Category: dominance

Borrowed Blueprints, Unintended Consequences: South Africa and the EU’s Digital Markets Act

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By Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya*

South Africa risks adopting the essence of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), if not its exact form, with the aim of reshaping the business models of online intermediation platforms. This marks a significant shift away from the principles of traditional competition regulation. 

In 2020, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) concluded that traditional enforcement tools might be inadequate to tackle structural barriers in digital markets particularly those that prevent new entrants or smaller players from expanding. This realisation led to the launch of the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (OIPMI). By borrowing a regulatory blueprint designed for the EU, South Africa could undermine its own digital ecosystem, stifle investment, and entrench local inefficiencies. The country’s growing interest in ex ante competition regulation via the Competition Commission’s market inquiries reflects an accelerating trend of policy mimicry without consideration of domestic realities. While there is broad agreement on the need for digital competition regulation, there is little consensus on how these rules should be structured, and approaches to implementation remain highly varied across jurisdictions. 

The OIPMI’s final report identified platforms such as Google, Apple, Takealot, Uber Eats, and Booking.com as dominant players distorting competition. It is claimed that, due to the significant online leads and sales these platforms generate and the high level of dependency business users have on them these scaled platforms can influence competition among businesses on the platform or exploit them through fees, ranking algorithms, or restrictive terms and conditions. However, this conclusion raises concerns about the underlying methodology. A central concern with the market inquiry approach is that it allows certain platforms to be identified as market leaders or sources of competitive distortion without requiring a formal finding of dominance, since such inquiries do not mandate that dominance be established. 

The designation has been based on characteristics typically associated with globally leading technology firms. Amazon, which currently maintains only a minimal presence in South Africa, was nevertheless singled out as a potential threat to competition. It is claimed that Amazon faces similar complaints in other jurisdictions, and it is argued that fair treatment of marketplace sellers is unlikely to become a competitive differentiator capable of overcoming barriers to seller competition. Moreover, the CCSA has indicated that it would enforce the same provisions against Amazon if it were to enter the market in a way that breaches the proposed remedial measures.

Regulating for hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy: global platforms may decide not to enter the market at all, leaving consumers, including small businesses and public services organisations with fewer options and slower innovation.

The OIPMI focuses on structural features that restrict competition both between platforms and among business users, facilitate the exploitation of business users, and hinder the inclusion of small enterprises and historically disadvantaged firms in the digital economy. Despite the absence of formal dominance findings, the OIPMI proposes a range of heavy-handed interventions, including the removal of price parity clauses, the introduction of transparent advertising standards, a ban on platform self-preferencing, and limitations on the use of seller data, many directly inspired by the EU DMA. 

In both of CCSA’s  2022 and 2023 findings, Google Search was explicitly accused of preferential placement and distorting platform competition in South Africa. More concerning still are the CCSA’s proposed remedies in its final report- requiring targeted companies to offer free advertising space to rivals, artificially boost local competitors in search rankings, and redesign their platforms to favour smaller firms. The SACC has recommended that Google introduce identifiers, filters, and direct payment options to support local platforms, SMEs, and Black-owned businesses, and contribute ZAR150 million (around EUR 7 million) to offset its competitive advantage. For search results, Google is required to introduce a new platform sites unit (or carousel) that prominently showcases smaller South African platforms relevant to the user’s query such as local travel platforms in travel-related searches entirely free of charge. This goes beyond competition enforcement and crosses into market engineering, compelling global firms not just to compete by government decree, but to subsidise rivals and actively shape market outcomes.

In 2025, South Africa’s Competition Commission also doubled down with its provisional Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry (MDPMI), calling for additional remedies targeting online advertising, content distribution, and the visibility of news media. These recommendations are again influenced by EU-style regulations, particularly the EU Copyright Directive, which harms the diversity and sustainability of small news publishers. However, the report downplays South Africa’s unique institutional constraints and specific market dynamics. If adopted, the proposals would compel digital platforms to subsidise select publishers based on arbitrary and hard-to-measure assessments of news content’s value to Google’s business. This could limit access to information, hinder innovation, and monetisation efforts, ultimately narrowing consumer choice and weakening the vibrancy of the content ecosystem.

More broadly, through these market inquiries South Africa risks undermining its evolving digital economy by pursuing an approach that will deter foreign investment due to ambiguous and discretionary enforcement. At the same time, the proposed regulatory burdens could disproportionately affect domestic firms that simply lack the resources to comply. This regulatory uncertainty threatens to stifle innovation and hinder progress toward regional digital integration. In a country where corruption remains a persistent challenge, granting regulators wide discretionary powers over digital market outcomes also raises serious governance concerns. Moreover, by enforcing a narrow and politicised notion of “fairness”, South Africa risks sacrificing consumer choice and strangling the diversity of digital services that a competitive market would otherwise deliver.

Notably, coming back to the EU’s DMA, it was crafted for specific European conditions, particularly in markets where technologically-leading global platforms held relatively high market shares in many EU Member States. Yet even within the EU, the DMA remains hotly disputed – not least because it targets large non-European companies that have long been politically embraced for injecting digitisation into traditional industries and, through competition, helped European businesses and consumers benefit from technology innovation. 

EU digital policies, developed from the perspective of wealthy, mature (Western) European markets, should not be assumed to be readily applicable elsewhere. South Africa’s digital markets are still in their infancy, ICT infrastructure remains unevenly developed, and regulatory institutions face significant resource constraints. Emulating the DMA – even informally – risks premature intervention, regulatory overreach, and the distortion of competitive dynamics before they have had a proper chance to emerge and mature.

Competition policy undoubtedly has a role in promoting competition. But poorly tailored rules may end up punishing the very firms that South Africa needs to scale and empower its own digital economy. Instead of replicating the EU’s Digital Markets Act, South Africa should focus on evidence-based case-by-case enforcement – grounded in its own market realities and institutional capabilities. Otherwise, South Africa risks becoming the casualty of a regulatory experiment designed for a different continent – with consequences its digital economy can ill afford.

*The authors are affiliated with ECIPE, the European Centre for International Political Economy

Betting on Fair Play: Competition Tribunal orders Interim Relief to Lottoland in Google Ads dispute

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By Matthew Freer

Introduction

On 12 November 2024, Lottoland South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Lottoland”) was granted interim relief by The Competition Tribunal (“The Tribunal”) against Google Ireland Limited and Google South Africa (Pty) Ltd (collectively “Google”).

Lottoland, a licensed bookmaker as of 7 November 2017 in terms of the Western Cape Gambling and Racing Act, offers fixed-odds bets on the outcome of an array of lotteries worldwide, including the South African National Lottery and various sporting events.[1] Lottoland’s competitors include other licensed bookmakers within the country such as Hollywood Bets, World Sports Betting and Betway, among others. Google, controlled by Google LLC, is a multinational technology company specialising in internet-related services and products, including search engines, online advertising technologies and more. Google is best known for its search engine and advertising platform, Google Ads, which is a key revenue driver for the company. Google Ads allows businesses to display advertisements on Google’s search engine results pages, partner websites and other platforms using a pay-per-clicks model where advertisers bid on keywords to reach targeted audiences. Businesses utilise this service to maximise visibility with the aim of gaining more customers.

In 2020 Google terminated Lottoland’s access to Google Ads, which Lottoland argued was without justification given that the other licensed bookmakers, providing like services, still had access to Google Ad Services. This termination caused financial harm to Lottoland, and it was argued to distort the competition in this very market that Lottoland operated with detrimental effect on options available to consumers. Google’s main argument was that Lottoland’s services contravene certain sections of the Lotteries Act and by granting them access to their Google Ads services, Google’s policies and reputation could be under scrutiny in a public light.

What is an Interim Relief Application?

An Interim Relief Application, in terms of by section 49C of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (“Act”), is a temporary measure sought to address an alleged prohibited practice and aimed to prevent serious or irreparable harm pending the outcome of a hearing.[2] “The Tribunal will only grant such relief if it is of the opinion that it is reasonable and just, having regard to the following factors:”[3]

  • The evidence relating to the alleged prohibited practice;
  • the need to prevent serious or irreparable damage to the applicant; and
  • the balance of convenience.

The Tribunal must make a summary assessment before granting such application and this assessment is only at a “prima facie level”.[4] The Tribunal has held that the three above steps must be applied holistically whilst balancing each factor against the other. In this regard “a weak case on say irreparable harm may be counterweighted by a very strong case on the prohibited conduct. And vice versa…”.[5]

In the event an interim relief order is granted, it operates for a period of six months from its date, or the conclusion of the hearing, whichever is earliest.

What is the prohibited practice?

The basis of Lottoland’s application was that Google had contravened sections 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c) of the Act.[6] Section 8(1)(d)(ii) states that a firm may not engage in exclusionary acts, such as refusing to supply scarce goods or services to a competitor or customer, unless it can demonstrate that the technological, efficiency, or other pro-competitive benefits outweigh the anti-competitive impact of its actions, and providing the goods or services is economically feasible.[7] Section 8(1)(c) prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in an exclusionary act if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain.[8] The overarching element that must be proved in both instances is that there must be a showing of dominance by the firm within the market in question.

A showing of dominance

Google raised the argument that they are not dominant within the ‘advertising ecosystem’ which includes both online (Google Ads) and offline advertising (print media, billboards, television, etc.) However, The Tribunal took a more detailed approach to determine the specific market Google is operating in, while accounting for the market in which Lottoland and its competitors are advertising in. The Tribunal refused the idea that the market in issue is that of the broader ‘advertising ecosystem’ but it is rather the specific market of online advertising, and even more specifically, the market for online search and search engine marketing (“SEM”) markets. The Tribunal stated that the service of Google Ads operates within this specific market, and it was proven, prima facie, that Google is likely to be dominant in this market in South Africa. Thus, rejecting Google’s argument that they should be viewed as operating in the broader ‘advertising ecosystem’.  

Lottoland submitted that Google has a market share of more than 90% in the SEM market, measured by search volume, and states that such dominance is well-established as The Commission had stated that Google is “the monopoly provider of intent-based marketing and customer acquisition in SA…”.[9]

Section 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c) of the Competition Act

Now that dominance is established, we can break down and analyse each element that needs to be proved in terms of this section. The first element involves a refusal to supply a customer. On the face of such scenario, Google has refused to supply Lottoland with their service of Google Ads as Google terminated Lottoland’s access. Google had argued that by allowing Lottoland access to such service there is a potential for criminal liability or other commercial risks. The Tribunal’s ultimate findings was that this argument lacked basis as Lottoland’s competitors were provided access, showing an inconsistent enforcement of Google’s “internal policies”. Furthermore, The Tribunal stated that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Lottoland had contravened the Lotteries Act.

The second element of proof is that of scarce goods or services. It was indicated in eMedia that a scarce good or service is one that is i) impossible or prohibitively expensive to duplicate or ii) there are effective substitutes for the service.[10] In GovChat, The Tribunal explained that a ‘scarce’ good or service is one that “cannot be easily duplicated without significant capital investment.”[11] Google’s main argument rested on the fact that there are numerous alternatives to Google Ads, all of which are viable and pose significant competitive constraint on Google Ads. However, The Tribunal in this case concluded that SEM services cannot be easily duplicated without significant capital investment and there is no feasible substitute, thus, rejecting Google’s argument and establishing the scarcity of Google Ads.

Alongside the above elements, it must be shown that it is economically feasible for Google Ads to supply Lottoland with Google Ads services. Lottoland seeks nothing more than to have access to Google Ads, as do their competitors. This equitable access request, and as is the opinion of The Tribunal, would prima facie not be impractical or unfeasible, the continued access to Lottoland’s rivals being a determining factor. The fact that Google has supplied Lottoland with Google Ads for some time before terminating access also suggests that it is not economically unviable to do so again.

Once the above has been established, harm is presumed, and the onus would typically shift to the respondent to show that these harmful effects are outweighed by pro-competitive gains. The Tribunal found that Google had no competition-related rationale for their actions and thus, there conduct prima facie distorts competition in the downstream market without any pro-competitive of efficiency justification presented or argued by Google.

Our assessment above, whilst done in the context of Section 8(1)(d)(ii) is also relevant for purposes of Section 8(1)(c). The Tribunal concluded that for reason stated under the section 8(1)(d)(ii) discussion, Google has also violated the provisions of section 8(1)(c). Google’s conduct has a prima facie anti-competitive effect, distorting competition by not allowing Lottoland to expand within their market relative to their rivals. The conduct was not found to be outweighed by technological, efficiency or pro-competitive gain and Google had little to no arguments in this regard.

Application of section 49C(2) of the Act

Lottoland submitted that Google’s refusal to allow it to use Google Ads resulted in Lottoland’s customer registration rate dropping significantly. Lottoland supplemented this with a monetary amount of the revenue that they had suffered as a result of Googles refusal to supply their Google Ads service, which, up until the interim relief was ordered, was ongoing. The Tribunal concluded that this is prima facie evidence that, due to Google’s conduct, Lottoland have suffered ‘serious or irreparable damage’, meeting one of the three stages of section 49C(2) of the Act. Additionally, the preamble of the Act states the importance to “provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and variety of goods and services they desire”, with the overarching purpose of promoting and maintain competition in the Republic for the ultimate benefit of the consumer. It is clear that Google’s conduct has limited the choice for end-consumers.

With reference to ‘the balance of convenience’, The Tribunal weighed up the harm suffered by each party if they were to grant/refuse the application for interim relief, pending a decision on merits and stated that if there is clear and non-speculative evidence that suggest, and to what extent, a party will suffer harm if the relief was not given, then such relief should be given. It was stated in eMedia that “whilst there will inevitably be disputes of fact”, the Tribunal should still take a robust approach on the evidence before it, and that “if there is a prima facie right, even one open to some doubt and well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted and ultimately granted at a final relief stage, then the balance of convenience favours the grant of the relief.”[12]

The Tribunal concluded that Lottoland had made out a prima facie case of restrictive practices and well as the irreparable harm it has suffered, therefore the balance of convenience, as shown, favours granting of interim relief. The requirements of section 49C of the Act have been satisfied and there is a case for interim relief.

Key takeaways

This case highlights critical elements that The Tribunal considers when assessing prohibited practices and granting interim relief under the Act. For a prohibited practice, The Tribunal focuses on determining market dominance, the exclusionary nature of the conduct, and whether the anti-competitive effects outweigh any pro-competitive justifications. The Tribunal’s approach to market dominance was particularly noteworthy. Instead of accepting Google’s broad definition of the market as the ‘advertising ecosystem,’ The Tribunal adopted a narrower definition focusing on the specific market for SEM services. This refined approach allowed for a more precise assessment of competition dynamics, underscoring Google’s overwhelming dominance in the SEM market.

The Tribunal further scrutinised Google’s refusal to supply Lottoland and its inconsistent application of internal policies, emphasising the scarcity of Google Ads as a service and its critical role for businesses reliant on digital advertising. Regarding interim relief, the Tribunal assesses whether there is prima facie evidence of a prohibited practice, serious or irreparable harm to the applicant, and whether the balance of convenience favours granting relief. Notably, the Tribunal’s robust and detailed approach to evaluating dominance and harm provides a roadmap for future cases, emphasizing the importance of context-specific market definitions and balancing the interests of all parties involved. This case underscores the Tribunal’s commitment to protecting competition and consumer choice while maintaining fairness in digital markets.

Joshua Eveleigh, Managing Associate at Primerio International says:

“At its crux, this matter dealt with the weighing up of the alleged risks and reputational harm to Google against the claimed foreclosure of Lottoland in the downstream market. Importantly, the Tribunal clarified that its mandate is to pronounce on how conduct may distort competition in a market.

Hence, if there is prima facie proof of anti-competitive conduct which cannot be outweighed on a balance of convenience, an application for interim relief must succeed. This is a particularly noteworthy judgement for firms operating within regulated environments. In effect, a dominant firm will be hard placed to cut-off services to a customer if, for example, it does not have clear evidence that the customer engaged in unlawful conduct.”

[1] Western Cape Gambling and Racing Act 4 of 1996.

[2] Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”), sec 49C.

[3] The Act, sec 49C(2).

[4] eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd SA v MultiChoice (Pty) Ltd and Another, Case No. 201/CAC/Jun22 (“eMedia”), para 93.

[5] GovChat (Pty) Ltd and Hashtag Letstalk (Pty) Ltd v Facebook, Inc and Others, Case No. IR165Nov20 (“GovChat”), para 160.

[6] The Act, sec 8(1)(d)(ii) and 8(1)(c).

[7] The Act, sec 8(1)(d)(ii).

[8] The Act, sec 8(1)(c).

[9] Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Lottoland South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Google Ireland Limited and Google South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Case No: IR191Mar23 (Reasons for Decision and Order), para 78.1.

[10] eMedia, para 129.

[11] GovChat, para 113.

[12] eMedia, para 83 and 95.

Lots of C’s: CCC(C) investigates Coca-Cola Contracts in COMESA

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Coca-Cola is suspected of having engaged in anti-competitive conduct in the common market region via unlawfully restrictive distribution agreements — much is at stake, including a chance for the respondent to justify its contract provisions, and for the CCC to provide more detailed objective reasoning for its ultimate decision than it previously did in its 2018 RPM case against the soft drink giant.

By Joshua Eveleigh & Henri Rossouw

On 14 October 2024, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Competition Commission (“CCC”) announced that it will investigate The Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”) for potentially violating the current Article 16 of the COMESA Competition Regulations (the “Regulations”). The Regulations are due to be amended prior to year’s end.

The alleged conduct relates to supposedly restrictive bottler and distribution agreements considered to affect trade between COMESA Member States, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the regional competition watchdog, akin to the European Union’s DG COMP enforcing antitrust rules across the EU.

Article 16 prohibits agreements that may affect trade between Member States of COMESA, with the main object of these agreements being to prevent, restrict, distort competition in the Common Market.  The present investigation provides an example of how one of the CCC’s primary objectives is the detection and prevention of any restrictions to trade in and across the Common Market, such as the suspected “absolute territorial restrictions” at issue here.  This is notably different from a prior run-in between Coca-Cola and the CCC back in 2017-2018: the CCC’s first soft-drink salvo dealt with so-called “Resale Price Maintenance” (“RPM”) in Coke’s distribution agreements. RPM is a generally frowned-upon practice in antitrust law globally. During that case, the then-still fledgling agency had issued a curt decision, resolving the case without fines but with an injunction against the practice and a mandatory Coke compliance programme.

This new matter arises out of entirely different legal issues and with a distinct factual background. Moreover, it is now being investigated by a notably matured and dramatically advanced enforcement agency compared to the 2018 case. Says Andreas Stargard, a Primerio attorney practising before the CCC:

“The Commission is doing what COMESA was designed for — a ‘territorial-restriction’ prosecution is nothing new for a regionally-integrated community. It lies at the heart of the concept of a unified, free market area. Territorial restrictions within such an area an inimical to the entire concept of COMESA. Just look at the EU: its antitrust rules have given the European Commission a similar mandate for decades, enforcing prohibitions against sellers’ territorial limitations that impinge on the free distribution and sale of their goods across the EU. Here, in the current COMESA investigation, it appears that we are notably dealing with restrictive conduct that may be justified by the parties in the end, as opposed to a pure prohibition ‘by object’, such as a cartel agreement. So if Article 16(1)-(4) applies, a prohibition with ‘rule-of-reason’ caveats, Coca-Cola may provide arguments as to why and how the restrictive agreements benefit end-consumers.”

Interestingly, the CCC previously assessed the distribution agreements between Anheuser-Busch InBev (“ABI”) and its third-party distributors and found that the distribution agreements contained clauses that restricted distributors from selling outside of their allocated territories, infringing upon the principle of “absolute territorial protection”. Accordingly, ABI remedied the infringing provisions. “The difference there, however, was that ABI had affirmatively and preemptively applied to the CCC for an authorization under Art. 20 — it was not the subject of an investigation after the fact, as is the case with Coca-Cola,” says attorney Stargard.

“Moreover, once the case is resolved, I am curious to see whether the CCC will take into account the prior compliance programme mandate from the 2018 case against Coca-Cola. It will be interesting to read whether or not the Commission refers to this condition of the prior non-fining resolution against Coke’s RPM conduct, and if so, where the failure point was? Was the programme either inefficient, entirely scrapped, or how did it otherwise fail to avoid further violative conduct on the part of the respondent…? We will have to wait and see, but other global enforcers, such as the DOJ, have certainly used the existence or non-existence of an effective compliance programme in their ultimate fining decisions to date.”

Regardless of outcome, it will also be interesting to learn how the CCC approaches the topic of exclusive distribution agreements across the Common Market. In this regard, it is widely accepted that exclusive agreements are likely to give rise to a range of efficiencies that may be passed down to customers and end-consumers, which Coca-Cola will, of course, need to establish by objective economic evidence if it seeks to justify its contracts vis-à-vis the CCC.

The CCC has been known to be deliberate and fair in its proceedings, especially in recent years of maturity and advancements in its team strength and econometric evaluation capabilities. Mr. Stargard observes that “[e]xamples of this nuanced approach and the due process being granted to parties in distribution cases include the most recent CAF soccer cases (see, e.g., here), in which the CCC spent extensive time and clarifying documentation on why certain, but not all, practices of the affected parties were harmful to consumer welfare in the Common Market.” That said, if the CCC were to adopt an overly protective stance here, however, it may have a concomitant effect on the consumer welfare and will have significant consequences for multinationals distributing into Africa.

The case is still in its investigatory phase, and thus all interested stakeholders are invited to submit representations by 14 November 2024 and can enquire further from Mr. Boniface Makongo (Director Competition Division) at +265 (0) 111 772 466 or at bmakongo@comesacompetition.org.

Nigeria & Single-Firm Conduct: FCCPC Smokes Monopolist with Largest-Ever Fine

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British American Tobacco faces $110 million fine for abuse of dominance in Nigeria, after settlement with up-and-coming antitrust enforcement agency

By Nicola Taljaard and Nicole Araujo 

About three years ago, in the summer of 2020, British American Tobacco Nigeria Limited and associated companies (collectively “BAT”) became the subject of an investigation by Nigeria’s then-brand-new Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“FCCPC”). The FCCPC was looking into the potential violation of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (“FCCPA”) and Administrative Penalties Regulations, 2020 (“Regulations”). After three years of investigating BAT’s business practices (including “dawn raids” on the company’s various office locations), the FCCPC found BAT guilty of having engaged in unfair business practices under section 155 of the Act by abusing its market dominance in Nigeria and violating public health regulations.  For the former, notably, BAT had penalized retailers for fostering an equitable and competitive market for its rival’s products in-store.

As a result of the finding, the FCCPC and BAT entered a consent order in December 2023. As part of this settlement pact, BAT agreed to engage in tobacco health advocacy, provide written assurances to the FCCPC and to be monitored by the FCCPC for the ensuing two years to ensure that BAT modified its behavioral and business practices to accord with relevant antitrust and tobacco control laws and efforts. BAT also agreed to pay a hefty fine of $110 million to the FCCPC in accordance with Clause 11 of the Regulations.  Notes Andreas Stargard, competition partner at specialist firm Primerio Ltd., “[t]he penalty agreed upon by the parties constitutes the largest fine imposed by the FCCPC thus far. It is also the first known instance in which the Regulations — which were intended to clarify the methodology for calculating administrative penalties — were applied and where the FCCPC has used the discretion conferred on it under Clause 11 to ‘consider administrative penalties on a case-by-case basis as the circumstances require’. Notably, BAT cannot appeal this fine, as it is part of a mutually agreed ‘consent order’ between the parties.”

In accordance with the terms and nature of the consent agreement, respectively, the FCCPCwithdrew the pending criminal charges against BAT and the agreement is not subject to appeal. Moreover, in compliance with applicable legislation, BAT and the relevant associated companies must advocate for both tobacco control and public health. 

The investigation and consent agreement have certainly come at a precarious time for BAT, which recently published that the value of its cigarette brands had diminished considerably in the past year and is known to have entered into a separate agreement with the US authorities surrounding investigations into the violation of a prohibition on tobacco sales to North Korea. 

The fine agreed to between the FCCPC and BAT follows the fairly recent publication of the FCCPC’s Regulations which delineate the legislative framework for the administration and imposition of administrative penalties according to the Act. The FCCPC reiterated its commitment to enforcing the law, making sure companies follow the relevant regulations, fair markets are fostered by all, and the protection of consumer interests are at the core of competitive actions and regulations. Ultimately, a fine to this extent sends a clear signal to other companies about the importance of fair, competitive behaviour and antitrust compliance. 

Sweeping Inquiry Sheds Light on Online Intermediation Platforms: Competition, Opportunity, and the Road Ahead

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By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Nicola Taljaard

On 31 July 2023, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) released its Final Report and Decision on the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry (“OIPMI”). The OIPMI was initially launched on 19 May 2021 and after a number of requests for information, public hearings, expert reports as well as comments and engagements with stakeholders, the SACC’s findings and recommendations have finally been concluded.

The SACC is empowered to conduct market inquiries according to section 43B(1)(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended) where it has reason to believe that there are market features that may impede, distort or restrict competition in a particular market; or to achieve the objects and purposes of the Act (including participation of small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) and historically disadvantaged persons (“HDPs”).

The Inquiry: A Timeline of Discovery and Discernment

  • May 2021: The kick-off. Release of the Statement of Issues (SOI), first round of Requests for Information (RFIs), and business user survey.
  • August 2021: Heating up with the release of the Further Statement of Issues (FSOI), second round of RFIs, and a refined business user survey.
  • November 2021: The public had their say with hearings and follow-up RFIs.
  • February 2022: Expert reports and in-camera hearings added a new dimension.
  • July 2022: Provisional Inquiry Report was published, provisional findings, and recommendations were made public.
  • August to December 2022: A flurry of submissions, stakeholder engagements, and follow-up RFIs.
  • January to July 2023: Engaging stakeholders on final findings and remedial actions, sealing the deal.

What Does It All Mean?

These findings focus on the various platform categories, including the mammoth influence of Google Search. The full extent of these actions requires deep exploration, but one thing is clear: the landscape of online intermediation platforms is about to shift.

During the launch of the OIPMI, the Minister Patel of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (“DTIC”) commended the SACC for its great effort and the high-quality product produced in the form of the OIPMI. He further noted that the government should consider taking an inclusive response to the findings and recommendations in the OIPMI.

The findings concluded, inter alia, that Google Search is vital as a means for consumers to access all platforms, and that its paid search alongside free results business model is disproportionately advantageous to larger and more established platforms. It also found that Booking.com’s practice of restricting hotel prices on certain online networks results in a restriction of competition and allows it to make more commission by making users reliant on it. eCommerce giant, Takealot, was found to have a conflict of interest due to its retail department competing with its marketplace sellers and causing detriment to the latter. Google Play and the Apple App stores were found to charge exorbitant fees to developers and on a global level, the platforms hampered the visibility of SA-paid apps. Food delivery platforms Uber Eats and Mr D Food were found to cause difficulty to their competitors because of the lack of openness regarding the surcharges charged on menus across their platforms, as well as the limitations put on national chain franchisees. Property advertisement platforms Property 24 and Private Property were further found to have hindered their competitors by providing low interoperability to competitors in respect of listings. Property 24, together with AutoTrader and Cars.co.za were also found to have hampered small estate agents and car dealers due to the discriminatory pricing implemented by these platforms.

To combat the effects of the findings, the SACC recommended the imposition of a number of remedial actions including consumer-aiding search filters, marketing incentives to purchase local goods, the removal of restrictive pricing clauses, the segregation of internal (competing) divisions, the removal of automatically directing mechanisms to larger players, disclosure clauses to consumers and other benefits to SMEs, HDPs and consumers.

All platforms will be provided a period within which to affect the remedial actions.

A New Chapter: Where Do We Go From Here?

This OIPMI hasn’t just been about pointing fingers and exposing flaws. It’s about shaping the future of a wide range of the economy. The implications are broad, affecting everyone from big tech to the small business owner striving to make a mark in a competitive world.

Michael-James Currie, Partner at Primerio, noted “The recommendations of the OIPMI are far reaching for online platforms. Regulators need to ensure that we do not undermine those who are growing and providing significant investment the digital market in a highly competitive market where firms are competing not only with established traditional retailers but also large international players. Likewise, South Africa cannot afford to signal to international players that their business models will be substantively undermined once they establish themselves in South Africa. This is particularly so if the Commission’s remedies are not informed by objective competition concerns.”

Moroccan telecom regulator fines dominant telco USD 1/4 billion

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Morocco’s national telco regulator (the Agence Nationale de Réglementation des Télécommunications or ANRT) has concluded, after a years-long investigation started in 2017 and a prior fining decision was taken in 2020, that Maroc Telecom Group had abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 7 of Law No. 104-12.

Says Andreas Stargard, a competition-law attorney at Primerio Ltd., “it is somewhat rare to see non-specialist regulator investigate competition-law violations and impose antitrust fines — particularly, as here, 5-year-long investigations and such enormous fine amounts as those imposed on Maroc Télécom, which is said to have committed various acts in furtherance of its dominance,” including conduct aimed at delaying competitors’ access to local-loop unbundling and entry into broadband. Stargard notes that the total fine of MAD2.45 billion (approx. US$238 million, which includes the prior 2020 fine amount) is now due to be paid, barring a successful appeal by the operator within 30 days.

Concentration and Participation in the South African Economy: Levels and Trends – SACC Publishes Report

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By Michael-James Currie & Gina Lodolo

On 7 December 2021, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Ebrahim Patel released a report titled “Measuring concentration and participation in the South African Economy: Levels and Trends”, accessible here (“Concentration Report”). This Concentration Report is the first of many as the Minster undertook to update the report bi-annually from hereon out.

The theme of the Concentration Report is centered on identifying and remedying:

  • Economic levels and trends that are skewed and don’t reflect South Africa’s population demographic; and
  • Entrenched leaders in certain sectors, which creates “inefficient concentration” by setting high barriers to entry thereby reducing competition, which, according to the Concentration Report, can lead to higher prices and lower investment in South Africa.

The Concentration Report highlights that concentrated markets are of a rising concern internationally, however, specifically in the South African context, the apartheid era created dominant firms that persist and prevent historically excluded persons from participating and gaining market share.

The Competition Commission (“SACC”) does however note that concentration does not automatically mean there is a lack of competition and there may be many instances where concentration will be for the benefit of the consumer and pro-competitive. In this regard pro-competitive concentration can be seen when innovation creates increased market size and economies of scale reduce prices for consumers. Further, the SACC notes that there are still gaps in the data, which will be addressed in the subsequent reports.

The Concentration Report highlights that the SACC will hereinafter be concentrating its efforts on markets that have been identified to contain a role player that is presumed dominant. In this regard, the sectors that have been identified as requiring increased scrutiny are:

  • Farming inputs;
  • Agro-processing;
  • Sin (alcohol and tobacco) industries;
  • Healthcare;
  • Communications;
  • Upstream steel value; and
  • Financial services

This increased scrutiny will be seen particularly in industries that require licenses to operate. This is of concern to the SACC because licensing can be used as a mechanism to spread out ownership, which may be curtailed by a merger, and the SACC has seen increased merger activity particularly in industries characterized by licensing requirements.

To conclude, it is vital to take cognizance of this Concentration Report because the SACC has highlighted that it will form the basis of strategic enforcement of the Competition Act 18 of 2018 (“Act”) and will lay the path for policy centered on a concentrated economy.  In this regard, we foresee closer scrutiny of role players with large market shares in the years to come, especially those players that are presumed to be dominant or expressly mentioned in the Concentration Report.

A further challenge that the Commission faces in tackling perceived high-levels of concentration, is balancing the clear socio-economic objectives with competition law goals and consumer welfare enhancing conduct. Although the Report acknowledges that high concentration does not mean the market is anti-competitive, the general policy of the Report is clearly aimed as protecting or promoting a designated group of competitors as opposed to the competitive process itself. This creates an inherent policy tension and requires very clear, transparent and quantifiable trade-offs.

As the Constitutional Court recently affirmed in the Mediclinic case, higher prices to consumers is not in the public interest. The converse is of course also true. Intervention in markets which may lead to adverse effects on consumer welfare would need to be weighed against the objective of “opening up” the market. Where healthy and efficient entry is permissible, that may well be consumer welfare enhancing but if remedial actions are deigned to simply protect inefficient market participants then interventionist measures are likely to amount to nothing more than a tax on large players which either ultimately gets passed on to consumers or discourages investment. It is absolutely critical to South Africa’s economy and to the integrity of the competition law regime that the latter consequences do not materialize.

You can access the summary report here: https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Concentration-Tracker-Summary-Report.pdf

China tells Africa: ‘Monopolies bad!’

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In an interesting twist, a representative of the last properly remaining centralised economy (the People’s Republic of China) has admonished African nations (specifically South Africa, where he acts as Ambassador) to enhance competition-law enforcement against dominant firms, including Western tech giants.

We observe that his statement is an “interesting” twist, because the Editor was taught over the years in several (perhaps faulty?) history lessons that the PRC itself had been inarguably heavily reliant on government-run monopoly companies for decades.

But let’s cut to the chase of what Mr. Xiaodong is actually saying: his thesis, not exactly ground-breaking in antitrust circles, can be summarised succinctly as “excessive power and influence of technology giants hinder innovation and competition and increases economic inequality.” There!

With regards to the applicability of his thesis to South Africa, the ambassador notes that “Antimonopoly practices also exist in SA. The control over data fees and food prices imposed by big corporations here has safeguarded consumers’ rights and interests. Monopolistic actions in the platform economy is also a matter of grave concern for SA’s Competition Commission. No country can turn a blind eye to the negative externality of the emerging digital economy.”

Image credit: Shutterstock

“Negative externalities…” sound very much like proper Western antitrust-economics-speak. Interesting. However, there is of course an ulterior motive behind this little lesson in competition economics from his excellency, the honorable ambassador. It comes at the end of his “opinion” piece: China would like to do more business in Africa, strengthen its ties, and deepen its influence (including in the area of education – beware!)… In the diplomat’s own words: “China’s high quality economic development brings greater opportunities for Africa’s development. … And China’s current cumulative investment in SA has exceeded $25bn, creating more than 400,000 jobs directly and indirectly in the region and making big contributions to SA’s economic and social development.”

Curious news, perhaps not so much any more after digging deeper. Especially when the interested reader googles (oh yes, coincidentally using that same FAANG company’s services that Mr. Xiadong’s diatribe indirectly disparages here) the simple search term “China – Africa“, the latest news from today’s South China Morning Post is that “China seeks to expand influence in Africa with more digital projects…” — nice coincidence.

Well, now readers of AAT know.

China wants to “share the achievements of digital technology with Africa to promote interconnectivity”

Interdict Granted in Favour of GovChat, Preventing Removal from the Whatsapp Platform

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By Gina Lodolo

The South African Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) has been called to consider a complaint of abuse of dominance against Whatsapp, arising out of its notice to terminate its contract with “GovChat” and off-board GovChat from the Whatsapp platform. GovChat is a chatbot service that allows the government to engage with citizens and provide government services such as health and education.

GovChat approached the Tribunal, alleging that due to the high market shares of Whatsapp in South Africa, competing platforms do not have sufficient scale (consumer numbers and reach) to provide alternatives on their own separate platform (such as WeChat in China). Smaller platforms are forced to make use of the Whatsapp network where Whatsapp’s terms of service do not allow for the expansion of the GovChat business model to become a competitor to Whatsapp. GovChat stated that its “entire existence will be materially prejudiced” if removed from the platform. It was alleged that the decision to off-board GovChat would put GovChat out of business and affect millions of citizens who benefit from the platform. CEO of GovChat, Eldrid Jordaan stated that “GovChat’s case is that Whatsapp/Facebook have abused their dominance because off-boarding GovChat has an exclusionary effect, preventing GovChat from operating in the relevant market.”Exclusionary acts are prohibited by Section 8(1)(c) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“Act”) which states that a firm is prohibited from engaging in an exclusionary act if the “anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain”.  In this matter, Whatsapp/Facebook would have to prove that the exclusionary act has a pro-competitive gain.  The respondent has to discharge the allegation that refusing consumers access to an essential facility or a scarce service is an abuse of dominance according to sections 8(1)(b) and/or 8(1)(d)(ii) of the Act.

The alleged breach of the terms of service lies in the use of GovChat as a de facto communications platform for the government, when it is in fact not a government owned entity and WhatsApp stated of concern that “GovChat seeks to intermediate itself between government and citizens as a profit-making entity. It seems to aspire to become the official communication channel for the South African Government and effectively be the gateway through which citizens access government through Whatsapp”, where GovChat monetises confidential information of citizens through the use of the Whatsapp platform. Accordingly, citizens share confidential information which is monetized by a private entity, of which practice Whatsapp believes to be prejudicial to its platform and its terms of use, and therefore in breach of its terms of service.

GovChat logo

The competitive harm towards GovChat lies in the manner in which Whatsapp made use of its dominance through the unilateral off-board of GovChat. Whatsapp argues that its conduct cannot be anti-competitive as Whatsapp and GovChat do not provide the same facilities and are therefore not direct competitors. To this end, representing GovChat, Advocate Paul Farlam stated that “Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg intends to introduce a payment system, as such, locking GovChat out of Whatsapp would give Whatsapp an advantage as being locked out of the market for an indefinite period would stop GovChat from entering the market first, allowing Whatsapp to keep customers away from GovChat while Whatsapp enters that market”. If this is the case,  Facebook is hiding under the guise that the offboard is due to a breach in its terms of service, in order to remove the potential competition from GovChat in the same market.

On the 25th of March 2021, the Tribunal issued an interim interdict to restrain Whatsapp from removing GovChat from its platform, pending the outcome of the complaint that GovChat has lodged against Facebook with the Competition Commission. The interim interdict has been granted in favour of GovChat as it established a prima facie case demonstrating the alleged exclusionary conduct and anticompetitive effects that the off-board would have on GovChat. Facebook failed to rebut the prima facie case by providing pro-competitive gains that outweigh the alleged anti-competitive effects of the off-board. Due to the nature of the GovChat platform being in the public interest during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tribunal held that “the balance of convenience favours the granting of interim relief to the applicants who provide an invaluable service.”

Importantly, the relief is only interim in nature. Accordingly, the Competition Commission has not yet made a finding that Facebook has indeed contravened the Competition Act 89 of 1998  through an abuse of dominance.

Enforcement Alert: SACC ordered to remedy its complaint referral in 2nd CompuTicket abuse-of-dominance case

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By Charl van der Merwe, assisted by Christine Turkington & Gina Lodolo

The South African competition Commission (SACC) has suffered yet another procedural setback- related to the facts pleaded in its referral affidavit – this time, in its ongoing saga with Computicket and Shoprite Checkers, apropos Computicket’s alleged abuse of dominance.

In its initial case against Computicket, which ultimately went to the Competition Appeal Court, SACC succeeded in holding Computicket to account for abuse of dominance in contravention of section 8(d)(i) of the Competition Act (Computicket One). Computicket One was based on the fact that Computicket had entered into exclusive agreements with customers which had the effect of excluding competitors from the market. See exclusive AAT article on Computicket One case here.

The SACC was critical of the conduct of Shoprite Checkers as, in Computicket One, the SACC alleged that the exclusive agreements were entered into between Computicket and Shoprite Checkers shortly after the Computicket was acquired by Shoprite Checkers. Computicket One was based on the agreement entered into for the period 2005 to 2010.

Accordingly and shortly after the conclusion of Computicket One, the SACC referred a second complaint against Computicket for abuse of dominance. The cause of action is substantively similar as that which had been found to be a contravention in Computicket One, however, this time based on the agreements entered into from January 2013 and which are alleged to be ongoing (Computicket Two). In Computicket Two, however, the SACC now seeks to hold Shoprite Checkers jointly and severally liable with Computicket in its capacity as the ultimate parent company of Computicket. Moreover, the SACC appears to seek the imposition of a penalty based on the higher turnover of Shoprite Checkers.

Note that Computicket Two was referred to the Tribunal prior to the enactment of the Competition Amendment Act, which provides for parent companies to be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of subsidiaries and/or allows for the calculation of an administrative penalty, based on the turnover of the parent company where the parent was aware or ought to have been aware of the conduct of the subsidiary.

The Tribunal, therefore, found the SACC’s referral affidavit to be flawed and lacking of the facts (and points of law) necessary to sustain a cause of action, particularly in so far as it seeks to hold Shoprite Checkers liable. In this regard, the Tribunal expressly held that they view Computicket and Shoprite Checkers as separate economic entities and should thus be treated separately with respect to the allegations made in the Commission’s complaint referral.

The Tribunal went on the emphasize that on the consideration of dominance (which is the statutory first step to an assessment under section 8), “… the Commission conceded that Shoprite Checkers is not active in the market for outsourced ticketing services to inventory providers in which Computicket is active. Unsurprisingly, no market shares attributable to Shoprite Checkers are reflected anywhere in the Commission’s referral. It is simply unclear of what we are to make of the allegations against Shoprite Checkers.”

In order to correct these defects and instead of dismissing SACC’s case, the Tribunal ordered the SACC to file a supplementary affidavit. The Tribunal held that “[g]iven that the Commission’s reliance on the single economic entity doctrine fails and the question of dominance is abundantly opaque, the Commission must rectify its referral to properly reflect and clarify the case against Shoprite Checkers in order for it to meet the case put against it.”

Should the SACC fail to file its supplementary affidavit, within the 30 business days, as order by the Tribunal, Shoprite Checkers and Computicket may approach the Tribunal for an order that the case be dismissed.

John Oxenham, director of Primerio, notes that the Tribunal’s order in allowing the SACC an opportunity to first supplement or amend its referral affidavit is in line with the recent orders of both the Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court to first allow such opportunity for the SACC to remedy its case, instead of ordering an outright dismissal of the case on an interlocutory basis. This is likely to form the precedent for interlocutory applications, even where the facts suggest that the SACC’s case is opportunistic and incapable of being remedied.

According to competition lawyer, Michael-James Currie, the recent orders which have come out of the Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court in interlocutory applications will hopefully have a positive effect on the manner in which cases are referred and prosecuted in South Africa.

The SACC has at times demonstrated a tendency to be overly broad in its complaint referrals, causing respondent firms to engage in costly and time consuming internal investigations to assess the merits of such cases. With the development of the previously underutilized interlocutory processes, respondent firms are now able to, at an early stage of the litigation process, ensure that the SACC sets out its case in a concise manner, substantiated with the requisite factual allegations required to sustain its case, thereby avoiding the unnecessary cost of expansive internal investigations and protracted litigation.