Category: South Africa

Betting on Fair Play: Competition Tribunal orders Interim Relief to Lottoland in Google Ads dispute

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By Matthew Freer

Introduction

On 12 November 2024, Lottoland South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Lottoland”) was granted interim relief by The Competition Tribunal (“The Tribunal”) against Google Ireland Limited and Google South Africa (Pty) Ltd (collectively “Google”).

Lottoland, a licensed bookmaker as of 7 November 2017 in terms of the Western Cape Gambling and Racing Act, offers fixed-odds bets on the outcome of an array of lotteries worldwide, including the South African National Lottery and various sporting events.[1] Lottoland’s competitors include other licensed bookmakers within the country such as Hollywood Bets, World Sports Betting and Betway, among others. Google, controlled by Google LLC, is a multinational technology company specialising in internet-related services and products, including search engines, online advertising technologies and more. Google is best known for its search engine and advertising platform, Google Ads, which is a key revenue driver for the company. Google Ads allows businesses to display advertisements on Google’s search engine results pages, partner websites and other platforms using a pay-per-clicks model where advertisers bid on keywords to reach targeted audiences. Businesses utilise this service to maximise visibility with the aim of gaining more customers.

In 2020 Google terminated Lottoland’s access to Google Ads, which Lottoland argued was without justification given that the other licensed bookmakers, providing like services, still had access to Google Ad Services. This termination caused financial harm to Lottoland, and it was argued to distort the competition in this very market that Lottoland operated with detrimental effect on options available to consumers. Google’s main argument was that Lottoland’s services contravene certain sections of the Lotteries Act and by granting them access to their Google Ads services, Google’s policies and reputation could be under scrutiny in a public light.

What is an Interim Relief Application?

An Interim Relief Application, in terms of by section 49C of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (“Act”), is a temporary measure sought to address an alleged prohibited practice and aimed to prevent serious or irreparable harm pending the outcome of a hearing.[2] “The Tribunal will only grant such relief if it is of the opinion that it is reasonable and just, having regard to the following factors:”[3]

  • The evidence relating to the alleged prohibited practice;
  • the need to prevent serious or irreparable damage to the applicant; and
  • the balance of convenience.

The Tribunal must make a summary assessment before granting such application and this assessment is only at a “prima facie level”.[4] The Tribunal has held that the three above steps must be applied holistically whilst balancing each factor against the other. In this regard “a weak case on say irreparable harm may be counterweighted by a very strong case on the prohibited conduct. And vice versa…”.[5]

In the event an interim relief order is granted, it operates for a period of six months from its date, or the conclusion of the hearing, whichever is earliest.

What is the prohibited practice?

The basis of Lottoland’s application was that Google had contravened sections 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c) of the Act.[6] Section 8(1)(d)(ii) states that a firm may not engage in exclusionary acts, such as refusing to supply scarce goods or services to a competitor or customer, unless it can demonstrate that the technological, efficiency, or other pro-competitive benefits outweigh the anti-competitive impact of its actions, and providing the goods or services is economically feasible.[7] Section 8(1)(c) prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in an exclusionary act if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain.[8] The overarching element that must be proved in both instances is that there must be a showing of dominance by the firm within the market in question.

A showing of dominance

Google raised the argument that they are not dominant within the ‘advertising ecosystem’ which includes both online (Google Ads) and offline advertising (print media, billboards, television, etc.) However, The Tribunal took a more detailed approach to determine the specific market Google is operating in, while accounting for the market in which Lottoland and its competitors are advertising in. The Tribunal refused the idea that the market in issue is that of the broader ‘advertising ecosystem’ but it is rather the specific market of online advertising, and even more specifically, the market for online search and search engine marketing (“SEM”) markets. The Tribunal stated that the service of Google Ads operates within this specific market, and it was proven, prima facie, that Google is likely to be dominant in this market in South Africa. Thus, rejecting Google’s argument that they should be viewed as operating in the broader ‘advertising ecosystem’.  

Lottoland submitted that Google has a market share of more than 90% in the SEM market, measured by search volume, and states that such dominance is well-established as The Commission had stated that Google is “the monopoly provider of intent-based marketing and customer acquisition in SA…”.[9]

Section 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c) of the Competition Act

Now that dominance is established, we can break down and analyse each element that needs to be proved in terms of this section. The first element involves a refusal to supply a customer. On the face of such scenario, Google has refused to supply Lottoland with their service of Google Ads as Google terminated Lottoland’s access. Google had argued that by allowing Lottoland access to such service there is a potential for criminal liability or other commercial risks. The Tribunal’s ultimate findings was that this argument lacked basis as Lottoland’s competitors were provided access, showing an inconsistent enforcement of Google’s “internal policies”. Furthermore, The Tribunal stated that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Lottoland had contravened the Lotteries Act.

The second element of proof is that of scarce goods or services. It was indicated in eMedia that a scarce good or service is one that is i) impossible or prohibitively expensive to duplicate or ii) there are effective substitutes for the service.[10] In GovChat, The Tribunal explained that a ‘scarce’ good or service is one that “cannot be easily duplicated without significant capital investment.”[11] Google’s main argument rested on the fact that there are numerous alternatives to Google Ads, all of which are viable and pose significant competitive constraint on Google Ads. However, The Tribunal in this case concluded that SEM services cannot be easily duplicated without significant capital investment and there is no feasible substitute, thus, rejecting Google’s argument and establishing the scarcity of Google Ads.

Alongside the above elements, it must be shown that it is economically feasible for Google Ads to supply Lottoland with Google Ads services. Lottoland seeks nothing more than to have access to Google Ads, as do their competitors. This equitable access request, and as is the opinion of The Tribunal, would prima facie not be impractical or unfeasible, the continued access to Lottoland’s rivals being a determining factor. The fact that Google has supplied Lottoland with Google Ads for some time before terminating access also suggests that it is not economically unviable to do so again.

Once the above has been established, harm is presumed, and the onus would typically shift to the respondent to show that these harmful effects are outweighed by pro-competitive gains. The Tribunal found that Google had no competition-related rationale for their actions and thus, there conduct prima facie distorts competition in the downstream market without any pro-competitive of efficiency justification presented or argued by Google.

Our assessment above, whilst done in the context of Section 8(1)(d)(ii) is also relevant for purposes of Section 8(1)(c). The Tribunal concluded that for reason stated under the section 8(1)(d)(ii) discussion, Google has also violated the provisions of section 8(1)(c). Google’s conduct has a prima facie anti-competitive effect, distorting competition by not allowing Lottoland to expand within their market relative to their rivals. The conduct was not found to be outweighed by technological, efficiency or pro-competitive gain and Google had little to no arguments in this regard.

Application of section 49C(2) of the Act

Lottoland submitted that Google’s refusal to allow it to use Google Ads resulted in Lottoland’s customer registration rate dropping significantly. Lottoland supplemented this with a monetary amount of the revenue that they had suffered as a result of Googles refusal to supply their Google Ads service, which, up until the interim relief was ordered, was ongoing. The Tribunal concluded that this is prima facie evidence that, due to Google’s conduct, Lottoland have suffered ‘serious or irreparable damage’, meeting one of the three stages of section 49C(2) of the Act. Additionally, the preamble of the Act states the importance to “provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and variety of goods and services they desire”, with the overarching purpose of promoting and maintain competition in the Republic for the ultimate benefit of the consumer. It is clear that Google’s conduct has limited the choice for end-consumers.

With reference to ‘the balance of convenience’, The Tribunal weighed up the harm suffered by each party if they were to grant/refuse the application for interim relief, pending a decision on merits and stated that if there is clear and non-speculative evidence that suggest, and to what extent, a party will suffer harm if the relief was not given, then such relief should be given. It was stated in eMedia that “whilst there will inevitably be disputes of fact”, the Tribunal should still take a robust approach on the evidence before it, and that “if there is a prima facie right, even one open to some doubt and well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted and ultimately granted at a final relief stage, then the balance of convenience favours the grant of the relief.”[12]

The Tribunal concluded that Lottoland had made out a prima facie case of restrictive practices and well as the irreparable harm it has suffered, therefore the balance of convenience, as shown, favours granting of interim relief. The requirements of section 49C of the Act have been satisfied and there is a case for interim relief.

Key takeaways

This case highlights critical elements that The Tribunal considers when assessing prohibited practices and granting interim relief under the Act. For a prohibited practice, The Tribunal focuses on determining market dominance, the exclusionary nature of the conduct, and whether the anti-competitive effects outweigh any pro-competitive justifications. The Tribunal’s approach to market dominance was particularly noteworthy. Instead of accepting Google’s broad definition of the market as the ‘advertising ecosystem,’ The Tribunal adopted a narrower definition focusing on the specific market for SEM services. This refined approach allowed for a more precise assessment of competition dynamics, underscoring Google’s overwhelming dominance in the SEM market.

The Tribunal further scrutinised Google’s refusal to supply Lottoland and its inconsistent application of internal policies, emphasising the scarcity of Google Ads as a service and its critical role for businesses reliant on digital advertising. Regarding interim relief, the Tribunal assesses whether there is prima facie evidence of a prohibited practice, serious or irreparable harm to the applicant, and whether the balance of convenience favours granting relief. Notably, the Tribunal’s robust and detailed approach to evaluating dominance and harm provides a roadmap for future cases, emphasizing the importance of context-specific market definitions and balancing the interests of all parties involved. This case underscores the Tribunal’s commitment to protecting competition and consumer choice while maintaining fairness in digital markets.

Joshua Eveleigh, Managing Associate at Primerio International says:

“At its crux, this matter dealt with the weighing up of the alleged risks and reputational harm to Google against the claimed foreclosure of Lottoland in the downstream market. Importantly, the Tribunal clarified that its mandate is to pronounce on how conduct may distort competition in a market.

Hence, if there is prima facie proof of anti-competitive conduct which cannot be outweighed on a balance of convenience, an application for interim relief must succeed. This is a particularly noteworthy judgement for firms operating within regulated environments. In effect, a dominant firm will be hard placed to cut-off services to a customer if, for example, it does not have clear evidence that the customer engaged in unlawful conduct.”

[1] Western Cape Gambling and Racing Act 4 of 1996.

[2] Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”), sec 49C.

[3] The Act, sec 49C(2).

[4] eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd SA v MultiChoice (Pty) Ltd and Another, Case No. 201/CAC/Jun22 (“eMedia”), para 93.

[5] GovChat (Pty) Ltd and Hashtag Letstalk (Pty) Ltd v Facebook, Inc and Others, Case No. IR165Nov20 (“GovChat”), para 160.

[6] The Act, sec 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c).

[7] The Act, sec 8(1)(d)(ii).

[8] The Act, sec 8(1)(c).

[9] Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Lottoland South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Google Ireland Limited and Google South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Case No: IR191Mar23 (Reasons for Decision and Order), para 78.1.

[10] eMedia, para 129.

[11] GovChat, para 113.

[12] eMedia, para 83 and 95.

AfCFTA: An Injection For Intra-African Trade Or Just Another Ambitious Idea?

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By Jannes van der Merwe

The African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”) agreement, currently entered by 55 African countries, came into operation on 30 May 2019 and thereafter officially lodged in 2021. The purpose of the AfCFTA agreement is to create a single market for the continent, allowing free flow of goods and services across the continent and boost trading position of Africa in the global market[1].

While it is important to take into consideration that any change requires time, the question remains whether the AfCFTA agreement will in fact inject a positive change into Africa’s economy and promote intra-African trade.

The World bank predicts an economic growth for Africa, albeit it substantially low, indicating that the projected growth for Sub-Saharan Africa is 3% in 2024 and by 4% in 2025 to 2026, with East Africa expected to grow by 2.2% in 2024 and West Africa to grow by 3.9% in 2024.[2]

In 2023, the World bank further stated that research shows that the AfCFTA could lift 50 million people in Africa out of extreme poverty by 2035 and expand incomes by USD 571 billion[3].

Africa has been preparing itself for a growth in the Economy and the competition that comes with this in the broader African economy, by increasing regulatory infrastructure to oversee intra-African trade, with the likes of COMESA[4] and the recently functional ECOWAS[5], together with an increase of regulatory provision within African jurisdictions.  ‘

However, despite the preparation and readiness for a nuclear increase of intra-African trade, various factors have been hindering the progress. Africa has been riddled with uncertainties, related to political unrest, rising conflict and violence, climate shocks and high debt distress risks[6]. This leaves market leaders cautious to invest in Africa, and African entities to trade over and across these uncertain jurisdictions.

Article 4 of the AfCFTA agreement states that the specific objectives of the agreement is to progressively eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers; progressively liberalise trade in services; cooperate on investments, IP and competition policy; cooperate on all trade-related areas; cooperate on customs matters and the implementation of trade facilitation measures; establish a mechanism for the settlement of disputes concerning their rights and obligations; and to establish and maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration of AfCFTA.

South Africa has taken a positive step in this direction, as trade under the AfCFTA commenced during January 2024 where South African entities can export on a duty free, or reduced duty, for certain products. The South African Revenue Services has implemented the AfCFTA agreement and reduced the tariffs for these products[7]. However, the responsibility remains on African entities to promote the benefits of AfCFTA by increasing the intra-African trade and making full use of the economic gain that stems from the AfCFTA agreement.

While Africa is hopeful for the positive incorporation of the specific objectives of AfCFTA and the potential economic boost that AfCFTA can incorporate, this will only come with time, cooperation by the various African jurisdictions and proper implementation of the AfCFTA agreement.

[1]See: https://www.eac.int/trade/international-trade/trade-agreements/african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta-agreement.   

[2]See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview.

[3] See: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/trade/africa-pursues-free-trade-amid-global-fragmentation.

[4] Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

[5] Economic Community of West African States.

[6] See fn. 2 supra.

[7] The reduced tariffs can be found at https://www.sars.gov.za/legal-counsel/secondary-legislation/tariff-amendments/tariff-amendments-2024/

Trouble in Store: New challenges for Shein and Temu devotees in South Africa

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By Nicole Araujo 

It is no secret that international e-commerce giants Shein and Temu — the “ultra-cheap, ultra-fast retail giants” — have become increasingly popular among the South African population. The entry of these affordable and efficient platforms has certainly given Takealot – the established market leader – a run for its money, sparking reasonable concern for its survival and that of other local players in the market. 

The Commissioner of the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”), Doris Tshepe, stated that “all tools of government” are needed to level the playing field in the e-commerce sector considering the entry of international industry giants such as Amazon, Shein and Temu. This call for action comes 14 months after the Commission’s Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry Final Report (“OIPMI”), released in July 2023which identified Takealot as the market leader and holding a dominant share of over 35% of online transactions.

The South African e-commerce sector is growing quickly, demanding stronger competition regulation and government policies. The OIPMI focused on ‘then’ current market dynamics. The arrival of international players (who were not in the Commission’s scope at the time of the inquiry), however, now arguably requires a shift in regulatory focus. 

In the government’s efforts to curb the large volume of low-value imports from Shein and Temu, the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) introduced a new tax regulation in September 2024. SARS’ intervention was based on the fact that domestic clothing retailers are required to pay 45% on imported clothes whereas international e-commerce retailers, as an alleged way to avoid higher import rates, segment large orders into smaller amounts to ensure they remain under R500.   In this regard, items are now subject to VAT, in addition to the 20% flat rate, even where items are less than R500. 

At this particular juncture, it is too early to gauge the impact of the adjustments on sales, however the implemented tax adjustments intend to address competition concerns by increasing costs for low-value imports, making it less advantageous for consumers to consistently choose Shein and Temu’s cheaper imports over local options. Takealot has, however, demanded greater intervention to ensure further fairness within the South African market. Takealot, therefore, proposes that international e-commerce players such as Shein and Temu set up local offices and distribution centres in South Africa. Implementing these proposals would require Shein and Temu to invest in local infrastructure, thereby leading to job creation and increased tax contributions in South Africa. This would ultimately establish equity in the market, aligning their operational costs and processes with those of local online retailers and reducing the cost advantage these companies currently enjoy by selling and shipping directly from abroad. Furthermore, Takealot has advocated for their international industry partners to collaborate with local businesses and open local bank accounts to ensure fair tax contributions. 

With the shift in the Commission’s focus from market dynamics to international players, South African fans of the two industry giants can expect further tax implications and regulatory changes which may impact their online purchases and decision-making.Additionally, the rapid developments in the industry and the Commission’s evolving approach to market assessments raise questions about the effectiveness of market inquiries and their findings.

In light of the Commissioner’s recent comments, it is expected that the Commission will keep a watchful eye on the industry and its international participants, particularly taking into account local player’s concerns. 

Ultimately, the Commission will aim to foster a more equitable playing field, ensuring the sustainability and competitiveness of South Africa’s local industry in an increasingly globalised market. For local retailers, there may be a positive shift in foreign-owned business tax contributions, while consumers could see a positive impact on the overall economy.

Joshua Eveleigh, an associate competition law attorney at Primerio International, notes:

“the explosive growth of Shein and Temu within South Africa also demonstrates an important concern associated with the Commission’s market inquiry regime. Specifically, the Commission looks to impose binding remedies on firms within dynamic markets. This creates an inherent risk that by the time the Commission does impose remedies on a firm, the market has already changed and the remedy becomes ineffective.”

In any event, it is clear that certain measures will be taken to maintain effective competition in South Africa. In doing so, however, the Commission should be cautious in not becoming a price or sector regulator.

South Africa’s New Cabinet Under the GNU: A Shift Towards Business-Friendly Policies?

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By Megan Friday

On Sunday, 30 June 2024, President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa announced South Africa’s new cabinet under the newly-formed Government of National Unity (‘GNU’).  The Government of National Unity is “a government that brings together a number of rival leaders and political parties in order to promote national unity and political stability” (Cheeseman, N., Bertrand, E., and Husaini, S. (2019). A Dictionary of African Politics, Oxford University Press). The Democratic Alliance, South Africa’s main opposition party, is generally considered to be more business friendly than other, rival parties.

From the new cabinet announcement, it has been revealed that Parks Tau is the new Minister of the Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (‘DTIC’), with Zuko Godlimpi and Andrew Whitfield serving as Deputy Ministers. Mr. Tau, the former Mayor of Johannesburg, is seen as a more business-friendly appointment than his predecessor, Ebrahim Patel.

We anticipate that the aggressive approach taken by the South African Competition Commission in driving an industrial policy agenda will be moderated in favour of a more business-friendly approach. A more balanced implementation of public interest objectives is expected, aiming to stimulate economic growth, business development, job creation, and more.

Any potential changes to the structure and mandate of the Commission remain to be seen.

“But did you really comply…?” Insights into Post-Merger Conditions

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Lessons drawn from the Constitutional Court in the Coca-Cola Appeal

By Brandon Cole

In a pivotal decision issued on April 17, 2024 by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the case of Coca-Cola Beverages Africa (Pty) Ltd against the Competition Commission has reshaped our understanding and enforcement of post-merger conditions in business transactions.  Stemming from a 2016 merger that led to the creation of “Coca-Cola Beverages South Africa” (out of four separate entities), the case underlines the complexity of adhering to merger conditions imposed to safeguard fair competition and operational continuity.

The merger was initially green-lit with certain conditions focused on preventing job losses (“retrenchments”) and on harmonizing employment terms across the new entity.  Despite these protective measures, certain challenging economic conditions, including a sugar tax and rising input costs, compelled Coca-Cola to undertake some retrenchments. This action sparked a legal challenge from the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), asserting a breach of the stipulated merger conditions that underlay the transaction’s approval by the antitrust authorities.

Central to the dispute was the interpretation of how merger conditions are enforced and reviewed under the South African Competition Act.  The crux was whether Coca-Cola’s retrenchments violated the merger-specific conditions or were justified by external economic pressures. The Competition Tribunal, tasked with adjudicating the challenge, initially ruled in favour of Coca-Cola, recognizing the broader economic factors at play. However, this decision was overturned by the Competition Appeal Court, which led to Coca-Cola’s subsequent appeal to the Republic’s Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court’s decision clarified several crucial aspects regarding the enforcement of merger conditions:

Nature of review: The Court differentiated this review from ordinary administrative actions, focusing on whether Coca-Cola substantially complied with the merger conditions rather than strictly adhering to them without regard for external circumstances.

Causal connection: The Court criticized the narrow focus of the Appeal Court on the direct causality between the merger and retrenchments. Instead, it supported a more holistic approach that must consider all relevant factors impacting business decisions post-merger.

Implications for business strategy: The judgment emphasized the importance for businesses to thoroughly plan and document their strategies when complying with merger conditions. This is essential to demonstrate substantial compliance, especially when external economic factors might compel deviations from the expected course.

This landmark judgment highlights the dynamic nature of post-merger conditions and their enforcement, illustrating that adherence to these conditions must consider both the intended protective measures and the practical realities faced by businesses. For companies undergoing mergers, this case serves as a critical reminder of the need to balance merger obligations with agile business responses to external challenges.

The insights derived from the Coca-Cola Beverages Africa case provide valuable lessons for businesses and legal practitioners involved in mergers and acquisitions, especially in terms of planning, executing, and justifying actions taken in relation to merger conditions.

South African Competition Appeal Court Still Grappling with Complex Forex Case

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By Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard

Eight years after the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) commenced its investigation into various national and foreign banks (“the Respondents”) in the Rand rigging case commonly referred to as the “Forex case”, the competition authorities continue to grapple with this complex case. While the Commission has continued to encourage the respondent banks to enter into settlement agreements with it, and several banks have done so, the case continues in respect of several Respondents. 

Briefly, the Forex case pertains to an allegation of collusion between South African and foreign banks which would have led to the manipulation of the Rand-Dollar exchange rate amongst said banks. The complained of conduct is alleged to have occurred between 2007 – 2013 (at least) amongst 28 banks in Europe, South Africa, Australia, and the United States of America. The banks allegedly conspired to manipulate the South African Rand by, inter alia, electronically sharing information on USD/ZAR currency pair trades. The harm alleged to the Commission extended to the Rand exchange rate, which had spillover effects on South African trade, foreign direct investment, corporate balance sheets, public and private debt, financial assets, and concomitant prices of goods and services. Accordingly, the Commission’s case is premised on section 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) – being market allocation and price fixing.

Earlier this month, the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) again heard the Forex case, as new arguments have come to the fore. This time, the remaining Respondents have alleged that the Commission bears the onus to prove that all the Respondents partook in a single overarching conspiracy to manipulate the Rand. In this regard, despite the Tribunal having noted that the Commission’s referral “contains adequate details that have enabled us to conclude that the Referral, as a whole, prima facie, shows that there was a [single overall conspiracy] between the foreign and local banks to manipulate trading in the USD/ZAR currency pair”, the Respondents maintain that the case cannot proceed until this onus has been fully discharged.

Despite various developments over the past years, including a number of unsuccessful exception, objection, dismissal and strike out applications brought by the Respondents relating to jurisdiction, prescription and lack of particularity as well as successful joinder applications (in respect of the primary case) by the Commission, the case has not substantively progressed, and it currently stands to become one of the longest running matters before the competition authorities.

One of the Respondent’s Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”), a multinational British Bank, has also recently entered into a settlement agreement with the Commission, in terms of which it admitted liability to the manipulation of the USD/ZAR currency pair and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of c.ZAR 42 million. SCB’s settlement follows a similar settlement between the Commission and Citibank in 2017. The Commission did not seek penalties against ABSA Bank, Barclays Capital and Barclays Bank as these Respondents had applied and were granted leniency in terms of the Commission’ Corporate Leniency Policy.  

 The Tribunal and CAC did, however, in March this year, require that the Commission file a new referral affidavit in order to substantiate the case that it had previously pleaded insufficiently. As to the Respondent’s argument that the Commission could not initiate complaint referrals absent the initiation of an investigation, the Tribunal noted that while the Commission needs to commence an investigation against a Respondent specifically to be able to initiate a complain referral against them, it clarified that whether such initiation is express or tacit, is immaterial. The Tribunal further noted that to oblige the Commission to specifically mention each respondent in its complaint to the Tribunal would lead to an absurd outcome, namely that the Commission would be precluded from joining potential or even self-confessed member(s) of a cartel subsequent to its complaint referral.

As it stands, the CAC continues to hear arguments on behalf of 13 banks, predominantly regarding evidence as to their involvement in the alleged “single overarching conspiracy”, and while the Respondents have spared no expense in defending their case, the competition authorities have in no way backed down.

This is an important case, but has also served as an important precedent setting case in relation to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter involving foreign entities (i.e., whether the Commission has jurisdiction to hear a complaint where firms are neither domiciled nor carry business in the Republic of South Africa). In this regard, the CAC held that the Competition Tribunal could enjoy personal and subject matter jurisdiction over pure peregrini, provided that there were adequate connecting factors between the foreign firms’ conduct and the complaint from the Commission and upheld that Tribunal’s decision in relation to local peregrini that the Tribunal had jurisdiction where the qualified effects test was met and that a penalty sought should be confined to turnover within and exports from South Africa.

Primerio Director, Michael-James Currie provides the following insights: “the Forex case has, throughout the several bouts before the adjudicative bodies, confirmed that the thresholds for establishing jurisdiction over foreign entities and foreign conduct have been lowered. The Commission does however still have the onus on demonstrating that the conduct had a “substantial, direct and reasonably foreseeable effect in South Africa”. This will likely remain a contentious issue at trial as even South Africa’s National Treasury has confirmed that the conduct unlikely had any impact on the ZAR exchange rate. To the extent that individuals were prejudiced by the alleged conduct, it would be particularly interesting to see whether such victims would consider civil follow-on damages actions.”

[Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard are lawyers in the competition law department at Primerio. The views expressed in this article are their own and not attributable to Primerio]

Competition Commission Publishes ‘Public Interest Guidelines Relating To Merger Control’

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A perspective from private practice — the real cost of doing business in South Africa: Merger Control Disincentivizing Investment into the South African Economy

By Gina Lodolo, Joshua Eveleigh, and Nicola Taljaard

A Look Back:

South Africa has been trying to find the delicate balance between the promotion of public interest initiatives, attracting foreign investment and promoting the competitiveness of South Africa’s markets. In recent years, however, the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) appears to have taken a more rigid approach towards requiring the promotion of public interest initiatives as an outcome of merger control investigations.  

At the outset, it is important to note that the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) allows the Commission to impose conditions on mergers and acquisitions that are deemed to result in a substantial lessening of competition or detrimental to the public interest.

In 2019, the Act also underwent a significant amendment regarding the public interest provisions. In accordance with the transformative values under the Act’s preamble, the amendment aimed to ensure that competition authorities have regard to public interest factors when assessing mergers and acquisitions and, in particular, section 12A(3)(e) makes provision for the promotion of a greater spread of ownership with a view to increasing the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and employees.

While the Commission was not so emphatic on the promotion of HDP and/or employee ownership immediately after the 2019 amendments, the Commission has been taking an increasingly robust approach to the imposition of these public interest criteria. Most notably, this can be seen from the widely publicised Burger King decision where a merger that raised no competition concerns was prohibited for the first time, based solely on public interest concerns (namely a decreased HDP shareholding from 68% to 0%). While the decision was ultimately settled before being heard on request for consideration before the Tribunal, it certainly indicated the trajectory of the Commission’s approach. Since the Burger King decision, the Commission has increasingly taken a hard-line regarding transactions that are benign both from a competition and public interest perspective.

While the amendments to the Act symbolize a benevolent effort toward the transformative objectives that the competition authorities are mandated to develop, a great deal of uncertainty stemmed as a result. In practice, the Commission’s interpretation of section 12A(3)(e) of the amended Act has been to place a positive obligation on the merging parties, post transaction, to increase the merging parties’ HDP and/or employee shareholding, often times utilising a benchmark of 5%. This is irrespective of whether a transaction is benign from both a competition and public interest perspective.

Merging parties, legal representatives and regulatory authorities have also substantially debated the interpretation and effect of the amended public interest provisions. The primary argument that contrasts the Commission’s interpretation of the amended public interest provisions, however, provides that section 12A(3)(e) is only one factor for consideration in determining whether a transaction that would otherwise have an adverse effect on competition or other public interest grounds, should be allowed. Premised on this interpretation, the Commission would not be authorised to refuse a transaction if it cannot show an adverse effect on competition based on a holistic assessment of the public interest grounds delineated in section 12A(3).

The Commission’s application of the public interest provision has increasingly lacked clarity and predictability, thereby creating uncertainty in the merger review process, and making it challenging for businesses to plan and execute transactions with confidence. This is particularly so when transactions are subject to long-stop dates where protracted engagements and negotiations with the Commission risk the termination of the entire agreement. To circumvent the incurrence of frictional costs and risks of breaching any long-stop dates, private practitioners are experiencing an increased amount of global mergers carving-out (or at least considering to) the South African legs of those transactions.

Firms are often concerned about the potential dilution of existing shareholders’ equity, regardless of the size of the firm. Foreign investors may be concerned about the impact of the allocation of new shares to employees on their current ownership stakes, potentially reducing their control and influence over the merged entity.

Further uncertainty surrounded how the application of what appears to be a 5% public interest divestiture approach will apply in all circumstances. For example, it is unclear whether this would apply to all merging parties even if the two merging entities are wholly owned BBBEE entities. Furthermore, how should firms divest a 5% stake in the merged entity where the underlying transaction involves land and no employees? These are some examples of the difficult questions the Commission has yet to consider if it is to continue with the outright application of its interpretation of the Act.

In addition, by insisting on ownership-related commitments from merging parties, the Commission’s policy undermines the efficacy of the BEE framework, as parties are likely to take the view that any efforts to improve their BEE profiles outside of the ambit of the transaction may, on the Commission’s approach and assessment, carry very little weight. Accordingly, firms may start to favour an approach of decreasing their BEE efforts prior to transactions in preparation of having conditions imposed on them. Firms may also start to undervalue the target to account for additional public interest spend or carve out the South African part of the transaction to circumvent this cumbersome condition.

Over an extended period, the outcome becomes evident for South Africa – increased uncertainty and an impractical application of the Act will result in decreased in investment; potential prohibition of competitively benign mergers and increased transaction costs.

While the Commission’s approach is prima facie laudable, the unintended consequences may result in a counterintuitive outcome and cause greater long-term prejudice to the public interest and growth of the South African economy. This is particularly true in light of the much-needed foreign direct investment South Africa requires following the effects of Covid-19, greylisting and economic instability.

Introduction of Public Interest Guidelines

On 28 September 2023, the Commission released their ‘Draft Amended Public Interest Guidelines relating to Merger Control’ for public comment accessible here (“Public Interest Guidelines”).

On the same day, at the Commission’s 17th Annual Conference, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition (“DTIC”), Minister Ebrahim Patel, lauded the amendments to the Act and stated that the increasing imposition of public interest conditions on mergers has resulted:

  • in a contribution of R67 billion towards the local economy;
  • the saving of at least 236 000 jobs over a period of five years;
  • the creation of at least 22 000 jobs;
  • and 143 000 workers now being shareholders in companies.

While there have certainly been commendable strides towards the achievement of promoting the transformation of the local economy, the above statistics do not paint a full picture. While many firms will continue to consent to the public interest commitments suggested by the Commission, for fear of an outright merger prohibition, a number of firms would rather carve-out the South African leg of multi-jurisdictional deals. This, in itself, would stifle economic growth and adversely effect the public interest in the long-term (as consumers do not stand to enjoy the benefits of pro-competitive mergers).

The Public Interest Guidelines are intended to formalise the Commission’s policy approach discussed above when evaluating public interest factors.

We outline the pertinent aspects of the Public Interest Guidelines below:

Commission’s approach to public interest factors in merger control

Section 12A of the Competition Act provides that both the competition and public interest assessments carry equal weight in merger considerations.

Regardless of whether a merger is found to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition (“SPLC”), the Public Interest Guidelines provide that the Commission must still determine whether the merger is “justifiable on Public Interest grounds”. In this regard, the Commission will determine the effect of the merger on each of the public interest elements arising from the merger to determine the net effect of the merger on the public interest.

General approach to assessing public interest provisions

The Commission considers that a merger assessment requires a quantitative and qualitative determination into the merger’s likely effect on:

  1. a particular industrial sector or region;
  2. employment;
  3. the ability of small and medium businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to effectively enter into, participate in or expand within the market;
  4. the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and
  5. the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the market.

Where the Commission concludes that the merger will have a positive effect on one of the above factors, there will be no further assessment into that factor. Where, however, the Commission finds that one of the above factors is substantially negatively impacted by the merger, the Commission will consider remedies to address these adverse impacts.

Importantly, the Public Interest Guidelines provide that where a negative impact on a public interest factor cannot be remedied, the Commission may consider “equally weighty countervailing Public Interest factors that outweigh the negative impact identified” on a case-by-case basis.

Where a merger is found to positively impact a majority of the above public interest factors, these may be outweighed countervailed by a substantial negative effects from a single public interest factor.

Approach to induvial public interest factors

The Public Interest Guidelines provide guidance on how the Commission will assess each of the public interest factors. For purposes of this summary, we focus primarily on “the promotion of a greater spread of ownership…by [HDPs] and workers…” factor which has caused the greatest degree of uncertainty, transaction costs and protracted negotiations with the Commission. This factor stands out from the rest of the public interest factors as the Public Interest Guidelines make it clear that the Commission considers section 12A(3)(e) of the Competition Act to confer a “positive obligation on merging parties to promote or increase a greater spread of ownership, in particular by HDPs and/or Workers in the economy.” In this regard, the Commission regards every merger having an effect in South Africa as having to promote HDP and/or worker ownership and therefore assumes no neutral effect.

In light of the above, where a merger does not promote HDP and/or worker ownership, it will be regarded as having an adverse impact on that particular public interest factor and, if considered substantial enough, may render the merger unjustifiable on public interest grounds.

The Public Interest Guidelines go further so as to state that where a merger promotes HDP ownership, this would not preclude the Commission’s obligation to consider an increase of ownership by workers.

Where the Commission considers there to be a substantial negative effect on the promotion of HDP and/or workers, the following remedies may be imposed:

  1. concluding alternative ownership agreements with HDPs/Workers in either the acquiring, target or merged firm; and
  2. divestitures to HDP shareholders which would create a greater spread of ownership in another part of the business. Importantly, the Commission will generally require that these HDPs and/or workers are actively involved in the operations (ideally control should be conferred) of the divested business and are not merely passive or financial investors.

Where the Commission proposes that an ESOP be implemented, the following guidance is provided:

  1. where a merger results in a dilution of HDP and/or workers, the ESOP should remedy the full extent of the dilution;
  2. where the merger does not result in a dilution, the ESOP should “hold no less than 5% of the value/shares of the merged entity but may be required to hold a higher shareholding based on the facts of the case”.

Where the Commission proposed that an HDP transaction be concluded, it provided the following guidance of the principles that ought to apply:

  1. the HDP transaction should be no less than 25% +1 share and “should ideally confer control on the HDPs”;
  2. the merging parties will have discretion to choose the HDPs; and
  3. the merging parties must inform the SACC of the proposed HDP transaction prior to its implementation to assess compliance with imposed conditions.

Importantly, while the Public Interest Guidelines are not binding on the Commission, the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, they provide clarity on how the Commission intends on assessing mergers notified to it.

Despite an increase in certainty, the Public Interest Guidelines remain a cause for concern amongst the local and international private sectors as they have merely confirmed the policy approach that the Commission has increasingly been adopting in practice. In this regard, even where a foreign-to-foreign merger is notified to the Commission, it ought to consider how it can actively promote HDP and/or worker ownership and may become susceptible to ESOPs and/or HDP transactions in achievement of the Competition Act’s transformational objectives.

The Public Interest Guidelines are open for public comment until 28 October 2023 and are likely to be subject to extensive submissions.

Sweeping Inquiry Sheds Light on Online Intermediation Platforms: Competition, Opportunity, and the Road Ahead

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By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Nicola Taljaard

On 31 July 2023, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) released its Final Report and Decision on the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (“OIPMI”). The OIPMI was initially launched on 19 May 2021 and after a number of requests for information, public hearings, expert reports as well as comments and engagements with stakeholders, the SACC’s findings and recommendations have finally been concluded.

The SACC is empowered to conduct market inquiries according to section 43B(1)(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended) where it has reason to believe that there are market features that may impede, distort or restrict competition in a particular market; or to achieve the objects and purposes of the Act (including participation of small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) and historically disadvantaged persons (“HDPs”).

The Inquiry: A Timeline of Discovery and Discernment

  • May 2021: The kick-off. Release of the Statement of Issues (SOI), first round of Requests for Information (RFIs), and business user survey.
  • August 2021: Heating up with the release of the Further Statement of Issues (FSOI), second round of RFIs, and a refined business user survey.
  • November 2021: The public had their say with hearings and follow-up RFIs.
  • February 2022: Expert reports and in-camera hearings added a new dimension.
  • July 2022: Provisional Inquiry Report was published, provisional findings, and recommendations were made public.
  • August to December 2022: A flurry of submissions, stakeholder engagements, and follow-up RFIs.
  • January to July 2023: Engaging stakeholders on final findings and remedial actions, sealing the deal.

What Does It All Mean?

These findings focus on the various platform categories, including the mammoth influence of Google Search. The full extent of these actions requires deep exploration, but one thing is clear: the landscape of online intermediation platforms is about to shift.

During the launch of the OIPMI, the Minister Patel of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (“DTIC”) commended the SACC for its great effort and the high-quality product produced in the form of the OIPMI. He further noted that the government should consider taking an inclusive response to the findings and recommendations in the OIPMI.

The findings concluded, inter alia, that Google Search is vital as a means for consumers to access all platforms, and that its paid search alongside free results business model is disproportionately advantageous to larger and more established platforms. It also found that Booking.com’s practice of restricting hotel prices on certain online networks results in a restriction of competition and allows it to make more commission by making users reliant on it. eCommerce giant, Takealot, was found to have a conflict of interest due to its retail department competing with its marketplace sellers and causing detriment to the latter. Google Play and the Apple App stores were found to charge exorbitant fees to developers and on a global level, the platforms hampered the visibility of SA-paid apps. Food delivery platforms Uber Eats and Mr D Food were found to cause difficulty to their competitors because of the lack of openness regarding the surcharges charged on menus across their platforms, as well as the limitations put on national chain franchisees. Property advertisement platforms Property 24 and Private Property were further found to have hindered their competitors by providing low interoperability to competitors in respect of listings. Property 24, together with AutoTrader and Cars.co.za were also found to have hampered small estate agents and car dealers due to the discriminatory pricing implemented by these platforms.

To combat the effects of the findings, the SACC recommended the imposition of a number of remedial actions including consumer-aiding search filters, marketing incentives to purchase local goods, the removal of restrictive pricing clauses, the segregation of internal (competing) divisions, the removal of automatically directing mechanisms to larger players, disclosure clauses to consumers and other benefits to SMEs, HDPs and consumers.

All platforms will be provided a period within which to affect the remedial actions.

A New Chapter: Where Do We Go From Here?

This OIPMI hasn’t just been about pointing fingers and exposing flaws. It’s about shaping the future of a wide range of the economy. The implications are broad, affecting everyone from big tech to the small business owner striving to make a mark in a competitive world.

Michael-James Currie, Partner at Primerio, noted “The recommendations of the OIPMI are far reaching for online platforms. Regulators need to ensure that we do not undermine those who are growing and providing significant investment the digital market in a highly competitive market where firms are competing not only with established traditional retailers but also large international players. Likewise, South Africa cannot afford to signal to international players that their business models will be substantively undermined once they establish themselves in South Africa. This is particularly so if the Commission’s remedies are not informed by objective competition concerns.”

Criminal cartels & dilapidated energy networks: Will South Africa act?

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A true challenge to the impartiality of the South African Competition Authority: Eskom and its Criminal Supplier Cartels — Let’s wait and see what SACC does now

By Joshua Eveleigh

Will South Africa’s antitrust watchdog, under the aegies of its relatively new head Doris Tshepe, investigate and prosecute flagrant cartel conduct, when it is practically presented on a sliver platter by one of the CEOs of the (willing?) victims of said illegality…? Andre De Ruyter, former CEO of South Africa’s recently-infamous Eskom, is no stranger to the limelight – this is particularly true, following his scandalous (but not so surprising) bombshell allegations of deep-rooted and systemic corruption within the State-Owned Enterprise, together with ‘senior politicians’.

Even more recently, De Ruyter tested the antitrust waters and emphasised the existence of at least four cartels amongst coal mines in Mpumalanga (the Presidential Cartel, the Mesh-Kings Cartel, the Legendaries Cartel, and the Chief Cartel, respectively) intent on defrauding Eskom by, amongst a myriad other means, engaging in collusive tendering, so as to ensure that one of the cartel’s participants would ultimately be appointed as a lucrative vendor.

While there may not be any definitive or public available evidence, as of yet, the mere allegations of such cartels by the SOEs former CEO should at least raise enough red flags for South Africa’s Competition Commission. In this respect, section 4(1)(b)(iii) of the Competition Act expressly prohibits collusive tendering, forming part of the ‘cartel conduct’ category, the most egregious form of competition law contraventions due to their unnecessary raising of prices – of which may be passed down to end-consumers.  Mr. De Ruyter noted that the mere reality that cartel chiefs had ceased posting personal jet set lifestyle photos on social media was evidence of their having been alerted to the risks attendant to flagrant antitrust violations.

Given the current state of load-shedding, Eskom’s R423 billion indebtedness (as of March 2023) and the prejudicial impact that these factors are having on both business and personal livelihoods, the South African Competition Commission – theoretically in charge of cartels in the country — must surely regard the energy sector as a priority.  In this regard, one would expect a similar sense of urgency and emphasis that the Competition Commission has recently placed on the retail and grocery sectors, for the focus to be on South Africa’s energy sector.  After all, says Primerio partner John Oxenham, “this sector impacts every facet of commerce and consumer welfare.  If this was the case, the South African public could expect to see the prosecution and sanctioning of numerous cartels, each allowing for a maximum administrative penalty of 10% of the cartelist’s locally derived turnover as well as the potential for subsequent civil follow-on damages claims as well as criminal prosecutions.”

Oxenham’s competition-law colleague, Michael Currie, opines that, “[i]n the event that the Competition Commission does not investigate and prosecute against the coal mine cartels, such a position would largely reinforce the notion that some of the most unscrupulous of cartels are immune from prosecution, further entrenching the existence of cartels in South Africa’s most sensitive sectors.”

Market Inquiry here, Market Inquiry there, Market Inquiry everywhere! – 3 Market Inquiries in as Many Months

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By Joshua Eveleigh and Nicholas Petzwinkler

The South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) has not spared any time in demonstrating its bench strength by publishing three draft Terms of Reference for as many separate market inquiries within the first four months of 2023.

This article provides a brief overview in respect of the: Fresh Produce market inquiry (“FPMI”); Media and Digital Platforms market inquiry (“MDPMI”); and South African Steel Industry market inquiry (“SASMI”) and what this all means for firms across these varying sectors.

What is a Market Inquiry and what is its Purpose?

In brief, a market inquiry is an investigative tool used by the SACC to identify whether there are any aspects of a particular market that impedes, distorts or restricts competition by asking industry stakeholders for information regarding their business, its operations within a specific market as well as the market in general.

FPMI

On 14 February 2023, the SACC published the final Terms of Reference for the FPMI which seeks to identify and understand the state of competition within the industry, market features affecting pricing outcomes and the challenges faced by, in particular, small and emerging farmers.

The FPMI will focus on the following themes:

  1. Efficiency of the value chain, with an emphasis on the dynamics around fresh produce market facilities;
  2. Market dynamics of key inputs and its impact on producers; and
  3. Barriers to entry, expansion and participation.

The Terms of Reference also provide that the FPMI will focus on, in particular: apples, bananas, oranges / citrus, stone fruit, pears, avocados, grapes and nuts, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, sweetcorn, carrots and cabbage and will also extend to processed fruit and vegetables.

Most notably, the FPMI concerns the entire value chain, including inputs (such as fertiliser, agrochemicals and farming equipment), production, wholesalers, intermediaries, national fresh produce markets, distribution, marketing and retailers.

Given that the SACC views the fresh produce sector as a priority sector, it is foreseeable that the SACC will place increased scrutiny in its investigations across the value chain. This is particularly in light of recent and controversial Essential Food Price Monitoring Report which concluded that there were reasons to suspect that firms across the value chain may have engaged in opportunistic price increases

All Things Digital: MDPMI

On 17 March 2023, the SACC announced and published the draft Terms of Reference for the MDPMI.

The MDPMI appears to largely come off the back of several inquiries and investigations led by competition authorities globally, on the impact of digital platforms on news media publishers that use these platforms to distribute content online as well as the SACC’s recent Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (“OIPMI”) where the Publishers Support Services made submissions that the widespread shift towards digital news consumption has resulted in a substantial decline in advertising revenue.

The MDPMI will focus on whether there are any market features in digital platforms that distribute news media content which impede, distort or restrict competition, or undermine the purposes of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (“Competition Act”), and which have material implications for the news media sector of South Africa, which includes news publishers and broadcasters. The scope of the market inquiry will extend to the following digital platforms:

  1. Search engines (e.g. Google Search and Microsoft Bing);
  2. Social media sites (e.g. Meta);
  3. News aggregator sites and/or apps (e.g. Google News and Apple News);
  4. Video sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube and Tiktok);
  5. Generative AI services whether integrated into the above platforms or not (e.g. ChatGPT alone or integrated with Bing); and
  6. Other platforms identified in the course of the inquiry.

Evidently, the MDPMI will be far reaching and will also extend to emerging technologies, such as open AI search engines.

The draft Terms of Reference can be accessed here.

South African Steel Industry market inquiry (“Steel Industry Inquiry”)

On 07 April 2023, the SACC published the draft Terms of Reference for the Steel Industry Inquiry, and will focus particularly on inputs and raw materials (such as iron ore and coking oil) and the upstream primary steel production. The SACC notes specifically that:

Iron ore

  1. Based on 2018 estimates, the three largest market participants in the mining of iron ore account for more than 95% of total ore mined in the country with the largest participant having a market share in excess of 55% while the third-largest iron ore miner held a market share of approximately 15% which, alongside large levels of production, may result in a large degree of market power. The SACC also states that there is a need to assess the pricing mechanisms adopted by iron ore producers in South Africa to ensure the competitiveness of steel producers.
  2. It has received information that there were previously contractual arrangements in respect to allocations of capacity on the Sishen-Saldanha railway line which may result in competitive concerns. The SACC has also received complaints of differential pricing whereby larger rail customers are provided favourable rates in comparison to emerging miners.

Coking oil

  1. The SACC highlights that South African steel manufacturers rely heavily on imported coking oil which could negatively impact the sustainability of the local steel manufacturing market due to import taxes and which may allow local producers to set their prices at import parity levels.
  2. The SACC considers it important to determine whether, inter alia, there are any policy interventions to encourage the local production of coking oil and the entering of new market participants.

Upstream Primary Steel Production

  1. In its Terms of Reference, the SACC notes that there is a considerable degree of market concentration with there only being three blast furnace plants in South Africa (of which are all owned by one company). Additionally, there are six electric arc furnaces which are owned by six different companies.
  2. The SACC also notes that he pricing behaviour of upstream suppliers, in relation to the supply of long and flat steel, may have a direct impact on the ability of downstream metal fabricators to be competitive in their respective markets. Additionally, the SACC also identified that there may be high barriers to entry in the upstream level of steel production which has the ability to increase the capital requirements for entry and sustainability in various markets in the upstream level.

The Terms of Reference are open for public comment until 05 May 2023 and can be accessed here.

What do market inquiries mean for industry stakeholders?

As is evident from the scopes of the above market inquiries, market inquiries provide the SACC with broad and seemingly unfettered powers to investigate competitive dynamics within a particular sector.

More importantly, the Competition Act affords the SACC with the powers to publish binding recommendations to specifically redress any anticompetitive effects that it identifies within a market during the course of a market inquiry. In this respect, companies which may be approached by the SACC during the course of its investigations are encouraged to seek specialised competition law advice to ensure that the proper information and legal safeguards are provided to mitigate against the imposition of onerous industry recommendations.