Executives Beware: The Long-Arm of the U.S. Government Strikes Again

Following up on our initial DOJ extradition victory post last week, here is a more in-depth look at the recent developments in worldwide criminal antitrust cases, and notably their overlap with parallel corruption / fraud / FCPA investigations.  Paul Hastings and Nortons Inc. – jointly covering North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa – have extensive experience handling the defense of competition-law and FCPA-based investigations into multi-national corporations and individual executives.  The piece below was written by Jeremy Evans, partner in Paul Hastings’ D.C. office, and AAT editor Andreas Stargard, in Brussels.

Jeremy P. Evans Andeas Stargard

The long-arm of the U.S. government and its increasing willingness to pursue foreign nationals for alleged violations of U.S. law was further in evidence last Friday when the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice Department announced (press release here) that it had extradited Romano Pisciotti, an Italian national, from Germany to the U.S. on a charge filed more than 3½ years ago that he participated in a price-fixing cartel involving the sale of marine hose.

(Full PDF of article )

Ian Norris, then-CEO of Morgan Crucible, sentenced to serve 18 months in federal U.S. prison
Ian Norris, then-CEO of Morgan Crucible, sentenced to serve 18 months in federal U.S. prison

Source: BSO / via CBS Miami

Pisciotti is the first foreign national to be extradited to the U.S. purely for an antitrust charge, although he joins a large number of foreign nationals in recent years to have been charged criminally by the Division in cartel cases, many of whom have agreed to plea deals requiring them to serve time in U.S. prisons. The Antitrust Division is not alone in its pursuit of foreign nationals; the Fraud Division of the Justice Department has also pursued extraditions of foreign nationals for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in recent years. Indeed, Pisciotti follows his countryman Flavio Ricotti, who, in 2010, also was arrested in Germany and extradited to the U.S. following his indictment on an FCPA charge. It is clear that in both antitrust cartel and FCPA investigations, the U.S. government is growing ever-confident in its power and ability to bring uncooperative foreign executives to the U.S. to face criminal charges in the U.S., even for conduct that occurred outside the U.S.

The Marine Hose Investigation

Pisciotti’s extradition is the latest chapter in the long-running marine hose cartel investigation. In May 2007, the Antitrust Division arrested eight foreign nationals traveling on business in the U.S. and charged them for their roles in an antitrust conspiracy involving the sale of marine hose used to transport oil. The Division’s investigation was part of a multi-national law enforcement effort that included the European Commission and the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading and much of the conduct at issue was alleged to have happened overseas. In the years that followed, the Antitrust Division secured over $54 million in fines from five companies, and nine individuals served jail time arising from their alleged involvement in the cartel. Two of these dispositions are worth particular note. The first involved the separate plea agreements by Bridgestone Corporation and Misao Hioki, a Japanese executive, each of which agreed to plead guilty to both an antitrust charge for involvement in the alleged conspiracy, as well as an FCPA charge relating to corrupt payments to government officials in various Latin American countries. These appear to be the only instances in which either a company or an executive has pled to both antitrust and FCPA charges arising from the same investigation. The second involved three British executives arrested in the U.S. at the onset of the investigation. Under a unique arrangement, the three were charged and sentenced by authorities in both the U.S. and the U.K., but the U.S. plea deals permitted them to return to the U.K. where they served their prison sentences concurrently.

Prior to Pisciotti’s extradition, the last criminal disposition involving an executive in the marine hose investigation occurred in 2009. But, what was not publicly known until recently is that the Antitrust Division had secured a sealed indictment of Pisciotti in August 2010 alleging that he rigged bids, fixed prices, and allocated markets in the sale of marine hose. It was this indictment that led to Pisciotti’s arrest in Germany last June and the subsequent extradition proceedings. The Division likely followed the same procedure that it did with Ricotti in the earlier FCPA case, using Pisciotti’s sealed indictment to obtain an Interpol red notice, effectively an international arrest warrant. Under the principle of reciprocal or dual criminality, countries often will only extradite individuals to the U.S. if an extradition treaty exists between the two countries that requires a person’s conduct to be a crime in both countries. Bid rigging is a criminal offense in Germany, thus ensnaring Pisciotti transiting through Germany on business travel and leading to his arrest in a country prepared to extradite him. Pisciotti was flown to Miami on Thursday and arraigned in federal court the following day. He now faces charges that could result in a maximum of 10 years in prison and $1 million in criminal fines.

The U.S. Government and the Ever-Shrinking World

AAG Bill Baer

Bill Baer, the assistant attorney general of the Antitrust Division, heralded Pisciotti’s “first of its kind extradition” as a “significant step” in the Division’s cooperation efforts with foreign antitrust enforcers. And, while it marks a new frontier for the Division, it can also be viewed as merely the latest example of the aggressive approach taken by the U.S. government in recent years toward foreign executives in international cartel and bribery cases. A little over a decade ago, the Division agreed to permit foreign executives in cartel cases to plead guilty and serve prison sentences of just a few months. But the more recent plea deals announced in seemingly ever-expanding auto parts cartel cases have seen well over twenty foreign executives face up to two years in jail.

Our experience in these and other cases also teaches that the Antitrust Division will routinely seek U.S. prison terms for conduct that occurred not merely partially or largely outside the U.S., but indeed was wholly undertaken on foreign soil. The example of Pisciotti’s extradition powerfully reaffirms that executives now must worry about the possibility of being extradited to the U.S. if they refuse to cooperate with the Antitrust Division and plead guilty in a cartel investigation, even in situations where the conduct at issue occurred exclusively or mostly overseas. This is in part because an increasing number of countries have criminalized antitrust conduct, or are in the process of doing so, meaning that there are now more jurisdictions than ever willing to extradite an executive for cartel offenses, either at home or when traveling abroad, even in situations where a sealed indictment may leave the executive ignorant of any potential risk.

These same government tactics exist in bribery and FCPA cases. Flavio Ricotti and Ousama Naaman are but two examples of foreign nationals who were extradited to the U.S. in the last five years to face FCPA charges, each apprehended overseas after the U.S. government obtained an indictment in federal court, and each charged based on conduct outside of the U.S. It appears that the U.S. government will continue to take an aggressive enforcement approach toward uncooperative executives, further highlighting the concern for senior foreign executives and their companies caught up in cartel and FCPA investigations.

Price-fixers beware: U.S. DOJ scores first-ever pure antitrust-based extradition from E.U.

From DOJ: First-Ever Pure Antitrust Extradition

In what may well affect African and other international price-fixers going forward, the spectre of U.S. extradition for criminal antitrust charges has been reinforced by the recent successful DOJ extradition request in the “Marine Hose” cartel.  An Italian national was extradited from Germany to face bid-rigging charges.

Ian Norris, then-CEO of Morgan Crucible, sentenced to serve 18 months in federal U.S. prison
Ian Norris, then-CEO of Morgan Crucible, sentenced to serve 18 months in federal U.S. prison

“First-ever”?! Some readers may recall the carbon products cartel and a certain Mr. Ian Norris, the then-Morgan Crucible chief executive, who had been extradited from the U.K. to the United States back in 2010.  Yet, that seven-year long procedure was based not a pure antitrust charge — rather, he was extradited on a technicality, if you will, namely the “obstruction of justice” charge, given the lack of reciprocal or dual criminality of the underlying price-fixing offense in the two countries at the time the competition offense had been committed in the early 1990s.  Norris’ 1 1/2 year prison sentence ended in November 2011.

The Marine Hose cartel extradition is different: In this case, the DOJ succeeded, for the first time ever, in securing an extradition solely on a competition-law offense being charged.

Source: BSO / via CBS Miami

What follows is the DOJ press release text (with added links):

WASHINGTON — Romano Pisciotti, an Italian national, was extradited from Germany on a charge of participating in a conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition by rigging bids, fixing prices and allocating market shares for sales of marine hose sold in the United States and elsewhere, the Department of Justice announced today. This marks the first successfully litigated extradition on an antitrust charge.

Pisciotti, a former executive with Parker ITR Srl, a marine hose manufacturer headquartered in Veniano, Italy, was arrested in Germany on June 17, 2013. He arrived in the Southern District of Florida, in Miami, yesterday and is scheduled to make his initial appearance today in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Ft. Lauderdale, at 11:00 a.m. EDT.

“This first of its kind extradition on an antitrust charge allows the department to bring an alleged price fixer to the United States to face charges of participating in a worldwide conspiracy,” said Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “This marks a significant step forward in our ongoing efforts to work with our international antitrust colleagues to ensure that those who seek to subvert U.S. law are brought to justice.”

Marine hose is a flexible rubber hose used to transfer oil between tankers and storage facilities. During the conspiracy, the cartel affected prices for hundreds of millions of dollars in sales of marine hose and related products sold worldwide.

According to a one-count felony indictment filed under seal on Aug. 26, 2010, and ordered unsealed on Aug. 5, 2013, in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida, Pisciotti carried out the conspiracy by agreeing during meetings, conversations and communications to allocate shares of the marine hose market among the conspirators; use a price list for marine hose in order to implement the conspiracy; and not compete for customers with other marine hose sellers either by not submitting prices or bids or by submitting intentionally high prices or bids, all in accordance with the agreements reached among the conspiring companies. As part of the conspiracy, Pisciotti and his conspirators provided information received from customers in the United States and elsewhere about upcoming marine hose jobs to a co-conspirator who served as the coordinator of the conspiracy. That coordinator acted as a clearinghouse for bidding information that was shared among the conspirators, and was paid by the manufacturers for coordinating the conspiracy. The department said the conspiracy began at least as early as 1999 and continued until at least May 2007. Pisciotti was charged with joining and participating in the conspiracy from at least as early as 1999 until at least November 2006.

Pisciotti is charged with violating the Sherman Act, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million criminal fine for individuals. The maximum fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.

As a result of the department’s ongoing marine hose investigation, five companies, including Parker ITR; Bridgestone Corp. of Japan; Manuli SPa of Italy’s Florida subsidiary; Trelleborg of France; and Dunlop Marine and Oil Ltd, of the United Kingdom, and nine individuals have pleaded guilty.

The investigation is being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s Washington Criminal I Section, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) of the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Navy Criminal Investigative Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The U.S. Marshals Service and other law enforcement agencies from multiple foreign jurisdictions are also investigating or assisting in the ongoing matter. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided assistance.

South Africa: Surprise search and seizure visit at Unilever and Sime Darby

south_africa
Dawn Raids Rattle South African Consumer-Goods Brands

The South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) has confirmed that it has conducted such a dawn raid operation at Unilever South Africa (Pty Ltd) (“Unilever”) and Sime Darby’s respective South African offices during the morning of 03 April 2014.

Unilever is one of the largest fast-moving consumer goods companies in South Africa. Unilever’s business activities include laundry, skincare and cleansing, margarine, deodorants, household care, tea, hair care and ice cream. Household names which form part of the Unilever group include Sunlight, Knorr, Lipton, Ola and Omo.

Sime Darby is a Malaysia-based multinational company involved in sectors such as plantation, industrial equipment, motors, property and energy & utilities, with operations in more than twenty countries. It is the world’s top palm oil planter. Its South African operation, namely Sime Darby Hudson & Knight (Pty) Ltd, is located in Boksburg and it produces and sells premium fats and oils to bakery, food service industry and food manufacturers predominantly in South Africa.

“The Commission believes that the information that will be obtained from today’s operation will enable the Commission to determine whether or not Unilever SA and Sime Darby have indeed engaged in collusive conduct,” Acting Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele said.

The Commission has indicated that this raid forms part of an ongoing investigation into collusive conduct in the product markets for the manufacture and supply of edible oils and baking fats to both wholesale and retail customers. The Commission has further indicated that it has reasonable grounds to believe that employees of Unilever and Sime Darby have information which is relevant to the investigation.

The last dawn raid was conducted on 06 May 2010 at the premises of four electrical cables manufacturers and suppliers based in Gauteng province, South Africa. The various premises were searched by the Commission on suspicions of price fixing, market allocation and collusive tendering. This was done subsequent to a complaint initiated by the Commissioner on 16 March 2010 against Aberdare Cables (Pty) Ltd, Alvern Cables (Pty) Ltd, South Ocean Electric Wire Company (Pty) Ltd and Tulisa Cables (Pty) Ltd.

Sections 46 to 49A of the South African Competition Act of 1998 (“Competition Act”) empowers the Commission to conduct surprise search and seizure visits and to carry out so-called “dawn raids” to a firm’s business premises in order to inspect documents and interview staff where an infringement of competition law is suspected.

The Commission is empowered to enter any such premises when a judge or a magistrate has issued a warrant. Although a warrant is usually an essential requirement to ensure that a dawn raid is conducted in accordance with the law, the Competition Commission does have the power to enter and search a premises without a warrant, in exceptional circumstances.

If the Commission has reason to believe that a firm is in contravention of provisions of the Competition Act, or is in possession of information relating to a matter that is under investigation, the Commission’s investigators have the authority to enter into the firm’s premises in order to inspect and request copies of documents, ask for information in relation to any documents, take notes and interrogate employees, search and examine computer data and remove evidence from the premises. In particular, officials may examine files, reports and emails. The Competition Commission is entitled to confiscate computer hard drives. They may also take copies of documents.

UPDATE: 23-April-2014:

Based on reporting in a BDLive story, the Commission has said that it “is too early for the commission to say what data or documents were seized. Information and data are being analysed,” noting that it “believes that information that will be obtained from (the) operation will enable (it) to determine whether or not Unilever SA and Sime Darby have indeed engaged in collusive conduct,” acting commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele said. “However, as part of any investigation, we also wish to urge anyone, be it business or individuals, with further information to come forward and assist the commission in concluding this investigation.”

Acting competition commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele. Picture: FINANCIAL MAIL

SA competition enforcer’s distribution monopoly case dismissed by Tribunal

south_africa
South African Breweries distribution case dismissed

The Competition Tribunal of South Africa has dismissed a monopolization case brought by the Competition Commission against South African Breweries (“SAB”). The Tribunal held that the Commission brought insufficient evidence to find that SAB acted in violation of the Competition Act.  Particularly in light of the significant resources which the Commission expended on the matter, it is a disappointing loss for the agency.

The Commission had alleged that SAB’s distribution system prevented competition between firms that distributed SAB-branded beers, but the Commission made no case against 90 per cent of SAB’s distribution and focused its case on the system of appointed distributors. This would account for only 10 per cent of SAB’s method of beer distribution. The Commission claimed that SAB has a market share of about 90% of ‘clear beer’ in South Africa. It went on to claim that SAB restricted competition between its distributors as SAB would appoint distributors and allocate exclusive territories.

The Tribunal held that the distributors appointed by SAB were not adequately independent to be in competition with each other and therefore their conduct could not be seen as being restricted. The Tribunal held that SAB’s conduct did not amount to unjustified discrimination.

The decision marks the first occasion that the Tribunal has dealt with the treatment of non-compete restraints in dual distribution arrangements in South African competition law. In deciding the matter, the Tribunal also introduced the novel concept of a “separate basic economic unit.  This concept operates as a measure used to assess the level of independence distributors have from their suppliers, which means that there must be a certain level of independence between a supplier and a distributor in order to contravene the Act.

There has been no indication that the Commission intends to appeal the Tribunal’s dismissal.

Regulation & Innovation in Africa: A licence to innovate?

Our popular Innovation & Antitrust series continues on its popular path to its 3rd installment, in which its author, Ass’t Professor Sofia Ranchordas, deals with regulation.  Prior pieces included the topics of ‘convergence or customization?’ and the deeply inquisitive ‘in the eye of the beholder…?’  The series continues.

Regulation and Innovation in Africa: licence to innovate?

 new multi-part series

Ass’t Prof. Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

In part II of the African Antitrust Innovation Series, Sofia Ranchordás discussed the relevant concept of ‘innovation’ underlying the discourse on innovation/competition/IP in African countries.  She concluded that in the African context, the advancement of economic growth may imply adopting a context-specific concept of ‘innovation’, where more attention is paid to incremental improvements performed by local innovators. Before analyzing whether competition laws can play a role in the advancement of innovation in the African context, it is important to take two steps back in this third part of the Innovation and Antitrust Series and:

(i) Analyze the African innovation policy context and its challenges;

(ii) Question whether regulation can and should play a role in the advancement of innovation.

(i) Wanted: Innovation in Africa

Up until recently, COMESA did not adopt an interventionist approach towards innovation in its member states, however it was expected that African governments would devote at least one per cent of GDP to R&D. Year after year, member states failed to achieve this objective and COMESA soon realized that in Africa only the South African government (ironically, a non-member) was in state to successfully pursue such goal. In 2012, the COMESA Committee of Ministers of Science and Technology recommended the creation of an Innovation Council and setting up an Innovation Fund, promoting efforts to harmonize intellectual property rights, and continued infrastructure development to facilitate regional trade. The creation of the COMESA Innovation Council in April 2013 evidenced a clear awareness of the importance of enhanced technological innovation for the competitiveness of African countries. This council was conceived mainly ‘to provide advice to member states relating to existing and new knowledge and innovations and best ways of applying it in the member states’.[1] The COMESA Innovation Council departed from the premise that the late adoption of technological innovation would be an advantage for cost effective developments due to the limited negative effects. Besides COMESA, other organizations have been supporting African countries investment in R&D. This is the case of UNESCO which has been coordinating the UN Science & Technology cluster and the African Union through the African Observatory of Science, Technology and Innovation (AOSTI).[2]

While an Innovation Council is much needed in Africa, the question that needs to be posed here is whether these countries really know what it takes to effectively promote innovation. Are African governments enacting the most adequate rules to foster investment and terminating the dispositions that contribute to the innovation chasm that characterizes a number of African countries?

While national governments have been trying to develop their own innovation policies and programmes, it has also been argued that innovation in Africa faces a significant hurdle:  donor nations are the ones setting the tone. Perhaps to ensure that African governments are able to define their own innovation priorities, the COMESA Innovation Council is solely composed by eminent scientists of member countries. However, this may not be enough. In the 2013 African Economic Outlook report,[3] it was underlined that despite Africa’s ‘impressive growth over the past fifteen years (…) institutions and regulations for private sector activity must be further improved. Addressing infrastructure bottlenecks increasing access to key public services (…) would put countries on a durable high growth path and reduce poverty and inequality’.[4] In the specific case of extractive-resource exploration and exploitation, this report explicitly states that more regulations that provide incentives for investment are needed. The 2009 African Economic Outlook had earlier verified that the ineffective African regulatory systems were one of the reasons why African was seriously lagging behind. This 2009 report concluded that ‘African regulators need more muscle’ and particular attention should be paid to telecoms regulators who tend ‘too often favor incumbent fixed-line operators, who have typically problems to make profits, over new entrants (…) [impeding] competition and private investment.’[5]

Willingness to innovate, investment and know-how are certainly essential elements of innovation, but any policy initiatives may be jeopardized by an ineffective regulatory framework. Stating that African regulatory systems must be improved seems to be stating almost the obvious. Explaining why may actually shed more light on how this should be done.  Does regulation really matter for innovation?

(ii) Innovation: law gives, and law may take it away

National laws and regulations can act as ‘licences to innovate’. But they can equally be regarded as obstacles to innovation, should they be excessive, costly and/or cause regulatory delays. Regulation and innovation can either be ‘friends’ or ‘foes’. Regulators can hinder it by imposing too many regulatory requirements with which companies must comply; or instead, facilitate it by providing a rapid and flexible regulation of innovations, and ensuring that novelties are quickly introduced in the market. The mentioned destinies depend notably on how well lawmakers know the nature and dynamics of the innovation process.[6] The relationship between law and regulations and innovation has often been underestimated in the literature and the study of the impact of the former on the latter is often vaguely justified and not supported by empirical evidence.[7] However, this is far from being an unimportant topic: regulation can impede or even facilitate innovation, depending on the type, timing, duration and the dispositions in question.

Regulation as a ‘foe’ to innovation

Legislative or regulatory instruments have been traditionally regarded as obstacles to innovation: the bureaucratic impositions of law are quickly accused of stifling creativity and commercial success, contributing to the image of ‘law as the bogeyman’.[8] This is explained, for example, by the multiple regulatory burdens imposed by regulators that often outweigh the harms they intended to prevent. High compliance costs may have a negative impact on investment, particularly in the case of smaller innovators with more limited capital. In addition, regulation has been regarded as an impediment to innovation because ‘entrepreneurs and government regulators see the world quite differently’: while the first see flexibility and risk as parts of the business, regulators are often risk-averse, preferring stability and long-term predictable outcomes.[9]  Moreover, the lack of experience with the private sector, the growing bureaucracy and entrenchment in agencies led to the enactment of stricter regulation aimed to avoid future problems. This need to regulate the unpredictable generated uncertainty, conflicting regulations, and had counterproductive effects, since the very same rules which aimed at stimulating innovation ended up frustrating it. [10]

Although excessive regulation may stifle regulation, innovation cannot be left unregulated. Innovative products can potentially endanger a number of significant social and economic values (e.g. public health, environment, or fair competition). The regulation of innovation should perform multiple tasks: regulate the risks inherent to novel products and services; ensure that innovators do not innovate beyond and against law; facilitate and even promote the development and implementation of innovations, by creating a legal order adapted or adaptable to the characteristics of the innovation process.[11]

Regulation as a ‘friend’ to innovation

Regulators all over the world are aware of the importance of innovation for a country’s competitiveness and have tried to actively encourage firms to innovate. This was visible in the well-known case of the U.S. Department of Justice’s command on Microsoft to sell its Internet Explorer as a separate product from its Windows operating system.[12] This idea that authorities should actively intervene, can be indirectly derived from the ‘Porter hypothesis’,[13] according to which public authorities, and specifically competition authorities, should guarantee that market forces drive firms to innovate, notably through the implementation of stringent competition policy.[14] The concretization of legislative or administrative interventions in this field does not always need or can be reduced to an aggressive implementation of competition law.[15] Innovation is essential to increase the competitiveness of firms, but the regulation of the former goes beyond competition concerns and requires a comprehensive regulatory approach.

Legal rules do not necessarily stifle innovation, by discouraging entrepreneurs from investing in R&D. Instead, regulation can equally assume a paternalist role and have a positive effect on behavior—as argued by behavioral law and economics scholars—and ultimately influence (‘nudge’) entrepreneurs to make the desired investing decisions.  The general impact of legislation and regulation on human behavior has been studied in the last decades by the behavioral law and economics literature.[16] A behavioral approach to law and economics proceeds to a study of legal rules informed by knowledge about human behavior and attempts to discover how law can be used to achieve particular ends. Behavioral law and economics aims to ‘regulate so as to improve economic welfare by more closely aligning each individual’s actual choices with his “true” or unbiased preferences without reducing his liberty.’[17] There are reasons to believe that this behavioral approach has been shaping policy and rulemaking in the United States, notably under the Obama Administration,[18] which has been particularly interventionist as far as the advancement of innovation is concerned.[19] If this interventionist approach has been successfully implemented in different countries, one can and should ask whether African governments should not also try to ‘nudge’ innovation, exempting innovators from complying with unnecessary burdens, providing better legal protection to investments, and improving the overall transparency of its legal system.

(iii) A regulatory recipe for more innovation

The role played by regulation in the advancement of innovation deserves more attention from most African countries and international organizations operating in this continent. Governmental innovation policies and the regulation of innovation should be elected as priority concerns in the quest for more innovation. [20] African governments could try to combat the innovation chasm that characterizes their systems if they create ‘innovation-friendly’ regulatory frameworks that make their legal systems attractive to investors and innovators. I leave you with a draft of a partial recipe to this ‘friendship’:

1. A solid legal and procedural framework, characterized by transparent and accountable regulatory authorization procedures;

2. Bonuses and prizes for innovators;

3. Innovation waivers,[21] i.e., regulation can facilitate innovation, notably by granting entrepreneurs exemptions from complying with certain rules as long as these companies substantially invest in R&D or authorizing companies to develop certain activities without further requirements;

4. Tax credits for companies investing in R& D projects and cooperating with local universities;

5. Subsidies to R&D projects partially financed by international organizations;

6. Termination of unnecessary regulatory burdens by inserting sunset dispositions in a number of regulations regarding innovative fields;

7. Attractive start-up visa regulations for innovators with concrete business plans involving local natural or human resources that may result in the creation of jobs;

8. Development of clear competition policies and better enforcement of competition laws. This last suggestion shall be further developed in part IV of the Innovation & Antitrust Series.

FOOTNOTES:


[1] Press release of the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, April 12th, 2013, available at http://www.opm.go.ug/news-archive/comesa-innovation-council-inaugurated.html

[2] See African Observatory of Science, Technology and Innovation, Assessing Best Practices of Science, Technology and Innovation, AOSTI Working Papers, No.1 (African Union 2013), available at http://aosti.org/index.php/working-papers/finish/6-working-papers/9-aosti-workingpapers1-executivesummary/0

[3] The African Economic Outlook is an initiative funded by a number of international organizations, including the African Devepment Bank Group, the OECD, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Development Programme for Africa. For more information, see http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/

[4] African Economic Outlook 2013, Special theme: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, pocket edition, available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Pocket%20Edition%20AEO2013-EN.web.pdf

[5] See African Economic Outlook 2009, summary available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/ict-africa/

[6] For an interesting overview of the dynamics of innovation throughout time, see François Caron, Dynamics of Innovation: The Expansion of Technology in Modern Times (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013)

[7] This concern is far from being a recent one, see Wesley A. Magat, ‘The effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation’ (1979) 43 Law & Contemporary Problems 4.

[8] Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf, Überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

[9] James T. O’Reilly, ‘Entrepreneurs and Regulators: Internet Technology, Agency Estoppel, and the Balance of Trust’ (2000) 10 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 63.

[10] Aryeh S. Friedman, ‘Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections’ (1986) Columbia Business Law Review 1.

[11] Robert Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Robert E. Litan, George L. Priest, ‘The importance of law in promoting innovation and growth’ in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation and Growth, Rules for Growth (Kauffman 2011) 6.

[12] Lawrence B. Landman, ‘Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the “Centerpiece” of “New Thinking” on Innovation’ (1998) 13 Saint John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 223.

[13] Michael Porter, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’ (1990) Harvard Business Law Review April-March 75.

[14]For a critical perspective on the Porter’s hypothesis, see Lawrence B. Landman, ‘Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the “Centerpiece” of “New Thinking” on Innovation’ (1998) 13 Saint John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 223, 231-232.

[15] This topic shall be thoroughly analyzed in part IV of Innovation & Antitrust Series.

[16]For an overview, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471.

[17] Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg, ‘Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty’ (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law Review 1033.

[18] Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg, ‘Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty’ (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law Review 1033, 1053.

[19] See the September 2009 Strategy for American Innovation, combining a number of programs focused on the promotion of innovation and Obama’s speech, available at Speech of Barack Obama, August 5, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Spurring-Innovation-Creating-Jobs. A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving Towards Sustainable Growth and Quality Jobs, White Paper, 2009, available <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnovation>

[20] Stuart Minor Benjamin, Arti K. Rai, ‘Fixing Innovation Policy: a Structural Perspective’ (2008) 77 George Washington Law Review 1.

[21] Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf’, Überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

Cable Cartel may lead to battle of the titans

The South African Competition Commission (the Commission) has recently referred its findings of cartel conduct against Alvern Cables, South Ocean Electric Wire Company (SOEW), Tulisa Cables, and Aberdare Cables who are all suppliers of power cables, to the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal). The Power cables include products such as house wire, surface twin and earth wire and are generally made from, amongst other things, copper, aluminium, polyethylene, steel tape and galvanised wire. These power cables are used to distribute electricity to residential and commercial users.

The Commission found that between 2001 to at least 2010, the firms directly or indirectly fixed the selling prices of power cables to wholesalers, distributors and original equipment manufacturers. The Commission, in its referral, is requesting that the maximum penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the companies should be imposed.

Acting Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele had some interesting remarks regarding the matter: “We have been working tirelessly to thwart any effort that goes to undermine South Africa’s global position that provides value to businesses. Our steadily growing economy can ill-afford rogue business practices” This from the same individual who defended the right of Government to intervene on the ill-defined “public interest” criterion in high-profile merger investigations, thus subjecting them to lengthy and costly reviews.
It is noteworthy to mention that amongst the affected customers who bought these products, were the Bidvest Group (Voltex Group), ARB Holdings Ltd; Universal Cables (Pty) Ltd, Trinity Cables CC, Powermac, Paragons and South Atlantic Cables and Electrobase. It is a small group of companies, with a great amount of resources, which could mean that civil damages might be instituted if the alleged cartel members are found guilty before the Tribunal.

Furthermore, the first class action matters based on competition law contraventions which are currently before the high courts of South Africa will be finalsised by the time the cable cartel proceedings have been finalised before the Tribunal, which means there would be a clear picture of the situation where distributors and end consumers institute damages claims simultaneously against the same parties.

The Acting Commissioner
The Acting Commissioner

COMESA Competition Commission web site hacked?

Attack shows risk of unauthorized disclosure of confidential commercial party information

COMESA site hacked with Indonesian love poem
COMESA site hacked with Indonesian love poem

It would appear that the young pan-African antitrust enforcement agency’s web site has been hacked.  The headline on the COMESA Competition Commission’s (“CCC”) home page today seems to indicate a relationship with a web site bearing the Indonesian TLD (top-level domain) “.ID”, and looks like gibberish at first glance.

Then, after some digging, AAT’s editors believed that it might in fact be a tribute or memorial of sorts to the missing crew and passengers of flight MH 370, given the Indonesian language of the text and the disappearance of the jetliner in the Viet-Indo-Malaysian region’s equivalent of the Bermuda Triangle.  The relationship with COMESA escaped us, however.  Yet, upon a final review of the Google Translate result, we can confirm that this is unfortunately not the case.  Instead, it appears to be a (fairly amateurish) love poem (full text in GoogleTranslate’s English below).

With all this wind-up, here comes the real point in the story.  We perceive this hacking event as evidence of a real risk that highly confidential party information (stemming from COMESA merger reviews or other competition investigations) may be vulnerable to accidental or intentional disclosure to unauthorized third parties.  In the United States, the agencies’ unwarranted disclosure of confidential data took center stage in the 2007 aftermath of the $1/2 billion Whole Foods / Wild Oats merger, during which the FTC had accidentally submitted an insufficiently redacted PDF document to the electronic U.S. court filing system ECF, spilling the secret data guts of the case. The Washington Post reported on the story here — just as we are now alerting current or potential future parties to CCC merger reviews regarding the apparently deficient safeguards in the competition enforcer’s electronic systems.  We advise all such interested parties to enquire with the Competition Commission precisely which steps are being taken to ensure the safety of their confidential submissions to the agency.

We also note that the CCC’s site has a very publicly visible page for access to “PRIVATE” documents, protected only by (it would seem) a most simple username/password combination.  The site even allows for a cookie-based “Remember Me” function.  The privacy risks here are manifold, as any e-security expert worth her salt can attest to: Should this “private” document repository contain confidential party information, and if the main home page of the agency has already been subject to a (successful) attack, it is no stretch to imagine that access may have equally been gained to the purportedly private document storage folder on the site.

AAT has contacted the CCC’s web master and leadership, Messrs. George Lipimile and Willard Mwemba, to inquire further about the details of this apparent safety breach.  We will report on their response here once we have heard back from them.

Should readers have any other information on the goings-on at the CCC or its web site, we always appreciate hearing from you, either by way of e-mail or in the comments section to this article.

Full text of COMESA site as of 17. March 2014 (all day) – (update 18. March: the text is still up on the site at 16:40 GMT):

Andika curhatan Dot ID

This heart is sick when you kianati
This heart is fragile when you leave
But this heart grateful you have introduced the meaning of a broken heart

I can still smile while getting bad grades
I can still smile when dropped
But I would not be smiling if it can not meet you

You introduced me to a love
But you were also introduced me to breakup

I’ve never know a woman like you
I also have never loved a woman like you
And I’ve never felt hurt because of you

None other than the beautiful scenery seen
None other than the beautiful singing heard
And no one has to know you regret

This heart will smile with you when both
And this will be a pensive moment waiting to hear from you

Worrying trends in South African merger control – Government’s abuse of process continues unabated

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Secret deals sideline competition authorities

In what can only be described as a significant step backwards in ensuring that the more established of the emerging economies enforce the application of sound and established (e.g., ICN) best practices in relation to merger remedies, AAT has discovered that the much publicised acquisition of South Africa’s AFGRI by international private investment group AgriGroupe has recently been subjected to a private side deal between the South African Government and the merging parties, sidestepping the Commission’s jurisdiction and decision-making competence.  According to its terms, Afgri is obligated to make available R90 million (US$9m, over four years) to certain South African farmers & enrol emerging farmers in development programmes and assist poultry farmers.

Minister’s side deal replaces Competition Act merger remedies

There is little doubt that these forced conditions constitute matters best handled by the relevant antitrust regulator as proper remedies in a merger-control proceeding. At the outer limit, relevant departments such as the Department of Water, Forestry and Fisheries might have input into them.  Yet, it appears that these conditions are purely negotiated by the Minister of Economic Development – the same office that sacked the prior chairman of the Competition Commission, Shan Ramburuth, and which has been subjected to criticism of meddling in the independent authority’s affairs.

Minister Patel

Following the questionable intervention of various South African Government departments in Walmart’s acquisition of Massmart (which is, as we have previously noted, the origin of the non-competition merger remedies), it appears that the same departments have in effect sought to force the merging parties into agreeing to perform services on behalf of the Government in exchange for the departments’ non-intervention before the Competition Tribunal proceedings.

Following a pattern…

Heather Irvine, counsel for the merging parties, confirmed that the “merger was approved (with the agreement as a condition) after the Tribunal hearing yesterday.”  She points out that “this agreement was voluntarily entered into by the merging parties in a spirit of goodwill and as a demonstration of Afgri’s commitment to growing the African food sector, not because of concerns about any public interest issues in terms of the Competition Act,” pointing to the transcript to be made available shortly.  We appreciate counsel’s confirmation that the side agreement was reached entirely outside the confines of the SA Competition Act between the ministry and the parties.

It is apparent that since Minister Patel has assumed his role as Minister of Economic Development (an “activist, interventionist and micromanaging minister,” according to the former Competition Tribunal chairman David Lewis), the competition authorities’ independence has been undermined (see some of our prior articles here and here).   In particular, the merger process is little more than a means by which the South African Government seeks to extract from merging parties a series of additional unwarranted (industrial policy) conditions. It is in our view a highly problematic development.  In sum, the S.A. merger review process remains a highly contentious issue and while the parties in this case sought to placate Government, others may not be as willing.

Telecom adversaries to remain “principled” in their competing bids for 4G spectrum

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The telecoms are at it again, and MTN and Vodacom find themselves close together once more.  Last October, we reported on their being jointly targeted by competitor Cell C for predatory “on-net” pricing.  Today, the two top market players are both eyeing additional spectrum for high-speed LTE/4G wireless service — an asset that can potentially be obtained much more swiftly by acquiring an existing firm owning such spectrum, rather than ex ante licensing or bidding at public auction for frequency band… At the moment, Vodacom is attempting a 100% share acquisition of smaller rival Neotel — a deal that might include valuable frequency.

In a South African Tech Central report, MTN’s group CEO is quoted as saying that he would refrain from “automatically” challenging any such acquisition by his main rival:

Asked if MTN would object to a deal between Vodacom and Neotel at the Competition Commission, MTN Group CEO Sifiso Dabengwa said that the operator would not automatically do so. “The issue here is you can’t take a position because of where you are [in the market],” he said. “It has to be principled, no matter which side you’re on.”

It does not take a clairvoyant to see what is behind MTN’s self-imposed restraint: equal hunger for additional spectrum – and acquisitions – which it does not want to stifle by raising rash arguments of anti-competitive effects of the Vodacom/Neotel deal…

SA Commission appoints mergers head; claims roster of “core” positions now filled

New head of mergers fills final “core” position according to Bonakele; replaces Ramburuth-appointed predecessor

Source: LinkedIn
New head of mergers at SA Competition Commission (Source: LinkedIn)

Following the by now fairly predictable fault lines of the Ramburuth-vs.-[others] staffing game at the Competition Commission, the agency’s crucial Mergers & Acquisitions division now also has a new head.  As of March 1, Hardin Ratshisusu is filling the post of Divisional Manager, after his predecessor Ibrahim Bah‘s departure in December last year created a three-month hiatus.

Bah, having worked at the Irish antitrust regulator for a while*, had been with the South African authority on-and-off since 2008, but had been Divisional Manager only for less than a year, holding the post since January 2013.  His successor Ratshisusu is likewise a former M&A veteran of the agency, having begun his career at the Commission as early as 2004 and with the division since December 2007 as a Senior Merger Analyst.  He also has recent private-practice experience outside government, which we view as a welcome feature on his C.V., in addition to his historical M&A expertise.

Mr. Ratshisusu’s self-description on his LinkedIn profile (with 22 endorsements from others as to M&A) is as follows:

“In the formative years, I started off as an enumerator for SA’s 2001 Census and then a research assistant at the University of Venda, whilst doing my post-graduate studies. I have since worked in the regulatory environment having held various positions at the Competition Commission of South Africa including being Senior Merger Analyst, Acting Divisional Manager of the Mergers and Acquisitions Division and Technical Consultant/Adviser to the Deputy Commissioner. I also had a stint in the economic regulatory division of Neotel (Pty) Ltd. This has given me exposure to a number of industries, including, construction, telecommunications, broadcasting, mining, chemicals, retailing and property. I now have expertise, garnered at both operation and strategic levels, in competition and regulatory economics, strategy, and governance.”

Mr. Ratshisusu’s appointment comes at a time of staffing difficulties at the authority, including most recently the departure of a senior Deputy Commissioner.   In its official release, the Commission’s Acting Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele is quoted as emphasizing the agency’s focus on getting past its recent personnel woes:

“I am pleased that we have now completed the task of filling all vacancies for the heads of the Commission’s core divisions. This will allow us to focus on fulfilling our strategic priorities”

We take it that any remaining open seats on the Commission’s org chart are, by logical inference, to be deemed “non-core” to the functioning of the agency.

The Acting Commissioner: Focusing on
The Acting Commissioner: Focusing on “strategic priorities”, such as the healthcare inquiry and other enforcement

* Mr. Bah co-authored an amusingly-titled mergers paper while at the Irish Competition Authority: “The Curious Tale of Pigs, Papers and Peru: Media Mergers in Ireland“.  It should not come as a surprise that AfricanAntitrust.com’s editors have a faible for anything that contains alliterations…

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