised that the SACC makes use of its ‘monitoring unit’ which tracks price increases by comparing increases in wholesale prices to increases in retail prices.

The work of the monitoring unit is particularly timely in light of its recent Report on Essential Food Pricing Monitoring, which was released on 1 March 2022. The Report clearly communicated the SACC’s intention to start tracking price increases and monitoring dynamics prevalent in the South African food value chain, which made it apparent that the SACC is cognizant of the impact of the significant disruptions and events which have characterized the pandemic years. The SACC has identified this impact to reflect particularly through supply chain disruptions, trade restrictions, border closures and the like.  

Should the SACC suspect that retail price increases have surpassed wholesale price increases, complaints may be initiated by the SACC in terms of Section 49B of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. Thereafter, the complaint will be investigated in terms of Section 49B(3) of the Act to determine whether it will be referred to the Competition Tribunal for adjudication.   

Healthy foods & price-gouging during Pandemic?

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High ginger, garlic and lemon prices have left a sour taste in mouths of South Africans

By Gina Lodolo and Jemma Muller

The exorbitant and rapid increase in prices of ginger, garlic and lemon, that which spans up to 300%, has been the source of much public outcry and regulatory concern over the past few months. The question remains whether the price increases by massive retailers can be justified or whether they should be considered as excessive?

The Consumer and Customer Protection and the National Disaster Regulations and Directions (the “Regulations”), which came into effect in March 2020, were put in place to consider inter alia when a price is excessive.  They empower the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) and National Consumer Commission (“NCC”) to investigate and prosecute cases of price-gouging.  Contraventions may result in penalties of up to ZAR 1 million or 10% of annual turnover. According to the NCC, price gouging is defined as “an unfair or unreasonable price increase that does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the cost of providing that good or service.”

The NCC has launched an investigation under the Consumer Protection Act into potential contraventions of the COVID-19 Regulations against major retailers such as Woolworths, Pick ‘n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Food Lovers market, Cambridge Foods and Boxers Superstores. According to the Regulations, and in terms of section 120(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, a price increase of a goods, including inter alia “basic food and consumer items”, which does not correspond to the increase in cost of supplying such goods, or increases in the net margin or mark-up on the good(s) which exceeds the average margin or mark-up on the said good in the three month period before 1 March 2020 is “unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and unjust and a supplier is prohibited from effecting such a price increase”.

The preferred tools of the COVID-19 Regulations relating to excessive pricing seem to be predominantly similar to competition policy and its associated institutions. Upon assessing an increase in pricing to determine whether the increase is excessive, the test would be whether the prices were increased due to cost-based increases (such as reduced supply due to an increase in import costs as the domestic currency get weaker) as opposed to price increases only due to a demand increase (such as more consumers buying ginger as an immune booster during the COVID-19 pandemic). When assessing exploitative conduct, it is more likely to establish that there has been an abuse of dominance when a firm is dominant or enjoys great market power.

It has appeared that the trend in the increase of ginger and garlic retail prices is that the allegedly exploitative conduct no longer originates from only one dominant player as such (eg. only Spar) but rather affects shops in the whole of South Africa. The price increases have sparked outrage with consumers who are driving shop-to-shop in an attempt to purchase ginger or garlic at a lower, or somewhat ‘standard’ pre-COVID-19, price.

As stated above, increasing prices will be seen as excessive when the increase is due only to an increase in demand. Retailers have claimed that the increase is not only because of rising demand but also due to an actual decrease in the product supply.  It is therefore pertinent to determine the extent to which the supply has been reduced in relation to the increased demand. This would require a proportionality balance, as shops would have to prove to the competition authorities that the increase of pricing is only due to the decrease in supply. Extortionary pricing above and beyond that would demonstrate an increase of pricing due to the increase of demand, and as such would fall foul of the  Competition Act and the Regulations cited above.

The rising prices in garlic and ginger have been on the SACC’s radar since July 2020, when it concluded a consent agreement with Food Lovers Holdings whereby the retailer agreed to immediately halt excessively pricing its ginger products at one of its stores. Notwithstanding this fact, the subsequent regulation and enforcement of ginger and garlic prices by the SACC under Regulations has become somewhat tricky due to the fact that the products are not considered to be essential products under the COVID-19 Regulations.

The SACC previously found that the increases in prices were largely attributed to the rise in costs experienced by retailers and they found no evidence of price gouging targeted at taking advantage of the constrained mobility of consumers or shortages during the pandemic. What the SACC found to be concerning, however, were the high pre-disaster margins on products such as ginger and garlic, which have largely been maintained throughout the pandemic by retailers raising their prices for the goods as the costs were increasing. Accordingly, as mentioned above, although the SACC did not find evidence of price gouging, it did find possible contraventions of the Consumer Protection Act and as such, referred the potential contraventions to the NCC to investigate further.

A spokesperson for the SACC, Siyabulela Makunga has stated the following:

“We also appreciate the changes in demand for garlic and ginger, but it is our view the price of ginger and garlic have [sic] increased astronomically at retailers. We don’t think that the increased demand in ginger justified the price of up to R400 a kilogram…”

John Oxenham, an R.S.A. competition lawyer with Primerio Ltd., notes that “the prosecution of the matter demonstrates the respective authorities’ commitment to priority sectors and an unbridled effort to root out any form of price-gouging.”

To conclude, market power of the implicated retailors has likely been increased due to the reduced availability of substitutes for customers as a majority of retailers have introduced a dramatic price increase. The investigation launched by the NCC is, however, a step in the right direction to protect consumers who have been left with very limited choices in the widespread steep increase in price of ginger and garlic.

South Africa’s Second Price Gouging Case: Dis-Chem Penalised For Excessive Pricing re Face Masks

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By Michael-James Currie and John Oxenham

On 14 July 2020, the South African Competition Tribunal published its written reasons in relation to its decision to penalize Dis-Chem (a large pharmaceutical chain in South Africa) for contravening section 8(1)(a) of the Competition Act by charging excessive prices for a variety of surgical face-mask products.

The Tribunal’ latest price gouging decision follows closely on the heels of the Tribunal’s decision in Babelegi, which was the first decision price gouging decision in South Africa during the Covid-19 pandemic (in terms of which the Tribunal also imposed a penalty on Babelegi based on a finding that Babelegi charged excessive prices for face masks during the pandemic). Babelegi was a firm which -pre-Covid 19 had a market share of less than 5%.

Turning to the Dis-Chem case, the price increases at play for three different face-masks were 261%, 43% and 25% respectively, on 9 March 2020 as the Covid-19 pandemic gripped South Africa, but before the Minister of Trade and Industry published the commonly referred to ‘Price Gouging Regulations’ (Regulations). The Regulations, promulgated, on 19 March 2020, essentially place a reverse onus on dominant firms (in relation to a defined list of “essential goods”) to demonstrate why any price increases post the proclamation of the Regulations, which were not directly and proportionally linked to a corresponding cost increase, are not “excessive”.

Although the Competition Commission (SACC) had initially framed its case in terms of the Regulations, the Tribunal confirmed that the Regulations did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the Tribunal proceeded to analysis the complaint in terms of section 8(1)(a) of the Act read together with the factors set out in section 8(3) of the Act in order to determine whether a price is excessive. This is noteworthy as the principles underpinning the Dis-Chem decision are applicable regardless of whether the Regulations are, or remain in, force and may well apply to cases beyond the Covid-19 pandemic.

In terms of the recently amended Competition Act, an “excessive price” is defined as a price which has “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product”. If there is a prima facie case of excessive pricing, the onus shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that the price is not excessive.

The Tribunal held that in order to demonstrate an “excessive price”, what the complainant must show is a price which “on the face of it was utterly exorbitant”. The respondent would then need to show that the increase was reasonable.

The crux of the case, however, largely turns on whether Dis-Chem is in fact considered “dominant”. Dominance, generally, is determined with reference to whether a firm is able to exert a substantial degree of “market power”. In terms of South Africa’s Competition Act, a firm is irrebuttably presumed to be dominant if it has market shares in excess of 45%. A firm can still be found to be dominant, however, with market shares less than 45% if it can be established that the firm is able to exert “market power”. “Market power” is specifically defined in the Act as “the power of a firm to control prices or to exclude competition, or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers”.

The Commission argued that defining the relevant market was not necessary. Rather, the fact that Dis-Chem was able to materially increase its prices in the context of a global health crisis independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers, meant that Dis-Chem was able to exert “market power” and was therefore “dominant”.

The Tribunal confirmed that the assessment of “market power” may be conducted with reference to the prevailing market conditions without having to specifically define the market. In essence, the Tribunal asked itself what advantages the global-health crisis conferred to the respondent (in this case Dis-Chem) that it would not enjoy absent the crisis?

At the time of the relevant price increase, the public were encouraged to wear surgical face-masks. The Tribunal rejected, therefore the argument raised by Dis-Chem that cloth face-masks are a suitable substitute. Dis-Chem had argued that barriers to entry were low as face-masks where easy to produce from a supply-side. The product market was broadly defined as the market for surgical face masks.

Turning to the geographic market definition, the Tribunal suggested that the geographic market must be narrowed (based on customers reluctance to travel far during the pandemic) despite Dis-Chem applying a national pricing strategy. The Tribunal ultimately did not define the geographic market. Instead, its assessment essentially refers back to that relating to the tests for market power. In essence, the Tribunal held that because there were concerns among consumers about supply shortages, consumers would not be prepared to “shop around” for better options fearing they may miss out altogether. The Tribunal mentioned that applying the well known “hypothetical monopolist test”, that Dis-Chem would have been able to profitably raise its prices by more than 5% and, therefore, was essentially in its own market (the Tribunal did not define the precise geographic boundaries of the market even though these was evidence put up suggesting that there were many suppliers of surgical face masks within a very small geographic radius of Dis-Chem’s largest outlets). Accordingly, this case was not determined by narrowing the geographic market.

Turning to the economic tests utilized or considered by the Tribunal, the following is summarized:

  1. The relevant “benchmark” price used was the price immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic compared to the prices thereafter.
  2. The relevant complaint period was held to be 1-31 March 2020.
  3. That the empirical evidence assessed pointed to an increase in prices in March (compared to prices prevailing in January and February) without a direct link to cost increases. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the gross-margins increased “exponentially” during the complaint period.
  4. The Tribunal rejected the argument that for multi-product retailers, profit margins ought to be assessed with reference to “net” as opposed to “gross” margins. In other words, the Tribunal precluded any cross-subsidization type defences.

The Tribunal found that had it not been for the surge demand for surgical face-masks as a result of the health crisis posed by Covid-19, Dis-Chem would not have been able to increase the prices to the extent it did. Further, the Tribunal found Dis-Chem enjoyed and exerted market power by substantially increasing its prices and profit margins for face-masks and therefore the SACC had established a prima facie case of excessive pricing which shifted the burden of proof to Dis-Chem to show its price increases were “reasonable”.

In determining whether a price increase is “reasonable”, the Tribunal appears to disfavour any economic assessment to the inquiry. Instead the Tribunal suggests that any price increase (presumably irrespective of the percentage increment) in relation to an item essential for the public’s health is unreasonable. Following the Tribunal’s earlier finding that the price increases were substantial, the Tribunal held that Dis-Chem’s price increases during the pandemic were “utterly unreasonable and reprehensible”.

As an aside, the Tribunal suggests that the price increase of any good in South Africa between 47%-261% would affect the public interest adversely. In the context of a health crisis where those increases related to essential goods, the price increase has a particular impact on poor customers.

Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Dis-Chem had engaged in excessive pricing in contravention of the Act and imposed a penalty of R1.2 million (which was calculated based on approximately twice the turnover which Dis-Chem derived from face-masks during the complaint period).

The Tribunal’s decision in Dis-Chem provides more analysis and considerations to market definition than the case of Babelegi although the central features and findings in both cases are the same. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, both Dis-Chem and Babelegi charged higher prices to consumer in relation to products considered essential to the health and well-being of the public and because these price increase were nor justified with reference to cost increases, the prices were considered “excessive”.

The Tribunal (as part of its assessment under the geographic market definition analysis) provides an important qualifier to intervening in matters arising from short-term market conditions. In particular, the Tribunal stated that “material price increases of life essential items such as surgical masks, even in the short run, in a health disaster such as the Covid-19 outbreak, warrants our intervention”. This is an important caveat as the Tribunal appears to recognize that intervening in competition law matters based on short term market conditions may have unintended consequences and that ordinarily competition authorities should allow the market to “self-regulate”.

While opportunistic and exploitative behaviour during a time of crisis may indeed warrant scrutiny, one does question whether these decisions fall into the classic “hard cases make bad law” dictum coined by US Supreme Court Justice, OW Holmes.

Different standards of law and economics should not apply to firms simply based on the type of product that they produce or sell. To punish a firm because it supplies essential healthcare products may indeed be a noble public interest objective, but caution must be had to using mechanisms such as the Competition Act to achieve these outcomes if the economic principles and justifications do not stack up.

While the Tribunal was at pains to point out in Dis-Chem that context matters, it is less clear precisely what context matters in excessive pricing cases going forward. Are the market dynamics due to the Covid-19 pandemic an outlier unlikely to repeat itself in history and that the Tribunal’s recent price gouging decisions should be assessed in that context? Or, does the Tribunal’s decision effectively mean that any firm who is able to profitably increase a price by 5% has market power (and is, therefore, dominant) and, therefore, any such price increase (unless linked proportionately to a cost increase) is prima facie excessive? When will the Tribunal intervene in excessive price cases and when will it allow the normal forces of supply and demand and the hallmark features of a dynamic competition to rectify any market abnormalities?

While the Tribunal suggests that a 47% increase and above would be excessive for “any good” in South Africa, the Tribunal does not provide much guidance on where to the draw the line. The Tribunal rejected the US’s guidance which refers to a 10% increase (in the context of a price increase of an essential good). Previously the Competition Appeal Court in the Sasol judgment suggested (without setting a firm benchmark) that a price which is less than 25% more than the economic value of the product cannot be said to be excessive.

While the Tribunal does make cursory mention of the prices of other competitors, the Tribunal seems to err in one important regard. Excessive price cases and indeed the assessment of market power should not be conducted with reference to the overall demand shock in the market but with reference to the firm’s ability to act independently of other competitors in the same prevailing market conditions. A comparison therefore between pre-market shock and post-market shock insofar as the shock applies to the whole market, is somewhat irrelevant.

If the overall demand for face-masks increased and all face-mask suppliers are able to profitably increase their prices for face-masks during the relevant period, it can hardly be said that every face-mask supplier is “dominant” during that period. If all ice-cream suppliers raise their prices in summer versus winter that would clearly not be a result of ice-cream suppliers having market power during the summer months only. The Tribunal’s analysis in Dis-Chem does not seem to answer this issue and in fact lends credence to such an outcome which would clearly not be supported by any credible economic justification.

The Tribunal does not deal with another important aspect relating to principles of supply and demand more generally. The Tribunal recognizes that there were (and are) a shortage of supply for face-masks. It was the shortage of supply (be it actual or potential) which in fact led to “panic buying” and higher demand and therefore higher prices. To suggest that the poorest customers are most likely to be harmed due to price increases following demand shocks is correct. However, all customers (including the poorest) are likely to be harmed if the supply shortage cannot be addressed and is perpetuated by the on-going health crisis. The most sensible way to encourage entry into the supply side market for face-masks is to allow such firms to earn short term profits which it would not otherwise enjoy. Without the upside incentive, new entry into the supply side market is unlikely and the only disciplining safeguard left in the market is quasi-price regulation by the competition authorities. The forces of competition in such instances are, therefore, precluded from being allowed to operate to restore the market to competitive levels. The Tribunal, however, recognizes in the Dis-Chem decision that in certain instances it should in fact play the role of a price regulator.

So where does that leave us? Firstly, it seems very likely that the Dis-Chem decision will be taken on appeal. Until such time as the Tribunal’s decision is altered (if at all), firms selling goods which are considered “essential” in the fight against Covid-19 should take particular cognizance of this decision. Secondly, the price gouging regulations published by the Minister are essentially rendered nugatory by the Tribunal’s approach to excessive pricing cases. Thirdly, regardless of the size of the firm pre-Covid, if a firm is able to increase its prices unilaterally as a result of a demand shock following the Covid health, there is a significant risk that the Tribunal will consider such a firm to possess market power and hence unless such price increase is justified with reference to cost increases, potentially liable to an administrative penalty (and possibly follow-on civil damages).

[About the Authors: John Oxenham and Michael-James Currie are practicing competition law attorneys based in South Africa and advise clients on competition law related matters across most African jurisdictions]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Competition Commission makes good on its promise to clamp down on excessive pricing amid COVID-19 outbreak

Posted on by Editor

Despite the overwhelming amount of excessive pricing complaints being referred to the South African Competition Commission (“the Commission”), it has remained unwavering in its commitment to prioritize and follow-through on bringing the full might of the law down on suppliers and retails who have used the prevailing circumstances to take advantage of consumers by increasing prices on essential goods and services with no cost increase justification.

This is illustrated in a media statement released by the Commission on 15 April 2020, wherein the particulars of the Commissions first referral to the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for price gouging on facial masks was expanded upon, and which is due to be heard on 24 April 2020.

Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Supplies CC (“Babelegi”) allegedly engaged in price gouging through its 500% mark-up on facial masks, which is considered as an essential good, for the period 31 January 2020 to 5 March 2020. Babelegi’s supplier is also under investigation by the Commission for allegedly engaging in excessive pricing after it subsequently came to light that the said supplier purportedly increased its input prices.

In a media statement issued on 31 March 2020, the Commission aired its concerns  in and prioritization on suppliers and retailers who charge excessive prices on COVID-19 essentials, as well as complainants who are considered essential service professionals (such as doctors, policemen etc). The Commission also outlined the expedited preliminary investigations it will undertake in complaints. In this respect, respondent firms have 48 hours in which to confirm or rebut the allegations brought against it. Importantly, the Commission has showed that some complaints may indeed be justified where firms provide a valid cost increase justification. Accordingly, not all acts of price increases will be condemned as price gouging.

As highlighted by the Commission, firms can expect to see a wave of prosecutions in the coming days. The Commission has already concluded (but not yet referred) numerous price gouging complaints, to name a few:

  • A pharmacy has increased its mark-up on face marks and sanitizers by more than 300%;
  • A hardware store has allegedly increased the price of surgical gloves from R99.99 to R170.00 within one week absent any cost increase justification; and
  • A wholesaler of chicken has marked-up chicken pieces by up to 50%, also absent any cost increase justification.

It is important to keep in mind that firms engaging in excessive pricing, price fixing, allocation of markets and market shares and bid rigging risk facing a fine of up to 10% of their annual turnover, and risk a fine of up to 25% of their annual turnover in respect of repeat offences. Furthermore, complaints regarding price fixing, the allocation of markets and market shares and bid rigging could result in certain directors who engage in or initiate such contraventions with imprisonment of up to 10 years.

The spike in competition law contraventions amidst the COVID-19 outbreak is not unique to South Africa, the Ministry of Trade in Rwanda has itself imposed fines on 178 companies to the amount of RwF of 15 850 000 to date. Furthermore, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) has shown its determination in prosecuting exploitative conduct during the outbreak in the remedial order it issued to Cleanshelf Supermarkets for unconscionably adjusting prices of sanitizers.  Cleanshelf was ordered to find and refund all consumers who purchased the sanitizers above the usual selling price.

There is little doubt that the Commission will continue its endeavor in prosecuting COVID-19 related competition complaints, it may very well be slowed down due to the sheer explosion of complaints, but firms should not be quick to translate this voluminous burden as a gap in competition law enforcement that can be taken advantage of. Akin to his observation, Tembinkosi Bonakele, Commissioner of the Competition Commssion said “The Commission has now gone past the stage of moral suasion and appeals to patriotism to stop abuse of market power by those seeking to exploit consumers at the worse possible time – the law must take its course – we will see a wave of prosecution of firms in the next coming days.”

 

South Africa Competition Tribunal: Regulations published to expedite COVID-19 excessive and unfair pricing complaint referrals

Posted on by Editor

[The editors at AfricanAntitrust wish to thank Jemma Muller and Gina Lodolo for compiling this article]

On 3 April 2020, Minister Ebrahim Patel made amendments to section 27(2) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) with regards to the regulations pertaining to the functions of the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

The amendment was enacted to regulate complaint referrals for alleged contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act which deals with the charging of excessive prices by a dominant firm. The amendment is crucial in light of the current state of affairs, where the charging of excessive prices has become more frequent during the Covid-19 outbreak. Accordingly, the amendment is only applicable for the duration of the period of the declaration of a Natural State of Disaster with regards to COVID-19.

An applicant who wishes to bring a complaint based on an alleged contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act, read with the Consumer and Customer Protection Regulations, must file a Notice of Motion and founding affidavit to the Tribunal.

Urgent complaint referral procedure

Who must file the complaint referral?

A complaint referral may be filed by the Commission or a complainant, as soon as possible after the commission has issued a notice of non-referral to that complainant.

Notice of motion requirements

An applicant must allege a contravention of section 8(1)(a), indicate the order sought against the respondent(s) and state the name and and address (electronic or otherwise) of each respondent in respect to whom the order is sought. Applicant’s may also state the date and time on which the applicant wishes the matter to be heard by the Tribunal.

Founding affidavit

The founding affidavit must set out the grounds of urgency and the material points of law and evidence that support the complaint. In addition, the applicant may include confirmatory affidavits from any factual or expert witnesses.

Procedure

The applicant must serve a copy of the Notice of Motion and founding affidavit on each of the respondent(s) named in the Notice of Motion and file a copy of the application with the Tribunal.

The important time periods:

A respondent must serve a copy of their Answering Affidavit on the complainant within 72 hours of service of the complaint referral. Thereafter the person who filed the Complaint referral may serve a copy for their Reply within 24 hours after being served with a copy of the Answering Affidavit.

The Tribunal will then determine the date and time for the hearing of the complaint referral (Tribunal Rules 6,16,17,18,18,47,54 and 55 apply to an application under this Rule unless they pertain to Rules which stipulate time-frames).

These documents may be filed electronically.

Urgent hearing

The Tribunal may direct that the urgent complaint proceedings in terms of the Rules may be conducted wholly as video or audio proceedings.

If no answering affidavit is filed within the period set out in the Notice of Motion or such extended period as may be determined by the Tribunal, the urgent complaint referral may be heard on an unopposed basis.

The Tribunal will determine if there was contravention of section 8(1)(a) of the Act based on the evidence contained in the affidavits unless there is a substantial dispute of fact which cannot be resolved by affidavits. In this case the Tribunal may determine an expedited procedure (which may include oral evidence on an expedited basis by way of video or audio proceedings). The Tribunal may also call for further evidence if it is required (subject to section 55 of the Act).

Remedies

The Tribunal may impose a pricing order if the respondent has been found to contravene section 8(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent may apply to appeal or review the decision on an urgent basis to the Competition Appeal Court (the pricing order will remain in force unless it is set aside by the court on appeal or review).

Consent order

The Commission may at any time (before, during and after and investigation) conclude a consent agreement for a complaint under section 8(1)(a) of the Act and it will be the full and final settlement of the matter  (including settlement of civil proceedings). This consent order may be confirmed by the Tribunal without hearing any evidence.

The amended complaint referral procedures equip complainants with the means in which to assist the competition authorities in penalizing those who have used the prevailing circumstances to exploit consumers, and is thus a commendable and efficient tool invoked by the Minister.