Regulation & Innovation in Africa: A licence to innovate?

Our popular Innovation & Antitrust series continues on its popular path to its 3rd installment, in which its author, Ass’t Professor Sofia Ranchordas, deals with regulation.  Prior pieces included the topics of ‘convergence or customization?’ and the deeply inquisitive ‘in the eye of the beholder…?’  The series continues.

Regulation and Innovation in Africa: licence to innovate?

 new multi-part series

Ass’t Prof. Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

In part II of the African Antitrust Innovation Series, Sofia Ranchordás discussed the relevant concept of ‘innovation’ underlying the discourse on innovation/competition/IP in African countries.  She concluded that in the African context, the advancement of economic growth may imply adopting a context-specific concept of ‘innovation’, where more attention is paid to incremental improvements performed by local innovators. Before analyzing whether competition laws can play a role in the advancement of innovation in the African context, it is important to take two steps back in this third part of the Innovation and Antitrust Series and:

(i) Analyze the African innovation policy context and its challenges;

(ii) Question whether regulation can and should play a role in the advancement of innovation.

(i) Wanted: Innovation in Africa

Up until recently, COMESA did not adopt an interventionist approach towards innovation in its member states, however it was expected that African governments would devote at least one per cent of GDP to R&D. Year after year, member states failed to achieve this objective and COMESA soon realized that in Africa only the South African government (ironically, a non-member) was in state to successfully pursue such goal. In 2012, the COMESA Committee of Ministers of Science and Technology recommended the creation of an Innovation Council and setting up an Innovation Fund, promoting efforts to harmonize intellectual property rights, and continued infrastructure development to facilitate regional trade. The creation of the COMESA Innovation Council in April 2013 evidenced a clear awareness of the importance of enhanced technological innovation for the competitiveness of African countries. This council was conceived mainly ‘to provide advice to member states relating to existing and new knowledge and innovations and best ways of applying it in the member states’.[1] The COMESA Innovation Council departed from the premise that the late adoption of technological innovation would be an advantage for cost effective developments due to the limited negative effects. Besides COMESA, other organizations have been supporting African countries investment in R&D. This is the case of UNESCO which has been coordinating the UN Science & Technology cluster and the African Union through the African Observatory of Science, Technology and Innovation (AOSTI).[2]

While an Innovation Council is much needed in Africa, the question that needs to be posed here is whether these countries really know what it takes to effectively promote innovation. Are African governments enacting the most adequate rules to foster investment and terminating the dispositions that contribute to the innovation chasm that characterizes a number of African countries?

While national governments have been trying to develop their own innovation policies and programmes, it has also been argued that innovation in Africa faces a significant hurdle:  donor nations are the ones setting the tone. Perhaps to ensure that African governments are able to define their own innovation priorities, the COMESA Innovation Council is solely composed by eminent scientists of member countries. However, this may not be enough. In the 2013 African Economic Outlook report,[3] it was underlined that despite Africa’s ‘impressive growth over the past fifteen years (…) institutions and regulations for private sector activity must be further improved. Addressing infrastructure bottlenecks increasing access to key public services (…) would put countries on a durable high growth path and reduce poverty and inequality’.[4] In the specific case of extractive-resource exploration and exploitation, this report explicitly states that more regulations that provide incentives for investment are needed. The 2009 African Economic Outlook had earlier verified that the ineffective African regulatory systems were one of the reasons why African was seriously lagging behind. This 2009 report concluded that ‘African regulators need more muscle’ and particular attention should be paid to telecoms regulators who tend ‘too often favor incumbent fixed-line operators, who have typically problems to make profits, over new entrants (…) [impeding] competition and private investment.’[5]

Willingness to innovate, investment and know-how are certainly essential elements of innovation, but any policy initiatives may be jeopardized by an ineffective regulatory framework. Stating that African regulatory systems must be improved seems to be stating almost the obvious. Explaining why may actually shed more light on how this should be done.  Does regulation really matter for innovation?

(ii) Innovation: law gives, and law may take it away

National laws and regulations can act as ‘licences to innovate’. But they can equally be regarded as obstacles to innovation, should they be excessive, costly and/or cause regulatory delays. Regulation and innovation can either be ‘friends’ or ‘foes’. Regulators can hinder it by imposing too many regulatory requirements with which companies must comply; or instead, facilitate it by providing a rapid and flexible regulation of innovations, and ensuring that novelties are quickly introduced in the market. The mentioned destinies depend notably on how well lawmakers know the nature and dynamics of the innovation process.[6] The relationship between law and regulations and innovation has often been underestimated in the literature and the study of the impact of the former on the latter is often vaguely justified and not supported by empirical evidence.[7] However, this is far from being an unimportant topic: regulation can impede or even facilitate innovation, depending on the type, timing, duration and the dispositions in question.

Regulation as a ‘foe’ to innovation

Legislative or regulatory instruments have been traditionally regarded as obstacles to innovation: the bureaucratic impositions of law are quickly accused of stifling creativity and commercial success, contributing to the image of ‘law as the bogeyman’.[8] This is explained, for example, by the multiple regulatory burdens imposed by regulators that often outweigh the harms they intended to prevent. High compliance costs may have a negative impact on investment, particularly in the case of smaller innovators with more limited capital. In addition, regulation has been regarded as an impediment to innovation because ‘entrepreneurs and government regulators see the world quite differently’: while the first see flexibility and risk as parts of the business, regulators are often risk-averse, preferring stability and long-term predictable outcomes.[9]  Moreover, the lack of experience with the private sector, the growing bureaucracy and entrenchment in agencies led to the enactment of stricter regulation aimed to avoid future problems. This need to regulate the unpredictable generated uncertainty, conflicting regulations, and had counterproductive effects, since the very same rules which aimed at stimulating innovation ended up frustrating it. [10]

Although excessive regulation may stifle regulation, innovation cannot be left unregulated. Innovative products can potentially endanger a number of significant social and economic values (e.g. public health, environment, or fair competition). The regulation of innovation should perform multiple tasks: regulate the risks inherent to novel products and services; ensure that innovators do not innovate beyond and against law; facilitate and even promote the development and implementation of innovations, by creating a legal order adapted or adaptable to the characteristics of the innovation process.[11]

Regulation as a ‘friend’ to innovation

Regulators all over the world are aware of the importance of innovation for a country’s competitiveness and have tried to actively encourage firms to innovate. This was visible in the well-known case of the U.S. Department of Justice’s command on Microsoft to sell its Internet Explorer as a separate product from its Windows operating system.[12] This idea that authorities should actively intervene, can be indirectly derived from the ‘Porter hypothesis’,[13] according to which public authorities, and specifically competition authorities, should guarantee that market forces drive firms to innovate, notably through the implementation of stringent competition policy.[14] The concretization of legislative or administrative interventions in this field does not always need or can be reduced to an aggressive implementation of competition law.[15] Innovation is essential to increase the competitiveness of firms, but the regulation of the former goes beyond competition concerns and requires a comprehensive regulatory approach.

Legal rules do not necessarily stifle innovation, by discouraging entrepreneurs from investing in R&D. Instead, regulation can equally assume a paternalist role and have a positive effect on behavior—as argued by behavioral law and economics scholars—and ultimately influence (‘nudge’) entrepreneurs to make the desired investing decisions.  The general impact of legislation and regulation on human behavior has been studied in the last decades by the behavioral law and economics literature.[16] A behavioral approach to law and economics proceeds to a study of legal rules informed by knowledge about human behavior and attempts to discover how law can be used to achieve particular ends. Behavioral law and economics aims to ‘regulate so as to improve economic welfare by more closely aligning each individual’s actual choices with his “true” or unbiased preferences without reducing his liberty.’[17] There are reasons to believe that this behavioral approach has been shaping policy and rulemaking in the United States, notably under the Obama Administration,[18] which has been particularly interventionist as far as the advancement of innovation is concerned.[19] If this interventionist approach has been successfully implemented in different countries, one can and should ask whether African governments should not also try to ‘nudge’ innovation, exempting innovators from complying with unnecessary burdens, providing better legal protection to investments, and improving the overall transparency of its legal system.

(iii) A regulatory recipe for more innovation

The role played by regulation in the advancement of innovation deserves more attention from most African countries and international organizations operating in this continent. Governmental innovation policies and the regulation of innovation should be elected as priority concerns in the quest for more innovation. [20] African governments could try to combat the innovation chasm that characterizes their systems if they create ‘innovation-friendly’ regulatory frameworks that make their legal systems attractive to investors and innovators. I leave you with a draft of a partial recipe to this ‘friendship’:

1. A solid legal and procedural framework, characterized by transparent and accountable regulatory authorization procedures;

2. Bonuses and prizes for innovators;

3. Innovation waivers,[21] i.e., regulation can facilitate innovation, notably by granting entrepreneurs exemptions from complying with certain rules as long as these companies substantially invest in R&D or authorizing companies to develop certain activities without further requirements;

4. Tax credits for companies investing in R& D projects and cooperating with local universities;

5. Subsidies to R&D projects partially financed by international organizations;

6. Termination of unnecessary regulatory burdens by inserting sunset dispositions in a number of regulations regarding innovative fields;

7. Attractive start-up visa regulations for innovators with concrete business plans involving local natural or human resources that may result in the creation of jobs;

8. Development of clear competition policies and better enforcement of competition laws. This last suggestion shall be further developed in part IV of the Innovation & Antitrust Series.

FOOTNOTES:


[1] Press release of the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, April 12th, 2013, available at http://www.opm.go.ug/news-archive/comesa-innovation-council-inaugurated.html

[2] See African Observatory of Science, Technology and Innovation, Assessing Best Practices of Science, Technology and Innovation, AOSTI Working Papers, No.1 (African Union 2013), available at http://aosti.org/index.php/working-papers/finish/6-working-papers/9-aosti-workingpapers1-executivesummary/0

[3] The African Economic Outlook is an initiative funded by a number of international organizations, including the African Devepment Bank Group, the OECD, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Development Programme for Africa. For more information, see http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/

[4] African Economic Outlook 2013, Special theme: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, pocket edition, available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Pocket%20Edition%20AEO2013-EN.web.pdf

[5] See African Economic Outlook 2009, summary available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/ict-africa/

[6] For an interesting overview of the dynamics of innovation throughout time, see François Caron, Dynamics of Innovation: The Expansion of Technology in Modern Times (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013)

[7] This concern is far from being a recent one, see Wesley A. Magat, ‘The effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation’ (1979) 43 Law & Contemporary Problems 4.

[8] Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf, Überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

[9] James T. O’Reilly, ‘Entrepreneurs and Regulators: Internet Technology, Agency Estoppel, and the Balance of Trust’ (2000) 10 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 63.

[10] Aryeh S. Friedman, ‘Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections’ (1986) Columbia Business Law Review 1.

[11] Robert Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Robert E. Litan, George L. Priest, ‘The importance of law in promoting innovation and growth’ in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation and Growth, Rules for Growth (Kauffman 2011) 6.

[12] Lawrence B. Landman, ‘Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the “Centerpiece” of “New Thinking” on Innovation’ (1998) 13 Saint John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 223.

[13] Michael Porter, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’ (1990) Harvard Business Law Review April-March 75.

[14]For a critical perspective on the Porter’s hypothesis, see Lawrence B. Landman, ‘Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the “Centerpiece” of “New Thinking” on Innovation’ (1998) 13 Saint John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 223, 231-232.

[15] This topic shall be thoroughly analyzed in part IV of Innovation & Antitrust Series.

[16]For an overview, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471.

[17] Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg, ‘Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty’ (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law Review 1033.

[18] Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg, ‘Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty’ (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law Review 1033, 1053.

[19] See the September 2009 Strategy for American Innovation, combining a number of programs focused on the promotion of innovation and Obama’s speech, available at Speech of Barack Obama, August 5, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Spurring-Innovation-Creating-Jobs. A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving Towards Sustainable Growth and Quality Jobs, White Paper, 2009, available <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnovation>

[20] Stuart Minor Benjamin, Arti K. Rai, ‘Fixing Innovation Policy: a Structural Perspective’ (2008) 77 George Washington Law Review 1.

[21] Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf’, Überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

SA Commission appoints mergers head; claims roster of “core” positions now filled

New head of mergers fills final “core” position according to Bonakele; replaces Ramburuth-appointed predecessor

Source: LinkedIn
New head of mergers at SA Competition Commission (Source: LinkedIn)

Following the by now fairly predictable fault lines of the Ramburuth-vs.-[others] staffing game at the Competition Commission, the agency’s crucial Mergers & Acquisitions division now also has a new head.  As of March 1, Hardin Ratshisusu is filling the post of Divisional Manager, after his predecessor Ibrahim Bah‘s departure in December last year created a three-month hiatus.

Bah, having worked at the Irish antitrust regulator for a while*, had been with the South African authority on-and-off since 2008, but had been Divisional Manager only for less than a year, holding the post since January 2013.  His successor Ratshisusu is likewise a former M&A veteran of the agency, having begun his career at the Commission as early as 2004 and with the division since December 2007 as a Senior Merger Analyst.  He also has recent private-practice experience outside government, which we view as a welcome feature on his C.V., in addition to his historical M&A expertise.

Mr. Ratshisusu’s self-description on his LinkedIn profile (with 22 endorsements from others as to M&A) is as follows:

“In the formative years, I started off as an enumerator for SA’s 2001 Census and then a research assistant at the University of Venda, whilst doing my post-graduate studies. I have since worked in the regulatory environment having held various positions at the Competition Commission of South Africa including being Senior Merger Analyst, Acting Divisional Manager of the Mergers and Acquisitions Division and Technical Consultant/Adviser to the Deputy Commissioner. I also had a stint in the economic regulatory division of Neotel (Pty) Ltd. This has given me exposure to a number of industries, including, construction, telecommunications, broadcasting, mining, chemicals, retailing and property. I now have expertise, garnered at both operation and strategic levels, in competition and regulatory economics, strategy, and governance.”

Mr. Ratshisusu’s appointment comes at a time of staffing difficulties at the authority, including most recently the departure of a senior Deputy Commissioner.   In its official release, the Commission’s Acting Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele is quoted as emphasizing the agency’s focus on getting past its recent personnel woes:

“I am pleased that we have now completed the task of filling all vacancies for the heads of the Commission’s core divisions. This will allow us to focus on fulfilling our strategic priorities”

We take it that any remaining open seats on the Commission’s org chart are, by logical inference, to be deemed “non-core” to the functioning of the agency.

The Acting Commissioner: Focusing on
The Acting Commissioner: Focusing on “strategic priorities”, such as the healthcare inquiry and other enforcement

* Mr. Bah co-authored an amusingly-titled mergers paper while at the Irish Competition Authority: “The Curious Tale of Pigs, Papers and Peru: Media Mergers in Ireland“.  It should not come as a surprise that AfricanAntitrust.com’s editors have a faible for anything that contains alliterations…

south_africa

Antitrust & Innovation series, part II: “Innovation: in the eye of the beholder?”

Two weeks ago, assistant Professor of Law (Tilburg Univ.) Sofia Ranchordas gave us a first glimpse into Innovation & Antitrust – a hot topic especially in the developing BRICS economies – in the opening salvo of her ongoing series of posts on the issue.

By: Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

new multi-part series
A multi-part series on Innovation & Antitrust

‘Innovation’: is it in the eye of the beholder?

In my first short working paper (‘Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?’) I questioned whether the globalization of competition and IP laws was pushing developing countries in the sense of convergence, and whether this tendency was beneficial for these countries’ quest for innovation. I also posed five guiding questions and invited the reader to think about the trichotomy ‘innovation/IP/competition laws’ in the context of developing countries. This second post addresses the first question and the point of departure of this analysis:

What is innovation?

A mere definition of ‘innovation’ does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Therefore, I will also discuss a number of topics and try to provoke further discussion on (i) the concept of innovation, (ii) the context-specificity of the concept; (iii) and some key drivers of innovation in developing countries.

Let’s ‘begin at the beginning’ and ‘go till we come to the end:[1] the ‘innovation’ that should be stimulated or safeguarded by competition or IP laws (or both) in African countries.

(i) Innovation: what’s in a name?

In the legal literature, ‘innovation’ is often imprecisely associated with the development of ‘something significantly new’: [2] what ‘does something new’ mean? New to whom? How new is new enough? ‘Innovation’ should be distinguished from ‘invention’: the conception of a new idea, a discovery or a unique finding. [3] A genius idea or a cutting-edge invention cannot be automatically qualified as ‘innovations’ before they are introduced in the marketplace. In simple terms, innovation is the ‘process of putting ideas into useful form and bringing them to the market’.[4] The innovator is the one that successfully manages to successfully concretize an idea, commercialize it, or in the case of social innovation, externalize it to society. The innovative ideas included in the concept of ‘innovation’ refer to new products, processes, services and public policies, which may have either a commercial goal or simply an altruistic aim to solve social problems. The core element of the concept of ‘innovation’ I would like to point out is therefore (a) the successful externalization and concretization of ideas. However,  an innovation must also be the (b) first concretization of these ideas.

(ii) Innovation: a context-specific concept?

How can we measure the newness element of innovation? Must this be the first externalization ever of a new idea translated into the commercialization of a new product? From an IP rationale, the answer would be yes: the first ever. However, we should ask ourselves whether this makes sense in Africa. Is the concept of ‘innovation’ context-specific? Is it in the ‘eye of the beholder’? Can we really expect poor countries to develop cutting-edge technology while their R&D spending is limited? We surely want to stimulate and safeguard the same type of innovation present in developed countries, but from a policy point of view, is this realistic?

 Innovation as a relative concept?  According to Srinivas/Schutz, innovation is contextual/sector-specific, i.e., innovation depends on the socioeconomic conditions it is embedded in and should therefore ‘meet the needs of the most people, especially in countries where innovation and poverty reside side by side’.[5] If we reflect upon this topic from the perspective of the stimulation and diffusion of the ‘innovation spirit’ and good innovation policies to African countries, we might want to adopt a less strict concept of innovation and content ourselves with a relative concept of innovation for these developing countries.

Inspired in the literature on policy diffusion, we might perhaps want to perceive innovation here as something that ‘it is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states have adopted it’.[6] The facilitation of innovation in a different context might still pose important challenges to a developing country even if it has been implemented elsewhere. According to this perspective, the ‘newness’ of the innovation in question is not assessed in absolute terms but related to the experience and knowledge of the jurisdiction in question. This may mean that African innovators are allowed to stand in the shoulders of other innovators, ‘imitate them’ (?) and concretize their ideas within a circumscribed territory. This is perhaps easily applicable to innovative programs or policies, but should African countries not be stimulated to develop innovative products with their own resources and adapted to their local characteristics, even if they are similar to existing products in developed countries? (Potential IP concerns shall be discussed a few weeks in one of my next posts) While this less ambitious perspective of innovation takes into account the socioeconomic conditions of developing countries, it almost goes against the globalization trend that is fighting for convergences of laws and policies. In addition, a relative concept of innovation opens the door to free-riding and may not give incentives to the development of truly innovative products and processes.

Leaving IP and other legal concerns aside for now, I would like to introduce briefly some of the relevant incentives or favorable conditions to the emergence of innovation.

(iii) The drivers of innovation

Ashford/Hall argue that innovation is determined by three decisive factors that should be present at the firm and governmental levels: (a) willingness to innovate; (b) opportunity/motivation to do so; and (c) capacity to innovate.[7] I would like to mention an additional external driver: competition.

(a) Willingness to innovate refers to how firms and individuals perceive changes in production, understand technological or social problems, develop and assess alternative solutions for it. While this ambition may easily be found in developed countries, underdevelopment, limited capacity of higher education, and profound scarcity may affect this willingness to innovate.

(b) Opportunity and (c) capacity to innovation are influenced by external factors, including the regulatory conditions faced by firms. Ashford has claimed that regulation, by taking these elements into account, can create ‘an atmosphere conducive to innovation’.[8] Innovators in African countries face however here significant hurdles. Although governments are aware of the need to enhance their R&D spending, they still have not been able to find the adequate mix of regulatory instruments that can create a sound regulatory environment for innovation.[9]

(d) Competition: in simplistic terms, it is often argued that competition drives innovators because companies feel, on the one hand, the pressure to be more cost-efficient notably through the development of innovative production processes; on the other, to stand out of the crowd of competitors, differentiating their products from the existing ones and offering consumers innovative and better products. Innovative companies are those that leave their comfort zone and strive for better products and processes. However, leaving your comfort zone implies taking risks that developing countries might not be willing to embrace. Although ‘necessity is the mother of invention’, innovators in African countries might need a helping hand from their governments to solve the ‘innovation chasm’ that often characterizes them.[10] This ‘innovation chasm’ is currently affecting these last three drivers of innovation. Can law—particularly Antitrust & Competition laws—play a role here? Can laws provide wings to African innovators to fly in the direction of innovation? Or will innovators feel prisoned and palsied by these giant wings?[11]

This discussion will continue in the next post of this series: in the meantime, keep reading, discussing and searching for innovation…


[1] Adapted quote from Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865)

[2] Stefan Müller, ‘Innovationsrecht—Konturen einer Rechtsmaterie’ (2013) 2 Innovations- und Technikrecht 58, 60.

[3] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (first published in 1939, Harper, 1942) Luke A. Stewart, ‘The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States: A Cross-Industry Literature Review’, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 2010, paper commissioned by the Institute of Medicine Committee on Patient Safety and Health IT, available at www.iom.edu, 1.

[4] Eugene Fitzgerald; Andreas Wankerl; Carl J. Schramm, Inside Real Innovation: How the Right Approach Can Move Ideas from R&D to Market and Get The Economy Moving (Kauffman Foundation, World Scientific Publishing 2011) 2.

[5] Smita Srinivas, Judith Schutz, ‘Developing Countries and Innovation: Searching for a New Analytical Approach’ (2008) 30 Technology in Society 129.

[6] Jack L. Walker, ‘The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States’ (1969) 63(3) The American Political Science Review 880, 881.

[7] Nicholas A. Ashford; Ralph P. Hall, ‘The Importance of Regulation-Induced Innovation for Sustainable Development’ (2011) 3 Sustainability 270, 279.

[8] Nicholas A. Ashford; Christine Ayers; Robert F. Stone, ‘Using Regulation to Change the Market For Innovation’ (1985) 9 Harvard Environmental Law Review419, 422.

[9] See, for exemple, the Report by the SA Department of Science and Technology, ‘A knowledge-based economy. A ten-year plan for South Africa (2008-2018)’ available at http://www.esastap.org.za/download/sa_ten_year_innovation_plan.pdf

[10] Department of Science and Technology, ‘A knowledge-based economy. A ten-year plan for South Africa (2008-2018)’ available at http://www.esastap.org.za/download/sa_ten_year_innovation_plan.pdf

[11] Inspired in the English translation of ‘L’ albatros’ by Charles Baudelaire (Les Fleurs du Mal), by Jacques Le Jacques LeClercq, Flowers of Evil  (Mt Vernon, NY: Peter Pauper Press, 1958). The original verse is ‘Le Poète est semblable au prince de nuées (…) ses ailes de géant l´empêchent de marcher’.

S. African antitrust watchdog described as “toxic” by insider

south_africa

Trade union NEHAWU’s influence over agency staff cited as reason for departure

According to an excellent piece in the ZA Financial Mail – written by Andile Makholwa* and entitled “Competition Commission Bleeds Staff” – departing Acting Deputy Commissioner Trudi Makhaya has explained in detail her recent decision to leave the antitrust authority, describing a “toxic” work environment there since at least October 2013.  On the staffing front, Acting Commissioner Bonakele is quoted as regretting her departure, saying that “one of his priorities is to repair the fractured relations with senior managers and contain the staff exodus.” In the article, Makhaya is cited as bemoaning the increasing influence of NEHAWU (a powerful trade union) over the agency and its staff.

Ms. Makhaya (photo credit: Financial Mail)

While Ms. Makhaya has had her fair share of agit-prop P.R. published under her name (see, eg., her piece published this piece in the Daily Maverick, entitledThe temptations of neo-volkskapitalisme), her insider revelations of NEHAWU’s unduly high influence over the Commission are particularly interesting.

Many ZA commentators have lamented the increasingly pervasive sway that trade unions have in merger-control talks with the enforcer.  This is especially important in light of South Africa’s merger-control regime having express “public interest criteria” embedded in its legislation.

Two ZA antitrust lessons

  1. The legislation’s social agenda element, combined with the now confirmed unions’ influence over agency staff, may have resulted (and will likely result in the future, if unchecked) in extensive so-called “public-interest” conditions imposed on otherwise unproblematic transactions that pose no pure antitrust issues.
  2. The ZA Competition Commission has received extensive bad press of late.  Now, even insiders speak out about the (personnel, rather than structural) problems that have befallen the agency.  Specialist publications (such as Global Competition Review, which publishes a dedicated review and ranking of government antitrust enforcement agencies, in which the Commission used to fare rather well), as well as practitioners and the courts, may perceive these developments as significant steps backward for an institution that once was lauded as a shining example of developing competition-law authorities.  Even Acting Commissioner Bonakele admits that the authority is “in a rebuilding phase. All I can say is that the commission is losing a key staff member. It’s a setback. When you’re rebuilding an institution you need all hands on deck,” and the minister in chage (Patel) believes the Commission too independent.

 

* The author also wrote an interesting piece on the Competition Commission‘s sectoral health-care inquiry (we reported here and elsewhere) in last week’s FM.

AAT launches multi-part “@innovation & #antitrust” series

Philips changed its company slogan from “We make things better” to “We create better ideas”

new multi-part series

Philips is but one of the companies – albeit a pioneer – that recognizes the crucial forward-looking importance of innovation.  Its CEO, Frans van Houten, has been quoted as saying: “Innovation is our lifeblood and will be the main driver of profitable growth going forward. … I intend to drive innovation with more intensity to help us win new customers.”

The U.S. Department of Commerce published a 2010 report claiming that 75% of U.S. economic growth since the end of World War II is attributable to innovation in technology.

Antitrust law is likewise cognizant of the uniqueness of ideas — the result of innovation — rather than old-fashioned brick-and-mortar “products & services”.  For instance, how do you define the relevant market for a merger of ideas-based companies?  The agencies have come to accept the existence of innovation markets almost two decades ago, in the mid-1990s (based on the original “R&D markets” concept of the 1980s, and driven in no insignificant part by the advent and meteoric rise of biotechnology patents).  The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines now expressly incorporate the concept of innovating as a relevant metric of competitiveness into their language, notably at section 1 of the HMG: A transaction may have anti-competitive effects if it strengthens a firm’s market power by encouraging market participant(s) “to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”

We at AAT are now previewing a series of posts on innovation & antitrust to be published during the spring and summer of 2014. They will be hash-tagged #AntitrustInnovation on Twitter.

You can read our first installment of the thematic collection here (last post on innovation, competition and IP in developing countries), written by contributing author and Tilburg University scholar Sofia Ranchordás.

We expect the series to engender active discussions with, and within, our readership, either via comments on this site or on Twitter.

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Advance africanantitrust.com publication of working paper

By: Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

new multi-part series
new multi-part series on Innovation & Antitrust

Innovation: a path to long-term economic growth,[1]hope for economic recovery,[2] and a vital opportunity for economies in developing countries.[3] Innovation is the Holy Grail we would all like drink from. Individuals dedicate their lives to its pursuit, governments invest significant amounts of money in R&D, but despite decades of research on ‘the wealth of nations’, we remain with a poor perception of innovation as a ‘complex and mysterious phenomenon’[4] that should be stimulated, although no one knows very well how.[5]

Government intervention in itself is insufficient and it might rather have costly results, if incorrectly targeted.[6] This is particularly true when it comes to the inevitable relationship between legal conditions and innovation since the lack of an effective legal framework is in the poorest countries the main obstacle to innovation and consequently to economic growth.[7] In this context, during many years, law was simply told to stay away and admire it from a distance to avoid impeding innovation. However, beyond laboratories, laborious inventions and serendipitous discoveries, law can play a greater role than a mere walk-on in the ‘innovation film’. In fact, law can act as a ‘brakeman’ or ‘a driver’ of innovation.[8] Competition and IP law have been competing for the supporting role of ‘drivers of innovation’. Here this ‘innovation film’ does not take place in the EU or in the US, but in developing countries trying to promote domestic innovation while adopting competition laws and being forced to respect IP rights that incentivize innovation in the Western world. In such context, and before the audition starts, five questions must be posed: (i) What is innovation and what type of innovation do governments aim to promote? (ii) Should and can law in general interfere in the regulation of innovation? (iii) How can competition law play a role in the promotion of innovation? (iv) Should competition law not remain in the shadow of Intellectual Property (IP’) laws that are already designed to provide innovators with incentives or should it be the other way around? (v) Last but not the least, in the context of the problematic trichotomy antitrust/IP/innovation, should a customized approach be conceived for developing countries characterized by different socioeconomic conditions or should one plea for convergence?

In this article (and subsequently, expanded paper), I reflect upon the role of law, and particularly competition laws, in the promotion of innovation in developing countries and the problematic relationship between IP, competition laws and innovation. Up until now, (competition) law’s potential to drive innovation has been either closely associated with patent law[9] or analyzed on a mere casuistic basis in the setting of specific antitrust or mergers cases.[10] However, the enforcement of competition laws against unlawful monopolizing conduct plays in general an undeniable role in the promotion of innovation.[11] Competition law promotes innovation by removing barriers to freedom of choice, trade and market access and prevents the formation of monopolies or conditions in the marketplace susceptible of stifling the development of new products. This implies however analyzing the connection between the market structure and the ability to influence undertakings to innovate:[12] while in some cases, a large number of companies on the market may slow down innovation, in others, the lack of competitive pressure may reduce the incentives to innovate (e.g. international market of derived financial products).[13]

Although the debate on the promotion of innovation has been restricted to developed countries, the promotion of innovation is equally vital for developing countries, notably in Africa.[14] These countries are looking up to the EU and US and trying to adopt similar competition laws and policies.[15] What’s more, a number of developing countries have been deriving their antitrust legal frameworks from Western countries, as a result of trade agreements. Globalization appears to push developing countries in the sense of convergence, but is this tendency beneficial for these countries quest for innovation? Absolute convergence of antitrust enforcement might not suit the current economic stage of most developing countries, particularly in Africa. A ‘Western’ design of antitrust laws and policies might not fit the socioeconomic conditions of these countries. This might be particularly problematic when governments are struggling to promote local innovation but face inevitable IP constraints.

Reconciling the difficult relationship between antitrust and patent law can be particularly complex in African countries since patent policy has a significant impact on development. Although one might at first think that developing countries should emphasize patent policy, as they are considerably behind the global technological frontier and are craving domestic innovation, they cannot afford the short-term consumer welfare loss that must be incurred to generate patentee reward.[16] Some African countries like South Africa have been developing a solid IP regulatory framework so as to incentivize innovation,[17] but many lack the technological and financial capacity to invest in R&D. In such cases, access to protected technologies on reasonable terms may be the key to more domestic innovation. What does this mean for the trichotomy innovation-IP-competition? Although developing countries urgently require innovation,[18] should their competition authorities look less up to Western models and rather question whether they should sacrifice consumer welfare by upholding patent exploitation practices?

Instead of pushing developing countries toward convergence of global competition policy, the specific socioeconomic conditions of these countries should be taken into consideration. Thomas Cheng argues, rightly so one might say, that ‘antitrust principles and doctrines need to be tailored to domestic economic circumstances. Markets and economies function differently in developing countries and antitrust laws should reflect these differences.[19] This is a particularly important lesson for African countries as they are prone to imitate the approaches of developed countries without the required customization. Different suggestions have been advanced in the literature, such as the reduction of patent protection in developing countries, allowing even the imitation of foreign technology so that domestic innovators possess a technological basis they can further develop,[20] or the expansion of compulsory licensing beyond certain drugs for developing countries.[21]

This contribution aimed to draw attention to the challenging role of law as the driver (or at least guardian) of innovation in developing countries. Competition and IP laws both wish to share a supporting role in this ‘innovation film’ taking place in developing countries. Should they be granted this part in a context of convergence of laws and policies or should IP remain in the shadow in order to ensure that the innovation film can successfully be produced and released in the theaters? You decide who gets the part at this audition; however, recalling Eleanor Fox’ words ‘antitrust should not be used to protect David from Goliath, but it may be used to empower David against Goliath’.[22]

To be continued…


[1] Richard S. Whitt, ‘Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy’ (2009) 61(3) Federal Communications Law Journal 485.

[2] BERR, ‘Regulation and Innovation: evidence and policy implications’, BERR Economics Paper No.4, 2008, iv.

[3] Jean-Eric Aubert, ‘Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework’ (2004) World Bank Institute, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KFDLP/Resources/0-3097AubertPaper[1].pdf

[4] D. Augey, ‘Les mystères de l’innovation: le regard contemporain de l’économie et de la gestion’ (2013) In J. Mestre, & L. Merland, Droit et Innovation (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille) 89, 91.

[5] Joshua D. Sarnoff, ‘Government choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change)’ (2013) 62 Emory Law Journal, 1087.

[6] B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347.

[7] Robert Cooter, ‘Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law Review 373.

[8] W. Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit rechtswissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung’, in D. Sauer, Christa Lang (Eds.), Paradoxien der Innovation: Perspektiven sozialwissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung (Campus Verlag 1999). Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf’, überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

[9] Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See Christine A. Varney, ‘Promoting Innovation Through Patent and Antitrust Law and Policy’ (2010), Department of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice on the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260101.pdf.

[10] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69. Pierre Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation’ (2009) 75 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 933. François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilitaties: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ (2005) 28 World Competition 71.

[11] Douglas Rosenthal, ‘Do Intellectual Property Laws Promote Competition & Innovation?’ (2006) 7 Sedona Conference Journal 143.

[12] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69.

[13] COMP/M.6166, NYSE Euronext / Deutsche Börse.

[14] Smita Srinivas, Judith Sutz, ‘Developing countries and innovation: Searching for a new analytical approach’(2008) 30 Technology in Society 129.

[15] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1.

[16] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1, 3.

[17] Alexis Apostolidis, ‘IP Law in South Africa: Key Cases and Issues’ (2009) ASPATORE WL 2029096.

[18] There is a significant body of literature arguing that IP does not necessarily promote innovation. For an overview, see, e.g., B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347. Julie E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs: Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’ (2007) 40 U.C. Davis L. Review 1151.

[19] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 79.

[20] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 4.

[21] Colleen Chien, ‘ Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 853.

[22] Eleanor M. Fox, ‘ Economic development, Poverty and Antitrust: the Other Path’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 211.

South Africa: another senior Commission member resigns

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It has recently been reported that Ms Trudi Makhaya, the Deputy Competition Commissioner, has resigned. There has been no indication yet on a replacement but it signals a continuation of the worrying trend of senior experienced Commission staff departing the authority.

For further information see the attached link.  Her twitter and LinkedIn accounts remain unaffected by her resignation as of Feb. 11, as both still show her job title as Competition Commission executive.  She is likewise still listed on the Commission’s web site as active.  We previously reported on one of her opinion pieces here.  She also recently published this piece in the Daily Maverick, entitled “The temptations of neo-volkskapitalisme“.

Competition Commission releases latest newsletter

A couple of months after its official release date, the SACC’s latest newsletter, “CompetitionNEWS (December 2013 ed. no. 47), is finally out.

For those interested, the South African Competition Commission has published a piece largely consisting of the agency’s internal personnel news and photographs of “cultural dinners” & the like (even screenshots of related tweets?)…  One of the only substantive sections appears to be the half-pager on p.15 summarising “conditions placed on mergers during September-November 2013.”  Other than that, it’s picture time and a recapitulation of the ICN Cape Town event.

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Readers of AfricanAntitrust.com have full access to the PDF here.

Competition Commission fails to find conclusive evidence of supermarket violations

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Competition Commission concludes exclusive-lease investigation without taking action

John Oxenham, Nortons Inc.

The South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) has recently announced that it has concluded its investigation into the major retail grocery stores, namely Shoprite Holdings Ltd, Woolworths Holdings Ltd, the Spar Group Ltd and Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd, as well as wholesale retailers, Massmart Holding Ltd and Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd for alleged contraventions of the Competition Act in relation to exclusive lease agreements.

By way of factual background, the Commission initiated an investigation in 2009 against Shoprite, Woolworths, Spar, Massmart, Metcash and Pick ‘n Pay in which the Commission  examined various competition concerns including buyer power, category management, information exchange and long-term exclusive lease agreements. The Commission’s initial investigation uncovered no evidence of competition contraventions, yet subsequently the Commission decided to focus its investigation on the long-term exclusive lease agreements, evaluating whether they could potentially give rise to contraventions of abuse of dominance and restrictive vertical practices.

The Commission’s investigation failed to find sufficient evidence to meet the tests set out in the Competition Act to proceed with the investigation. As a result, the Commission has decided not to refer the matter to the Competition Tribunal, concluding that “on the basis of the evidence before the commission, the anti-competitive effects of the conduct could not be demonstrated conclusively.

Image Credit: SA Sunday Times

More or less competition in African mobile payments sector?

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More countries may enter the mix of players – but at the platform level, competition may have stagnated

As we reported last month, the mobile payments sector is going gangbusters on the African continent.  Kenya is ahead of the game, but other countries are closing in.

Kenya itself is considered by many to be at the forefront of the African mobile-payments universe, with its M-Pesa mobile-currency system often touted as the most developed mobile-payment system in the world.  The Economist asked rhetorically: “Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?”, pointing out that roughly 25% of Kenya’s GDP flows through the mobile service, with over 17 million users in Kenya alone.  The WorldBank has commented that “Mobile payments go viral [with] M-PESA in Kenya.”

Earlier this week, South African media outlet Business Tech published an interesting comparative piece on the issue, entitled “Africa leads in mobile banking“.  The article shows (also graphically, see below) how  and South Africa are close rivals to the Kenyan leadership in the mobile payments industry:

Image credit: Business Tech

What triggered the article is the release of the MEF-Africa report on mobile payments on the continent, which provides much of the content of the Business Tech piece.

One of the key developments highlighted is that M-Pesa’s platform may soon see a major upgrade in South Africa (where it is run by Vocadom and Nedbank), according to the article, linking the system directly with the brick-and-mortar banks’ platforms.  This may either (1) cement the relative market dominance of M-Pesa or (2) spur further innovation and enhance the overall competitiveness of the still rather young industry.