Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Advance africanantitrust.com publication of working paper

By: Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

new multi-part series
new multi-part series on Innovation & Antitrust

Innovation: a path to long-term economic growth,[1]hope for economic recovery,[2] and a vital opportunity for economies in developing countries.[3] Innovation is the Holy Grail we would all like drink from. Individuals dedicate their lives to its pursuit, governments invest significant amounts of money in R&D, but despite decades of research on ‘the wealth of nations’, we remain with a poor perception of innovation as a ‘complex and mysterious phenomenon’[4] that should be stimulated, although no one knows very well how.[5]

Government intervention in itself is insufficient and it might rather have costly results, if incorrectly targeted.[6] This is particularly true when it comes to the inevitable relationship between legal conditions and innovation since the lack of an effective legal framework is in the poorest countries the main obstacle to innovation and consequently to economic growth.[7] In this context, during many years, law was simply told to stay away and admire it from a distance to avoid impeding innovation. However, beyond laboratories, laborious inventions and serendipitous discoveries, law can play a greater role than a mere walk-on in the ‘innovation film’. In fact, law can act as a ‘brakeman’ or ‘a driver’ of innovation.[8] Competition and IP law have been competing for the supporting role of ‘drivers of innovation’. Here this ‘innovation film’ does not take place in the EU or in the US, but in developing countries trying to promote domestic innovation while adopting competition laws and being forced to respect IP rights that incentivize innovation in the Western world. In such context, and before the audition starts, five questions must be posed: (i) What is innovation and what type of innovation do governments aim to promote? (ii) Should and can law in general interfere in the regulation of innovation? (iii) How can competition law play a role in the promotion of innovation? (iv) Should competition law not remain in the shadow of Intellectual Property (IP’) laws that are already designed to provide innovators with incentives or should it be the other way around? (v) Last but not the least, in the context of the problematic trichotomy antitrust/IP/innovation, should a customized approach be conceived for developing countries characterized by different socioeconomic conditions or should one plea for convergence?

In this article (and subsequently, expanded paper), I reflect upon the role of law, and particularly competition laws, in the promotion of innovation in developing countries and the problematic relationship between IP, competition laws and innovation. Up until now, (competition) law’s potential to drive innovation has been either closely associated with patent law[9] or analyzed on a mere casuistic basis in the setting of specific antitrust or mergers cases.[10] However, the enforcement of competition laws against unlawful monopolizing conduct plays in general an undeniable role in the promotion of innovation.[11] Competition law promotes innovation by removing barriers to freedom of choice, trade and market access and prevents the formation of monopolies or conditions in the marketplace susceptible of stifling the development of new products. This implies however analyzing the connection between the market structure and the ability to influence undertakings to innovate:[12] while in some cases, a large number of companies on the market may slow down innovation, in others, the lack of competitive pressure may reduce the incentives to innovate (e.g. international market of derived financial products).[13]

Although the debate on the promotion of innovation has been restricted to developed countries, the promotion of innovation is equally vital for developing countries, notably in Africa.[14] These countries are looking up to the EU and US and trying to adopt similar competition laws and policies.[15] What’s more, a number of developing countries have been deriving their antitrust legal frameworks from Western countries, as a result of trade agreements. Globalization appears to push developing countries in the sense of convergence, but is this tendency beneficial for these countries quest for innovation? Absolute convergence of antitrust enforcement might not suit the current economic stage of most developing countries, particularly in Africa. A ‘Western’ design of antitrust laws and policies might not fit the socioeconomic conditions of these countries. This might be particularly problematic when governments are struggling to promote local innovation but face inevitable IP constraints.

Reconciling the difficult relationship between antitrust and patent law can be particularly complex in African countries since patent policy has a significant impact on development. Although one might at first think that developing countries should emphasize patent policy, as they are considerably behind the global technological frontier and are craving domestic innovation, they cannot afford the short-term consumer welfare loss that must be incurred to generate patentee reward.[16] Some African countries like South Africa have been developing a solid IP regulatory framework so as to incentivize innovation,[17] but many lack the technological and financial capacity to invest in R&D. In such cases, access to protected technologies on reasonable terms may be the key to more domestic innovation. What does this mean for the trichotomy innovation-IP-competition? Although developing countries urgently require innovation,[18] should their competition authorities look less up to Western models and rather question whether they should sacrifice consumer welfare by upholding patent exploitation practices?

Instead of pushing developing countries toward convergence of global competition policy, the specific socioeconomic conditions of these countries should be taken into consideration. Thomas Cheng argues, rightly so one might say, that ‘antitrust principles and doctrines need to be tailored to domestic economic circumstances. Markets and economies function differently in developing countries and antitrust laws should reflect these differences.[19] This is a particularly important lesson for African countries as they are prone to imitate the approaches of developed countries without the required customization. Different suggestions have been advanced in the literature, such as the reduction of patent protection in developing countries, allowing even the imitation of foreign technology so that domestic innovators possess a technological basis they can further develop,[20] or the expansion of compulsory licensing beyond certain drugs for developing countries.[21]

This contribution aimed to draw attention to the challenging role of law as the driver (or at least guardian) of innovation in developing countries. Competition and IP laws both wish to share a supporting role in this ‘innovation film’ taking place in developing countries. Should they be granted this part in a context of convergence of laws and policies or should IP remain in the shadow in order to ensure that the innovation film can successfully be produced and released in the theaters? You decide who gets the part at this audition; however, recalling Eleanor Fox’ words ‘antitrust should not be used to protect David from Goliath, but it may be used to empower David against Goliath’.[22]

To be continued…


[1] Richard S. Whitt, ‘Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy’ (2009) 61(3) Federal Communications Law Journal 485.

[2] BERR, ‘Regulation and Innovation: evidence and policy implications’, BERR Economics Paper No.4, 2008, iv.

[3] Jean-Eric Aubert, ‘Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework’ (2004) World Bank Institute, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KFDLP/Resources/0-3097AubertPaper[1].pdf

[4] D. Augey, ‘Les mystères de l’innovation: le regard contemporain de l’économie et de la gestion’ (2013) In J. Mestre, & L. Merland, Droit et Innovation (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille) 89, 91.

[5] Joshua D. Sarnoff, ‘Government choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change)’ (2013) 62 Emory Law Journal, 1087.

[6] B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347.

[7] Robert Cooter, ‘Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law Review 373.

[8] W. Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit rechtswissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung’, in D. Sauer, Christa Lang (Eds.), Paradoxien der Innovation: Perspektiven sozialwissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung (Campus Verlag 1999). Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf’, überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

[9] Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See Christine A. Varney, ‘Promoting Innovation Through Patent and Antitrust Law and Policy’ (2010), Department of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice on the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260101.pdf.

[10] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69. Pierre Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation’ (2009) 75 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 933. François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilitaties: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ (2005) 28 World Competition 71.

[11] Douglas Rosenthal, ‘Do Intellectual Property Laws Promote Competition & Innovation?’ (2006) 7 Sedona Conference Journal 143.

[12] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69.

[13] COMP/M.6166, NYSE Euronext / Deutsche Börse.

[14] Smita Srinivas, Judith Sutz, ‘Developing countries and innovation: Searching for a new analytical approach’(2008) 30 Technology in Society 129.

[15] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1.

[16] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1, 3.

[17] Alexis Apostolidis, ‘IP Law in South Africa: Key Cases and Issues’ (2009) ASPATORE WL 2029096.

[18] There is a significant body of literature arguing that IP does not necessarily promote innovation. For an overview, see, e.g., B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347. Julie E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs: Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’ (2007) 40 U.C. Davis L. Review 1151.

[19] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 79.

[20] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 4.

[21] Colleen Chien, ‘ Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 853.

[22] Eleanor M. Fox, ‘ Economic development, Poverty and Antitrust: the Other Path’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 211.

The Commission Doth Protest Too Much?

south_africa

The defensive justification for the Commission’s healthcare inquiry by its acting chief has widely caused eyebrows to be raised…

As reported, the South African Competition Commission (“Commission”) has launched its first-ever market inquiry into the South African private healthcare sector.

The sector has recently been the subject of significant attention from the Commission, the South African health minister in particular, and the S.A. government in general. In spite of the perilous state of South Africa’s public health system, the government appears to have invested more time in deflecting from the obvious problems in the public branch by subjecting the private sector to a costly investigation.  From a procedural-history point of view, it is interesting to note that the market inquiry provision was brought into effect by way of Section 6 of the amended South African Competition Act. Although there were other areas of the legislation to be amended, it is noteworthy that only the market inquiry provision was brought into effect.

Many have suspected that the motivation behind the private healthcare inquiry was based on aspirations from outside the ambit of the Commission, particularly since the launch of the South African government’s National Health Insurance policy scheme (designed to achieve the noble aim of universal health insurance coverage, not entirely unlike the United States’ “Obamacare” effort) may ultimately cause the demise of a robust private healthcare sector.

Independence of Commission questioned

With this in mind, what is perhaps most interesting is a recent public submission made by the newly appointed 37-year old Acting Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele in the South African media.  In an article co-authored with Ms. Paremoer, the Commission principal responsible for the healthcare inquiry, entitled Market inquiries an important advocacy tool (also published in the Sunday Times), Bonakele attempts to deflect any suggestions of government involvement in (or other ministerial influence over the pursuit of) the market inquiry. This approach seems at odds with Mr Bonakele’s predecessor, Shan Ramburuth – who was unceremoniously let go by the same government in a public display of shaming last year – in seeking to justify the motivation behind the private healthcare inquiry.  (We note that the present government has an apparent history of “letting go” unruly cabinet members in unusual and rather bombastic fashion, see here and here.)

Ramburuth’s Commission had previously stated expressly, for instance, that the inquiry was intended at least in part to review the sector for collusive behaviour, while Mr. Bonakele now disavows this rationale and claims that any such findings would merely be a side effect of the inquiry (“[o]f course, during such an inquiry, we may come across anti-competitive practices that need to be rooted out”).

In his piece, the Acting Commissioner seeks to reassure those who “remain confused about the […] intended market inquiry,” and states that the “inquiry is not a stalking horse“:

“we are simply seeking to understand how to improve efficiency and competition” in what he calls the “complicated web” of the healthcare industry.

Is this a case of Shakespearean “the [man] doth protest too much”, especially when keeping in mind that the private healthcare sector has previously been acknowledged to be competitive and efficient.  Mr. Bonakele has previously emphasised his independence, despite being referred to in the press as Minister “Patel’s man”:

“I haven’t responded to the media debate out there because I don’t think one has to stand on a mountain and say ‘I’m independent’. Actions speak louder than words.” [Source: BDLive]

Acting Commissioner Bonakele

The aim of the inquiry, according to the Acting Commissioner, is to improve competition and efficiency in the sector to such a degree that the ordinary man on the street will have full access. A very noble goal indeed, but when juxtaposed with the fundamental function and intention of the NHI,it is highly contradictory: the private healthcare sector is, by definition, not in the business of providing access to everybody. The public NHI body’s own slogan, on the other hand, shows that the national insurance programme fulfills precisely that role: “NHI is premised on the ideology that all South Africans are entitled to access quality healthcare services.”

What is perhaps of greater concern (with a wider applicability than just the healthcare sector, public or private) to competition-law enforcement in South Africa as a whole, is the confluence of the government’s industrial policy ambitions with otherwise supposedly independent Commission investigations and its competition adjudication based in the pure law & economics of antitrust. As previously reported in our piece on political interventionism in South African competition law, the Commission should seek to demonstrate its complete independence from the cabinet and executive branch as a whole, and avoid falling into the trap FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez warned against: the “proper goals” of competition law are best solved when a competition authority is focused on competitive effects and on consumer welfare and its analysis is not “interrupted to meet social and political goals.”

In sum, one must hope that Mr. Bonakele can be taken at his word when he says that, while “[m]aybe people think the minister will use the commission as a tool, but it’s just not possible. This is a legal process we are talking about.

Antitrust & “extreme economic inequality” – new OXFAM paper out

Arguably, most if not all of today’s antitrust enforcers would agree that the world’s competition regimes (African or Asian, American or European, established or recently budding) are fundamentally designed to achieve very few, but important, goals.  Among these goals are the following: (1) economically, to enhance the market’s allocative efficiency & stimulate growth of production and (2) individually, consistent with Bob Bork‘s key insight, to increase consumer welfare (even if the latter may not be a formally stated aim of some regimes).

Today’s release of the OXFAM briefing paper on “Political Capture and Economic Inequality,” tantalizingly entitled “WORKING FOR THE FEW,” brings the second of the two above-stated goals to the fore:

Is the world today better for the [working] consumer than it was 123 years ago, when Senator Sherman and the majority of the U.S. legislature decried the unjust and ill-gotten riches of that era’s robber barons and enacted the Sherman Act?

Robber Baron
Robber Baron, circa 1890

The paper is interesting but too short to be of real academic or legal value in and of itself, in our view.  The infamous photo of the super-yacht on the authors’ blog represents the easy part of what they set out to accomplish – politicizing the issue and driving popular opinion (much akin to the period newspaper cartoon above).

Robber Baron, circa 2014

That said, authors Ricardo Fuentes and Nick Galasso go somewhat beyond the, by now, usual egalitarian quotes (Brandeis’s Depression-era statement: “We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of the few, but we cannot have both“) and the well-known head-turner statistics of inequality (e.g., “almost half [of the world’s wealth is] going to the richest one percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent“), many of which are also found on their blog.

Yet, while they do go a bit deeper than merely scratching the surface with populist platitudes and photos of jetsetter playtoys, they fail to do so on the specific issue of how antitrust fits into the question of global economic inequality.  One need not attempt to un-seat Bork from the academic and judicial pedestals he has reigned over for 4 decades, but one could try a bit harder here…  The OXFAM study simply does not provide any new insights.  To its credit, it does identify the issue – but it does not develop the overall impact of competition law any further than highlighting the one (very particularized) example of the allegedly monopolistic Mexican telecoms sector:

Anti-competition and regulatory failure: the richest man in the world
Weak regulatory environments are ideal settings for anti-competitive business practices. Without competition, firms are free to charge exorbitant prices, which cause consumers to lose out and ultimately increase economic inequality. When elites exploit weak or incompetent anti-trust authorities, price gauging follows as a form of government to big business. By not acting when dominant firms crowd out competition, government tacitly permits big business to capture unearned profits, thereby transferring income from the less well-off sections of society to the rich. Consumer goods become more expensive, and if incomes do not rise, inequality worsens.

Mexico’s privatization of its telecommunications sector 20 years ago provides a clear example of the nexus between monopolistic behavior, weak and insufficient regulatory and legal institutions, and resulting economic inequality.

Mexico’s Carlos Slim moves in and out of the world’s richest person spot, possessing a net worth estimated at $73bn. The enormity of his wealth derives from establishing an almost complete monopoly over fixed line, mobile, and broadband communications services in Mexico. Slim is the CEO and Chairman of América Móvil, which controls nearly 80 percent of fixed line services and 70 percent of mobile services in the country. A recent OECD review on telecommunications policy and regulation in Mexico concluded that the monopoly over the sector has had a significant negative effect on the economy, and a sustained welfare cost to citizens who have had to pay inflated prices for telecommunications.

As the OECD report argues, América Móvil’s ‘incessant’ monopolistic behavior is facilitated by a ‘dysfunctional legal system’, which has replaced the elected government’s right and responsibility to develop economic policy and execute regulation of markets. This system has stunted the emergence of a dynamic and competitive telecommunications market. In fact, many of the regulatory instruments present in most OECD countries are absent in Mexico.

The costs of government failure to curb such monopolistic behavior are large. Mexico has a high level of inequality and has the lowest GDP of all OECD countries. As other OECD countries demonstrate, a more efficient telecommunications (especially broadband) sector can play an important role in driving economic growth and reducing poverty, especially among a large rural population, as in Mexico’s case. The OECD calculates that the market dysfunctions stemming from the telecommunications sector have generated a welfare loss of $129.2bn between 2005 and 2009, or 1.8 percent of GDP per year.

In the end, no matter how deeply or superficially the paper treats its subject, it will likely be of great interest to several of the African competition enforcers that preside over antitrust regimes in which the “public interest” criterion is present (e.g., COMESA, South Africa, and several others).  This means in practice: We at AfricanAntitrust.com expect the paper to be cited in the near future by a competition authority near you.  So get acquainted with it before it’s too late.

Public Interest Factors in African Competition Policy

Author and economist Patrick Smith recently publishedPublic Interest Factors in African Competition Policy in The African and Middle Eastern Antitrust Review 2014.  The consideration of public interest factors in competition law inquiries has generated much debate over the past few years. Several high profile cases have illustrated the potential for competition decisions,
and in particular merger inquiries, to be significantly affected by non-competition public interest issues.

Our readers have free access to the full PDF.

The Review is published by Global Competition Review and is available online at: http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/59/the-african-middle-eastern-antitrust-review-2014

This year’s issue of the Review also features two other AfricanAntitrust.com writers: contributing author, Chabo Peo, whose piece on competition law in Botswana is available at the GCR web site, as well as editor John Oxenham‘s piece on cartels in South Africa, available here.

A full list of contributors to our site can be found at: https://africanantitrust.com/about/

Balancing Public Interest Merger Considerations with the Quest for Certainty

AAT editor John Oxenham‘s paper on “Balancing Public Interest Merger Considerations with the Quest for Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Control Certainty” in the “US-China Law Review.

Our readers have free access to the full PDF.

Abstract:

The growing importance of public interest considerations, and the uncertainty that it creates, in South Africa and other sub-Saharan jurisdictions, including Zambia, Namibia and Botswana, pose an additional challenge for merging entities attempting to coordinate multi-jurisdictional merger notifications. These difficulties were, most recently, brought to the fore during the much publicized and highly opposed proceedings involving Wal-Mart’s takeover of the South African listed retailer Massmart. While the growing importance of public considerations increases the complexity and cost of multi-jurisdictional merger filings, the author suggests that these challenges can be countered by addressing public interest considerations as an integral part of submissions in support of merger filings in the sub-Saharan African region