Flying somewhat under the radar during the Christmas and year-end holiday season (but not under AAT’s radar), the South African Petroleum Industry Association (made up of BP, Shell, Chevron and other oil heavyweights) have sought a five-year renewal of their currently temporary holdover exemption from certain competition laws, which will expire in June 2016. The application was made on Christmas Eve 2015 under section 10(6)(a) of the Competition Act. SAPIA has not posted any news item or press release about its application on its web site to date.
SAPIA is seeking permission to allow its members to “cooperate and co-ordinate” on common industry logistics issues, as Andreas Stargard, a director with African competition-law and anti-corruption advisors Pr1merio notes.
“These include areas such as Single Buoy Mooring, port facilities, shipping, mooring, and interestingly also distribution as well as less well-defined ‘production and manufacturing plant shutdowns.'”
As Stargard observes, from an antitrust perspective, this could be of significant interest: production limitations would necessarily decrease available supply and thereby have the potential to drive up price, he notes. Under the terms of SAPIA’s application, the plant shutdowns are both scheduled and unscheduled and supposedly relate to upgrades and safety measures only, according to the application. In practice, however, such an exemption could give possibly provide the oil industry with carte blanche on competition issues and market manipulation.
In order to assuage concerns, the SAPIA members agree, in return for the exemption, that:
Competing participants in exempt agreements and practices may not share competitively sensitive information, except for the purposes described in the exemption application.
SAPIA and its members may not share information relating to setting of margins, imposition of levies and or approval of tariffs, unless required to do so by the DOE or NERSA.
The employees of any operating party who receive such information shall ensure that the information is held, maintained and used separately, confidentially and on need- to-know basis only.
The full text of the request for exemption is located here. Interested parties and the public have 20 business days to comment on the application.
We have previously, on African Antitrust, reported on South Africa’s first predatory pricing case in the Media 24 matter. In light, however, of the recent cases on exclusionary conduct — particularly predatory pricing, which has received significant attention from competition law agencies across a number of jurisdictions of late (see, for instance, the Paris Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the predatory pricing and exclusionary conduct allegations made against Google by an online maps rival. The Indian Competition Commission has also launched an investigation into alleged predatory pricing in the taxi industry, and the European Commission has launched investigations into predatory pricing in the potato-chips / crisps industry) — a more substantive evaluation of predatory pricing in South Africa is called for. The following article on predatory pricing, in light of the Media 24 case, neatly sets out and evaluates the landscape of predatory pricing in South Africa.
Predatory Pricing & the South African Competition Act: a False-Positive?
By Michael J. Currie
Intro & Summary
“From an antitrust perspective, predatory pricing is a particularly difficult problem with which to deal. If we are to prevent anticompetitive monopolization, it is a strategy that must not be permitted. The paradox, however, is that such a pricing strategy is virtually indistinguishable from the very sort of aggressive competitive pricing we wish to encourage.”
D L Kaserman and J W Mayo, ‘Government and Business: The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation’ (1995) Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press at 128
In September 2015, the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”), for the first time in South Africa’s sixteen-year history of competition-law enforcement found, in the Media 24 case that the respondent had engaged in predatory pricing in contravention of the South African Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (“Act”).
The Media 24 case, despite being dragged out for nearly six years, was set to be the leading jurisprudence on the laws pertain to predatory pricing, and in particular, how Section 8(d)(iv) of the Act would be interpreted and applied by the Tribunal. The finding by the Tribunal was, however, based on Section 8(c) of the Act, which is a broader ‘catch-all’ provision, and left some important questions as to the interpretation of Section 8(d)(iv) unanswered. Most notably, whether or not Section 8(d)(iv) permits complainants to utilise cost measurement standards other than Average Variable Costs (“AVC”) or Marginal Costs (“MC”) to prove that a dominant firm has engaged in predatory pricing in contravention of the provision.
Having said that, however, the Media 24 case provides some insight as to the precise relationship between Sections 8(d)(iv) and 8(c) of the Act as they relate to predatory pricing, and may have offered, by way of certain obiter remarks, an indication as to how the Tribunal may interpret and apply Section 8(d)(iv) of the Act in the future.
Continue reading the full article, an AAT exclusive, in PDF format:
The Public Protector, in theory, was designed and created to strengthen the constitutional democracy within South Africa along with the other Constitutional Institutions established under Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.[1] In order to strengthen this constitutional democracy, it is imperative that the Public Protector be independent from any governmental branch or agency, as making it accountable to the exact organs it seeks to protect society from renders it ineffective and voiceless. What follows is an elaboration on the role of the Public Protector within a constitutionally democratic South Africa and whether its purpose and effectiveness has in essence fallen into redundancy by making it accountable to Parliament.
Thula Madonsela
Establishing a constitutionally democratic Public Protector
The unfailing oppressiveness and secretiveness of the Apartheid government lead to a distrust of such a government and one which was consequently not open and accountable.[2] State organs could and often did act ultra vires, doing whatever they wished regardless of whether such powers were given to them, and would not need to be accountable for any such actions.[3]
However with the dawning of a constitutional democracy in 1994, the need to divide the once monopolised parliamentary power among all branches of government and the implementation of checks and balances ensuring that all branches of government became accountable towards one another became imperative in securing the ideal of a democratic nation once founded upon racial oppression and impunity.[4] With the implementation of the 1993 Interim Constitution, in terms of principle 29, the office of the Public Protector was first established and by including it the Constitutional Principles, secured its existence within the final Constitution.[5]
The Public Protector was designed to assist in the transformation of an oppressive society into an open and democratic society, creating an accountable and credible government through the re-establishment and respect of the rule of law. No longer was government above the law nor could they do a they wished, rather the government was in theory, accountable to the people of the nation, echoing the entire theory of the social contract.[6] Consequently the office of the Public Protector was ideally to act as a check between the Executive and Legislative branches of government and to provide a link between the citizens and such branches.[7]
The powers, functions and duties of the office of the Public Protector
The Public Protector is an institution established to investigate purported or supposed indecorous behavior of state affairs, whereby upon the decision to investigate such, which is at the discretion of the Public Protector, the Public Protector must report on such conduct and if applicable the taking of appropriate remedial action must occur.[8]
The Public Protector may not investigate judicial decisions, as this is the function of the Judicial Services Commission as well as owing to the fact that the Public Protector acts as a check between the Executive and Legislature.[9] The Public Protector may also not investigate human rights issues as such issues fall within the jurisdiction of the South African Human Rights Commission.[10] Once the Public Protector has an affirmative finding of misconduct, such a finding is then referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions.[11]
What follows is a determination of the ability of the Public Protector to accurately fulfill the role of its office. Such capability is determined by means of the independence which is afforded to it.
How independent is the Public Protector?
In order to hold the Executive and Legislative branches of government accountable, the Public Protector requires a “sufficient” amount of independence. This leads to predominant issues of what constitutes sufficient independence and the issue of over independence of such institutions which would then lead to an abuse of such independence.
Independence is a characteristic, which is established objectively in terms of whether a reasonable person would perceive such an institution as being independent.[12] Thus the impact that the Public Protectors perceived independence upon the reasonable person would in hindsight affect the Public Protector to fulfill the role of its office.
In order to accurately understand the independence which the Public Protector is afforded, its independence needs to be divided amongst five aspects namely a prima facie contradiction that exists between sections 181(2) and 181(5) of the Constitution, financial independence, administrative independence and finally, the independence of appointments and dismissals of the Public Protector.
Amid section 181(2) and 181(5) of the Constitution, there exists a prima facie conflict of these two provisions in the sense that section 181(2) holds Chapter 9 institutions to be independent and only subject to the Constitution whereas 181(5) holds such institutions accountable to the National Assembly.[13] This inconsistency was settled in Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality [14] whereby the court held in accordance with section 239 such institutions are not governmental departments which the Cabinet may have stimulus over, rather they are independent from government.[15] Thus by holding such, the court made it clear that although the Public Protector is accountable to the National Assembly, it is not accountable to government nor is it afforded the same independence as the judiciary.[16]
Two reasons exist at the outset for such accountability.[17] Firstly the Public Protector is said to be accountable to the National Assembly, as through representative democracy, the National Assembly represents the population of South Africa, their opinions and ideologies, and thus by making the Public Protector accountable to the National Assembly, it is in essence making the Public Protector accountable to the public.[18]
Financial independence of the Public Protector was too dealt with in Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality whereby the Constitutional Court affirmed such Chapter 9 institutions need a degree of financial independence but it is not to say that such institutions may set their own budget.[19] Rather Parliament as opposed to the Executive has the obligation to provide sufficiently reasonable funding in order for the Public Protector to fulfill its functions.
Appointments of the Public Protector are made by the President through a shortlisting of candidates, by the National Assembly, whom the Public nominated.[20] Therefore there exists a grave deficit in terms of public participation, as the public does not participate beyond the nominations stage.
It is too the National Assembly who may dismiss the Public Protector with a two-thirds majority vote. Such a majority is to ensure a simple majority does not unjustly dismiss the Public Protector.[21]
In theory, affording the Public Protector this amount of Constitutional independence at first glance, seems to allow it the ability to perform its functions. However, over the past couple of years, grave injustices have been committed towards this Chapter 9 institution that raises doubts as to whether the Public Protector can effectively fulfil its office, and whether the continued lack of the required independence renders the office of the Public Protector redundant.
The Constitution can be said to afford the Public Protector “sufficient” independence. However I posit that sufficient independence does not mean effective independence, and it is evident that the Public Protector as a chapter 9 institution is fundamental in the supporting of a democratic South Africa, representing a mechanism of holding the Executive and Legislature accountable, but such an office is not effective for as long as those whom the Public Protector seeks to hold accountable are the exact persons who have the power and ability to dismiss the Public Protector and furthermore have the ability to dictate the funding it therefore receives. With the recent cries for funding by the Public Protector, and the closing of its Mpumalanga office with others following suit, the question arises of whether the Public Protector has been reduced to a mere symbol of a ideology of democracy, unable to protect the public. Furthermore the manner in which the Nkandla Report was received in Parliament shows its inability to effectively exercise its powers and functions. Not being able to protect the public renders the Public Protector a useless feat.
I therefore posit that the theoretical independence afforded to the Public Protector is not enough to allow it to effectively fulfil its powers and duties. Therefore all efforts must be made to afford the Public Protector such effective independence in order to fulfil its role and allow it to effectively protect the public.
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Footnotes
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[1] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 section 181(1)(a).
[2] Pierre de Vos ‘Balancing Independence and Accountability: The Role of the Chapter 9 Institutions in South Africa’s Constitutional Democracy’ in M Danwood, M. Chirwa and Lia Nijzink ‘Accountable Government in Africa Chapter 10’ (2012) 160 at 160.
[3] Ibid; Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The New Constitutional & Administrative Law vol 1 (2013) 46 to 50.
[4]Public Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd and Others 2011 (4) SA 422 (SCA) paras 5 & 6; C. Thornhill ‘Role of the Public Protector’ (2011) 2 Case Studies of Public Authority at 87.
[5] C, Murray ‘The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the Role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?’ (2006) 2 PELJ 122 at 123 & 124;Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) certification case 1996 (4) SA 744 para 161.
By AAT Editor, John Oxenham and Senior Contributor, Michael-James Currie.
During November 2015, the Constitutional Court of South Africa dismissed an application by the South African Competition Commission to appeal the competition Appeal Court’s (CAC) decision that Sasol Chemical Industries (SCI) had not charged excessive prices in contravention of the Competition Act’s abuse of dominance provisions. The CAC reaffirmed its decision in Mittal, which has been the leading authority on excessive pricing in South Africa.
In doing so the CAC confirmed that the first step in an excessive pricing case is to determine the economic value of the product. This is an objective test and must be determined in consideration of a notionally long run competitive environment.
Once the economic value has been determined, it is then necessary to establish whether the price was reasonably related to the economic value.
While this is a subjective test, the CAC confirmed the origin of a firm’s dominance and ‘degree of dominance’ is not particularly relevant. The CAC went even further and held that it is unlikely that a price will be deemed “unreasonably related” to the economic value if the price is not greater than 20% of the economic value.
For a comprehensive examination of the SCI case and what it means for excessive pricing cases in South Africa, please see the authors’ paper on Excessive Pricing.
In light of the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of the leave to appeal and coupled with Minister of Economic Development Ebrahim Patel’s recently stated desire to use the Competition Act to promote industrial policies goals, South Africa’s antitrust legislation may be amended in order to assist the Competition Commission in prosecuting abuse of dominance cases, in particular, excessive pricing.
In our latest instalment of our Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with South African Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele on the topic of hosting a series of academic & practitioner platforms to discuss cases and developments in competition-law enforcement.
This week, the South African Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal successfully organised the 9th Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics & Policy (as part of the 4th BRICS International Competition Conference), taking place in Durban, South Africa.
Commissioner Bonakele, the head of the SACC, discussed hosting the conference with AAT’s contributing author, Njeri Mugure, Esq. According to his biography, Mr. Bonakele has been with the Commission for the past ten years. He briefly left the Commission in March 2013 and came back in October 2013 as Acting Commissioner. He has been in this position until his appointment as the Commissioner. Bonakele has occupied various positions in the Commission’s core divisions. He was appointed Deputy Commissioner in 2008, and prior to that worked as head of mergers, head of compliance and senior legal counsel respectively.
The AAT-exclusive interview follows:
AfricanAntitrust.com: South Africa has been participating in the BRICS International Competition Conference (“BRICS ICC”) since 2011, a year after she officially became a member of BRICS. This November the country will host the 4th of this biennial meeting in Durban. What are your goals for this year’s conference?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
The theme for the BRICS International Competition Conference 2015 is “Competition and Inclusive”. This theme will enable the conference to explore the relationship between competition and growth, competition and employment, competition and inequality and competition and poverty. As with the previous conferences, the aim of the conference is to strengthen cooperation amongst BRICS countries in the area of competition regulation by creating a platform for sharing experiences. We also aim to use the conference to discuss a proposed Memorandum of Understanding between BRICS competition agencies. Finally, the conference is also a platform for both developed and developing countries to discuss competition policy and enforcement issues.
AfricanAntitrust.com: Speaking of Durban, some might have expected for the 9th Annual Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference (“Annual Competition Conference”) and/or the BRICS ICC to be held in Pretoria, the capital city of South Africa. Could you tell us why you chose to hold the two conferences in Durban?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
We wanted a venue that would provide world class facilities for the conference as well as enjoyment for the delegates, and Durban ticks both boxes. The Kwazulu-Natal province, where Durban is situated, is home to rich natural resources, including Africa’s Big Five game and beautiful mountainous landscapes.
Durban itself is a diverse African city providing cultural diversity as well as a natural paradise known for its beautiful coastline beaches and subtropical climate. The City is also host to the largest and busiest harbor in Africa. The Inkosi Albert Luthuli International Convention Centre (Durban ICC), where the two conferences will be held, is the largest indoor conference facility in Africa.
The Commission has previously partnered with the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government, eThekwini (Durban) Municipality and the University KwaZulu-Natal on various activities.
AfricanAntitrust.com: In addition to hosting the Annual and the BRICS competition conferences, the South African Competition Commission (“the Commission”) along with Cresse and the University of Kwazulu-Natal will hold a joint workshop exploring areas such as collusions and cartels, unilateral and coordinated effects in mergers, the economics of exclusionary conducts, and use of economic evidence, among others. What do you hope this workshop will achieve?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
The economic understanding of competition policy is constantly evolving. In the last two decades economists have developed new theories of harm and traditional views have changed significantly. The workshop will bring top quality instruction on the economics of competition to agency officials in South Africa and more broadly Africa, competition practitioners, academics and policy makers. I hope that everyone attending the workshop will walk away having learned something new about the economics of competition.
AfricanAntitrust.com: Speaking of the this year’s events, planning the joint workshop, the Annual Competition Conference and the BRICS ICC was a great undertaking, could you tell us why you decided to have the three events back to back and what audience each event is tailored to suit?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
With the BRICS conference coming into South Africa was a great opportunity as so many people were interested to come. So many opinion makers, academics and practitioners were going to be in the country, so we organized all these events to take advantage of their presence, and the response was very positive. We also thought logistically it makes sense to have our annual conference organized back to back with BRICS, so we don’t get conference fatigued. In the end, all the events flow into each other.
The Joint Workshop is a technical training and knowledge sharing platform, looking at the latest thinking on various aspects of competition enforcement.
The conference is an annual academic platform to discuss cases and developments in competition law enforcement.
AfricanAntitrust.com: Turning to the BRICS International Competition Conference, in what way has this year’s agenda been informed by the previous three conferences? What impact do you think the previous conferences have had on antitrust discourse in BRICS and non-BRICS countries?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
The previous conferences, hosted by the Federal Antimonopoly Services of Russia in 2009, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China in 2011 and Competition Commission of India in 2013, created a solid platform on which we can deepen our relations in the field of competition regulation.
South Africa has focused the conference on the relationship between growth and inclusivity. Furthermore, this year’s conference aims to institutionalize BRICS cooperation on competition matters, and move it beyond conferences. There is a proposed Memorandum and Understanding, as well as a joint research initiative.
AfricanAntitrust.com: There’s been a lot of debate surrounding public interest factors in merger review. What do you hope to achieve by including the topic to this year’s conference agenda?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
It is important that BRICS countries weigh-in on this important debate. There is a divergence of views amongst many antitrust practitioners on the compatibility of antitrust issues with public interest issues, but everyone accept that there are public interest issues. The conference will deepen and broaden perspectives on the matter.
AfricanAntitrust.com: How do these engagements such as the BRICS conference and competition law enforcement in general benefit the ordinary South African?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
The South African competition authorities were established as a package of reforms to transform the unequal South African economy to make it economy inclusive and ensuring that those who participate in it are competitive.
Through engagements such as the BRICS conference we’re able to discuss with our BRICS counterparts how to make our economies, which are similar, more efficient, competitive and inclusive.
The Commission has, in the past 16 years investigated and dismantled cartels from different sectors including construction, bread – a staple food for many South Africans, and cement. In the cement cartel, for instance, the Commission conducted a study post the cartel and discovered that we have saved consumers about R6 billion.
AfricanAntitrust.com: Mr. Bonakele, are there other topics you would have liked to address or comments you would like to add?
Tembinkosi Bonakele:
We see BRICS as an important and strategic platform where we advance arguments about the relationships between competition and other policy instruments that are very relevant in our developing countries.
As a collective, BRICS competition authorities are able to provide leadership in the international antitrust community on what it means to create and enforce competition law and policy in developing economies which come with their own particular challenges and opportunities. These perspectives will serve to enrich the global knowledge base in competition enforcement.
AfricanAntitrust.com: Thank you for taking the time to speak with me, Commissioner!
The interview was conducted by Ms. Mugure for AfricanAntitrust.com on 8 November 2015.
South Africa and Namibia sign landmark memorandum of understanding
On 11 November 2015, the Competition Commission of South Africa and theNamibian Competition Commission signed an historic memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation on competition matters both in terms of policy and enforcement.
Andreas Stargard, a director with African competition-law and anti-corruption advisors Pr1merio, points out, that collaboration of the two relatively mature agencies is not new per se:
Having cooperated in prior years on multiple merger investigations (see, e.g., the Wal*Mart / Massmart transaction), the time had come for a formalised agreement in principle between these two key southern-African jurisdictions. Antitrust practitioners in the region should anticipate a hopefully streamlined process across national borders, especially in terms of merger reviews & clearance, as well as quite likely conduct investigations in the cartel or dominance areas.
Says the SACC’s press release:
“We thank the Namibian Competition Commission for their cooperation. I’m grateful we’re able to formalise our relations. Our laws tend to be similar which makes cooperation easier,” said South African Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele.
Namibian Competition Commission Chief Executive Officer, Mr Mihe Gaomab said that the signing of the MoU is a historic moment for them, and that this will improve cooperation between the authorities, especially on multi-jurisdiction projects, such as mergers.
As the South African Competition Commission announced today, it raided the offices of Liquefied Petroleum Gas suppliers today, 14 October 2015, seizing documents and other evidence from African Oxygen Limited, Oryx Oil South Africa (Pty) Ltd, EasiGas (Pty) Ltd and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Safety Association of Southern Africa (LPG Association) in Gauteng and KayaGas (Pty) Ltd as well as Totalgaz Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd in the Western Cape.
According to the Commission’s press release, “[t]he five firms are competitors in the market for the supply of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and gas cylinders. The LPG Association is an association of firms which are active at various levels of the LPG sector. The Commission has an ongoing market inquiry into the broad LPG sector. This dawn raid operation forms part of the Commission’s investigation into alleged fixing of the price or deposit fee for gas cylinders, and is unrelated to the ongoing market inquiry. The Commission is conducting the dawn raid operation with due regard to the rights of the firms and all affected persons. During the search the Commission will seize documents and electronic data, which will be analysed together with other information gathered to determine whether a contravention of the Competition Act has taken place. In terms of section 48 of the Competition Act, the Commission is authorised to enter and search premises and seize documents which have a bearing on an investigation. The Commission duly obtained warrants authorising it to search the offices of the firms at the High Courts of South Africa, namely: Gauteng Division in Pretoria and Western Cape Division in Cape Town. Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele said, “The Commission believes that the information that will be obtained from today’s operation will enable the Commission to determine whether or not the firms have indeed engaged in collusive conduct. However, as part of any investigation, we also wish to urge anyone, be it business or individuals with further information to come forward and assist the Commission in concluding this investigation.”
A year ago, we at AAT reported on the intervention by competitors in the merger between Media24 and Paarl Media. Today, we want to highlight a “one-year-later” feature about that same company, which has now been found liable of predatory exclusion of its rivals by the South African Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). The Tribunal found on 8 September 2015 that Media24 had engaged in exclusionary conduct due to predation by removing a rival community newspaper publication, Gold Net News (“GNN”), out of the market. [1]
Two routes explored by the South African Competition Commission’s (“SACC”) to sanction Media24’s predation conduct
In 2009, GNN exited the newspaper community market. Within 10 months of the exit of GNN, Media24 closed down one of its titles, Forum. From then until today, Vista which is another title owned by Media24, is the only title to survive in the Welkom market.
According to the SACC:
If Vista is the only local paper operating in the Welkom market, it is because Forum was used as a predatory vehicle to exclude its competitor, GNN.
The strategy consisted in pricing Forum’s advertising rates below market cost despite repeated loss making and failure to perform to budget forecasts.
Media24 operated Forum as a fighting brand, meaning that Media24 sacrificially maintained Forum in the market to exclude its competitor.
For the SACC the reduction of choice of community newspapers during the period January 2004 to April 2009 can only be explained by Media24’s predatory pricing conduct. In order to condemn this conduct as predation, the SACC relied on two provisions of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Act”) which respectively lead to different sanctions.
First and ideally, the SACC alleged that Media24 should be sanctioned for its predatory behaviour in terms of section 8(d)(iv) of the Act, which is the explicit predation provision and enables the Tribunal to impose a fine for a first offence.
Second, should the predation not be captured by the express predation provision of section 8(d)(iv), Media24 should at least be found responsible for engaging in general exclusionary conduct, prohibited by section 8(c) of the Act which only gives the Tribunal the power to impose remedies. No fine is available for a first contravention. Only a repeated offence may be subject to an administrative penalty.
Following the Commission’s investigation after the allegations brought by Hans Steyl, who ran GNN from 1999 until its eventual closure in 2009, the Commission referred the case to the Tribunal in 2011.
The denial of predation conduct by Media24
Media24 (whose slogan is, somewhat ironically perhaps: “Touching lives through the power of media“) denied any casual link between the fates of the Forum and the GNN’s papers. Forum was not used as a predatory vehicle to exclude GNN. Media24 attributed the closure of Forum to the 2008 recession, on-going downsizing in Media24 as a whole, and to the problem of publishing two newspapers, Forum and Vista, in the Welkom area. It further argued that GNN had exited because it was not viable.
The difficulty to prove a direct predatory pricing conduct
For the first time in the sixteen years in which the new Competition Act has been in operation[2], the Tribunal assessed a predatory pricing case.
Predatory pricing means that prices charged by a dominant firm are not market related but below what would be expect to be a market price. Predatory pricing is only a transient pleasure for consumers as once competitors are eliminated or new entrants are deterred from entering, then the low price honeymoon is over and the predator can impose high prices to recoup the losses sustained in the period of predation.
In terms of section 8(d)(iv) of the Act, to find an express predation contravention, the Commission is required to prove that Media24 priced below “its marginal or average variable cost” (“AVC”) (our emphasis)[3]. The Commission argued that this wording is broad enough to include pricing below average avoidable cost (“AAC”)[4]. This is the cost the firm could have avoided by not engaging in the predatory strategy.[5]
To find exclusionary conduct and thus a contravention of section 8(c) based on predation[6], the Commission would not necessarily need to establish that the dominant firm’s pricing is below any specific cost standard.All that is required is that the conduct (in this case, low pricing) has an anti-competitive exclusionary effect.
In the Media24 case, the Tribunal has effectively established a new test for predatory pricing which does not meet the test under section 8(d)(iv).It said that if Media24 is found to have priced below its average total cost (“ATC”)[7] accompanied by additional evidence of intention and recoupment of the loss of profits sustained during the predation period, then a contravention of section 8(c) has taken place.
As ATC include more costs than AAC and AVC of marginal cost, it makes a finding of predation more likely.The AAC test is thus more stringent than the ATC test.This follows the logic of the consequences of each section.As a contravention of section 8(d)(iv) of the Act leads to a fine while a contravention of section 8(c) of the Act only leads to a remedy, it is more difficult to fill the requirements of the specific predation section – section 8(d)(iv).
Consequently, a central issue in this case was to determine Media24’s costs, and compare them to the prices charged during the relevant period.This is no simple matter.
The Tribunal’s findings trigger questions about how section 8 of the Act on abuse of dominance is structured
Following lengthy discussions about what constitute avoidable costs, the Tribunal held that opportunity costs[8] and re-deployment costs cannot be factored into the calculation of Forum’s AAC. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Media24 did not contravene the express predation section 8(d)(iv) of the Act.
Interestingly, the Tribunal did however found that Media24 contravened the general exclusionary section 8(c) of the Act. Indeed, after establishing that Media24 was a dominant firm in the market for community newspapers[9], the Tribunal found the evidence of predatory intent which resulted from statements and the implementation of a plan that was predatory in nature. Moreover, the Tribunal held that the pricing of Forum was below ATC.
As a result, it was found that GNN’s exit of the market affected both advertisers and readers. While advertisers paid higher prices as they lost an alternative outlet, readers lost the choice of an alternative newspaper.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that Media24 engaged in exclusionary practice because of predation but didn’t find a contravention of the express predation section of the Competition Act.
The implication of this finding is that Media24 is not liable for a fine. The only power left to the Tribunal is the imposition of another form of remedy. Only if Media24 does the same thing again, will it be subjected to a potential administrative penalty under section 8(c).
Such a finding triggers two interrogations about how section 8 of the Act deals with abuse of dominance.[10]
Firstly, how can deterrence be guaranteed when the only consequence of a predatory exclusion conduct, in certain circumstances, is a remedy without a monetary fine? This case leaves food for thought as to the necessity to empower the Tribunal to impose a fine for a first offence when a general exclusionary conduct is found.
Secondly, if the required test to prove a contravention of the explicit predation section is too stringent and almost impossible, not only a predatory conduct will never lead to a fine but more generally the utility of this section should be seriously considered.
[3] A variable cost being a cost that varies with changes in output. The AVC is defined as the sum of all variables costs divided by output.
[4] The important difference with AVC is that AAC include an element of fixed costs.
[5] AAC has become a widely accepted cost standard for the assessment of predatory pricing. This acceptance is evident both from its inclusion in the EU‘s Guidelines, the recent International Competition Network Guidelines, and a Department of Justice Report.
[6] See Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v SAA (Pty) Ltd and others [1999-2000] CPLR 230 (CT), page 10. The Tribunal stated that a predatory pricing could lead to a finding in terms of section 8(c).
[7] ATC includes fixed, variable and sunk costs (sunk costs being costs that have already been incurred and thus cannot be recovered).
[8] An opportunity cost is a cost of an alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain action.
[9] Media24 would have had a market share of approximately 75%.
AAT previously reported (here and here) that the SACC had been investigating cartel behaviour which allegedly took place between multiple shipping liners who transported vehicles for various Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”).
The investigation resulted in two consent agreements being concluded between the SACC and Nippon Yusen Kaisha Shipping Company (“NYK”) and Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics (“WWL”) respectively (the “Respondents”).
On 12 August 2015, the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”) was requested to make the consent agreements, orders of the Tribunal.
In terms of the consent agreements, the Respondents had admitted that they had contravened Section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (the “Competition Act”) on multiple occasions (between 11 and 14 instances), and accordingly agreed to pay administrative penalties of approximately R95 million ($ 8million) and R103 million (R8.5 million) respectively.
We had noted in our previous article on this matter, that in light of the SACC’s recently adopted Guidelines for the Determination of Administrative Penalties for Prohibited Practices (the “Guidelines”), it would be interesting to see how the SACC and the Tribunal go about calculating and quantifying an administrative penalty, when dealing with factual circumstances similar to this matter.
We had been concerned that in cases which involve cartel conduct relating to tenders (i.e. bid-rigging), the Guidelines will have limited application. Andreas Stargard, an attorney with the Africa consultancy Pr1merio, notes:
There are two main reasons why there we view only a narrowly circumscribed application of the Guidelines in these particular circumstances:
Firstly, the Guidelines require in the case of bid-rigging that the affected turnover to be used for purposes of calculating an administrative penalty must be the higher of: the value of the bid, the value of the contract ultimately concluded, or the amount of money ultimately paid to the successful bidder. While this approach to calculating affected turnover when dealing with tenders such as those in the construction industry may be useful, the Guidelines present an anomaly when one is dealing with a tender, the value of which is subject to one or more variable and the tender contract has not been completed yet at the time of the calculation or imposition of an administrative penalty.
Secondly, and perhaps even more problematic, is that the Guidelines envisage that a party involved in cartel conduct should be fined for the tenders that the party successfully ‘won’, as well as being held liable for tenders that the party ‘lost’. In terms of the Guidelines, a party who was involved in ensuring that another company was awarded the tender (due to collusion), the ‘unsuccessful’ party will be subjected to an administrative penalty for such a tender as well. In this regard, the affected turnover that will be utilised to calculate the administrative penalty for the ‘unsuccessful’ party, the SACC would also choose the greater of the actual value of the bid submitted by the ‘unsuccessful party’, or the value of the contract or the amount ultimately paid to the successful bidder.
This in itself creates two further issues. The first is from a policy perspective; in terms of penalising the unsuccessful bidder, the unsuccessful bidder’s affected turnover would in most instances be either than the affected turnover of the successful bidder higher (because when a firm deliberately ‘loses’ a bid, they usually submit a cover bid which is higher than the ‘winning’ bid), or at a minimum the same value as the affected turnover attributed to the successful bidder. Thus it is conceivable that the ‘unsuccessful’ bidder while not having derived any benefit from the bid in question, would be subjected to a similar or greater administrative penalty than the successful bidder.
Furthermore, for purposes of reaching a settlement quantum, it is often not possible for the ‘unsuccessful bidder’ to know or calculate the value of the contract or the amount paid to the successful bidder. The only way to obtain such information would require information sharing between competitors, which raise a host of further competition law concerns.
Accordingly, while the adoption of Guidelines for purposes of ensuring greater certainty and transparency is created for parties who are potentially subjected to administrative penalties, the Guidelines have respectfully fallen short of doing that, when dealing with instances of bid-rigging.
The difficulty of applying the Guidelines to cases of bid-rigging was acknowledged by the SACC during the shipping cartel hearings before the Tribunal, a consequence of which saw the SACC adopt a novel and individualised strategy to calculating the administrative penalties which the Respondents ultimately agree to.
The SACC decided firstly that whichever strategy they adopt for purposes of calculating the Respondents financial liability, must be one that can be consistently and fairly applied to all respondents in the investigation.
Accordingly, the SACC decided to impose a administrative penalty of 3.5% of the Respondents’ turnover derived within or from South Africa, in respect of bids which the Respondents were awarded, and a lesser percentage of turnover was used in respect of bid’s which were not awarded to the Respondents.
The SACC thus acknowledge that it would not be fair to impose the same penalty quantum on the successful bidder on the unsuccessful bidder as well.
The M/V Thalatta, a WWL High Efficiency RoRo vessel (image (c) WWL)
When pressed on how the SACC reached a value of 3.5%, the SACC indicated that the Respondents’ willingness to engage the SACC and their commitment to settling the process was a weighty factor taken into account.
Importantly, the SACC decided to penalise each of the respondents cumulatively. In other words, for each instance of a contravention, the SACC imposed a penalty equal to 3.5% of the firm’s annual turnover (or a slightly lesser amount if the firm was the unsuccessful bidder’).
Section 59 of the Competition Act limits the amount of affirms administrative penalty to 10% of the firm’s annual turnover derived within or from South Africa in its preceding financial year.
Due to the fact, however, that the SACC ultimately imposed a cumulative penalty, the administrative penalty imposed on the Respondents exceeded 10% of the Respondents annual turnover.
On a side note, the SACC did use the annual turnover of the proceeding financial year as the based upon which to penalise the respondents, but rather opted to use the year 2012 which was the most recent year during which there was evidence of collusion.
Accordingly, the Commission has exercised a considerable degree of discretion when choosing a strategy for purposes of imposing an administrative penalty and while the SACC considered the sic-step approach to calculating an administrative penalty, opted rather to impose a turnover based percentage figure, and thus, we are left none the wiser as to how the Guidelines are actually going to be interpreted and implemented.
The M/V Thalatta, a WWL High Efficiency RoRo vessel (image (c) WWL)
WWL settles collusion allegations in South Africa for US $7,500,000
As we reported on 2 July 2015 (see “Shipping Cartel Update: NYK settles in South Africa“), the South African competition-law enforcers have had success in bringing members of the acknowledged international liner-shipping cartel to the settlement table, extracting R104 million (approximately $8,600,000) from NYK.
Now, Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics (“WWL”) has become the second investigated party to enter into a settlement agreement with the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) — presumptively for a decent discount off the maximum possible fine, as outlined in greater detail below.
On 30 July 2015, it was announced that WWL settled the SACC’s charges stemming from the investigation into the seven shipping companies for fixing prices, allocating markets and collusive tendering.
SACC found that WWL colluded on 11 tenders with its competitors in the transportation of motor vehicles by sea issued by several automotive manufacturers to and from South Africa.
WWL — a 50/50 Swedish/Norwegian liner-shipping conglomerate, which has had a representative office in South Africa since 2013 and previously had “a major Turn Key Project for a copper mine in Zambia, … creating a sub-Saharan hub for moving Breakbulk into and out of Africa” — settled for an amount of R95 million. As Andreas Stargard, an attorney with the Africa advisory boutique Pr1merio, notes:
“This amount — in today’s dollar terms only about $7,500,000 — is a mere 0.25% of WWL’s global turnover of about $2.9 billion. In other words, the company got away with only a tiny fraction [namely 2.5%] of the potential maximum fine, which under South African law would have been capped at $290 million or 10% of total group revenue.”
The SACC found that NYK colluded on 14 tenders with its competitors for the transportation of motor vehicles by sea issued by several automotive manufacturers to and from South Africa, including BMW, Toyota Motor Corporation, Nissan, and Honda among others.
The agency filed the WWL settlement agreement with the South African Competition Tribunal on 30 July 2015 for confirmation as an order of the Tribunal.
WWL’s Africa Ties
What is of particular note in the WWL matter is the company’s business commitment to the African continent. As Mr. Stargard points out, WWL recently published a document entitled, “West Africa – The frontier of opportunity?” in which it states:
The outlook for Africa has long been seen as one of great promise, but with major challenges attached. It certainly is a place of great dimensions and great opportunities, but with immense development needs and complexities to be tackled. According to African Economic Outlook, a recent report published jointly by the OECD, the African Development Bank and the UN Development Program, Africa’s economic growth will gain momentum and reach 4.5 per cent in 2015 and 5 per cent in 2016.
The world’s attention to Africa has largely been directed towards West Africa in the last few years, as some of the fastest growing economies were to be found there, as well as some of the world’s richest resource bases from oil to rare earth minerals. As of late, the shine has come off a little bit, with West African economies struggling with lower oil income, weakening currencies as well as a lack of economical and societal reform. The Ebola epidemic on top of this effectively served to slow the West African growth somewhat. The region is nevertheless expected to stage a recovery from the Ebola epidemic with 5 per cent growth in 2015.
West African growth is largely driven by the development in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and largest economy. Despite the large oil revenue dependency (which naturally is hurting from the recent decline in oil prices), the country has started diversifying its economic base. In the automotive industry, several OEMs have opened assembly plants for complete knock-downs, boosted by the increased import tax for finished vehicles. The slow process towards building more advanced manufacturing capabilities continues, but still remains some way off.
Other economies in the region are smaller and even more dependent on resource exports. A few have been seeing quite positive development, like Ghana, but we still find some of Africa’s poorest countries in this region, highlighting the large contrasts to be found there.
Trade patterns for vehicles and heavy equipment are, not surprisingly, dominated by imports, with Europe and Asia being the largest regional trade partners.
In 2014, the single largest country exporting vehicles and heavy equipment to West Africa was the US followed by China, Japan and Germany. This illustrates the diverse geographical trade interests in the region. Trade has been developing strongly after the crisis, but has weakened over the past couple of years.
Long term, given its population and resource base, West Africa remains sure to be on everyone’s target list when it comes to capturing African opportunities.
Strategic Timing of Exemption Application?
African Antitrust & Competition Law 