ECOWAS: ERCA Approves first Merger with Conditions

By Jannes van der Merwe

Since the election of the Council for the Economic Community of West African States’ (“ECOWAS”) competition authority, the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (“ERCA”) on 1 October 2024, the ERCA has taken significant strides in bolstering the region’s M&A presence.

The council of the ERCA approved its first merger with conditions on 8 August 2025 when the council approved the acquisition of MultiChoice Group Limited by the Canal+ Group SAS. This decision follows a detailed assessment carried out under the ECOWAS Community Competition Rules and the regulatory framework governing mergers and acquisitions within the common market. The transaction was formally notified to the Authority on 24 March 2025 and was declared complete on 2 May 2025 after all procedural requirements and conditions were satisfied.

The operation involves Canal+ increasing its shareholding in MultiChoice from an existing minority position of c.45.2%, to full control. Both companies are competitors in the distribution of audiovisual services in the ECOWAS region.

The Authority examined the structure of the regional audiovisual market which includes wholesale content supply and retail audiovisual services delivered through satellite digital terrestrial television and online streaming. Although the market is highly concentrated and characterized by strong players the analysis showed limited overlap between the parties due to linguistic segmentation. While the combined entity would hold a significant share at the community level the merger was not expected to substantially reduce competition within national markets. The presence of alternative providers including regional and global digital platforms also contributes to ongoing competitive pressure.

The Council of the ERCA acknowledged concerns expressed by stakeholders and consumers regarding potential risks of market dominance price increases and reduced content diversity. As a result, the acquisition was approved subject to conditions. The first of its kind in the common market.

The Council of the ERCA imposed the following conditions on Canal+:

  1. Canal+ is required to maintain a diverse range of audiovisual offerings for French and English speaking audiences;
  2. Canal+ to preserve existing distribution networks; and
  3. Comply strictly with competition rules and to also annually report to the Authority and notify any price changes to enable effective monitoring.

Michael-James Currie, director at Primerio, states: “This conditional merger is evidence that the ERCA intends to strike a balance between promoting investment into the region, while also considering the effects on the market and consumers.”

Clarifying the Suspensory Regime: Key Insights from Egypt’s 2025 Competition Q&A

By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Holly Joubert

In June 2025, the Egyptian Competition Authority (“ECA”) released a soft-law guidance tool entitled “Q&As concerning the ex ante control of economic concentrations pursuant to Law no. 3/2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and its amendments” (the “Q&A”), which provides a number of clarifications with respect to its merger control regime. We summarise the most notable features of the Q&A below, with respect to notification thresholds and procedure.

  1. Notification Thresholds

The Q&A provides clarity as to the definition of an ‘economic concentration’ notifiable with the ECA. In this regard, an ‘economic concentration’ is defined as any ‘change of control or material influence’. The ECA’s determination of a change of control follows the ordinary standards, such as owning over half of the total voting rights or shares in a firm, the ability to use or exploit the majority of assets of another firm, any acquisition of rights which confer the ability to appoint the majority of directors or control the decisions of the board of a firm. The ECA will further consider material influence to arise where a person obtains ownership of 25% or more of the total voting rights of another person, essentially conferring special rights or veto rights in respect of a firm. The Q&A clarifies in this regard that owning less than 10% of the total rights, shares, or stocks is not likely to result in material influence.

Additionally, the ECA reaffirmed that market shares are irrelevant to the notification requirement. If parties in a transaction meet the specified threshold, a filing is a mandatory step regardless of their market position.

Helpfully, the Q&A provides helpful insight in relation to the ECA’s financial thresholds required for notification of economic transactions. Generally, the ECA prescribes both a domestic threshold and an international threshold:

DomesticWorldwide
Threshold met if the combined annual turnover or asset value (whichever is higher) of parties to the economic concentration in Egypt equals or exceeds EGP 900 million (c. USD 19 million) and individually each party exceeds turnover of EGP200 million (c. USD 4 million) in Egypt.Threshold met if the worldwide combined annual turnover equals or exceeds EGP 7.5 billion (c. USD 159 million) and the target firm exceeds turnover in Egypt of EGP 200 million. (c. USD 4 million)
  • Clarity in respect of the ECA’s simplified notification procedure  

Under the ECA’s notification procedures, it prescribes the ability of parties to notify economic concentrations under a ‘simplified procedure’. This procedure was introduced to enable low-risk transactions that will not result in substantial competition concerns, and which are capable of expeditious review to be assessed and cleared within 20 business days. Under the ordinary notification procedure, the ECA prescribes a review period of 30 business days for Phase 1 notifications and 60 business days for Phase 2 (complex) notifications. Additionally, both Phases 1 and 2 reviews are capable of being extended by a further 15 business days if remedies are proposed.

Under the simplified notification procedure, parties are required to complete a short-form notification file with the ECA, which significantly assists in the preparation and finalisation of economic concentration notifications, particularly with respect to large-scale multinational transactions.

The simplified procedure is, however, only available to parties who meet the notification thresholds prescribed above and who also fall within the following simplified financial thresholds. These are also split between a domestic and worldwide threshold:

DomesticWorldwide
Domestic threshold will be met where the combined annual turnover or asset value of the parties in Egypt does not exceed EGP 2 billion.Worldwide threshold will be met where the annual turnover or asset value in Egypt of the target does not exceed EGP 500 million. (c. USD 10.6 million)

John Oxenham, director at Primerio notes that “Importantly, prior to utilising the simplified procedure and in order to prevent delays in assessment, parties should be minded to engage with the ECA as to whether these requirements are met, particularly where it appears that parties are able to meet one of the simplified thresholds.”

To intervene or not to intervene: a twisted tale in Pepkor’s proposed acquisition of Shoprite’s furniture business

By Michael-James Currie and Joshua Eveleigh

Participation by third parties in merger control proceedings has long been a fundamental aspect of South Africa’s merger control regime. In this regard, section 53(c)(v) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (“Act”) broadly permits that that any person whom the Tribunal has recognized as a “participant” in a merger hearing, may “participate” in that hearing.

The scope of section 53(c)(v), however, has recently been ventilated before the Tribunal, Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) and the Constitutional Court (i.e., South Africa’s top court) in respect of Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd’s (“Lewis”) application to intervene in the proposed merger between Pepkor Holdings Limited (“Pepkor”) and Shoprite Holdings Limited (“Shoprite”) (collectively, the “Merging Parties”)(“Proposed Transaction”).

Background

In brief, the Proposed Transaction relates to Pepkor’s acquisition of the furniture business of Shoprite, consisting of OK Furniture and House & Home retail brands, which will subsequently be incorporated into Pepkor’s existing furniture, bedding and plugged goods retail business.

As part of its investigations, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) found that the Proposed Transaction would give rise to horizontal overlaps in the supply of:

  • Furniture products; and
  • Bed sets and mattresses.

The SACC also received concerns about the potential effects of the Proposed Transaction from different market participants, including Lewis. Nevertheless, the SACC found that there would continue to be several alternatives within the product markets which would serve as a competitive constraint against the merged entity post-implementation. It was on this basis that the SACC concluded that the Proposed Transaction would not give rise to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition (“SLC”) and recommended that the Proposed Transaction be approved, subject to public interest commitments.

Lewis’s basis for intervening

During the Tribunal’s consideration of the Proposed Transaction, Lewis brought its application to intervene in the Proposed Transaction on the basis that:

  • Shoprite will be removed as a key competitive constraint on Pepkor and, therefore, resulting in a 3-to-2 merger at the national level in relation to the retail of household furniture; and
  • that the Proposed Transaction will likely result in increased provided for low-to-middle-income consumers.

Lewis also submitted that the SACC did not properly consider the effects that the Proposed Transaction would have on different local geographic markets and, concomitantly, whether any SLC would arise within those specific catchment areas.

Accordingly, Lewis argued that in its capacity as the only national furniture retail chain that competes with both Pepkor and Shoprite on a national basis, it has important knowledge and insights into the furniture retail industry which would assist the Tribunal in assessing the Proposed Transaction.

Tribunal’s reasons for permitting Lewis’s intervention

Lewis’s application to intervene was brought in terms of section 53(c)(v) of the Act, read with rule 46 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal Rules”).

Tribunal Rule 46(1) provides that any person who has a “material interest” in the relevant matter may apply to intervene in the Tribunal proceedings.

Importantly, the Tribunal nevertheless stated that an intervening party is not entitled to rights that would “displace or supplant” the role of the SACC. Rather, the Tribunal must assess whether the intervening party would be able to assist it in understanding whether the Proposed Transaction gives rise to an SLC or adverse public interest effects.

In this regard, the Tribunal summarized the three-fold test required for a successful intervention application. In this regard, the Tribunal must consider whether the information to be provided by the proposed intervenor:

  • relates to matters within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction;
  • is not already available to the Tribunal; and
  • whether the potential benefits of such assistance outweigh any adverse effects the intervention might have on the speed and resolution of the proceedings.

The Tribunal must also inquire as to whether the intervenor will provide the Tribunal with meaningful assistance for its purposes of assessing the competition and public interest effects of the particular transaction.

In assessing Lewis’s application, the Tribunal found that there are significant and material disputes of fact that have to be ventilated for the Tribunal to understand the relevant market dynamics and that Lewis could assist the Tribunal in this regard.

Accordingly, the Tribunal permitted Lewis as an intervening party on the basis that it demonstrated its ability to provide “significant and material evidence” on the:

  • nature of competition in the market(s);
  • closeness of competition, and
  • characterisation of regional or localised markets.

The Tribunal did, however, limit the scope of Lewis’s intervention rights on the relevant market definitions and whether the Proposed Transaction is likely to lead to an SLC. Lewis was also admitted to assist the Tribunal in respect of potential remedies and/or the imposition of any conditions that might be imposed.

The CAC’s assessment of merger intervention rights

While there were several aspects of the Merging Parties appeal to the CAC, one of the substantive concerns raised was the Tribunal’s supposed outsourcing of the SACC’s functions in merger hearings to Lewis, as an intervenor. This is particularly because the Tribunal granted Lewis with broad powers including: rights to participate in all prehearing conferences; full discovery rights; the right to require the Tribunal to summon people and documents; full participation rights in any and all interlocutory proceedings; the right to adduce evidence and present argument and the right to cross examine any witnesses; the right for Lewis’s legal and economic advisors to access the merger record and all documents filed.

Considering the extensive rights afforded to Lewis, the CAC stated that the scope of rights afforded to Lewis would “retard an expeditious hearing”. The CAC also went on to state that:

“In the light thereof and in the required balancing exercise, this Court must surely take account of these factors together with the possible vested interest of a competitor in the merger proceedings to slow matters down in order to subvert the merger. It must then be satisfied that the contribution which a respondent can bring to the proceedings meets the test laid down by this Court. In particular, that the respondent has shown that it has unique knowledge of the market and can provide evidence in relation to the overall enquiry as to whether a merger should be permitted in order to justify admission.(own emphasis)

On the latter inquiry, and after a review of Lewis’s affidavits, the CAC found that Lewis had not demonstrated that it was in possession of evidence which would not otherwise be available to the Tribunal after requiring further assistance from the SACC and would assist the Tribunal in understanding the effects of the Proposed Transaction. 

Accordingly, the CAC found that the Tribunal’s reasons for admitting Lewis as an intervenor:

  • did not properly consider to what extent Lewis was likely to assist the Tribunal in circumstances where the information and evidence it was intending to provide could not have been obtained elsewhere; and
  • failed to find a balance between an order which did not undermine the objective of an expeditious resolution of the matter, the interests of the Merging Parties to an expeditious hearing as compared to the value of Lewis’s contribution to the Tribunal.

Importantly, the CAC also confirmed that orders by the Tribunal which relate to applications for intervention are ‘final’ in nature and are subject to appeal.

In sum, the CAC set aside the Tribunal’s order and dismissed Lewis’s application to intervene, stating that:

“It must be emphasised that the approach adopted in this judgment does not represent the end of the road for the respondent. The Tribunal possesses inquisitorial powers. It is more than entitled to summon the respondent to appear before it to provide it with any information and argument relevant to this proposed merger. It also has the power in terms of its inquisitorial powers to require the [SACC] to gather and present additional evidence in relation to the topics which it identified; being market shares, the effects of the merger on specified identified local markets and the role of online sales and economic surveys, demand side analyses of consumer preference. These are matters which clearly represent the kind of investigations that should be undertaken by the [SACC]. It has been alerted to the type of investigations which the Tribunal requires in the reasons provided by the Tribunal. To the extent that the [SACC] or the Tribunal considers that the respondent could be of assistance in this regard it could require the respondent to provide it with further evidence which would be of assistance.”

Further and final appeal to the Constitutional Court

Following the CAC’s order, Lewis approached the Constitutional Court on an urgent basis.

The central tenet of Lewis’s appeal to the Constitutional Court is that the CAC had effectively imposed a new and burdensome threshold for intervention applications for purposes of section 53 of the Act. In brief, Lewis submits that the CAC required that the potential intervenor’s material interest and ability to assist the Tribunal in a proposed transaction was insufficient and that the intervenor must rather demonstrate that its submissions would be “unique” and “could not be obtained elsewhere”. 

Lewis also raised the following key arguments in its appeal to the Constitutional Court:

  • that the CAC’s judgment violated meaningful procedural fairness and constitutional rights; and
  • that the CAC improperly overrode the Tribunal’s specialist discretion, breaching institutional deference.

The Constitutional Court upheld Lewis’s appeal, permitting Lewis to intervene in the Tribunal proceedings, however, its reasons for doing so have not been published at the time of publishing of this article.

Conclusions and Insights

The protracted saga in Lewis’s application to intervene in the Proposed Transaction has raised much debate as to whether intervention by third parties unduly frustrates the finalization of merger hearings in South Africa. It would make little sense, however, for market participants, with direct and substantial knowledge of the potential effects of a particular transaction, from being precluded from participating in merger hearings before the Tribunal. In this regard, ‘rubber stamping’ a contested merger without affording interested parties to ventilate potential competition and/or public interest concerns before the Tribunal may have the consequence of increasing prices, lowering output and quality, foreclosing competitors – all of which the SACC would be hard placed to remediate post-implementation of the merger.

Rather, it should be incumbent on the Tribunal to find a balance between allowing third parties to provide limited assistance to it, on specific disputes of fact, while ensuring that merger hearings do not become extensively protracted.

Draft Amendments to South Africa’s Merger Thresholds and Filing Fees Published for Public Comment

By Matthew Freer

Introduction

On 27 January 2026, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Mr Mpho Parks Tau, published a series of draft notices in the Government Gazette proposing significant updates to South Africa’s merger control regime. These include draft amendments to the merger thresholds under section 11 of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (the “Act”), as well as a separate draft amendment to the merger filing fees payable to the Competition Commission.

Together, the proposed changes reflect the first inflationary adjustment to South Africa’s merger notification framework in several years and are intended to align regulatory thresholds and fees with prevailing economic conditions.

Draft amendment to merger thresholds

In Government Notice No. 7029, published in Government Gazette No. 54020, the Minister, acting in consultation with the Competition Commission, invited public comment on proposed amendments to the Determination of Merger Thresholds set out in Part A of General Notice 1003 of 2017 (published in Government Notice No. 41124 of 15 September 2017).

The notice is issued in terms of section 11 of the Act and confirms the Minister’s intention to:

  • amend the existing merger thresholds; and
  • make a new determination of merger thresholds as set out in the Schedule to the notice.

Method of calculation remains unchanged

Importantly, the Minister has expressly confirmed that the Method of Calculation remains unchanged. The method set out in Part B of General Notice 1254 of 2017 (published under Government Notice No. 41245 of 10 November 2017) will continue to apply. Turnover and asset values must therefore still be calculated in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”), applying the same methods and principles currently used by the Competition Commission.

The Schedule further retains the existing definitional framework, including the definition of a “transferred firm” aligned with section 12 of the Act.

Revised lower (intermediate) merger thresholds

A merger will meet the lower threshold if both of the following requirements are satisfied:

  • The combined annual turnover in, into or from South Africa, or the combined asset value in South Africa, of the acquiring and transferred firms is R1 billion or more (up from R600 million); and
  • The annual turnover or asset value in South Africa of the transferred firm is R175 million or more (up from R100 million).

Revised higher (large) merger thresholds

A merger will meet the higher threshold if both of the following requirements are satisfied:

  • The combined annual turnover in, into or from South Africa, or the combined asset value in South Africa, of the acquiring and transferred firms is R9.5 billion or more (up from R6.6 billion); and
  • The annual turnover or asset value in South Africa of the transferred firm is R280 million or more (up from R190 million).

Merger classification unchanged

The proposed amendments do not alter the categorisation of mergers under the Act:

  • Small mergers fall below either value of the lower threshold;
  • Intermediate mergers meet the lower threshold but fall below the higher threshold; and
  • Large mergers meet or exceed the higher threshold.

Draft amendment to merger filing fees

Published simultaneously, Government Notice No. 7030 in Government Gazette No. 54021 proposes amendments to Rule 10(5) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Commission and inflationary adjustment to the merger filing fees gazetted in General Notice 1336 of 2018 (published in Government Notice No. 42082 of 4 December 2018), dealing specifically with merger filing fees.

This notice is issued in terms of section 21(4) of the Act, in consultation with the Commissioner, and invites public comment on a draft amendment aimed at effecting an inflationary adjustment to merger filing fees. The fees were last updated in 2018 and have remained unchanged since.

Proposed revised merger filing fees

Under the draft amendment to Rule 10(5), the filing fees for merger notifications will increase as follows:

  • Intermediate mergers: from R165,000 to R220,000;
  • Large mergers: from R550,000 to R735,000.

No changes are proposed to the structure or timing of fee payments, only the quantum payable upon filing.

Public participation and next steps

Stakeholders and interested parties are invited to submit written comments on both draft notices within 30 business days of publication. Submissions must be addressed to the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, for the attention of Dr Ivan Galodikwe, either by email or by hand delivery to the Department’s offices in Sunnyside, Pretoria.

If finalised, the combined effect of the proposed amendments will be to:

  • reduce the number of transactions requiring mandatory notification; while
  • increasing the cost of filing notifiable intermediate and large mergers.

Together, these measures signal a recalibration of South Africa’s merger control regime to reflect inflation and economic growth, without altering the underlying legal framework or analytical methodology applied by the competition authorities.

Conclusion

John Oxenham, director at Primerio, notes that “the step taken by the DTIC to increase the financial thresholds for purposes of merger regulation in South Africa demonstrates a move towards greater ease in deal negotiation and has been welcomed by the economy. Parties must still, however, note that while the thresholds may indicate fewer notifications being required be submitted with the South African competition authorities, the Commission may require mandatory notification of small mergers (i.e., mergers which do not meet the intermediate thresholds).”

What’s Changing? An overview of the South African Competition Commission’s recent Draft Guidelines

by Michael-James Currie and Kelly Baker

Pre-merger filing consultation process

The Competition Commission of South Africa (“Commission”) is fundamentally reshaping how it conducts market oversight through a series of new draft guidelines designed to enhance clarity and a more speedy regulatory processes. One of the most significant changes involves introducing a voluntary, informal, and confidential pre-merger consultation. This process aims to simplify the evaluation of complex Phase II and Phase III mergers, enabling parties to address competition concerns or major public interest issues, including HDP ownership or large-scale retrenchments before they are formally filed. By encouraging merging parties or business rescue practitioners to tender appropriate remedies or competitive assessments upfront, the Commission seeks to reduce regulatory costs and accelerate review timelines.

The draft guidelines on the Pre-Merger Consultation Process can be accessed here.

Online intermediation platforms

For the digital economy, the Commission issued a guidance note for online intermediation platforms, shifting its focus from static market shares to “gatekeeper” characteristics. These platforms often benefit from extreme scale economies and powerful network effects, creating a “virtuous cycle” where a high volume of users makes the platform invaluable to businesses, but also creates significant dependency. The Commission identifies several practices that are likely to harm competition, starting with price parity clauses. Wide price parity prevents businesses from offering lower prices on any other platform, while narrow price parity restricts them from pricing lower on their own websites. As a result, both can entrench a leading platform’s position and discourage price competition. Additionally, a lack of interoperability (the ability for different systems to exchange information and work together) can reinforce a platform’s market power by preventing users from mixing services from different providers. Self-preferencing is another red flag, where vertically integrated platforms favour their own products in rankings or charge lower fees to their own affiliates compared to third-party competitors.

Furthermore, the Commission warns against the misuse of non-public, competitively sensitive data belonging to business users to benefit the platform’s own competing offerings. To protect the participation of SMEs and HDP-owned firms, the Commission scrutinises differentiated trading terms, such as charging higher service fees or providing fewer marketing benefits to smaller businesses compared to global corporate entities. Finally, unfair treatment, such as imposing one-sided contracts, transferring disproportionate risks to sellers (like immediate customer reimbursements at the seller’s expense), or lacking clear dispute resolution mechanisms, is identified as conduct that exploits the dependency of smaller business users.

The draft Guidance Note for Online Intermediation Platforms can be accessed here.

Internal restructuring

The Commission’s final Guidelines on Internal Restructuring clarify that transactions occurring within a group of firms generally do not require notification if they are “purely internal”. A transaction is considered purely internal when it has no implications for the control rights of external shareholders – typically minority stakeholders who are not part of the primary group. A formal merger notification may still be required, however, if the restructuring results in a change, loss, or gain of negative control by these external parties. This includes any alteration to veto rights over strategic commercial decisions such as budgets, business plans, or the appointment of senior management. The Commission distinguishes these from ordinary minority investment protections, such as decisions regarding security listings or alterations to share capital, which do not typically confer control.

Ultimately, the Commission assesses these transactions on a case-by-case basis to determine if an alteration in the market structure has occurred.

The Guidelines on Internal Restructuring are accessible here.

Price-cost margin calculation

Lastly, the Commission has standardised the technical assessment of excessive pricing under Section 8(1)(a) through its price-cost margin calculation guidelines. To determine the actual price charged, the Commission adopts International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS 15”) revenue recognition principles, accounting for discounts, rebates, and business cycles. Operational costs are accurately classified as fixed, variable, or semi-variable, with a strong preference for actual costs used internally over those contrived for an investigation. The Commission will also scrutinise internal transfer pricing within groups of companies; if an input cost appears artificially inflated, they will prioritise the actual production cost of the entity producing that input. For calculating capital employed, the Commission prefers market values or depreciated replacement costs for tangible assets over simple book values. A “reasonable rate of return” is determined using the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (”WACC”), calculated via the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) to reflect the risk of the specific industry. This rigorous approach ensures that pricing assessments reflect economic reality rather than inflated accounting figures.

The Guidelines on Price-Cost Margin Calculations are accessible here.

One Statute, Wider Reach: The Gambia’s 2025 Draft Bill and the Shift to Proactive Market Enforcement

By Michael Williams

The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) has published the draft Competition and Consumer Protection Bill 2025 (the Bill). The Bill is intended to consolidate and repeal the Competition Act 2007 and the Consumer Protection Act 2014 within a single statutory framework, signalling a shift towards a more robust enforcement regime across both competition law and consumer welfare.

Institutionally, the Bill maintains the GCCPC as an independent corporate regulator, overseen by a Board of Commissioners and supported by an Executive Secretariat. The Bill also reflects a more proactive regime by empowering the GCCPC to inter alia act on its own initiative or in response to complaints, publish decisions supported by reasons, impose corrective measures and administrative penalties, and facilitate alternative dispute resolution in appropriate consumer matters.

On competition enforcement, the Bill reinforces the abuse of dominance regime by addressing both exploitation of customers and foreclosure of competitors. In practice, this equips the GCCPC to intervene against conduct such as unfair pricing outcomes, exclusionary strategies, and access-related restrictions (including scenarios associated with essential facilities), and it also contemplates risks arising in platform markets, including self-preferencing by dominant digital intermediaries. The Bill further introduces an “abuse of economic dependence” framework by defining the conduct of enterprises with “strategic market status” that will amount to abuse of economic dependence.

The Bill adopts a broad concept of “merger”, including full-function joint ventures and acquisitions conferring material influence, introduces notifiability criteria linked to turnover or assets in The Gambia, and contemplates transaction-value thresholds for digital and emerging technology transactions. The regime is suspensory: implementation before approval is prohibited and non-compliant mergers are treated as void. The GCCPC may also call in certain non-notifiable transactions where they appear likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition. Further guidance in relation to merger control is provided for in a dedicated GCCPC Draft Merger Regulations & Guideline.

Consumer protection is integrated into the same statute and supported by a clearer redress pathway. Consumers are expected, in the first instance, to seek redress from suppliers or follow a sector regulator’s process where applicable, with escalation to the GCCPC where the supplier does not respond within seven days or does not provide satisfactory redress within a reasonable period. The Bill also provides for investigations and consensual referrals to Alternative Dispute Resolution. It addresses aspects of digital commerce by introducing joint liability for digital platforms in defined circumstances, subject to specified defences.

Finally, the Bill strengthens enforcement mechanics and deterrence through a combination of investigatory powers including: channels for confidential or anonymous information, turnover-based administrative fines for certain infringements, including abuse of dominance and abuse of economic dependence, and potential personal exposure for directors and officers in specified circumstances, subject to statutory defences. Altogether, the Bill is likely to broaden compliance risk for businesses operating in The Gambia, particularly in relation to merger implementation risk and the accessibility of consumer complaint mechanisms.

COMESA — a 2025 Retrospective (and Thoughts on the Path Forward)

By the Editor

COMESA’s long-delayed and much-anticipated publication of the new 2025 Competition and Consumer Protection has prompted much fanfare, and rightfully so.  It represents a potential turning point and coming-of-age for the now 12-year old regional antitrust regulator. 

We decided to swim against the current and, rather than focus exclusively on “COMESA 3.0,” take a look back at the past year, so as to better gauge the (now) CCCC’s future performance versus its immediate past.

Fortuitously, our editor was present at a gathering of the ‘Fourth Estate,’ convened in Nairobi by COMESA’s Dr. Willard Mwemba.  For the third consecutive time, the Commission had invited members of the press to present its successes, show off the tight relationships between its staff and that of other national authorities (of note, David Kemei, Director General CAK, chairman of the EACA and local host, was present for most of the event, as was of course the agency’s éminence grise, Dr. George Lipimile), and to remind the assembled journalists that, in the bigger picture, the agency’s AfCFTA competition protocol coordination remained ongoing — more on that another day…

Without further ado, here are the 2025 COMESA highlights, as selected by the Commission:

Mergers

The large francophone-anglophone broadcasting deal of Canal+ acquiring Multichoice presented “lots” of competitive concerns according to Dr. Mwemba.  Already dominant firms merging to form an even larger entity was a serious threat to broadcast competition. Multichoice’s past behavior of refusing sublicenses and threatening to leave certain markets showed its unparalleled dominant position in various COMESA submarkets.  The parties did compete head-on with head other in three jurisdictions, Rwanda, Madagascar, and Mauritius, and would have had a foreclosing position COMESA-wide in relation to super premium content, leading the (then still) CCC to seek prohibition of the merger, and at a minimum the survival of Multichoice (and its “Talent Factory”) as an independent entity and employer in the region.

The parties’ defense relied in part on arguments alleging subscriber losses, eventually resulting in a conditional approval by the CCC with several commitments of the parties.

Two failure-to-file violations stand out in the past year: The Bosch/Johnson Control deal drew a failure-to-file violation of the (much maligned and soon to be replaced under the new Regulations) “30-day rule”.  Interestingly, the fine was reduced from a significant $400,000 initial amount to an almost negligible $8000, as JCI (the target and a first-time offender entitled to a 30% fine reduction) was to blame for the “inadvertent” false company statistics Bosch used to calculate whether the filing threshold was met.  While challenged by the acquirer, Bosch received a symbolic $1 fine for its own negligence in failing to vet the target’s figures for purposes of determining notifiability.

In the Mauritian BRED/BFV banking transaction, the fine was significantly reduced by the acquirer’s cooperation, minority shareholding status in many subsidiaries, and first-time offender status, resulting in merely $28,005 initial F2F fines.

On a broader scale, looking to the newly established EAC competition regime and its merger notification requirements, Dr. Mwemba recognized the concern that dual notifications will occur in all likelihood for the foreseeable future.

Anticompetitive Practices

The Commission’s standout case this past year was doubtless the “beer matter”: three main areas of concern stood out in the Heineken case, in which the respondent was found to be dominant in various geographic markets.  The three issues were: single-branding (foreclosing competing products at the downstream distribution level), absolute territorial restrictions (prohibiting distributors from not only active but also passive selling into unauthorized regions), and resale price maintenance (imposing a firm price — or here, a fixed profit margin — on resellers of the products).  A long lasting case, from June 2021 until early September 2025, resulting in a settlement procedure, eliminating the three clauses of concern and imposing the maximum settlement amount of $900,000 on Heineken.  Of note: Beer makers are also subject to an ongoing CCC investigation into the cross-shareholdings of various manufacturers.

Similarly, the Commission accused Diageo of the same types of anticompetitive practices in several COMESA member states. As the respondent had stopped one of the offending types of conduct (RPM) prior to the investigation’s commencement, the final combined fine amount was reduced to $750,000.

A further territorial restriction investigation into Toyota’s distribution practices is ongoing and “at an advanced stage”, with the CEO expecting to close the matter by Q1/2026.  Finally, the CCC is evaluating the effects of, among other things, Coca-Cola’s unilateral single-branding rules against retailers stocking only its own products in branded refrigerators, which can result in effective foreclosure of competing brands, especially at small retail businesses with limited floor space allowing only a single fridge.

Consumer Protection 

The airline sector did not escape the CCC’s enforcement net, as British Airways/Qatar experienced in the recently concluded investigation into Nairobi-London route collaboration among the parties, which they claimed allowed them to increase the volume of flights to 28 per week and lower ticket prices. The CCC permitted the conduct for a limited time of 5 years, requiring the parties to provide proof of the alleged efficiencies within two years.

On the consumer protection front, the CCC was heavily focused on the air travel sector over the past reporting year. It will publish, on Monday coming, a report detailing the results of its year-long airline survey and study, undertaken in conjunction with the African Union’s airline regulator.

Its signature agriculture study program, the African Market Observatory, continues to be funded and operationally supported by the Commission, having provided a key report to the COMESA Council of Ministers.  This effort has also led to the ICN having awarded the running of its agriculture program to the Observatory.  Dr. Mwemba proudly highlighted that the CCC assisted in averting a potential hunger crisis, namely in an (unpublished, we presume) maize case involving a sovereign engaging in absolute territorial restrictions, threatening serious food insecurity in Eswatini; it was the CCC’s advocacy efforts, as opposed to a full-fledged investigation, that yielded the positive results.

Finally, the CCC also concluded its drafting of a unified Model Consumer Protection Law, to serve as a standardized & harmonized guideline for African countries.  This comes as part of an effort to eradicate the fragmentation of competition and consumer protection laws, seeking the eradication of harmful corporate conduct and non-tariff trade barriers.

Looking Ahead: What’s in Store for COMESA 3.0?

Diverging from the titular “retrospective,” it appears fitting to step forward into the present moment and look ahead, with the Commission’s recent successes under its former Regulations now firmly established. To do so, I will quote from an article Dr. Liat Davis and I recently published in the Concurrences journal, entitled “Refining Regional Rapprochement: COMESA’s Competition Enforcement Comes of Age“:

The Mwemba era (2021 – present) has both accelerated and consolidated these earlier reforms, contributing to increased confidence in the regime among international stakeholders. With the exception of a temporary pandemic-related decline, merger activity has continued to rise, surpassing 500 notifications to date and now including the Commission’s first enforcement against gun-jumping. Non-merger enforcement has also expanded, with 45 conduct investigations and at least two cartel cases initiated. In parallel, the Commission has entered into numerous Memoranda of Understanding and multilateral cooperation agreements with African and global counterparts, strengthening its external partnerships. At the regional level, the CCC has acted as a catalyst for the establishment and development of National Competition Authorities (NCAs), offering indirect financial support, training, and collaborative initiatives.

This iterative process of course correction and capacity-building is now culminating in the long-awaited revision of the primary legislation. The new CCPR, due to take effect at the end of 2025, will formalize the Commission’s expanded mandate.  In light of the extensive reforms embodied in the new CCPR, and consistent with the prior informal designation of the CCC’s post-2021 period as “COMESA 2.0,” the implementation of the CCPR will mark the beginning of a third phase in the regime’s evolution. Appropriately described as “COMESA 3.0,” this stage is expected to be characterized by the following key attributes:

  • Expanded unilateral-conduct enforcement, owing to increased staffing, sustained capacity-building, and growing experience in conduct and cartel cases;
  • A significant rise in cartel investigations, driven principally by the forthcoming leniency regime;
  • Higher merger volumes, resulting from the move to a suspensory filing regime and accompanied by a likely increase in conditional approvals (subject to wider global economic conditions); [note: the CCC’s statistical trajectory is already sloping upward, as it has reviewed approximately the same number of transactions in the past 4 years as it had in the first 8 years of its existence.]
  • Strengthened consumer-protection enforcement by the ‘CCCC’, reflecting the Commission’s broadened mandate and aligning with wider African competition-law trends, including South Africa’s increasing incorporation of public-interest factors in merger analysis and Nigeria’s FCCPC using data-protection grounds to impose record fines; and
  • The development and application of a carefully delineated “public interest” standard in competition cases, subject to strict guardrails to prevent politicization and adapted to the unique constraints of a multi-national enforcement regime.

African Merger Control Regulation: A Look At Recent Developments

Megan Armstrong and Jenna Carrazedo

Michael-James Currie, director at Primerio, hosted an insightful webinar alongside Primerio’s in-country Partners, Mweshi Bunda Mutana for Zambia, Hyacinthe Fansi for Cameroon, and Cris Mwebesa for Tanzania. The conversation provided an extensive look into recent developments in merger control across Africa’s principle regional competition authorities and can be accessed here.

This deep dive showed a significant shift towards a more prominent enforcement, lower notification thresholds and stronger coordination between national and supranational regulators. Africa’s merger landscape has vastly changed over the past four to five years which has resulted in more complexity in multi-jurisdictional merger control, increased detection risk for non-notified transactions and a widened the set of jurisdictions that must now be considered for compliance.

This webinar session contained a slightly different focus as the inspiration for the session was to feature a more pragmatic approach that stems from how merger control has changed significantly in Africa over the past few years. There has been a very clear shift in merger regulation and an increase of agencies that have adopted merger control or antitrust laws more generally. The rules and regulations surrounding merger control have become more sophisticated, and these developments are important for the agencies that make use of merger control, antitrust compliance and enforcement. As a result, it was highlighted that the CEMAC merger control has evolved from a basic framework to a more formalised and substantive merger control regime. This is evident in how the system now imposes mandatory filings when both turnover and market share thresholds are met, even for foreign deals without substantial local operations. The system does remain very paperwork-heavy, and a growing concern is the high filing fee cap that is c. USD 70 million.

COMESA was described as Africa’s most advanced and prominent regional regulator in respect of merger control and is now preparing to make substantial amendments to its merger regulators which are expected to take effect in the beginning of 2026. These changes will include mandatory notification for greenfield joint ventures, provisions on digital markets, provisions relating to public interest considerations and questions regarding how regional and national priorities will be remedied.

The East African Community Competition Authority has now operationalised its merger control system, effective as of 1 November 2025. This regime has exclusive jurisdiction over mergers with cross-border effects involving at least two partner states, stated by Cris Mwebesa, and meeting a certain asset or turnover threshold of USD 35 million. The system includes a 120-day review period and filing fees, however several Member States have not domesticated this regional law which means that filings at a national level in parallel to the regional level should be expected. This means that there will be overlaps with COMESA and there is a lack of clarity on how the public’s interest will be prioritised which creates further confusion and uncertainty. Confusion can arise when, for example, Zanzibar’s separate competition authority adds an additional filing requirement for merger control.

The ECOWAS Competition Authority has been operational for around one year and has demonstrated steady progress in handling non-contentious mergers. This authority considers transactions at certain turnover levels and individual thresholds which renders the regime broad in scope. The jurisdictional thresholds for an ECOWAS filing remain low, which may result in challenges around when a dual filing is appropriate and delaying decision making by the respective authorities.

Evidently, across many jurisdictions there are varying levels of institutional maturity that influence regional merger control. This is seen in how Zambia has strengthened its relationship with COMESA, following recent domestic legislative amendments, whilst Tanzania’s national authority co-exists with emerging EAC obligations, creating an emphasised need for coordination. These national-regional intersections will continue to influence filing strategies, especially in sectors where public interest or national sensitivities are emphasised.

These insightful discussions highlighted that merging parties now face a more complex and differentiated compliance across Africa. Although procedural clarity continues to develop, the direction of development is clear in that African merger regimes are growing more enlightened, more interrelated and more aligned with global standards.

Africa’s Merger Control Regulation: A Look At Recent Developments

Megan Armstrong and Jenna Carrazedo

Michael-James Currie, director at Primerio, hosted an insightful webinar alongside Primerio’s in-country Partners, Mweshi Bunda Mutana for Zambia, Hyacinthe Fansi for Cameroon, and Cris Mwebesa for Tanzania. The conversation provided an extensive look into recent developments in merger control across Africa’s principle regional competition authorities and can be accessed here.

This deep dive showed a significant shift towards a more prominent enforcement, lower notification thresholds and stronger coordination between national and supranational regulators. Africa’s merger landscape has vastly changed over the past four to five years which has resulted in more complexity in multi-jurisdictional merger control, increased detection risk for non-notified transactions and a widened the set of jurisdictions that must now be considered for compliance.

This webinar session contained a slightly different focus as the inspiration for the session was to feature a more pragmatic approach that stems from how merger control has changed significantly in Africa over the past few years. There has been a very clear shift in merger regulation and an increase of agencies that have adopted merger control or antitrust laws more generally. The rules and regulations surrounding merger control have become more sophisticated, and these developments are important for the agencies that make use of merger control, antitrust compliance and enforcement. As a result, it was highlighted that the CEMAC merger control has evolved from a basic framework to a more formalised and substantive merger control regime. This is evident in how the system now imposes mandatory filings when both turnover and market share thresholds are met, even for foreign deals without substantial local operations. The system does remain very paperwork-heavy, and a growing concern is the high filing fee cap that is c. USD 70 million.

COMESA was described as Africa’s most advanced and prominent regional regulator in respect of merger control and is now preparing to make substantial amendments to its merger regulators which are expected to take effect in the beginning of 2026. These changes will include mandatory notification for greenfield joint ventures, provisions on digital markets, provisions relating to public interest considerations and questions regarding how regional and national priorities will be remedied.

The East African Community Competition Authority has now operationalised its merger control system, effective as of 1 November 2025. This regime has exclusive jurisdiction over mergers with cross-border effects involving at least two partner states, stated by Cris Mwebesa, and meeting a certain asset or turnover threshold of USD 35 million. The system includes a 120-day review period and filing fees, however several Member States have not domesticated this regional law which means that filings at a national level in parallel to the regional level should be expected. This means that there will be overlaps with COMESA and there is a lack of clarity on how the public’s interest will be prioritised which creates further confusion and uncertainty. Confusion can arise when, for example, Zanzibar’s separate competition authority adds an additional filing requirement for merger control.

The ECOWAS Competition Authority has been operational for around one year and has demonstrated steady progress in handling non-contentious mergers. This authority considers transactions at certain turnover levels and individual thresholds which renders the regime broad in scope. The jurisdictional thresholds for an ECOWAS filing remain low, which may result in challenges around when a dual filing is appropriate and delaying decision making by the respective authorities.

Evidently, across many jurisdictions there are varying levels of institutional maturity that influence regional merger control. This is seen in how Zambia has strengthened its relationship with COMESA, following recent domestic legislative amendments, whilst Tanzania’s national authority co-exists with emerging EAC obligations, creating an emphasised need for coordination. These national-regional intersections will continue to influence filing strategies, especially in sectors where public interest or national sensitivities are emphasised.

These insightful discussions highlighted that merging parties now face a more complex and differentiated compliance across Africa. Although procedural clarity continues to develop, the direction of development is clear in that African merger regimes are growing more enlightened, more interrelated and more aligned with global standards.

The Evolution of ECOWAS Merger Control: A Review of ERCA’s Latest Approvals

By Simone dos Santos and Megan Armstrong

Throughout November 2025, ERCA has examined and approved four merger transactions in Liberia. Liberia is a Member State of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), which was established in 1975 when the Heads of State and Heads of Government of fifteen Western African Countries signed the ECOWAS Treaty. As of 29 January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger officially withdrew from ECOWAS. The current Member States of ECOWAS include Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sénégal, and Togo; the headquarters of ECOWAS is in Abuja, Nigeria. The aim of ECOWAS is to promote cooperation and integration among Member States in order to raise the standard of living, maintain economic stability, foster relations, and contribute to the development of Africa.

Article 26(3)(a) ECOWAS Treaty sets out the priority sectors of the economy of Member States which include Food and Agriculture Industries, Building and Constructions Industries, Metallurgical Industries, Mechanics Industries, Electrical, Electronic and Computers Industries, Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Petrochemical Industries, Forestry Industries, Energy Industries, Textile and Leather Industries and the Transport and Communications Industries

In each of these sectors, there are mergers and acquisitions that take place, which are regulated by the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (“ERCA”).  ERCAS merger control regime became operational on 1 October 2024, and for any merger and acquisition that takes place, a notification must be submitted to ERCA for prior authorisation (See: Regulation C/REG.23/12/21). The four recent merger approvals centred around the following priority sectors: Mechanics Industries, Food and Agriculture Industries, as well as one of the Treaty’s aims, which is to ensure harmonisation in terms of education. The decisions have been made as follows:

ACQUISITION OF IVECO GROUP N.V. BY TATA MOTORS LIMITED COMMERCIAL VEHICLE HOLDINGS

On 19 August 2025, TML CV Holdings Ltd (“TMLCVH”), a company incorporated in Singapore, notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 100% of the shares issued in Iveco Group N.V., excluding its Defence Business Unit. The proposed merger would result in the full integration of both TMLCVH and Iveco Group N.V. commercial vehicles and powertrain divisions under the control of Tata Motors Limited. They are formally known as TML Commercial Vehicles Limited. The relevant market definition in this decision is the “global design, production and distribution of commercial vehicles (trucks and buses), as well as the supply of engines and related components to end customers and third-party manufacturers (OEMs).” The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and the acquisition is authorised unconditionally, effective from 3 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF TOYOTA GHANA LIMITED COMPANY (TGLC) BY TOYOTA TSUSHO MANUFACTURING GHANA CO. LIMITED (TTMG)

On 29 August 2025, Toyota Tshusho Manufacturing Ghana Co. Limited (“TTMG”) and Toyota Ghana Limited Company (“TGLC”) notified ERCA of TTMG’s intention to acquire the distribution business, assets, and operations of TGLC. The relevant market definition includes “new passenger cars, commercial vehicles such as buses and trucks, and the spare parts and after-sale services.” The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and it promotes local industrialisation and regional trade integration. Additionally, it provides benefits to consumers as the service standards have been improved. The ERCA Council authorised this acquisition as unconditional. Despite the overlap in segments, the combined market share remains below the dominance threshold (Article 11 of the ERCA Manual on Market Dominance Thresholds). The authorisation of this acquisition is effective from 4 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF HONORIS HOLDING LIMITED BY K2025283350 (SOUTH AFRICA) PROPRIETARY LIMITED (SA BIDCO), JOINTLY CONTROLLED BY OMPE SPV AND MANGRO HOLDINGS PROPRIETARY LIMITED

On 4 September 2025, SA BidCo notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 100% of the share capital of Honoris Holding Limited (“HHL”). After the merger, SA BidCo will be jointly controlled by an entity of the Old Mutual Group, OMPE SPV, as well as Mangro Holdings Proprietary Limited. This merger furthermore forms part of a broader restructuring and investment initiative led by Old Mutual Private Equity. The relevant market definition in this decision related to the “provision of private higher (tertiary) education services, including foundation-level preparatory programmes”. The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and is expected to improve capacity, attract investment, and enhance the quality of education in Nigeria. The acquisition of HHL was authorised as unconditional and effective as from 6 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF SIERRA LEONE BREWERY LIMITED BY AFRICAN BOTTLING GROUP ABG LIMITED

On 12 September 2025, African Bottling Group ABG Limited notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 98.07% of the share capital of Sierra Leone Brewery Limited (“SLBL”). This share capital was previously held by Heineken International B. The aim of this acquisition is to integrate SLBL’s brewing operations and distribution network into ABG’s beverage operations across the ECOWAS Member States. The relevant market definition in this decision is the “production and distribution of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages”. In this instance, this includes beer, other alcoholic beverages including beer, malt-based non-alcoholic beverages and carbonated soft drinks, juices or energy drinks. The ERCA Council concluded that the merger may lead to enhanced production efficiency, quality, and provide potential benefits to consumers. This merger is unlikely to reduce competition, however, it may moderately impact competition in Sierra Leone negatively. It is possible for this impact to be mitigated through appropriate remedies and therefore the Council concluded that the merger be authorised, subject to certain conditions, and is effective from 6 November 2025.

These four merger approvals highlight the Executive Directorate and Councils’ continuous effort to clear the docket before the end of 2025. In addition, the ERCA Council took this opportunity to visit Liberia’s Minister for Commerce and Industry to follow up on the progress of Liberia’s new Competition and Consumer Protection Bill. AAT looks forward to seeing developments and merger approvals made by the ERCA Council in 2026.

Meet the Enforcers: Unpacking Tanzania’s merger control amendments & enforcement strategy

By Daniella de Canha and Megan Armstrong

On 18 August 2025, pan-African competition-law boutique firm Primerio continued its “African Antitrust Agencies – In Conversation” series, casting a light on the Tanzanian Fair Competition Commission (“FCC”) in a dynamic exchange which analysed merger control practices, regional competition enforcement and regulatory reform. The discussion featured Director of Research, Mergers, and Advocacy at the FCC, Zaytun Kikula, in conversation with Primerio Director, Andreas Stargard, Primerio Associate Tyla Lee Coertzen, and Advocate at Mwebesa Law Group, Monalisa Mushobozi. You can watch a recording of this session here.

Ms. Kikula highlighted that the FCC’s focus has thus far mainly been on mergers, as well as investigating the dominance of abuse and cartels. She also points out that the FCC have been very active in its merger control regime, handling  between 50 and 70 filings annually.  Most of the notified transactions are smaller, spanning across sectors from telecommunication, finance, manufacturing, mining and insurance. Ms. Kikula stated that the recent amendments made to the Fair Competition Act 2024, have created a shift in merger reviews. Before these changes, the focus was only market share, whereas now mergers are being evaluated through a broader lens.

Monalisa noted an amendment to the Act now allows for a merger to be approved even it is strengthens the position of a dominant firm, provided the transaction yields a demonstratable public interest benefit. Ms. Kikula further explained that while the FCC has not received a transaction which triggers the above-mentioned amendment, notified transactions are subject to a 14-day notice period which invites commentary in order to ensure that the concerns of the public are adequately considered.

The FCC has encountered numerous instances of unnotified mergers, some voluntarily disclosing these transactions to the FCC, after the fact and others through investigation by the FCC. The FCC engages with these firms and lets them know that if they do not notify the Commission and proceed, this will constitute an offence which is punishable by a fine of between 5% and 10% annual turnover. Ms. Kikula mentioned the FCC assumes the role of a business facilitator and encourages settlements where the firms pay a filing fee as well as an additional settlement fee for instances of non-compliance. Filing fees are determined by the structure of the transaction, for instance, when dealing with a global entity the fees are calculated based on global turnover. When the transaction is domestic fees are calculated based on local turnover. She also pointed out the fact that this fee calculation is unconditionally governed by law and that there is no room for negotiation.

Monalisa mentioned that the law stipulates that the Commission has 60 days to approve the merger and inquired whether there have been cases where this timeframe has been shortened or extended. Ms. Kikula explained that non-complex merger reviews can extend between 30 to 45 days, however, in some cases can extend to 90 days. Noting that it may go up to 135 days, the statutory maximum. With regards to remedies, the FCC typically imposes behavioural conditions which are tailored to the specific sector involved.

The regional integration of competition law across Africa was a key theme which was highlighted. Andreas brought to the listeners attention that the East African Community Competition Authority (“EACC”) will be coming online in November of this year and will be open to receiving merger notifications. She further expressed that dual filings should be avoided in order to lessen confusion, emphasising the importance of confidentiality under a Memorandum of Understanding in order to protect information. Ms. Kikula discussed the two upcoming regulatory reforms which the FCC is in the process of introducing, with the first being a leniency program and the second being specific regulation for the assessment of dominance. She further noted that the  threshold for market share has increased from 35% to 40%. This expansive discussion highlights the FCC’s ability to balance application with facilitation, making it a driving force in East African competition law.