By Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya*
South Africa risks adopting the essence of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), if not its exact form, with the aim of reshaping the business models of online intermediation platforms. This marks a significant shift away from the principles of traditional competition regulation.
In 2020, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) concluded that traditional enforcement tools might be inadequate to tackle structural barriers in digital markets particularly those that prevent new entrants or smaller players from expanding. This realisation led to the launch of the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (OIPMI). By borrowing a regulatory blueprint designed for the EU, South Africa could undermine its own digital ecosystem, stifle investment, and entrench local inefficiencies. The country’s growing interest in ex ante competition regulation via the Competition Commission’s market inquiries reflects an accelerating trend of policy mimicry without consideration of domestic realities. While there is broad agreement on the need for digital competition regulation, there is little consensus on how these rules should be structured, and approaches to implementation remain highly varied across jurisdictions.
The OIPMI’s final report identified platforms such as Google, Apple, Takealot, Uber Eats, and Booking.com as dominant players distorting competition. It is claimed that, due to the significant online leads and sales these platforms generate and the high level of dependency business users have on them these scaled platforms can influence competition among businesses on the platform or exploit them through fees, ranking algorithms, or restrictive terms and conditions. However, this conclusion raises concerns about the underlying methodology. A central concern with the market inquiry approach is that it allows certain platforms to be identified as market leaders or sources of competitive distortion without requiring a formal finding of dominance, since such inquiries do not mandate that dominance be established.
The designation has been based on characteristics typically associated with globally leading technology firms. Amazon, which currently maintains only a minimal presence in South Africa, was nevertheless singled out as a potential threat to competition. It is claimed that Amazon faces similar complaints in other jurisdictions, and it is argued that fair treatment of marketplace sellers is unlikely to become a competitive differentiator capable of overcoming barriers to seller competition. Moreover, the CCSA has indicated that it would enforce the same provisions against Amazon if it were to enter the market in a way that breaches the proposed remedial measures.
Regulating for hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy: global platforms may decide not to enter the market at all, leaving consumers, including small businesses and public services organisations with fewer options and slower innovation.
The OIPMI focuses on structural features that restrict competition both between platforms and among business users, facilitate the exploitation of business users, and hinder the inclusion of small enterprises and historically disadvantaged firms in the digital economy. Despite the absence of formal dominance findings, the OIPMI proposes a range of heavy-handed interventions, including the removal of price parity clauses, the introduction of transparent advertising standards, a ban on platform self-preferencing, and limitations on the use of seller data, many directly inspired by the EU DMA.
In both of CCSA’s 2022 and 2023 findings, Google Search was explicitly accused of preferential placement and distorting platform competition in South Africa. More concerning still are the CCSA’s proposed remedies in its final report- requiring targeted companies to offer free advertising space to rivals, artificially boost local competitors in search rankings, and redesign their platforms to favour smaller firms. The SACC has recommended that Google introduce identifiers, filters, and direct payment options to support local platforms, SMEs, and Black-owned businesses, and contribute ZAR150 million (around EUR 7 million) to offset its competitive advantage. For search results, Google is required to introduce a new platform sites unit (or carousel) that prominently showcases smaller South African platforms relevant to the user’s query such as local travel platforms in travel-related searches entirely free of charge. This goes beyond competition enforcement and crosses into market engineering, compelling global firms not just to compete by government decree, but to subsidise rivals and actively shape market outcomes.
In 2025, South Africa’s Competition Commission also doubled down with its provisional Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry (MDPMI), calling for additional remedies targeting online advertising, content distribution, and the visibility of news media. These recommendations are again influenced by EU-style regulations, particularly the EU Copyright Directive, which harms the diversity and sustainability of small news publishers. However, the report downplays South Africa’s unique institutional constraints and specific market dynamics. If adopted, the proposals would compel digital platforms to subsidise select publishers based on arbitrary and hard-to-measure assessments of news content’s value to Google’s business. This could limit access to information, hinder innovation, and monetisation efforts, ultimately narrowing consumer choice and weakening the vibrancy of the content ecosystem.
More broadly, through these market inquiries South Africa risks undermining its evolving digital economy by pursuing an approach that will deter foreign investment due to ambiguous and discretionary enforcement. At the same time, the proposed regulatory burdens could disproportionately affect domestic firms that simply lack the resources to comply. This regulatory uncertainty threatens to stifle innovation and hinder progress toward regional digital integration. In a country where corruption remains a persistent challenge, granting regulators wide discretionary powers over digital market outcomes also raises serious governance concerns. Moreover, by enforcing a narrow and politicised notion of “fairness”, South Africa risks sacrificing consumer choice and strangling the diversity of digital services that a competitive market would otherwise deliver.
Notably, coming back to the EU’s DMA, it was crafted for specific European conditions, particularly in markets where technologically-leading global platforms held relatively high market shares in many EU Member States. Yet even within the EU, the DMA remains hotly disputed – not least because it targets large non-European companies that have long been politically embraced for injecting digitisation into traditional industries and, through competition, helped European businesses and consumers benefit from technology innovation.
EU digital policies, developed from the perspective of wealthy, mature (Western) European markets, should not be assumed to be readily applicable elsewhere. South Africa’s digital markets are still in their infancy, ICT infrastructure remains unevenly developed, and regulatory institutions face significant resource constraints. Emulating the DMA – even informally – risks premature intervention, regulatory overreach, and the distortion of competitive dynamics before they have had a proper chance to emerge and mature.
Competition policy undoubtedly has a role in promoting competition. But poorly tailored rules may end up punishing the very firms that South Africa needs to scale and empower its own digital economy. Instead of replicating the EU’s Digital Markets Act, South Africa should focus on evidence-based case-by-case enforcement – grounded in its own market realities and institutional capabilities. Otherwise, South Africa risks becoming the casualty of a regulatory experiment designed for a different continent – with consequences its digital economy can ill afford.
*The authors are affiliated with ECIPE, the European Centre for International Political Economy




