The Commission Doth Protest Too Much?

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The defensive justification for the Commission’s healthcare inquiry by its acting chief has widely caused eyebrows to be raised…

As reported, the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) has launched its first-ever market inquiry into the South African private healthcare sector.

The sector has recently been the subject of significant attention from the Commission, the South African health minister in particular, and the S.A. government in general. In spite of the perilous state of South Africa’s public health system, the government appears to have invested more time in deflecting from the obvious problems in the public branch by subjecting the private sector to a costly investigation.  From a procedural-history point of view, it is interesting to note that the market inquiry provision was brought into effect by way of Section 6 of the amended South African Competition Act. Although there were other areas of the legislation to be amended, it is noteworthy that only the market inquiry provision was brought into effect.

Many have suspected that the motivation behind the private healthcare inquiry was based on aspirations from outside the ambit of the Commission, particularly since the launch of the South African government’s National Health Insurance policy scheme (designed to achieve the noble aim of universal health insurance coverage, not entirely unlike the United States’ “Obamacare” effort) may ultimately cause the demise of a robust private healthcare sector.

Independence of Commission questioned

With this in mind, what is perhaps most interesting is a recent public submission made by the newly appointed 37-year old Acting Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele in the South African media.  In an article co-authored with Ms. Paremoer, the Commission principal responsible for the healthcare inquiry, entitled Market inquiries an important advocacy tool (also published in the Sunday Times), Bonakele attempts to deflect any suggestions of government involvement in (or other ministerial influence over the pursuit of) the market inquiry. This approach seems at odds with Mr Bonakele’s predecessor, Shan Ramburuth – who was unceremoniously let go by the same government in a public display of shaming last year – in seeking to justify the motivation behind the private healthcare inquiry.  (We note that the present government has an apparent history of “letting go” unruly cabinet members in unusual and rather bombastic fashion, see here and here.)

Ramburuth’s Commission had previously stated expressly, for instance, that the inquiry was intended at least in part to review the sector for collusive behaviour, while Mr. Bonakele now disavows this rationale and claims that any such findings would merely be a side effect of the inquiry (“[o]f course, during such an inquiry, we may come across anti-competitive practices that need to be rooted out”).

In his piece, the Acting Commissioner seeks to reassure those who “remain confused about the […] intended market inquiry,” and states that the “inquiry is not a stalking horse“:

“we are simply seeking to understand how to improve efficiency and competition” in what he calls the “complicated web” of the healthcare industry.

Is this a case of Shakespearean “the [man] doth protest too much”, especially when keeping in mind that the private healthcare sector has previously been acknowledged to be competitive and efficient.  Mr. Bonakele has previously emphasised his independence, despite being referred to in the press as Minister “Patel’s man”:

“I haven’t responded to the media debate out there because I don’t think one has to stand on a mountain and say ‘I’m independent’. Actions speak louder than words.” [Source: BDLive]

Acting Commissioner Bonakele

The aim of the inquiry, according to the Acting Commissioner, is to improve competition and efficiency in the sector to such a degree that the ordinary man on the street will have full access. A very noble goal indeed, but when juxtaposed with the fundamental function and intention of the NHI,it is highly contradictory: the private healthcare sector is, by definition, not in the business of providing access to everybody. The public NHI body’s own slogan, on the other hand, shows that the national insurance programme fulfills precisely that role: “NHI is premised on the ideology that all South Africans are entitled to access quality healthcare services.”

What is perhaps of greater concern (with a wider applicability than just the healthcare sector, public or private) to competition-law enforcement in South Africa as a whole, is the confluence of the government’s industrial policy ambitions with otherwise supposedly independent Commission investigations and its competition adjudication based in the pure law & economics of antitrust. As previously reported in our piece on political interventionism in South African competition law, the Commission should seek to demonstrate its complete independence from the cabinet and executive branch as a whole, and avoid falling into the trap FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez warned against: the “proper goals” of competition law are best solved when a competition authority is focused on competitive effects and on consumer welfare and its analysis is not “interrupted to meet social and political goals.”

In sum, one must hope that Mr. Bonakele can be taken at his word when he says that, while “[m]aybe people think the minister will use the commission as a tool, but it’s just not possible. This is a legal process we are talking about.

SA telecoms firm implements antitrust settlement terms

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According to a report by ITweb Business, the South African incumbent R16 billion telecommunications giant Telkom Limited (no stranger to this blog) has now taken steps to implement its landmark June 2013 settlement in a margin-squeeze and monopolization case brought by the South African Competition Commission (the “Commission”).

The settlement was finalized by the Competition Tribual on 18 July 2013.  Its terms include, importantly for the latest job-related and divisional developments at Telkom, the functional separation between the company’s retail and wholesale divisions, in addition to other pricing commitments, a fine, and ongoing monitoring obligations under the guidance of the Commission.  As reported today, the company has now also issued and implemented a new antitrust/competition compliance policy, its so-called “Competition Settlement Code of Conduct Policy,” reportedly a whopping 25-page document.

In this latest round of compliance efforts, Telkom’s CEO Sipho Maseko is said to have sent out communications to all staff, attempting to alleviate media reports about potential large-scale job cuts.  He is cited as follows: “While I can’t predict the future, I can unhesitatingly say the 12 months that lie ahead will be demanding. Challenges await, of this we can be certain. We will have to be on top of our game and tackle the issues that influence our business with focus and purpose if we are to unlock our full potential.”

Telkom’s CEO

How a BRICS country defeats EU Commission & the rule of law

South Stream pipeline
South Stream pipeline

According to various reports, the European Commission (specifically, its top management in the energy DG [Oettinger] and its president [Barroso], as well as others) has caved to the Russian energy powerhouse GAZPROM.

N.B.: (1) Yes, this relates to Africa.  (2) And yes, this relates to competition.

It relates to competition because the pending antitrust investigation by Mr. Almunia, already hamstrung, is clearly hampered by this development from its adjacent energy DG.  One Commissioner has caved, and another (a lame duck by now, who has already announced his retirement from the entire realm of politics) will not even bring a conclusion to his DG’s investigation into GAZPROM.  Putin and his friends at the gas giant have (now successfully) challenged the European energy and competition ministers, effectively saying to them: “We will break your laws, and there isn’t a thing you can do about it.”

It relates to Africa, because this is the story of how a BRICS country state-owned enterprise (or at least de facto SOE) is fully capable of defeating the “rule of law” that European proponents of the superiority of Western legal systems often tout.  Is EU law hard and fast?  Unbreakable?  Strictly enforced?  Without exceptions, for special friends (or powerful foes)?  All the common criticisms that are levied by eurocrats against developing African judicial systems are brought to the fore by this abject failure of the EU to uphold its own laws vis-a-vis a stronger opponent.

Banana Republic Brussels

The answer to the rhetorical questions posed above is – quite clearly as of today at least – a resounding “no“:

The EU has caved.  EU laws can be broken.  Without any consequences.

Until recently, the GAZPROM contracts with EU member states for its (63 billion cubic metres of gas per year) “South Stream” Project violated EU law, according to prior statements of the relevant EU Commissioners and their spokespeople.  The main concerns (here from the energy perspective, not the competition issues) were:

  • ownership unbundling rules violated by Gazprom being both a producer and a supplier of gas that owns simultaneously production capacity and its own transmission network
  • 3d-party non-discriminatory access endangered by Gazprom being exclusive shipper
  • South Stream’s pricing structure violates EU energy tariff rules

Yet, after some diplomatic prodding and economic threats, the Commission now has changed its tune and is literally giving GAZPROM a “get-out-of-jail-free card.”

“Gunther Oettinger, the European Commissioner for Energy, told Vedomosti newspaper that Moscow and Brussels will find a solution to honor previous intergovernmental agreements Gazprom has made with European transit countries.” (Source: Vedomosti newspaper, as quoted by rt.com)

Contrast this with what Mr. Oettinger said back in 2011 (note that he also (1) called South Stream a “phantom project” and essentially didn’t believe the Russians would go ahead with its construction in 2012, and (2) was quite clear in his understanding of how market participants operate: “money talks,” baby!):

I understand that certain EU Member States entered into bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation which may partially contradict these principles. If this is true, these Member States will nevertheless have to apply the internal market rules and they are under an obligation to bring their IGAs in line with the EU legislation. (Source: His own speech)

Even more tellingly, contrast the green light now given to the project with Mr. Oettinger’s spokespersons’ statements from December 2013 and even August 2013:

“The Commission has looked into these intergovernmental agreements and came to the conclusion that none of the agreements is in compliance with EU law,” Borchardt said.

“That is the reason why we have told these states that they are under the obligation, either coming from the EU treaties, or from the Energy Community treaty, that they have to ask for re-negotiation with Russia, to bring the intergovernmental agreements in line with EU law,” he added.  (Source: EurActiv)

Lesson (not) learned

How to wrap up a piece that essentially sounds the death knell of the rule of law in the EU, especially in Brussels?  Well, since this is an AfricanAntitrust.com post (this could arguably be published anywhere), the focus should be on EU lessons learned on the African continent.  The key take-away here may be this:

Very simply put: any African (or other BRICS or BRICS-like country) negotiator dealing with an official EU delegate as his or her counterparty should keep the “GAZPROM incident” in mind when faced with a lecture on the superiority and objectivity of EU law over whichever domestic judicial system may be at issue.

Antitrust & “extreme economic inequality” – new OXFAM paper out

Arguably, most if not all of today’s antitrust enforcers would agree that the world’s competition regimes (African or Asian, American or European, established or recently budding) are fundamentally designed to achieve very few, but important, goals.  Among these goals are the following: (1) economically, to enhance the market’s allocative efficiency & stimulate growth of production and (2) individually, consistent with Bob Bork‘s key insight, to increase consumer welfare (even if the latter may not be a formally stated aim of some regimes).

Today’s release of the OXFAM briefing paper on “Political Capture and Economic Inequality,” tantalizingly entitled “WORKING FOR THE FEW,” brings the second of the two above-stated goals to the fore:

Is the world today better for the [working] consumer than it was 123 years ago, when Senator Sherman and the majority of the U.S. legislature decried the unjust and ill-gotten riches of that era’s robber barons and enacted the Sherman Act?

Robber Baron
Robber Baron, circa 1890

The paper is interesting but too short to be of real academic or legal value in and of itself, in our view.  The infamous photo of the super-yacht on the authors’ blog represents the easy part of what they set out to accomplish – politicizing the issue and driving popular opinion (much akin to the period newspaper cartoon above).

Robber Baron, circa 2014

That said, authors Ricardo Fuentes and Nick Galasso go somewhat beyond the, by now, usual egalitarian quotes (Brandeis’s Depression-era statement: “We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of the few, but we cannot have both“) and the well-known head-turner statistics of inequality (e.g., “almost half [of the world’s wealth is] going to the richest one percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent“), many of which are also found on their blog.

Yet, while they do go a bit deeper than merely scratching the surface with populist platitudes and photos of jetsetter playtoys, they fail to do so on the specific issue of how antitrust fits into the question of global economic inequality.  One need not attempt to un-seat Bork from the academic and judicial pedestals he has reigned over for 4 decades, but one could try a bit harder here…  The OXFAM study simply does not provide any new insights.  To its credit, it does identify the issue – but it does not develop the overall impact of competition law any further than highlighting the one (very particularized) example of the allegedly monopolistic Mexican telecoms sector:

Anti-competition and regulatory failure: the richest man in the world
Weak regulatory environments are ideal settings for anti-competitive business practices. Without competition, firms are free to charge exorbitant prices, which cause consumers to lose out and ultimately increase economic inequality. When elites exploit weak or incompetent anti-trust authorities, price gauging follows as a form of government to big business. By not acting when dominant firms crowd out competition, government tacitly permits big business to capture unearned profits, thereby transferring income from the less well-off sections of society to the rich. Consumer goods become more expensive, and if incomes do not rise, inequality worsens.

Mexico’s privatization of its telecommunications sector 20 years ago provides a clear example of the nexus between monopolistic behavior, weak and insufficient regulatory and legal institutions, and resulting economic inequality.

Mexico’s Carlos Slim moves in and out of the world’s richest person spot, possessing a net worth estimated at $73bn. The enormity of his wealth derives from establishing an almost complete monopoly over fixed line, mobile, and broadband communications services in Mexico. Slim is the CEO and Chairman of América Móvil, which controls nearly 80 percent of fixed line services and 70 percent of mobile services in the country. A recent OECD review on telecommunications policy and regulation in Mexico concluded that the monopoly over the sector has had a significant negative effect on the economy, and a sustained welfare cost to citizens who have had to pay inflated prices for telecommunications.

As the OECD report argues, América Móvil’s ‘incessant’ monopolistic behavior is facilitated by a ‘dysfunctional legal system’, which has replaced the elected government’s right and responsibility to develop economic policy and execute regulation of markets. This system has stunted the emergence of a dynamic and competitive telecommunications market. In fact, many of the regulatory instruments present in most OECD countries are absent in Mexico.

The costs of government failure to curb such monopolistic behavior are large. Mexico has a high level of inequality and has the lowest GDP of all OECD countries. As other OECD countries demonstrate, a more efficient telecommunications (especially broadband) sector can play an important role in driving economic growth and reducing poverty, especially among a large rural population, as in Mexico’s case. The OECD calculates that the market dysfunctions stemming from the telecommunications sector have generated a welfare loss of $129.2bn between 2005 and 2009, or 1.8 percent of GDP per year.

In the end, no matter how deeply or superficially the paper treats its subject, it will likely be of great interest to several of the African competition enforcers that preside over antitrust regimes in which the “public interest” criterion is present (e.g., COMESA, South Africa, and several others).  This means in practice: We at AfricanAntitrust.com expect the paper to be cited in the near future by a competition authority near you.  So get acquainted with it before it’s too late.

Ph.D. student elevated to Chief Economist position

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High-level appointments made by acting Competition Commissioner

According to statements made by the interim South African Competition Commissioner, Tembinkosi Bonakele, and based on several news reports (here and here, for instance), the SACC has filled several of its recently (or not-so-recently) emptied ranks:

  1. Chief Economist and Manager of the Policy and Research division: Liberty Mncube
  2. Divisional Manager of Enforcement and Exemptions: Junior Khumalo
  3. Chief Financial Officer: Thomas Kgokolo

The appointments were made effective as of the first of the year.  The SACC had been criticised for lack of stability in its leadership and overall staff, given a fairly high turnover rate among its employees and officers.  Perhaps to counter this impression, Mr. Bonakele said in the official SACC statement that the “new appointees will provide the necessary leadership to their very important divisions. It is important that we have a very strong and stable senior management team and I have full confidence that this team will take the Commission to higher levels. We are privileged as an institution that we are able to find most candidates internally and thereby ensure continuity.”  (Emphasis added).

Focusing on the first new appointment to the Chief Economist role – a position that has sat empty for over a year, according to our recollection – it not only provides for a catchy title but is indeed a noteworthy fact that Mr. Mncube is a graduate student at the moment We do not know of any other competition enforcement agency that has filled the job of chief economist with someone who is currently pursuing a degree in economics.  This comment is not to diminish Mr. Mncube’s accomplishments, nor to take away from his potential to fill the role adequately.  It simply states a fact.  His past professional biography includes the following, according to a 2011 ICN The Hague conference web site:

[Note: information as of 2011] “Liberty Mncube is a Senior Analyst in the Policy and Research Division of the Competition Commission of South Africa. At the Commission, his responsibilities include managing and coordinating research and policy development; managing and coordinating case analysis; contributing in building capacity for research and knowledge of competition policy; and undertaking analysis related to competition matters with regard to policy and regulation. Prior to joining the Commission, he was a Researcher at the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. Liberty holds an MSc in Economics from the University of York.”

Mr. Mncube’s own LinkedIn profile is updated to reflect his current position:

I am the Chief Economist at the Competition Commission South Africa. I hold a MSc in Economics from the University of York and am currently completing a PhD in Economics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. I have been a visiting PhD graduate student at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

For the economists among our readership, here are a few selected publications by Mr. Mncube (note that his LinkedIn profile lists several additional articles and book chapters): “On merger simulation and its potential role in South African merger control“; “Strategic Entry Deterrence: Pioneer Foods And The Bread Cartel“; and “Designing Appropriate Remedies For Competition Law Enforcement: The Pioneer Foods Settlement Agreement

Cartel regulation in S.A. – 2014 Oxenham

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In addition to his highlights of the latest developments in the ZA cartel sphere, AfricanAntitrust.com editor John Oxenham recently published an excellent overview of Cartel Regulation in South Africa.

A must-read.

We are making the full PDF available to our blog readers.  The piece was originally published by Global Competition Review.

John Oxenham, editor
John Oxenham, AAT editor

 

How to (almost) gut an agency – the final twist in the maize seeds case?

How to (almost) gut an agency – the final twist in the maize seeds case?

By Patrick Smith

On 18 December 2013, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“Constitutional Court”) handed down its decision in an appeal by the Competition Commission (“Commission”) against an unprecedented costs order imposed by the Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”).  The costs order related to the CAC’s decision to overturn the decisions of the Commission and the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) to prohibit the merger between Pioneer Hi-Bred International and Pannar Seeds.

The Commission had originally prohibited the proposed merger on 7 December 2010,[1] following a three-month investigation.  In the Commission’s assessment, the transaction amounted to a 3 to 2 concentration amongst producers of seeds for the staple food in South Africa, if not much of sub-Saharan Africa.  Quite apart from the substance, this sector fell squarely within the Commission’s prioritisation programme, and so was always likely to receive close scrutiny.[2]  On the Commission’s assessment, the transaction would give rise to significant unilateral effects, removing an important competitor from the market.  The Commission considered the merging parties’ submissions that the transaction would lead to efficiencies from a combination of the two parties’ breeding programmes, but found the claimed benefits unconvincing and unlikely to outweigh the anti-competitive harm.
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Following an extensive discovery process and a three-week hearing involving nine witnesses, the Tribunal also decided to prohibit the merger, on 9 December 2011.[3]  The Tribunal considered the potential for anti-competitive effects (concluding that the parties were close and effective competitors, and that the transaction would accordingly give rise to very significant anticompetitive effects),[4] and the likelihood of significant efficiencies (concluding that the Parties’ assumptions were “either grossly exaggerated or totally unrealistic”, and that any potential merger-specific efficiencies would lie beyond a 5 year time horizon)[5].  Despite the parties’ characterisation of the industry as a “dynamic innovation market”, maize seeds improve by 1-2% per annum (not exactly Moore’s law)[6] and the wide variety of different growing conditions (and the use of seeds adapted for each region), mean that any particular innovation is unlikely to be universally applied; the Tribunal highlighted the need to account for anticipated non-merger specific innovation as a benchmark against which the parties’ claims should be measured.

Notably, the Tribunal focussed substantial attention on assessing the relevant counterfactual against which the merger should be assessed.  While it was common cause that the target firm did not meet the requirements of the failing firm defence, in the course of the Tribunal hearing the parties had argued that the target firm, Pannar, would decline as a competitive force, most rapidly in relation to one specific product area (so-called irrigated region hybrids), but also more generally across its whole product range.  Considering local and international approaches to the counterfactual, the Tribunal found that there was no compelling evidence of the certain decline of the target firm (which was still the market leader in relation to the irrigated region hybrids), and concluded that there was no reason not to accept the status quo as the relevant counterfactual.

Following two days of oral argument, the CAC overturned the Tribunal’s prohibition, instead deciding on 28 May 2012[7] that the merger should be allowed subject to conditions, including the imposition of restrictions on price increases on existing Pannar varieties to the level of consumer price inflation for three years, and agreeing to license a list of Pannar varieties for breeding by third parties.  The CAC’s reasoning was based on an assumption that the decline of the target firm was “inevitable”[8] albeit uncertain in its timing, although it was again universally accepted that Pannar failed to meet the requirements of a failing firm.  On that assumption, the CAC appeared to reverse the onus that would have applied with a failing firm defence, and stated that the Commission[9] had failed to establish the likelihood of an alternative transaction that might preserve Pannar’s assets, in the event of a prohibition.  The CAC placed an unusually heavy weight on the interests of private shareholders,[10] as opposed to consumers, which is in distinction to the strict requirements of the failing firm defence, as applied internationally.[11]  The CAC ultimately concluded that the relevant counterfactual was the continued decline, eventual demise and exit by Pannar,[12] and against that benchmark, approved the transaction, subject to conditions.

It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Appeal denied the Commission leave to appeal on the substance, as the CAC’s approach to the counterfactual has created some uncertainty that may need to be resolved in another case.  In any event, the Constitutional Court was only asked to consider the CAC’s costs award.[13]

The CAC had awarded costs against the Commission, not only in respect of the CAC proceedings, but also those before the Tribunal.  The Constitutional Court first clarified that the Tribunal has no power to award costs against the Commission (thereby distinguishing the Commission, as a “party”, from a private “complainant” in Tribunal proceedings).[14]  Furthermore, the Constitutional Court determined that the CAC is similarly unable to award costs in relation to Tribunal proceedings.[15]  Finally, while the CAC has discretion to award costs against the Commission in respect of CAC proceedings, it must properly exercise this discretion.[16]  The Constitutional Court noted that while the “Unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious pursuit of a particular stance” may justify a costs order against the Commission, the vigorous pursuit of its case would not.  The Court highlighted the distinction between an ordinary civil litigant and the Commission, which is required to pursue its statutory mandate vigorously, often where there is no opposing party or amicus.  Ultimately, the Constitutional Court concluded that the lack of reasoning behind the costs award, and the lack of any evidence of “mala fides, irregularity, or unreasonable conduct” by the Commission meant that the costs order had to be set aside.

This is clearly an important result for the Commission’s ongoing activities.  The Commission had argued before the Constitutional Court that a costs order would have a serious effect on its budget and its stance in defending similar investigations and findings before the CAC.  Ideally, competition enforcement should aim to strike a balance between sufficiently robust enforcement to achieve policy objectives and the need to avoid imposing undue or disproportionate costs on the businesses that ultimately drive competition, growth and job creation.  Particularly in a developing country context, a certain degree of prioritisation can be helpful in building institutional capability and making the most effective use of limited resources, as well as minimising the burden of investigations.  By focussing the most resources and attention on those cases most likely to cause harm, an agency might maximise the benefits of enforcement, while minimising the potential for any inefficiency caused by the investigation process.

In this case, while the CAC took a different view from the Tribunal (and the Commission), it would be difficult to label the Tribunal’s decision (and hence the Commission’s defence at the CAC) as unreasonable or vexatious.  In a nutshell, this was a 3 to 2 combination between direct (“horizontal”)[17] competitors in a priority sector, in an industry that, while increasingly influenced by innovation, is slow moving in comparison with “innovation markets” such as those in the ICT sector.

South African merger control is not characterised by many prohibition decisions.  Amongst intermediate and large mergers, this is the most recent prohibition decision issued by the Tribunal.  There have been around 500 decisions since the previous prohibition, Telkom/BCX in August 2007.[18]  Few prohibitions may well point to the outstanding deterrent effect of the Commission’s historical enforcement efforts, but it seems a stretch to consider that the Commission’s (albeit vigorous) defence of the only large/intermediate prohibition decision by the Tribunal in the past 6 years is an indication of a vexatious or overly aggressive approach.

While the Commission will no doubt be heartened by this decision, it will be interesting to see whether the clarifications provided by the Constitutional Court will have any bearing on the Commission’s stance on contentious matters before the CAC in future, in particular those involving more complex theories of harm.  Arguably more important will be the anticipated clarification of the approach to mergers involving declining firms in the light of the CAC’s approach to the counterfactual.

Patrick Smith, RBB, author
Patrick Smith, RBB, author (South Africa)

[2]     See Roberts, Simon (2008) “South African Competition Policy in 2008: Key Priorities of the Competition Commission” Global Competition Policy, April 23rd, 2008.  Prioritisation might justify closer scrutiny, or even firmer enforcement, in particular sectors or industrial areas.  For an example of where enforcement might depend on sector characteristics, see EdF/British Energy, European Commission Case No COMP/M.5224, 22/12/2008, at para 31, cited in http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-Competition-Law-Conferece/Session-4B/100812-PS-Paper-for-SACC-conference-DRAFT.pdf.

[3]     Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc and Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and the African Centre for Biosafety, CT CASE NO: 81/AM/DEC10 (“Tribunal Decision”), http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/81AMDec10.pdf

[4]     Tribunal Decision paragraphs 282 to 284.

[5]     Tribunal Decision paragraphs 317 and 327.

[7]     Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc and Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and the African Centre for Biosafety, CAC CASE NO.: 113/CAC/NOV11, (“CAC Decision”), http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/113CACNov11-Pioneer-Pannar.pdf

[8]     CAC Decision paragraphs 3 and 29.

[9]     CAC Decision paragraph 26.

[10]    CAC Decision paragraphs 21-26.

[12]    CAC Decision paragraph 28.

[13]    The Competition Commission v Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc, Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd, and the African Centre for Biosafety, Case CCT 58/13 [2013] ZACC 50, (“Constitutional Court Decision”), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/50.html

[14]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 40.

[15]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 43.

[16]    Constitutional Court Decision paragraph 46-47.

[17]    More precisely, producers of substitutes.

Cartels: Developments in South Africa

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AfricanAntitrust.com editor John Oxenham recently published a terrific summary of the latest developments in the ZA cartel sphere.

A teaser introduction is below.  His detailed article can be found here (PDF).
John Oxenham, editor
John Oxenham, AAT editor

The past 18 months have witnessed significant developments in the investigation and prosecution of cartel conduct in South African competition law.  In summary, these developments are the following:

• The Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the availability of ‘opt
out’ class actions for private damages and set out a procedure
through which plaintiffs can seek certification of a class.
• The Constitutional Court extended the availability of class actions
for private damages by recognising ‘opt-in’ class actions
where the interests of justice permit such a procedure.
• The Competition Commission (the Commission) for the first
time utilised a fast-track settlement process in relation to the
prosecution of a widespread cartel in the construction industry.
• An amendment to the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (the Act)
was promulgated giving the Commission the power to institute
market enquiries. The Commission has indicated that it wishes
to conduct a market inquiry into the private health-care sector.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal broadened the scope for the
Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) to adjudicate complaints
prosecuted by the Commission.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that leniency applications
submitted to the Commission by a leniency applicant are
subject to legal privilege unless the Commission makes reference
to the application in a complaint referral to the Tribunal
– in which case it will be taken to have waived privilege.
• The North Gauteng High Court found that a leniency applicant
is not protected from private damages claims – even where it
is not cited by the Commission as a respondent in complaint
proceedings brought before the Tribunal.

The article originally appeared in The African and Middle Eastern Antitrust Review 2014, which is published by Global Competition Review and is available online at: http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/59/the-african-middle-eastern-antitrust-review-2014

NB: AfricanAntitrust.com author and economist Patrick Smith recently also published an article in the same edition of the Review, see: Public Interest Factors in African Competition Policy.

Public Interest Factors in African Competition Policy

Author and economist Patrick Smith recently publishedPublic Interest Factors in African Competition Policy in The African and Middle Eastern Antitrust Review 2014.  The consideration of public interest factors in competition law inquiries has generated much debate over the past few years. Several high profile cases have illustrated the potential for competition decisions,
and in particular merger inquiries, to be significantly affected by non-competition public interest issues.

Our readers have free access to the full PDF.

The Review is published by Global Competition Review and is available online at: http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/59/the-african-middle-eastern-antitrust-review-2014

This year’s issue of the Review also features two other AfricanAntitrust.com writers: contributing author, Chabo Peo, whose piece on competition law in Botswana is available at the GCR web site, as well as editor John Oxenham‘s piece on cartels in South Africa, available here.

A full list of contributors to our site can be found at: https://africanantitrust.com/about/

In-house competition counsel joins leading African antitrust blog

We are pleased to present the latest addition to the ranks of AAT authorship: Mark Griffiths.

Mark Griffiths is Competition Counsel for Barclays Africa Group and is accountable for competition risk management across the African continent for Barclays.  Mark is heavily involved in antitrust and merger matters across twelve African jurisdictions with active competition authorities.  He has been involved in a number of pivotal developments across the region.

Prior to his appointment with the Barclays Group in 2007, he was a senior associate (admitted as a solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales) in the EU and Competition practice of Clifford Chance (London).  He also previously worked for DG Competition at the European Commission as well as being specialist legal advisor to the House of Lords EU Select Committee on the EU Financial Services Action Plan.

Mark is a regular contributor to a range of legal journals as well as a regular speaker on African competition law at local and international conferences. Mark has attended meetings of the International Competition Network as a NGA. He has an LLB (University of Southampton, UK) and an LLM in European Law (College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium).

A full list of contributors to our site is available here: https://africanantitrust.com/about/