Competition Authority of Kenya emphasises the role of public interest in M&A reviews
By Joshua Eveleigh
On 05 January 2024, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) approved Nava Apparels L.L.C-FZ acquisition of the assets of Mombasa Apparel (EPZ) and Ashton Apparel (EPZ) on the condition that Nava retains all of EPZ’s 7019 employees on terms that are no less favourable than their current terms of employment.
Notably, post-transaction the merged entity would have an insignificant market share of only 3.83% in the market for the manufacture of clothing apparel for export. Accordingly, the merged entity would still face significant competitive restraint from various other market players post-transaction and, against this, the CAK found that the transaction would not result in any substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the relevant market.
Similar to South Africa’s merger control regime, the CAK is mandated to conduct a public interest assessment, in addition to the conventional competition assessment, during its merger review process. As part of its public interest assessment, the CAK has particular regard to the enhancement and sustainment of employment; the ability of SMEs to enter into and compete into a particular market; and the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. Where the CAK has a credible basis to conclude that a notified transaction will result in a public interest concern, it may prevent that particular transaction.
What is interesting in this instance, however, is that the merger decisions do not appear to include any particular period within which the retrenchment moratorium must be adhered to. Without guidance, the acquirer may find itself in the invidious position of not being able to retrench any of the 7019 employees for an extended period of time.
The CAK’s recent decision emphasises the agencies’ commitment to preventing merger specific retrenchments. Parties intending to conclude mergers in Kenya must proactively consider the effect of the proposed transaction on the public interest, as is the case in other African jurisdictions such as South Africa and be able to meaningfully engage with the CAK to proffer public interest commitments.
Fidel Mwaki, Kenyan lead partner of Primerio International, says: “An interesting decision by the CAK that highlights the need for businesses to seek legal and regulatory guidance on public interest factors that may affect their workforce retrenchment timelines when looking to conclude mergers.”
In our previous update on this matter, we reported on the South African Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”)’s second hearing of the Forex case.
On Monday, 8 January 2024, the CAC handed down its judgement of the appeals brought by several national and foreign banks (the “Respondents”) against an earlier decision handed down by the South African Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”).
The CAC’s decision comes eight years after the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) commenced its investigation into various national and foreign banks for alleged collusion and manipulation of the Rand-Dollar exchange rate between the years 2007 to 2013. The appeals heard by the CAC arose from the exceptions proceedings launched by majority of the Respondent banks, which sought to attack the allegations against them.
The CAC has now formally dismissed the cases against 23 of the 28 Respondents, highlighting a significant question on the impact of the judgement, namely whether it has the effect of hindering international cartel conduct or whether it was merely a product of an inadequate case presented by the Commission.
Background to the judgement
The CAC’s judgement follows a decision handed down by the Tribunal in 2019 (which ordered the Commission to comply with several requirements to establish the necessary jurisdiction over a number of Respondent banks who were neither domiciled nor carried on business in South Africa) as well as the 2020 decision of the CAC in the same matter. In this regard, the Commission was ordered by the Tribunal to reconfigure its referral affidavit to include allegations pertaining to, inter alia, (i) the establishment of a direct or immediate and substantial effect in South Africa, (ii) confining the case to a single overall conspiracy (“SOC”), (iii) the facts relied on to prove that the relevant bank had joined the SOC, and (iv) the facts on which the Commission relied to allege that there were adequate connecting factors between the Respondents. In summary, the Commission was ordered to amend its referral affidavit to ensure it met the requirements of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction against the Respondents.
The Commission based its entire case on the alleged SOC in which it alleges all of the Respondents were participants. The Commissions case thus had to: (i) meet the requirements set out in the Tribunal’s 2019 decision and the CAC’s 2020 decision, (ii) set out the core requirements of a SOC, and (iii) show that each firm was aware of actual conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of same. The Commission’s case against the Respondent banks was based on the establishment of a SOC, namely, a common anti-competition objective (i.e., that each firm intentionally contributed to the common objectives that were pursued by all participants).
Simply put, the Commission had to prove that all the Respondent banks in its referral affidavit had perpetrated the SOC and, where that each bank could have reasonably foreseen their participation in the SOC, were aligned with the risk of such. In determining whether the Commission had alleged this, the following legal issues were placed before the CAC:
whether Respondents who were not traders in foreign currency could be included in the alleged conduct;
whether the referral affidavit complied with the requirements set out by the Tribunal;
whether the Commission adequately demonstrated the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction in cases of pure peregrine (i.e., firms neither domiciled nor carrying on business in South Africa);
whether the Commission adequately demonstrated the existence of personal and subject matter jurisdiction in cases of incola and local peregrine (i.e., banks with some presence in South Africa by way of a local branch in South Africa);
whether the allegations contained in the referral affidavit were sufficient to show the Respondents had joined and/or actively participated in the SOC; and
whether certain Respondents were incorrectly joined in the proceedings.
Key findings
The CAC made the following key findings.
Holding company liability
The CAC found that the fact that certain Respondents who were merely holding companies of banks (and who were not themselves registered banks and not authorized to trade in foreign currency) cannot be a sufficient basis on which to establish a case against such company. On this issue, and due to the insufficient evidence presented by the Commission, the CAC found that several Respondents had been incorrectly joined in the proceedings.
Personal and subject matter jurisdiction
The CAC found that that in establishing the requisite jurisdiction over international Respondents, there are separately defined requirements for the establishment of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, in respect of subject matter jurisdiction, it must be established that the alleged conduct has a direct or immediate or substantial effect in South Africa. On personal jurisdiction, the CAC found that one needed evidence of linkages to each South African bank as part of the SOC (thus linking the incola banks and the peregrini banks).
The CAC found that reference to an occasional participation without any evidence and that is not linked to a South African bank is inadequate to meet the requirements set out by the Tribunal, and resultantly found that the Commission had failed to show personal jurisdiction for several of the Respondents.
Non-traders
The CAC emphasized that the individuals who were not traders in foreign currency employed by the banks derived no basis to be joined to the matter. On this basis, the CAC dismissed the case against the sixth Respondent’s (namely, Standard New York Securities Inc.).
Impact of the judgement
Simply put, the CAC upheld the appeals brought by 23 of the Respondent banks and dismissed the appeals brought by the remaining 4 Respondent banks. As such, the remaining 4 Respondent banks will proceed to face charges at a main trial before the Tribunal alongside Investec Bank (who elected not to join the other Respondent banks in the exception proceedings).
The scope of the judgement is significant in that it did not sanction cartel conduct. Rather, the decision concerns the key averments that needed to be put forward by the Commission in order to successfully present a case against all the Respondent banks it joined in the proceedings. While the Commission had several opportunities to amend its pleadings in order to comply with the requirements set out by the Tribunal and the CAC, it could not do so adequately and was unable to provide the necessary evidence nor establish the necessary jurisdiction against several of the Respondent banks. Thus, the CAC’s judgement represents the Commission’s inadequate case for prosecution of the alleged cartel conduct.
The inadequacies are seen in the findings of the CAC, including, inter alia, the Commission failing to comply with the requirements of the CAC’s 2020 decision, and the failure of the Commission to lead a sufficient case with adequate evidence against the Respondent banks. This is despite the Tribunal’s previous decision indicating the need to establish personal jurisdiction and allowing the Commission the ability to reconfigure its referral affidavit in an attempt to ensure a fair and just handling of the matter. Despite several years of investigations and preparation, the CAC’s recent judgement represents a mere product of the Commission’s case being flawed and lacking necessary evidence.
AAT is sad (but not surprised) to report that the new Nigerian government under President Bola Tinubu has sacked the legendary head of its competition-law enforcer, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), Babatunde Irukera. His termination is with immediate effect. His pro tempore replacement at the agency will be Dr. Adamu Ahmed Abdullahi, as the next-in-command Executive Commissioner of Operations.
While it is certainly not a shocking revelation that incoming administrations frequently shake up their senior agency leadership, it is nonetheless an objective loss to the burgeoning FCCPC, which — under Irukera’s leadership — invariably gained international respect and, indeed, won an award for Nigeria’s most effective government institution.
The reactions of those with personal knowledge of the outgoing FCCPC CEO were almost invariably gloomy. Says Andreas Stargard, a partner with competition firm Primerio Ltd.: “This is a real loss to the Commission, which was literally brought into existence under the aegis of Babatunde. The antitrust community views his departure with dejection and a real concern for the future trajectory of the otherwise blossoming young agency, with which we had nothing but positive experiences so far. Babatunde is a real leader, and I wish him well in his future endeavours — I have a feeling that this is not the last we have seen of him in Nigerian antitrust.“
Messrs. Babatunde Irukera (outgoing FCCPC CEO) and Ali Kamanga (COMESA Competition Commission, CCC) at the first IBA competition-law conference in Lagos, Nigeria (photo: A. Stargard, November 2023)
Other industry voices echoed similar sentiments, with academic Vellah Kigwiru opining that Irukera “had so much to offer for the continent,” while the FCCPC’s Chief Legal Officer,Florence Abebe, stated poignantly:
“He is such an icon. FCCPC cannot be the same. The sadness is real. He took the then-CPC from a T-shirt and face cap wearing council with disgruntled incapacitated staff to what it is today on the continent and globally. Staff welfare was paramount, he prioritised capacity development like no other, he demanded excellence and professionalism from staff; he folded his sleeves and did the work, he wasn’t just directing operations, he was handling himself. While we were preparing, this guy was thinking on his feet. He is a genius, unpredictable, humble, compassionate, patient to the core, and didn’t accept failure. He is an institution!”
Mr. Irukera’s departure comes on the heels of the FCCPC’s record-setting multi-million dollar single-firm conduct settlement with British American Tobacco, on which AAT reported previously.
10 January 2023 update:
After widespread criticism and backlash against the manner in which Mr. Irukera’s departure from the Commission was announced by the new(ish) Nigerian government, the administration revised its statements to the effect of having “relieved [him] of his duties,” as opposed to “dismissed” the CEO. From a tweet: “I have followed the concerns in the media on the report that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu dismissed Babatunde Irukera EVC/CEO, Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) and Alexander Ayoola Okoh — Director-General/CEO, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE). The President’s directive did not intend a dismissal. The two men who have served our country were relieved of their duties by the President, as he scouts for their successors. The connotations implied in using the word dismissal were clearly not intended in the statement issued. President Tinubu thanks the two men for their services and wishes them well in their future endeavours.”
British American Tobacco faces $110 million fine for abuse of dominance in Nigeria, after settlement with up-and-coming antitrust enforcement agency
By Nicola Taljaard and Nicole Araujo
About three years ago, in the summer of 2020, British American Tobacco Nigeria Limited and associated companies (collectively “BAT”) became the subject of an investigation by Nigeria’s then-brand-new Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“FCCPC”). The FCCPC was looking into the potential violation of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (“FCCPA”) and Administrative Penalties Regulations, 2020 (“Regulations”). After three years of investigating BAT’s business practices (including “dawn raids” on the company’s various office locations), the FCCPC found BAT guilty of having engaged in unfair business practices under section 155 of the Act by abusing its market dominance in Nigeria and violating public health regulations. For the former, notably, BAT had penalized retailers for fostering an equitable and competitive market for its rival’s products in-store.
As a result of the finding, the FCCPC and BAT entered a consent order in December 2023. As part of this settlement pact, BAT agreed to engage in tobacco health advocacy, provide written assurances to the FCCPC and to be monitored by the FCCPC for the ensuing two years to ensure that BAT modified its behavioral and business practices to accord with relevant antitrust and tobacco control laws and efforts. BAT also agreed to pay a hefty fine of $110 million to the FCCPC in accordance with Clause 11 of the Regulations. Notes Andreas Stargard, competition partner at specialist firm Primerio Ltd., “[t]he penalty agreed upon by the parties constitutes the largest fine imposed by the FCCPC thus far. It is also the first known instance in which the Regulations — which were intended to clarify the methodology for calculating administrative penalties — were applied and where the FCCPC has used the discretion conferred on it under Clause 11 to ‘consider administrative penalties on a case-by-case basis as the circumstances require’. Notably, BAT cannot appeal this fine, as it is part of a mutually agreed ‘consent order’ between the parties.”
In accordance with the terms and nature of the consent agreement, respectively, the FCCPCwithdrew the pending criminal charges against BAT and the agreement is not subject to appeal. Moreover, in compliance with applicable legislation, BAT and the relevant associated companies must advocate for both tobacco control and public health.
The investigation and consent agreement have certainly come at a precarious time for BAT, which recently published that the value of its cigarette brands had diminished considerably in the past year and is known to have entered into a separate agreement with the US authorities surrounding investigations into the violation of a prohibition on tobacco sales to North Korea.
The fine agreed to between the FCCPC and BAT follows the fairly recent publication of the FCCPC’s Regulations which delineate the legislative framework for the administration and imposition of administrative penalties according to the Act. The FCCPC reiterated its commitment to enforcing the law, making sure companies follow the relevant regulations, fair markets are fostered by all, and the protection of consumer interests are at the core of competitive actions and regulations. Ultimately, a fine to this extent sends a clear signal to other companies about the importance of fair, competitive behaviour and antitrust compliance.
In a move towards ensuring fair competition in Morocco’s fuel market, the Morocco Competition Council (“MCC”) recently took decisive action. This decision followed amendments to the legal framework governing competition in Morocco, aligning it with Laws No. 40.21 and No. 41.21, which amended and supplemented Law No. 104.12 related to freedom of prices and competition, and Law No. 20.13, which pertains to the Competition Council, along with their implementing decrees and their entry into force. In this regard, in June 2023, the MCC initiated an investigation into potential practices that contravened competition rules within the fuel market.
The complaints were filed against nine companies operating in the supply, storage, and distribution of gasoline, along with the professional organisation representing these companies (the “Companies”).
In response to the investigation, the Companies expressed their willingness to engage with the new legal framework, particularly the settlement procedure outlined in Article 37 of Law No. 104.12, as amended and supplemented.
The MCC considered and approved the requests submitted by the Companies to enter into discussions. The General Rapporteur was tasked with initiating official discussions with each company and its professional organisation separately. The result of these discussions was the signing of reconciliation minutes, documenting the approval of the reconciliation proposals.
On 23 November 2023, the MCC issued a report detailing reconciliation agreements that had been entered into with the Companies, stipulating that the Companies would collectively pay an amount of 1,840,410,426 Moroccan dirhams as a reconciliatory settlement. In addition to the financial commitment, the Companies made a set of pledges aimed at improving the competitive functioning of the fuel market and preventing anti-competitive practices.
These commitments are legally binding and include:
Developing competitive risk maps within the Companies.
Establishing effective internal warning systems.
Appointing an internal official responsible for overseeing the conformity program.
Providing detailed reports on supply, storage, and distribution activities every three months for a period of three years.
Ensuring that price changes align with market dynamics.
Allowing independent service stations to change prices without prior approval.
Not linking discount programs to service stations with compliance with recommended prices by the Companies, directly or indirectly.
The commitments also emphasised the importance of preventing anti-competitive practices related to the exchange of sensitive information. In this regard, the Companies committed to adopting best practices regarding the collection, exchange, or sharing of information, especially in the management of shared infrastructure for storage and distribution.
To ensure the effective implementation of these commitments, the MCC will be closely monitoring and evaluating compliance. In this regard, the Companies are required to provide periodic evaluation reports, demonstrating their commitment to the agreed-upon measures.
The MCC’s proactive approach in addressing potential anti-competitive practices in Morocco’s fuel market through reconciliation agreements is a significant step forward and signifies robust and increased enforcement activity in Morocco.
Eight years after the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) commenced its investigation into various national and foreign banks (“the Respondents”) in the Rand rigging case commonly referred to as the “Forex case”, the competition authorities continue to grapple with this complex case. While the Commission has continued to encourage the respondent banks to enter into settlement agreements with it, and several banks have done so, the case continues in respect of several Respondents.
Briefly, the Forex case pertains to an allegation of collusion between South African and foreign banks which would have led to the manipulation of the Rand-Dollar exchange rate amongst said banks. The complained of conduct is alleged to have occurred between 2007 – 2013 (at least) amongst 28 banks in Europe, South Africa, Australia, and the United States of America. The banks allegedly conspired to manipulate the South African Rand by, inter alia, electronically sharing information on USD/ZAR currency pair trades. The harm alleged to the Commission extended to the Rand exchange rate, which had spillover effects on South African trade, foreign direct investment, corporate balance sheets, public and private debt, financial assets, and concomitant prices of goods and services. Accordingly, the Commission’s case is premised on section 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) – being market allocation and price fixing.
Earlier this month, the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) again heard the Forex case, as new arguments have come to the fore. This time, the remaining Respondents have alleged that the Commission bears the onus to prove that all the Respondents partook in a single overarching conspiracy to manipulate the Rand. In this regard, despite the Tribunal having noted that the Commission’s referral “contains adequate details that have enabled us to conclude that the Referral, as a whole, prima facie, shows that there was a [single overall conspiracy] between the foreign and local banks to manipulate trading in the USD/ZAR currency pair”, the Respondents maintain that the case cannot proceed until this onus has been fully discharged.
Despite various developments over the past years, including a number of unsuccessful exception, objection, dismissal and strike out applications brought by the Respondents relating to jurisdiction, prescription and lack of particularity as well as successful joinder applications (in respect of the primary case) by the Commission, the case has not substantively progressed, and it currently stands to become one of the longest running matters before the competition authorities.
One of the Respondent’s Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”), a multinational British Bank, has also recently entered into a settlement agreement with the Commission, in terms of which it admitted liability to the manipulation of the USD/ZAR currency pair and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of c.ZAR 42 million. SCB’s settlement follows a similar settlement between the Commission and Citibank in 2017. The Commission did not seek penalties against ABSA Bank, Barclays Capital and Barclays Bank as these Respondents had applied and were granted leniency in terms of the Commission’ Corporate Leniency Policy.
The Tribunal and CAC did, however, in March this year, require that the Commission file a new referral affidavit in order to substantiate the case that it had previously pleaded insufficiently. As to the Respondent’s argument that the Commission could not initiate complaint referrals absent the initiation of an investigation, the Tribunal noted that while the Commission needs to commence an investigation against a Respondent specifically to be able to initiate a complain referral against them, it clarified that whether such initiation is express or tacit, is immaterial. The Tribunal further noted that to oblige the Commission to specifically mention each respondent in its complaint to the Tribunal would lead to an absurd outcome, namely that the Commission would be precluded from joining potential or even self-confessed member(s) of a cartel subsequent to its complaint referral.
As it stands, the CAC continues to hear arguments on behalf of 13 banks, predominantly regarding evidence as to their involvement in the alleged “single overarching conspiracy”, and while the Respondents have spared no expense in defending their case, the competition authorities have in no way backed down.
This is an important case, but has also served as an important precedent setting case in relation to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter involving foreign entities (i.e., whether the Commission has jurisdiction to hear a complaint where firms are neither domiciled nor carry business in the Republic of South Africa). In this regard, the CAC held that the Competition Tribunal could enjoy personal and subject matter jurisdiction over pure peregrini, provided that there were adequate connecting factors between the foreign firms’ conduct and the complaint from the Commission and upheld that Tribunal’s decision in relation to local peregrini that the Tribunal had jurisdiction where the qualified effects test was met and that a penalty sought should be confined to turnover within and exports from South Africa.
Primerio Director, Michael-James Currie provides the following insights: “the Forex case has, throughout the several bouts before the adjudicative bodies, confirmed that the thresholds for establishing jurisdiction over foreign entities and foreign conduct have been lowered. The Commission does however still have the onus on demonstrating that the conduct had a “substantial, direct and reasonably foreseeable effect in South Africa”. This will likely remain a contentious issue at trial as even South Africa’s National Treasury has confirmed that the conduct unlikely had any impact on the ZAR exchange rate. To the extent that individuals were prejudiced by the alleged conduct, it would be particularly interesting to see whether such victims would consider civil follow-on damages actions.”
[Gina Lodolo and Nicola Taljaard are lawyers in the competition law department at Primerio. The views expressed in this article are their own and not attributable to Primerio]
South African Competition Commission releases its Statement of Issues in respect of the recently launched Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry
By Tyla Lee Coertzen
As we reported in a previous update (see here), the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) announced and published its draft Terms of Reference (“ToR”) underlying the Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry (“MDPMI”), initiated in terms of section 43B(1)(a) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended) (the “Act”). Following public comments and written submissions from relevant stakeholders, the SACC finalised its ToR on 15 September 2023 and, on 17 October 2023, released its Statement of Issues (“SoI”).
The MDPMI is set to focus on any market features which impede, restrict or distort competition and/or undermine the Act. Specifically, the SoI notes that the MDPMI will investigate the following areas of competition and public interest in the market:
“Market features that may distort competition for advertising revenue between news media organisations and digital platforms, and whether these are affected by imbalances in bargaining power.”
“Market features of those digital platforms that may distort competition amongst news media organisations for online distribution and advertising revenue.”
“The impact of generative AI tools of digital platforms on the above.”
“Market features of ad tech that may distort competition, affecting the level, price and share of advertising revenue to news media organisations.”
“The impact of the above on the quality and choice of news content to consumers, and on SME and HDP owned news organisations.”
Market players and stakeholders have further been invited to provide comments and information in relation to the SoI itself as well as the operation of the market in general. In this regard, the SACC is open to receiving comments from media publishers, digital platforms, academic think tanks, regulators, government departments, affected parties and any other relevant stakeholder. Such comments should be provided by 14 November 2023. The SoI further details the platforms to be covered by the market inquiry as follows:
Search engines;
Social media sites;
News aggregator sites and/or applications;
Video sharing platforms;
Generative AI services;
Ad Tech stack companies on the supply side, demand side and ad exchanges; and
Any other relevant platforms identified throughout the inquiry.
A brief summary of the pertinent issues identified by the SACC thus far are canvassed below:
Competition amongst news media platforms
The MDPMI will look to investigate how news media is distributed and consumed by end-users through online channels and the evolution thereof (with a common trend of media being consumed via audio and video on online platforms).
Revenue services for news media platforms
The SACC will look to understand how news media platforms are funded and how such funding is set to evolve within the digital era.
Ad tech stack trends
There is an increased reliance on digital services and the internet which has affected the traditional advertising methods, where advertisers compete for user attention. Digital advertising has become a crucial tool for target audiences. The SACC will look to understand tech companies’ position in this regard, with many such as Google and Meta consolidating their positions. Undoubtedly, the SACC will look to understand the position of smaller players in this regard.
The SoI also provides the dates over which the public hearings in respect of the MDPMI are set to take place, namely 2-24 March 2024. With the public hearings for the Fresh Produce Market Inquiry currently underway, stakeholders might find a good example from these public hearings as to how the SACC operates its market inquiries as well as the kind of issues it intends to address, specifically those related to public interest issues.
The SACC is mandated to conclude the MDPMI 18 months from the release date of the SoI and is set to release its final findings and recommendations in January 2025.
Primerio Director, Michael-James Currie, notes: “While several jurisdictions have similarly considered market studies into this sector, South Africa’s differing standards and express focus on public interest initiatives means the South African Competition Commission will look at the media and digital platforms market through a different lens. As we saw from the recommendations in the Online Intermediation Platform market inquiry, the remedies imposed had very little to do with addressing competition issues but primarily focused on assisting smaller firms participate in the market.”
On 29 September 2023, the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) announced that it will be conducting a market inquiry into the Kenyan animal feeds market (“Animal Feeds Market Inquiry”) to assess the various factors affecting competition in the animal feeds value chain.
The animal feed market is particularly important due to its impact on the pricing of essential food items, such as chicken. In this respect, the recent Essential Food Price Monitoring Report published by the South African Competition Commission found:
“The poultry industry is also the largest consumer of animal feed in the local market. Any shocks in the feed market, therefore, have a tangible and direct effect on broiler and chicken production costs and ultimately prices paid by consumers.”
Provided that there ought to be differences between the South African and Kenyan markets, the economic principles would be largely identical in that the increase of animal feed products would have an adverse impact on farmers and, ultimately, on the consumer welfare as a result of reduced supply and/or increased purchase prices.
In light of the above, the CAK has identified the following objectives of the Animal Feeds Market Inquiry:
the prices, costs and quantities produced, supplied and purchased at different levels from inputs supply to production and sale of different animal feed products;
the market shares, concentration, ownership relationships, joint ventures and marketing agreements for the different products and services related to animal feeds and its inputs;
different terms and conditions of supply for feed producers of different sizes;
barriers to entry and growth of smaller feed producers;
information availability, information sources, and any information exchange practices by companies, associations, and other formal or informal groupings relating to animal feed and its inputs;
arrangements, including licensing and other supply terms, which may affect the sourcing and supply of animal feed including breeding stock and animal feed;
trade flows of feed constituents, including maize, soybeans and derived products, and what may be affecting the flows from other countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”) and East African Community (“EAC”) regions, taking into account standards, permits, and other requirements in light of the existing trade agreements; and
the flows of demand and supply of products and services along the value chain for the main animal feed products.
In conducting the market inquiry and to gain an understanding of the above items, the CAK shall arrange and hold meetings and Key Informant Interviews (“KIIs”) and may also receive oral and/oral submissions from industry stakeholders. Importantly, section 18(6) of the Competition Act provides that “every person, undertaking, trade association or body shall be under an obligation to provide information requested by the [CAK] in fulfilment of its statutory mandate for conducting an inquiry.”
Upon the conclusion of a market inquiry by the CAK, its findings shall be used to inform policy considerations. In this respect, however, the policy recommendations of the CAK are non-binding and are handed to the Minister for appropriate legislative action.
Industry stakeholders may submit their oral or written submissions to the CAK by 20 October 2023.
Michael-James Currie, Partner at Primerio, noted: “Market inquiries are powerful investigative tools available to competition authorities and are becoming increasingly utilised across the continent. For instance, South Africa’s Competition Commission has announced its intention to conduct three market inquiries in three separate sectors in 2023 alone. While market inquiries may be disruptive for industry stakeholders, they are undoubtedly necessary for competition authorities to understand the structure, functioning and nuances of particular markets before initiating protracted and complex investigations into allegations of anticompetitive conduct”
A perspective from private practice — the real cost of doing business in South Africa: Merger Control Disincentivizing Investment into the South African Economy
By Gina Lodolo, Joshua Eveleigh, and Nicola Taljaard
A Look Back:
South Africa has been trying to find the delicate balance between the promotion of public interest initiatives, attracting foreign investment and promoting the competitiveness of South Africa’s markets. In recent years, however, the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) appears to have taken a more rigid approach towards requiring the promotion of public interest initiatives as an outcome of merger control investigations.
At the outset, it is important to note that the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) allows the Commission to impose conditions on mergers and acquisitions that are deemed to result in a substantial lessening of competition or detrimental to the public interest.
In 2019, the Act also underwent a significant amendment regarding the public interest provisions. In accordance with the transformative values under the Act’s preamble, the amendment aimed to ensure that competition authorities have regard to public interest factors when assessing mergers and acquisitions and, in particular, section 12A(3)(e) makes provision for the promotion of a greater spread of ownership with a view to increasing the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and employees.
While the Commission was not so emphatic on the promotion of HDP and/or employee ownership immediately after the 2019 amendments, the Commission has been taking an increasingly robust approach to the imposition of these public interest criteria. Most notably, this can be seen from the widely publicised Burger King decision where a merger that raised no competition concerns was prohibited for the first time, based solely on public interest concerns (namely a decreased HDP shareholding from 68% to 0%). While the decision was ultimately settled before being heard on request for consideration before the Tribunal, it certainly indicated the trajectory of the Commission’s approach. Since the Burger King decision, the Commission has increasingly taken a hard-line regarding transactions that are benign both from a competition and public interest perspective.
While the amendments to the Act symbolize a benevolent effort toward the transformative objectives that the competition authorities are mandated to develop, a great deal of uncertainty stemmed as a result. In practice, the Commission’s interpretation of section 12A(3)(e) of the amended Act has been to place a positive obligation on the merging parties, post transaction, to increase the merging parties’ HDP and/or employee shareholding, often times utilising a benchmark of 5%. This is irrespective of whether a transaction is benign from both a competition and public interest perspective.
Merging parties, legal representatives and regulatory authorities have also substantially debated the interpretation and effect of the amended public interest provisions. The primary argument that contrasts the Commission’s interpretation of the amended public interest provisions, however, provides that section 12A(3)(e) is only one factor for consideration in determining whether a transaction that would otherwise have an adverse effect on competition or other public interest grounds, should be allowed. Premised on this interpretation, the Commission would not be authorised to refuse a transaction if it cannot show an adverse effect on competition based on a holistic assessment of the public interest grounds delineated in section 12A(3).
The Commission’s application of the public interest provision has increasingly lacked clarity and predictability, thereby creating uncertainty in the merger review process, and making it challenging for businesses to plan and execute transactions with confidence. This is particularly so when transactions are subject to long-stop dates where protracted engagements and negotiations with the Commission risk the termination of the entire agreement. To circumvent the incurrence of frictional costs and risks of breaching any long-stop dates, private practitioners are experiencing an increased amount of global mergers carving-out (or at least considering to) the South African legs of those transactions.
Firms are often concerned about the potential dilution of existing shareholders’ equity, regardless of the size of the firm. Foreign investors may be concerned about the impact of the allocation of new shares to employees on their current ownership stakes, potentially reducing their control and influence over the merged entity.
Further uncertainty surrounded how the application of what appears to be a 5% public interest divestiture approach will apply in all circumstances. For example, it is unclear whether this would apply to all merging parties even if the two merging entities are wholly owned BBBEE entities. Furthermore, how should firms divest a 5% stake in the merged entity where the underlying transaction involves land and no employees? These are some examples of the difficult questions the Commission has yet to consider if it is to continue with the outright application of its interpretation of the Act.
In addition, by insisting on ownership-related commitments from merging parties, the Commission’s policy undermines the efficacy of the BEE framework, as parties are likely to take the view that any efforts to improve their BEE profiles outside of the ambit of the transaction may, on the Commission’s approach and assessment, carry very little weight. Accordingly, firms may start to favour an approach of decreasing their BEE efforts prior to transactions in preparation of having conditions imposed on them. Firms may also start to undervalue the target to account for additional public interest spend or carve out the South African part of the transaction to circumvent this cumbersome condition.
Over an extended period, the outcome becomes evident for South Africa – increased uncertainty and an impractical application of the Act will result in decreased in investment; potential prohibition of competitively benign mergers and increased transaction costs.
While the Commission’s approach is prima facie laudable, the unintended consequences may result in a counterintuitive outcome and cause greater long-term prejudice to the public interest and growth of the South African economy. This is particularly true in light of the much-needed foreign direct investment South Africa requires following the effects of Covid-19, greylisting and economic instability.
Introduction of Public Interest Guidelines
On 28 September 2023, the Commission released their ‘Draft Amended Public Interest Guidelines relating to Merger Control’ for public comment accessible here (“Public Interest Guidelines”).
On the same day, at the Commission’s 17th Annual Conference, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition (“DTIC”), Minister Ebrahim Patel, lauded the amendments to the Act and stated that the increasing imposition of public interest conditions on mergers has resulted:
in a contribution of R67 billion towards the local economy;
the saving of at least 236 000 jobs over a period of five years;
the creation of at least 22 000 jobs;
and 143 000 workers now being shareholders in companies.
While there have certainly been commendable strides towards the achievement of promoting the transformation of the local economy, the above statistics do not paint a full picture. While many firms will continue to consent to the public interest commitments suggested by the Commission, for fear of an outright merger prohibition, a number of firms would rather carve-out the South African leg of multi-jurisdictional deals. This, in itself, would stifle economic growth and adversely effect the public interest in the long-term (as consumers do not stand to enjoy the benefits of pro-competitive mergers).
The Public Interest Guidelines are intended to formalise the Commission’s policy approach discussed above when evaluating public interest factors.
We outline the pertinent aspects of the Public Interest Guidelines below:
Commission’s approach to public interest factors in merger control
Section 12A of the Competition Act provides that both the competition and public interest assessments carry equal weight in merger considerations.
Regardless of whether a merger is found to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition (“SPLC”), the Public Interest Guidelines provide that the Commission must still determine whether the merger is “justifiable on Public Interest grounds”. In this regard, the Commission will determine the effect of the merger on each of the public interest elements arising from the merger to determine the net effect of the merger on the public interest.
General approach to assessing public interest provisions
The Commission considers that a merger assessment requires a quantitative and qualitative determination into the merger’s likely effect on:
a particular industrial sector or region;
employment;
the ability of small and medium businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to effectively enter into, participate in or expand within the market;
the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and
the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the market.
Where the Commission concludes that the merger will have a positive effect on one of the above factors, there will be no further assessment into that factor. Where, however, the Commission finds that one of the above factors is substantially negatively impacted by the merger, the Commission will consider remedies to address these adverse impacts.
Importantly, the Public Interest Guidelines provide that where a negative impact on a public interest factor cannot be remedied, the Commission may consider “equally weighty countervailing Public Interest factors that outweigh the negative impact identified” on a case-by-case basis.
Where a merger is found to positively impact a majority of the above public interest factors, these may be outweighed countervailed by a substantial negative effects from a single public interest factor.
Approach to induvial public interest factors
The Public Interest Guidelines provide guidance on how the Commission will assess each of the public interest factors. For purposes of this summary, we focus primarily on “the promotion of a greater spread of ownership…by [HDPs] and workers…” factor which has caused the greatest degree of uncertainty, transaction costs and protracted negotiations with the Commission. This factor stands out from the rest of the public interest factors as the Public Interest Guidelines make it clear that the Commission considers section 12A(3)(e) of the Competition Act to confer a “positive obligation on merging parties to promote or increase a greater spread of ownership, in particular by HDPs and/or Workers in the economy.” In this regard, the Commission regards every merger having an effect in South Africa as having to promote HDP and/or worker ownership and therefore assumes no neutral effect.
In light of the above, where a merger does not promote HDP and/or worker ownership, it will be regarded as having an adverse impact on that particular public interest factor and, if considered substantial enough, may render the merger unjustifiable on public interest grounds.
The Public Interest Guidelines go further so as to state that where a merger promotes HDP ownership, this would not preclude the Commission’s obligation to consider an increase of ownership by workers.
Where the Commission considers there to be a substantial negative effect on the promotion of HDP and/or workers, the following remedies may be imposed:
concluding alternative ownership agreements with HDPs/Workers in either the acquiring, target or merged firm; and
divestitures to HDP shareholders which would create a greater spread of ownership in another part of the business. Importantly, the Commission will generally require that these HDPs and/or workers are actively involved in the operations (ideally control should be conferred) of the divested business and are not merely passive or financial investors.
Where the Commission proposes that an ESOP be implemented, the following guidance is provided:
where a merger results in a dilution of HDP and/or workers, the ESOP should remedy the full extent of the dilution;
where the merger does not result in a dilution, the ESOP should “hold no less than 5% of the value/shares of the merged entity but may be required to hold a higher shareholding based on the facts of the case”.
Where the Commission proposed that an HDP transaction be concluded, it provided the following guidance of the principles that ought to apply:
the HDP transaction should be no less than 25% +1 share and “should ideally confer control on the HDPs”;
the merging parties will have discretion to choose the HDPs; and
the merging parties must inform the SACC of the proposed HDP transaction prior to its implementation to assess compliance with imposed conditions.
Importantly, while the Public Interest Guidelines are not binding on the Commission, the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, they provide clarity on how the Commission intends on assessing mergers notified to it.
Despite an increase in certainty, the Public Interest Guidelines remain a cause for concern amongst the local and international private sectors as they have merely confirmed the policy approach that the Commission has increasingly been adopting in practice. In this regard, even where a foreign-to-foreign merger is notified to the Commission, it ought to consider how it can actively promote HDP and/or worker ownership and may become susceptible to ESOPs and/or HDP transactions in achievement of the Competition Act’s transformational objectives.
The Public Interest Guidelines are open for public comment until 28 October 2023 and are likely to be subject to extensive submissions.
The COMESA Competition Commission Issues Its First Partial Refusal to Grant Merging Parties Permission to Consummate Merger
By Tyla Lee Coertzen
On 2 September 2023, the COMESA Competition Commission released its decision to prohibit the proposed acquisition by Akzo Nobel N.V (“AkzoNobel”) of Kansai Plascon East Africa Proprietary Limited (“KPEA”) and Kansai Plascon Africa Limited (“KPAL”) (the “Target Firms”). The CCC’s decision in this merger represents the first merger prohibition it has issued since its inception in 2013.
In terms of the proposed acquisition, AkzoNobel was set to acquire 83.31% of the issued share capital of KPAL and 100% of the issued share capital of KPEA from Kansai Paint Co. Ltd.
AkzoNobel is a Dutch multinational company active in the manufacture and sale of paints and coatings, with a presence in Egypt, Mauritius, Tunisia and Zambia and Zambia. In addition, AkzoNobel supplies paints to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
The Target Firms are also active in the manufacture and supply of coating products. KPEA maintains a presence in Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zanzibar and operates five manufacturing plants, four of which are located within the Common Market (namely in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia). KPAL also has manufacturing plants in the Common Market, namely in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and derives turnover in Eswatini.
This would-be transaction has a somewhat convoluted history and was, by some observers’ interpretations, many years in the making. As Andreas Stargard notes regarding our prior reporting, “this very publication has analysed the COMESA competition troubles of the merging paints makers of the recent past. These have included failure-to-file mandatory notifications (and also here), as well as a paints cartel-conduct inquiry by the CCC, after Akzo and Kansai’s acquisitive hunger had initially begun in 2013 with disputes over use of the Sadolin brand in Uganda and elsewhere — coincidentally the same year the CCC became functional.”
In addition, notably, the same transaction was prohibited by the South African Competition Commission in late 2022 (which decision is currently being determined by the South African Competition Tribunal). The merger is also currently being assessed by the Namibian Competition Commission.
In its assessment of the market for the manufacture and supply of decorative paints, the CCC identified several competition concerns arising from the proposed merger. Specifically, it identified that the merger would result in a combination of two strong paint brands (namely Plascon and Dulux) and that there were no effective competitors present who would pose a real ability to counter the undue market power and unilateral conduct arising thereof.
While the merging parties proffered a number of commitments, the CCC found that such commitments would not sufficiently remedy the decrease in competition in the market (particularly in Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The CCC thus outright prohibited the merger in these three Member States.
The CCC approved the merger in certain other jurisdictions subject to conditions proffered by the parties. Specifically, the parties are obliged to divest the Sadolin brand owned by AzkoNobel to an independent third-party competitor in Uganda within 6 months of the date of the CCC’s decision. In Malawi, the CCC approved the merger subject to a condition that the merging parties continue productions in the Malawi manufacturing plant for a period of three years after the CCC’s decision, in order to remedy the plant’s potential closure and job losses resulting thereof.
The CCC’s decision over this merger is a clear indication of the approach it will take to mergers which it believes will pose significant anti-competitive harm and competitive loss within the Common Market. Thus, the decision is an indication of CCC’s powers, adjudicative authority as well as its willingness to enforce its powers.
African Antitrust & Competition Law 