Without the graciousness and leadership of Mr. Mandela, the rule of law governing the country and the open discussions engendered on AAT & AAF would not be possible today.
As one journalist observed in 2013 upon the former President’s and civil-rights icon’s death:
Few world leaders can claim among their devotees a cast as diverse as the English monarch, the president of the Palestinian Authority, and Chinese human rights activists. In Beijing and Tel Aviv, Lagos and Havana, London and Washington, DC, many around the world awoke Friday morning with their leaders momentarily united by the loss of one of the 20th century’s most revered statesmen.
“Too huge to be monopolised”? — Orkeh cites business need for Nigerian competition law
The Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of African Cable Television, Mr. Godfrey Orkeh, was interviewed recently in Lagos, Nigeria, and discussed a topic we at AAT have previously addressed: The need for Africa’s largest economy to enact antitrust laws. ACTV (pronounced “active”) began its service in December 2014 and has faced an uphill battle in entering the pay-TV marketplace.
As John Oxenham, a founding director of Pr1merio, the Africa-focussed legal advisory firm and business consultancy, points out: “In April of 2014, Nigeria surpassed South Africa as the continent’s largest economy, yet it still lacks any enforceable antitrust provision in its statutes.” (See Economist Apr. 12, 2014: “Africa’s New Number One“).
The way forward still remains for Nigeria to have a Competition Law as the basic legal framework upon which other sector regulations can build upon.
Chilufya Sampa, a former COMESA Competition Commissioner and currently the Executive Director of the Zambian Competition & Consumer Protection Commission, said that antitrust law in Africa’s largest economy “would be great indeed,” noting the “many benefits in having a competition law.”
Pr1merio director Andreas Stargard likewise promoted the idea of establishing an antitrust regime in West Africa’s dominant economy. He wrote in an article aptly entitled “Nigerian antitrust?“:
Today, AfricanAntitrust adds its voice to the steady, though infrequent, discussion surrounding the possibility of a Nigerian competition-law regime. In our opinion, it is not a question of “if” but “when”, and perhaps more importantly, “how“?
“If”: it is a virtual certainty that sooner or later, the drivers of growth in the Nigerian economy (innovators, IPR owners and applicants, upstarts, and foreign investment) will succeed in their demands for an antitrust law to be enacted.
“When”: it’s been debated in Nigeria since at least 1988; there was another push in the right direction in 2002; and, since then, at least a steady trickle of intermittent calls for a central antitrust regulator, often coming loudest from the outside (as does this post). This general time line coincides with that of other developing or now emerging competition-law jurisdictions, and we believe it is now a question of years, not decades, until a Nigerian Sherman Act will see the legislative light of day. Our (admittedly unscientific) prediction is that Nigeria will have a competition-law regime prior to 2020. (Note: the latest of up to six bills introduced to date, the Competition and Consumer Protection Bill, has been languishing in the Nigerian Senate since 2009).
“How”: this is the kicker — the most interesting bit of the Groundhog Day story this would otherwise be and remain. The intriguing part about reigniting the discussion surrounding Nigerian antitrust law is that we now live in the age of COMESA and more importantly here, the COMESA CCC (Competition Commission).
This opens up new opportunities that may not have been envisaged by others in the 1990s or 2000s. For example: will the economies of West Africa band together and create a similar organisation, notably with “legal teeth”, which might include provisions for a centralised enforcement of antitrust? Will it be under the auspices of ECOWAS or UEMOA? A monetary union has been known to be an effective driver of ever-increasing competition-law enforcement elsewhere in the world (hint: Brussels)…
If the answer to these crucial questions is “no”, what are the consequences to the Nigerian economy? Will Nigeria continue on its path to outsider status when it comes to healthy economic regulation — despite its powerhouse status in sub-Saharan Africa? Will this add to the disincentive against increased foreign investment, akin to the prevalent oil and diesel-stealing that occurs ’round-the-clock and in the open? Will businesses — other than former state monopolies, now privatised and firmly in the hands of oligarchs, or cartelists — continue to accept being deprived of the economic fruit of their labour, without protection from certifiably anti-competitive behaviour? Will other state agencies continue to step in and act as quasi-enforcers of antitrust, as they have done in the past (the Air Cargo cartel is an example), filling the void of a central competition commission?
Chief Executive Officer of African Cable Television, Mr. Godfrey Orkeh
Below, we excerpt a few of Mr. Orkeh’s pertinent comments on the issue, in which he discusses the lack of any monopolisation offence under Nigerian law and the high barriers of entry in the television and media sector he and his company have faced while challenging the incumbent domestic TV provider.
The number one challenge in the industry is that there is no regulation, NBC is doing its best but there is no act of law that backs the activities up. Before the last government handed over, there was a bill that was being pushed, [competition-law] bill like what we find in Europe that nobody can own 100 per cent of an industry, if you grow beyond a particular size, for instance when Microsoft, Google among others grew beyond a certain size, they were stopped to allow room for other players. There is no such law right now in Nigeria so it is a big barrier; it is only legislature that can change that. … This is good for the economy and the customers.
We knew there is a monopolistic tendency in the market, the existing structure in the legislature of Nigeria allows a dominant player to take advantage of the environment, before we came to the market. There was no pay TV offering PVR for the middle class and for you to get decoder with PVR you have to cough out about N70, 000 but we are saying with N15, 000 you can have a PVR. And content-wise there was a lot of exclusivity which is going to be difficult for one person to break. Beyond this, we will develop the market for our self, develop a niche for our self because right now the tendency is also thriving in the industry, Nigeria with a population of about 170 million, 26 million households with television, but the market is so huge. There is still a huge market that is not being addressed, we are here to capture that niche market and grow it. … [] Nigerians are the only ones that can take a stand as far as monopoly is concerned, and we have started seeing that in recent social media reactions about what is happening in the industry. If we don’t have a choice there will always be a monopoly even if it is only a player that is that market, but you’ve created an avenue for two to three players to play in the market, there would be options like what we see in the telecoms sector, where I can port my number, which I believe has taken efficiency to another level. So we are getting to a point where with digitisation every Nigerian would be exposed to as many channels as possible. But the fact remains that the market is a huge segment. It is too huge to be monopolised.
Outside of AAT’s own resources on the prospect of a future Nigerian antitrust law, we refer our readers to the following resources for further reading on this topic:
To answer our rhetorical question in the title above: We don’t believe so. For the merger junkies among our readership, here is AAT’s latest instalment of “COMESA MergerMania” — AfricanAntitrust’s occasional look at merger matters reviewed by the young multi-jurisdictional competition enforcers in south/eastern Africa. (To see our last post on COMESA merger statistics, click here).
COMESA publishes new Merger Filings, still fails to identify dates thereof
As nobody else seems to be doing this, let us compile the latest news in merger notifications to the COMESA Competition Commission. Prior to doing so, however, we observe one item of utility and basic house-keeping etiquette, which we hope will be heeded in future official releases by the agency: Please note the dates of (and on the) documents being issued. Using the date as a ‘case ID’ is insufficient in our view — the CCC’s current PDF pronouncements invariably remain un-dated, a practice which AAT deplores and which simply does not conform to international business (or government) standards. So: please date your press releases, opinions, decisions, and notifications on the documents themselves.
We observe that the matters below have not yet been assigned final “case numbers” (at least not publicly) in the style typical of the CCC decisions in the past, namely sequential numbers per year, as they are currently under investigation and have not yet been decided.
We also note that one notification in particular appears to have been retroactively made in 2014, even though it is identified as merger no. 3 of 2015 (Gateway), a peculiarity we cannot currently explain. Likewise, AAT wonders what the “44” stands for in its case ID (“12/44/2014”), we surmise it’s a typo and should be “14” instead.
In sync with greater enforcement: Firms’ compliance budgets grow
According to a recent survey, the budgets allocated to compliance have grown over the last year, including those of African participants in the study. Consulting giant Deloitte has released its 2015 Compliance Trends report, the result of its survey in which 20 large corporations across Africa (out of 364 total qualified respondents) participated.
Below, we summarise some its key conclusions on…
The Role of the Chief Compliance Officer
Taken together, these statistics … suggest that most CCOs, especially those at larger corporations, now have an opportunity to participate in high-level discussions about corporate strategy, values, and culture.
The key items under the CCO’s responsibility were:
compliance training,
code of conduct, and
whistleblower hotline.
Primerio director John Oxenham observes that, “unfortunately, the assessment of culture was perceived as the least important among the CCOs’ responsibilities. This is a serious problem, as pointed out in prior articles emphasising the importance of a culture of compliance, rather than sterile top-down pronouncements that often go unheeded by mid-level management.”
African Companies
While firms from the continent have increased their compliance budgets (about 16% by 10 to 19%, and many more by 1 to 9% over the past year) along with their U.S. and European counterparts, they are perceived to be dilatory in their evaluation of their own compliance efforts and results, and lacking in their ability to make full use of their compliance efforts. In short, many still (wrongly) view dollars spent compliance as a “grudge cost.”
Significant enforcement in Africa (both in the anti-corruption and competition-law domains) across various sectors of the economy (food, technology, construction, to name a few) have awakened many corporate boardrooms across Africa to the reality of effective home-grown government enforcement.
Information Technology and Compliance
IT Systems have not fared well in the latest report:
One possible disconnect emerges when asking CCOs about the IT systems they use to fulfill their missions: Most are not terribly confident in their IT systems’ ability to do the job. Only 32 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in their IT systems, down from 41 percent in 2014
Interestingly, smaller organisations with less than $5 billion in annual revenues showed higher levels of confidence in their IT systems when juxtaposed to their larger peers.
Dr. Tafotie is a Pr1merio advisor with a legal & business focus on both African and European markets. A member of the Luxembourg Bar, he is also a lecturer in law at the University of Luxembourg. His focus areas include project finance/public private partnerships, banking & finance, and corporate law.
In his latest paper on essential infrastructure development on the African continent, Roger not only embarks on a mission to clarify the valuable role of public-private partnerships (“PPPs”) — he also reminds us that, beyond “well-drafted projects contracts,” there must also be an “effective and efficient African regional regulatory oversight system, with clear roles and lines of command, that is able to protect against ills such as self-dealings and anti-competitive alliances or monopolies,” including “the monitoring of the tendering process against corruption.”
Enhanced competition and an effective oversight system to weed out corruption in the bidding (and execution) process not only protects the local, national or regional governmental issuer of the infrastructure PPP. In order to keep all stakeholders, including global financing institutions or other private lenders, in a position of “acceptable risk,” a well-supervised competitive process is essential to tender selection and project execution.
NYK Agrees To Pay R104 Million In Settlement Agreement
On 1 June 2015, it was announced that Japanese Shipping liner, NYK, had concluded a settlement agreement with the Competition Commission (the “Commission”) in the amount of R104 million (approximately $8 600 000), for contravening Sections 4(1)(b)(i),(ii) and (iii) of the Competition Act (“Competition Act”), 89 of 1998.
The listed sections relate to collusive conduct, including:
directly or indirectly fixing a purchase price or other trading condition;
dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers or territorial or specific types of goods or services; and/or
collusive tendering.
The settlement follows an investigation by the Commission into the collusive behaviour of a number of shipping liners, namely Mitsui O.S.K Lines; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd; Compania Sud Americana de Vapores; Hoegh Autoliners Holdings AS; Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics; Eukor Car Carriers; and NYK, in relation to allegedly fixed prices, divided markets and tendering collusively in respect of the provision of deep sea transportation services.
In terms of Competition Act, a settlement agreement must be made an order by the South African Competition Tribunal. The Order will of course also be made public.
It will be interesting to note that the new guidelines recently adopted by the Competition Commission, on the Calculation of Administrative Penalties is still relatively novel, and it will be interesting to see how and to what extent the Commission followed the Guidelines in reaching the settlement quantum. As AAT has written previously on the topic:
The Guidelines set out a six step process to be used by the SACC to calculate administrative penalties. The six steps are summarised below:
An affected turnover in the base year is calculated;
the base amount is a proportion of the affected turnover ranging from 0-30% depending on the type of infringement (the higher end of the scale being reserved for the more serious types of prohibited conduct such as collusion or price fixing);
the amount obtained in step 2 is then multiplied by the number of years that the contravention took place;
the amount in step 3 is then rounded off in terms of Section 59(20 of the Act which is limited to 10% of the firms turnover derived from or within South Africa;
the amount in step 4 can be adjusted upwards or downwards depending on mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and
the amount should again be rounded down in accordance with Section 59(2) of the Act if the sum exceeds the statutory limit.
It is important to note in the case of bid-rigging or collusive tendering, the affected turnover will be determined by calculating the value of the tender awarded. Thus, even where a firm deliberately ‘loses’ a tender, the firm will be subjected to an administrative penalty which calculates the value of the tender in the hands of the firm who ‘won’ the tender.
Bloomberg’s Felix Njini reports in an article published today that Tanzania’s Fair Competition Commission is threatening to undo the previously-approved merger between Nairobi-based East African Breweries Ltd.’s and Serengeti Breweries Ltd., alleging that the conditions laid out in the 2010 approval of the deal had not been honoured by the parties.
Apparently, notice was given to EABL in late April: “The commission has issued a notice of an intention to revoke its own decision with respect to the merger against EABL.”
EABL is majority-owned by Diageo Plc and is the largest regional brewer, whereas Serengeti was the #2 player pre-merger. The FCC conditioned its approval on
(1) Diageo’s sale of a 20% stake in rival Tanzania Breweries Ltd., (2) compliance with a requirement that Serengeti achieve “potential growth that is well beyond the level it was able to achieve previously,” (3) the obligation to continue promoting Seregenti’s corporate identity for five years post-merger, (4) an agreement not to shutter any of Seregenti’s existing plants without prior FCC approval, and (5) the submission of annual progress reports of compliance with the investment strategy plan submitted during the application of the merger.
At issue in the current challenge by the Commission is condition no. 2, i.e., the growth-target requirement imposed on the parties. Competition-law experts are puzzled by the FCC’s imposition of said condition, said John Oxenham of the Africa-focused Primerio consulting firm:
“Forcing a company to divest itself of a rival unit prior to acquiring a target entity is commonplace, and so is the requirement that certain brands must be maintained post-acquisition. But it is highly unusual in my view to see a revenue growth-target imposed on merging parties by a government antitrust enforcer.”
While noting that he had not seen the precise wording of the “potential growth” condition imposed by the FCC in 2010, “[h]ow does the regulator account for outside macro-economic factors, increased competition from other players, and similar third-party effects that are outside the control of the merging entities?“, said Oxenham.
We wish to observe that the FCC’s web site itself has no update on the topic. Its most recent press release is from 2014 and the last newsletter that is available online dates from 2013.
Professor Tchapga on competition legislation in a future regionally integrated Africa
AAT’s own contributing author and Primerio consultant, Professor Flavien TCHAPGA has drafted a paper for the African Economic Conference in Johannesburg. The conference is organized each year by AfdB, UNECA & UNDP.
The concise and eminently readable expose deals with the current and proposed competition regulation in the growing African free-trade area. It provides a comprehensive overview of, and new insights into, the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of African regional integration and the necessary (yet little developed) competition regulation that must go along with it.
We invite our readership, especially the francophone and francophile contingent, to download and peruse Professor Tchapga’s work. His prior related work, also published here, has been on developing effective competition policies in Africa and on the inherent tension this effort faces, focused on the member countries of CEMAC and WAEMU.
Discarding any objectivity and international best practice, the Minister of Economic Development, Mr. Ebrahim Patel, has once again expressed his desire to use the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) as an agency to actively promote the government’s industrial policies.
Speaking at a media briefing, Patel told journalists that the focus of the Economic Development Department would be to grow “black ownership of new industry in South Africa and using state funding to grow the work of black entrepreneurs”.[1]
Minister Patel
Patel said the intention of using the SACC to launch a market inquiry into the retail sector was to “ensure that we’ve got a competitive sector, but also an inclusive sector”. This statement and the decision to institute a market inquiry into the retail sector is, at least at this stage, problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the retail sector is arguably one of the most competitive sectors in South Africa, and any barrier to entry into the sector is a natural consequence of a highly competitive market. Furthermore, Patel identified exclusivity clauses (which are popular provisions inserted into lease contracts between mall anchor tenants and the developers) will be one of the issues that the inquiry will look into. Patel, unfortunately, overlooked the fact that there has already been an investigation relating to these clauses. At the conclusion of the investigation, the SACC found that there is not sufficient evidence of anti-competitive impact, resulting from these clauses, and thus the SACC refrained from referring the matter to the South African Competition Tribunal (“SACT”).[2] This thus begs the question, whether it is necessary to institute a market inquiry with regard to the issue of exclusivity clauses and expose the industry to intensive and unnecessary costs?
In an article written by Mfundo Ngobese in the official newsletter of the SACC, Ngobese responds to an article written by John Oxenham and Patrick Smith, presented at the Eighth Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy titled “What is Competition Really Good For?”. The main focus of Ngobese’s article is evaluating the merits of an argument put forward by Oxenham and Smith: that the Competition Authorities should engage in a balancing exercise between the short term impact on public interest issues (such as employment) versus the long term benefits that are associated with effective competition (such as increased economic growth which leads to more jobs created).
Public Interest Test
This brings us back to Patel’s decision to use public interest as the main ground on which a market inquiry into the retail sector should be instituted. The decision to launch a market inquiry based on the anti-competitiveness of exclusivity clauses is simply untenable in light of the SACC’s findings in respect of a previous investigation into the issue, as well as the fact that the retail industry is highly competitive.[4] Using any ‘anti-competitive’ argument as justification for launching this particular market inquiry, would amount to nothing more than a ‘fishing expedition’ by Patel and the Authorities.
The broad public interest grounds which are increasingly becoming prevalent as Patel transcends into the competition arena, coupled with the ill-defined rationale, guidelines and justifications behind the use of public interest grounds in competition review, is contributing significantly to uncertainty in the South African economy.
This ‘uncertainty’, that surrounds doing business in South Africa was recognised by African National Congress (ANC) stalwart Mathews Phosa. The former ANC Treasurer and Mpumalanga premier identified corruption, inconsistent government policies, and other factors as root causes of investors’ growing reluctance to invest in South Africa:
Policy stability leads to political, social and economic uncertainty. Policy stability in contrast created an “investment friendly culture where every investor feels protected and free to do business”.
While businesses in the retail industry (and indeed businesses across the board) in South Africa, are desperately seeking certainty, Patel is seeking a ‘second bite of the cherry’.
The second issue with Patel’s reason for instituting the market inquiry relates to him wanting to achieve an “inclusive retail sector” and how to bring more “black South Africans into the sector”. While transformation in the economy is certainly an important issue that needs to be addressed in South Africa, it is the manner and form in which such transformation takes place, which is concerning. In this regard, the SACC is patently not the appropriate institution to ensure that there are sufficient black-owned businesses in the retail sector.
Confused Motives
Patel seems to have, unfortunately, conflated the objectives and role of his own department, with the objectives and purpose of the SACC. This comes at a time when other political meddling has led to the resignation of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mxolisi Nxasana, who quit his post on Sunday, after almost a year of politically-motivated wrangling and formal investigations being initiated and ultimately dropped by President Jacob Zuma.
Former NPA head Mxolisi Nxasana, forced to resign due to political pressure.
The influence that Minister Patel has had on the SACC’s policy is undoubtedly evident when one evaluates the increased reliance of the South African Competition Authorities to impose stringent conditions in approving mergers.[5]
In justifying the use of public interest grounds in competition law, the Competition Authorities may point out that South Africa’s Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (the “Act”) permits and requires public considerations to be taken into account. However, the use of public interest grounds should not, as seems to be the case, be seen as independent issues unrelated to competition which is to be considered in isolation of the purpose of the Act.[6] The Competition Authorities’ purpose, as set out in Section 2 of the Act is to “promote and maintain competition in the Republic…”. It is likely that Patel views the following two subsections which state that competition must be maintained or promoted to:
“promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans” (Section 2(c)); and
“promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons” (Section 2(f))[7]
as the basis for his increased reliance on pushing his Department’s policy objectives through the channels of the SACC. However, placing an overly zealous reliance on these two subsections, fundamentally misconstrues the purpose and function of competition law.
Subsections (c) and (f) quoted above are not self-standing provisions; they are qualified by the general purpose of the Act. Furthermore, by viewing or placing greater reliance on these provisions as self-standing provisions, one would run into an inconceivable difficulty when considering section 2(a), which states as a further objective of the Act (and the purpose of the promoting competition) is to promote the “efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy”. At least from a Section 2 perspective, public interest considerations, at best, have to be reconciled with competition issues.
Market inquiries have often been used very successfully as an investigative tool by a number of competition agencies, especially in Europe. However, a market inquiry requires significant resource expenditure by both the SACC and the market participants and often casts a bad shadow over the relevant industry to the detriment of companies who have not engaged in any anti-competitive conduct. Market inquiries should thus be used sparingly and only when there is significant concern that a particular market is not functioning in a competitive manner. A market inquiry should certainly not be used as a means to affect change in the industry in order simply to suit the objectives of the Government.
There is a further institutional concern which must be noted, and that is that the SACC has, like all institutions, limited resources. In order to function as an efficient and formidable competition law agency, the SACC should ensure that what limited resources are available, is best utilised to achieve a competitive market environment in South Africa.
Before even engaging in policy discussions, as those that Patel is pushing for, it would firstly be necessary to ensure that the SACC has the requisite expertise to deal with policy agenda’s which are far broader than pure competition law. There are already institutions, as Patel has recognised, whose responsibility it is to promote economic growth and to address transformation within the economy.[8] It is not the responsibility of the Competition Authorities to address these issues as directly as has been the case in recent years.[9]
The need for transformation and the promotion of black industrialists is an issue to be addressed by the Government, however, it seems that there is a general lack of regard to competition concerns when Government departments form their policies. A good illustration of this is the significant criticism levelled at the new agreement struck between South African Airways (“SAA”) and the Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”), which will see SAA redirect R10 billion rand of procurement spending to “black industrialists” (“SAA Agreement”).[10]
While this may appear to be a noble policy, the question remains whether new “black industrialists” are coming into existence, or whether existing “black industrialists” are simply going to make substantial profits at the expense of true development.
The SAA Agreement, which requires, without anything more, that a certain amount of supplies (fuel) be purchased from specific suppliers (‘black suppliers’) strikes at the heart of competition. Effectively certain existing competitors are being excluded in order to favour other competitors. In no way does this promote ‘transformation’ within the industry as the existing barriers to entry remain.
From a competition point of view, the benefit of having healthy competition in the commercial aviation market seems to have been overlooked by the DTI. Apart from the direct benefit that flows from actual cheaper air tickets, the knock-on benefits of stimulating the leisure tourism seems to have been overlooked.
While acknowledging that the SAA decision taken by the DTI is not directly linked to competition law, the disregard that the DTI appears to have to competition in the aviation industry is in stark contracts to the to the Competition Authorities in Botswana who have launched a market inquiry into the aviation sector (although notably with the focus being on unscheduled flights), due to having recognised the importance that the price of flight tickets may have on the tourism industry and the benefits that would flow from boosting the tourism industry.
Considering that SAA is battling financially, and is highly dependent on State bailouts, it is baffling that the State’s primary objective is not to ensure that SAA operates viably and competitively, before risking such competitiveness in favour of a policy which is quite frankly, difficult to justify as there is no evidence that such policies actually achieve genuine transformation or promote economic growth.[11]
One can’t help but notice the irony when it comes to the Government’s social and transformation policies. The Government, and Patel in particular, consistently ignore well established economic principles and the benefits that flow from healthy competition in the economy, in favour of promoting short-sighted top-down “transformative industrial policies”, rather than spending the scarce resources on promoting and developing South Africa from a bottom-up approach.
For instance, poor service delivery in South Africa has a significant detrimental economic and social impact on South Africa. Why improving service delivery does not appear to be high on the radar of the Department of Economic Development or the DTI, is surprising if the objectives of these departments are to promote ‘black businesses’, as the areas which are most severely affected by poor service delivery are generally areas where there is a high percentage of black persons living, who form part of the lower income brackets. In other words, areas where the promotion of small businesses and healthy competition would be most valuable to any social development objectives.
Unfortunately, however, a recent report issued by the Institute of Race Relations stated that the highest incidence of recent public protests in relation to poor service delivery, took place in areas were the most “fruitless and wasteful government expenditure” took place.[12]
Recent statistics show that South Africa’s unemployment rate is increasing, bringing into question whether the policy intervention that Patel has been championing over the past 6 years, is indeed yielding the positive results envisioned by the Government. While the purpose of this article is not to evaluate and criticise all policy interventions, the point to be made is that the effectiveness of policy intervention to advance socio-economic interests in the South Africa is in no way proving effective. While there may be a number of reasons for failing policies, it appears worrying that politicians such as Patel are prepared to risk the independence, efficient functioning and objectives of the Competition Authorities, which are ultimately to promote competition in the market, in order to promote industrial policies when there is so much uncertainty whether such policies will truly ensure long term benefits for the Country as a whole.
Two recently issued reports, namely, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Report and the IMD World Development Report, succinctly confirm the concerns and issues which are addressed in this article.
The BCG Report evaluates the reasons for South Africa’s stagnant economic growth. The report acknowledges that it is a necessity to improve education and healthcare and reduce unemployment to advance growth; however, the report importantly states that:
“There is no hiding from the fact that short-term self-interested behaviour has been prevalent; that the emphasis in South Africa has been on cutting the pie rather than growing it.”[13]
This statement could not be truer if one considers Patel’s disregard of well established benefits that flow from a competitive environment, in favour of promoting industrial policies. The following statement by Adam Ikdal on the poor leadership in South Africa, corroborates this papers view:
“a concerted program of execution is essential. In many instances this may mean putting the greater good ahead of the individual or institutional interests.”[14]
The IMD World Competitiveness Report (IMD Report) not only complements the BCG Report, but essentially confirms the views of this paper, with empirical evidence. The IMD Report indicates that South Africa has dropped from a ranking of 37 in 2012 to 53 in 2015 on a list of the world’s most competitive countries. The IMD Report not surprisingly, identified South Africa’s infrastructure shortfall, poor service delivery and lack of education and skills as some of the major contributors to South Africa’s slip down the rankings.
Crucially the director of the IMD World Competitiveness Centre, Arturo Bris, identified what sets the top performing countries apart from the others. This is what Bris had to say, which is essentially, the basis upon which the criticism identified in this paper is levelled at Patel’s policy objectives:
“Productivity and efficiency are in the driver’s seat of a competitiveness wagon. Simply put, business efficiency requires greater productivity and the competitiveness of countries is greatly linked to the ability of enterprises to remain profitable over time”.[15]
In conclusion, we note that both transformation and fostering economic growth is an objective of the South African Government. This is, however, no justification for abandoning the tried and tested benefits that flow from a competitive market, in favour of promoting short-term industrial policies such as Patel is doing. Should the SACC adopt Patel’s industrial policies as part of their policy objectives, the SACC ultimately risks its independence and may effectively become an ‘umbrella institution’ under which any industrial policy agendas are driven. This would be an undesirable and intolerable outcome, and one which the South African Competition Authorities need to carefully guard against.
[5] We have dealt with this aspect of merger control in more depth in previous articles, please see the following link.
[6] To illustrate the extent that public interest considerations are used by the Competition Authorities, the last intermediate merger that was approved unconditionally was in 2008. Since then, there have been 14 mergers that have been approved subject to conditions. As to large mergers, approximately 10 of the most recent 40 mergers that have come before the Competition Tribunal, 5 have been approved subject to conditions. It should be noted that it is the SACC that reviews intermediate mergers, while large mergers are reviewed bu the Competition Tribunal.
[7] Sections 2(c) and (f) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998.
[8] For example the Industrial Development Corporation.
[9] See the AfriGroup Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Afgri Ltd merger where the South African Competition Tribunal (“SACT”) Acknowledged that the merger poses no horizontal or vertical competition law concerns. Despite reaching such a conclusion, the SACT, approved the merger on condition that an agreement reached by the parties in terms of which Afgri would contribute R90 million over four years, to a development fund for small farmers via the provision of loans, training and grain storage discounts. Similar burdensome conditions are becoming all the more prevalent in merger control, and are often self-imposed by the SACT and are not agreed upon by the parties as was the case in Afgri.
Banks in hot $$$: Another regulator investigates currency manipulation
The South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) has recently commenced an investigation into several banks and financial institutions for allegedly price-fixing in relation to the ‘Bid and Ask’ amounts, and consequently the ‘Bid-Ask spreads’, which the institutions allegedly make available make available for foreign exchange currency trading derivatives; specifically: Spot Trades; Forwards and Futures.
The SACC stated that the banks and financial institutions named, BNP Paribas SA, Barclays Plc’s African operations, JP Morgan South Africa, Investec and a unit of Standard Chartered Plc provided, have allegedly colluded to synchronize trades when quoting prices to customers seeking to buy or sell foreign currencies through the use of electronic messaging software utilized for currency trading.
The SACC investigation currently relates only to currency exchange trades involving South African Rand (ZAR). the SACC alleges that the conduct has the consequence of devaluing the ZAR with the following concomitant effects:
Foreign currencies exciting the country;
Local inflation in South Africa increasing as the cost of foreign imports into the Republic of South Africa increases e.g., oil; raw materials; steel etc.
By 
African Antitrust & Competition Law 