COMESA’s New Competition & Consumer Protection Regulations: Game-Changer for Regional Enforcement?

Posted on by Editor

By Tyla Lee Coertzen and Joshua Eveleigh

On 4 December 2025, the COMESA Council of Ministers adopted the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025 (the “2025 Regulations”), marking a significant overhaul of its regional regime since its inception in 2004. The 2025 Regulations, which entered into force immediately, officially repeal and replace the previous COMESA Competition Regulations (the “2004 Regulations”).

The 2025 Regulations have introduced a number of substantive developments and refinements to the COMESA competition regime. Most significantly, the 2025 Regulations have have introduced a suspensory merger control regime, expand a number of enforcement powers, formalise a leniency regime in respect of hardcore carte conduct and significantly strengthen oversight of digital markets.

The “Quad-C”: COMESA Competition Commission has also been rechristened as the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (“CCCC”), reflecting its enhanced consumer protection mandate.

“The 2025 Regulations have not come as a surprise,” according to competition-law practitioner Michael-James Currie. As AAT has previously reported, the COMESA Competition Commission had on 24 January 2024 issued a press release requesting comments to its proposed Draft Regulations (as amended in November 2023). “As such, the 2025 Regulations have been contemplated, revised and tightened alongside a number of stakeholders and comments over a period of at least two years, including our and our clients’ input,” says Currie. The 2025 Regulations have also been coupled with an updated set of implementing Rules. Finally, the CCCC recently introduced a Practice Note regarding the new merger control regime.

We report comprehensively on these significant developments here, as well as in a series of future COMESA updates. For an academic review of the “coming of age” of the COMESA enforcement regime, please see Dr. Liat Davis and Andreas Stargard‘s separate Concurrences article, “COMESA: Regional Rapprochement Refined“, tracing the trajectory of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) competition regime—the first multi-national antitrust enforcement system in Africa, and the second to be created globally after the European Union, in what has since become a growing field of regional enforcement regimes.

Regional Rapprochement Refined – Concurrences 10-2025Download

Merger Control

COMESA’s move to a suspensory regime & expanded merger assessment powers

“One of the most significant changes is the move to a suspensory merger control regime. Under the 2004 Regulations, merging parties could implement transactions notified in COMESA prior to obtaining clearance, provided such transactions were notified within 30 days of the ‘decision to merge’,” according to Primerio partner John Oxenham. “This is no longer the case: notifiable mergers must now be approved either unconditionally or conditionally by the CCCC prior to implementation.”

The 2025 Regulations have, however, introduced a derogation in respect of the suspensory rule, which provide a level of flexibility on the suspensory rules for parties involved in public takeovers, for example.

The Regulations also revise the definition of a ‘merger’ – introducing further clarifications on ‘controlling interest’ and explicitly capturing full-function joint venture arrangements – as well as introducing updated financial thresholds.

Dr. Mwemba, CEO of the CCCC

Transactions which meet the ‘merger’ definition will now be notifiable where the combined turnover or asset value of the parties in the Common Market equals or exceeds COM$60 million (US$60 million), and at least two parties each meet the COM$ (US$10 million) threshold. For certain digital market transactions, a new transaction-value threshold of COM$250 million (US$250 million) has been introduced.

In addition, the maximum merger filing fee cap has now been increased from COM$200,000 to COM$300,000.

The CCCC’s merger assessment powers have been broadened beyond the traditional lessening of competition (“SLC”) test. Borrowing from a number of African competition authorities’ precedent, the CCCC may now also consider specific public interest factors in merger control, including employment, the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises, environmental sustainability and effects on innovation in the Common Market.

Jurisdictional reach & Strengthening the COMESA one-stop shop

The 2025 Regulations reinforce COMESA’s ‘one-stop shop’ principle. COMESA Member States are now under stronger obligations not to require parallel merger notifications where a transaction falls within the jurisdiction of the CCCC. This provides greater legal certainty for merging parties operating across multiple COMESA Member States. That said, “some obstacles to a full one-stop-shop do remain,” according to Andreas Stargard. “Dr. Willard Mwemba, the CCCC’s CEO, noted at last year’s fall press conference that, in light of the newly-established EAC competition regime and its somewhat overlapping merger notification requirements, the Commission acknowledges the concern that dual notification obligations may occur in the foreseeable future due to the parallel regional body.”

For completeness, the COMESA Common Market comprises 21 Member States – Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Anti-competitive Practices

New standards and risks in respect of per se prohibitions

The 2025 Regulations overhaul the CCCC’s approach to restrictive practices. While the 2004 Regulations’ standard was related to having an ‘appreciable effect’, the general prohibition now applies to conduct that has the object or effect of resulting in an SLC in the Common Market.

The list of per se prohibitions has also been expanded. Certain vertical restraints – including absolute territorial restrictions, restrictions on passive sales and minimum resale price maintenance – are now prohibited outright and cannot be justified by efficiency defences.

Formal introduction of a leniency regime

One of the major developments flowing from the 2025 Regulations is the introduction of a formal leniency regime for hardcore cartel conduct occurring within the Common Market.

Importantly, any leniency decisions taken by the CCCC will officially bind individual COMESA Member States, meaning that leniency applicants will not be subjected to parallel enforcement at a national level for the same conduct reported. This significantly enhances legal certainty and aligns COMESA with international best practice.

Higher penalties and greater enforcement

Administrative penalties have been substantially increased by the 2025 Regulations. Under the 2004 Regulations, fines were capped at COM$200,000, the CCCC may now impose fines of up to 10% of a firm’s turnover in the COMESA Common Market. This change, coupled with the expanded per se prohibitions, signals a clear intention of the CCCC to strengthen enforcement and deterrence of anti-competitive practices.

Abuse of dominance and economic dependence

The definition of dominance has been revised, with a stronger focus on economic independence from competitors, customers and suppliers. While no bright-line market share thresholds are introduced by the 2025 Regulations, the broader definition may give rise to increased litigation and uncertainty.

The 2025 Regulations also introduce a new prohibition on the abuse of economic dependence which targets situations where a firm exploits a superior bargaining position over a counterparty that lacks reasonable alternatives, even where the firm is not dominant.

Increased focus on digital markets and gatekeepers

In line with international trends and standards, the 2025 Regulations introduce the concept of ‘gatekeepers’ in digital markets. Gatekeepers are subject to a wide range of behavioural prohibitions, including bans on self-preferencing, data leveraging, anti-steering provisions and discriminatory treatment of small and medium enterprises.

While the criteria for identifying ‘gatekeepers’ remain vague, the scope of the obligations is broad and signals a far more interventionist approach to digital markets in the COMESA Common Market than anticipated previously.

Enhanced market inquiry powers

The CCCC’s investigative powers have been broadened to include the ability to conduct market inquiries and allow the CCCC to compel information and take action, including launching official investigations, engaging in advocacy or negotiating potential remedies.

Importantly, the CCCC cannot unilaterally impose remedies on parties following a market inquiry alone.

Conclusion

The 2025 Regulations represent a major evolution in the COMESA competition framework. As the authors conclude in their Concurrences article cited above, “[t]hese reforms expand the CCC’s toolkit—introducing suspensory merger control, cartel leniency, market inquiries, and digital-market provisions—while also placing public interest and consumer rights more explicitly into the regional framework. They are ambitious, progressive, and aligned with global trends, yet they also raise difficult questions of clarity, implementation, and institutional capacity.”

In AAT’s view, provided adequate staffing and resources exist, the CCCC has now become one of the best-equipped regional competition regulators on the African continent.

Much will depend on how the 2025 Regulations are implemented in practice. For now, companies operating in the COMESA region should consider the 2025 Regulations in line with their compliance strategies and, if in doubt, seek professional legal advice to tailor their business practices and corporate strategies accordingly.

African Merger Control Regulation: A Look At Recent Developments

Posted on by Editor

Megan Armstrong and Jenna Carrazedo

Michael-James Currie, director at Primerio, hosted an insightful webinar alongside Primerio’s in-country Partners, Mweshi Bunda Mutana for Zambia, Hyacinthe Fansi for Cameroon, and Cris Mwebesa for Tanzania. The conversation provided an extensive look into recent developments in merger control across Africa’s principle regional competition authorities and can be accessed here.

This deep dive showed a significant shift towards a more prominent enforcement, lower notification thresholds and stronger coordination between national and supranational regulators. Africa’s merger landscape has vastly changed over the past four to five years which has resulted in more complexity in multi-jurisdictional merger control, increased detection risk for non-notified transactions and a widened the set of jurisdictions that must now be considered for compliance.

This webinar session contained a slightly different focus as the inspiration for the session was to feature a more pragmatic approach that stems from how merger control has changed significantly in Africa over the past few years. There has been a very clear shift in merger regulation and an increase of agencies that have adopted merger control or antitrust laws more generally. The rules and regulations surrounding merger control have become more sophisticated, and these developments are important for the agencies that make use of merger control, antitrust compliance and enforcement. As a result, it was highlighted that the CEMAC merger control has evolved from a basic framework to a more formalised and substantive merger control regime. This is evident in how the system now imposes mandatory filings when both turnover and market share thresholds are met, even for foreign deals without substantial local operations. The system does remain very paperwork-heavy, and a growing concern is the high filing fee cap that is c. USD 70 million.

COMESA was described as Africa’s most advanced and prominent regional regulator in respect of merger control and is now preparing to make substantial amendments to its merger regulators which are expected to take effect in the beginning of 2026. These changes will include mandatory notification for greenfield joint ventures, provisions on digital markets, provisions relating to public interest considerations and questions regarding how regional and national priorities will be remedied.

The East African Community Competition Authority has now operationalised its merger control system, effective as of 1 November 2025. This regime has exclusive jurisdiction over mergers with cross-border effects involving at least two partner states, stated by Cris Mwebesa, and meeting a certain asset or turnover threshold of USD 35 million. The system includes a 120-day review period and filing fees, however several Member States have not domesticated this regional law which means that filings at a national level in parallel to the regional level should be expected. This means that there will be overlaps with COMESA and there is a lack of clarity on how the public’s interest will be prioritised which creates further confusion and uncertainty. Confusion can arise when, for example, Zanzibar’s separate competition authority adds an additional filing requirement for merger control.

The ECOWAS Competition Authority has been operational for around one year and has demonstrated steady progress in handling non-contentious mergers. This authority considers transactions at certain turnover levels and individual thresholds which renders the regime broad in scope. The jurisdictional thresholds for an ECOWAS filing remain low, which may result in challenges around when a dual filing is appropriate and delaying decision making by the respective authorities.

Evidently, across many jurisdictions there are varying levels of institutional maturity that influence regional merger control. This is seen in how Zambia has strengthened its relationship with COMESA, following recent domestic legislative amendments, whilst Tanzania’s national authority co-exists with emerging EAC obligations, creating an emphasised need for coordination. These national-regional intersections will continue to influence filing strategies, especially in sectors where public interest or national sensitivities are emphasised.

These insightful discussions highlighted that merging parties now face a more complex and differentiated compliance across Africa. Although procedural clarity continues to develop, the direction of development is clear in that African merger regimes are growing more enlightened, more interrelated and more aligned with global standards.

Africa’s Merger Control Regulation: A Look At Recent Developments

Megan Armstrong and Jenna Carrazedo

Michael-James Currie, director at Primerio, hosted an insightful webinar alongside Primerio’s in-country Partners, Mweshi Bunda Mutana for Zambia, Hyacinthe Fansi for Cameroon, and Cris Mwebesa for Tanzania. The conversation provided an extensive look into recent developments in merger control across Africa’s principle regional competition authorities and can be accessed here.

This deep dive showed a significant shift towards a more prominent enforcement, lower notification thresholds and stronger coordination between national and supranational regulators. Africa’s merger landscape has vastly changed over the past four to five years which has resulted in more complexity in multi-jurisdictional merger control, increased detection risk for non-notified transactions and a widened the set of jurisdictions that must now be considered for compliance.

This webinar session contained a slightly different focus as the inspiration for the session was to feature a more pragmatic approach that stems from how merger control has changed significantly in Africa over the past few years. There has been a very clear shift in merger regulation and an increase of agencies that have adopted merger control or antitrust laws more generally. The rules and regulations surrounding merger control have become more sophisticated, and these developments are important for the agencies that make use of merger control, antitrust compliance and enforcement. As a result, it was highlighted that the CEMAC merger control has evolved from a basic framework to a more formalised and substantive merger control regime. This is evident in how the system now imposes mandatory filings when both turnover and market share thresholds are met, even for foreign deals without substantial local operations. The system does remain very paperwork-heavy, and a growing concern is the high filing fee cap that is c. USD 70 million.

COMESA was described as Africa’s most advanced and prominent regional regulator in respect of merger control and is now preparing to make substantial amendments to its merger regulators which are expected to take effect in the beginning of 2026. These changes will include mandatory notification for greenfield joint ventures, provisions on digital markets, provisions relating to public interest considerations and questions regarding how regional and national priorities will be remedied.

The East African Community Competition Authority has now operationalised its merger control system, effective as of 1 November 2025. This regime has exclusive jurisdiction over mergers with cross-border effects involving at least two partner states, stated by Cris Mwebesa, and meeting a certain asset or turnover threshold of USD 35 million. The system includes a 120-day review period and filing fees, however several Member States have not domesticated this regional law which means that filings at a national level in parallel to the regional level should be expected. This means that there will be overlaps with COMESA and there is a lack of clarity on how the public’s interest will be prioritised which creates further confusion and uncertainty. Confusion can arise when, for example, Zanzibar’s separate competition authority adds an additional filing requirement for merger control.

The ECOWAS Competition Authority has been operational for around one year and has demonstrated steady progress in handling non-contentious mergers. This authority considers transactions at certain turnover levels and individual thresholds which renders the regime broad in scope. The jurisdictional thresholds for an ECOWAS filing remain low, which may result in challenges around when a dual filing is appropriate and delaying decision making by the respective authorities.

Evidently, across many jurisdictions there are varying levels of institutional maturity that influence regional merger control. This is seen in how Zambia has strengthened its relationship with COMESA, following recent domestic legislative amendments, whilst Tanzania’s national authority co-exists with emerging EAC obligations, creating an emphasised need for coordination. These national-regional intersections will continue to influence filing strategies, especially in sectors where public interest or national sensitivities are emphasised.

These insightful discussions highlighted that merging parties now face a more complex and differentiated compliance across Africa. Although procedural clarity continues to develop, the direction of development is clear in that African merger regimes are growing more enlightened, more interrelated and more aligned with global standards.

Google to pay R688 million to SA Media following Competition Commission Inquiry

Posted on by Editor

Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry Final Report Launch

By Courtney Kaplan

The South African Competition Commission’s Final Report of its Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry (“MDPMI Report” or simply “Report”) found that online search is dominated by Google, with news queries making up at least 5-10% of user searches, driving engagement which generates revenue through commercial enquiries. Google uses content from media sites without reimbursement, where artificial intelligence (“AI”) assists in the reduction of referral traffic, and Google’s algorithm prefers foreign media over local media.

Google and YouTube have agreed to pay a fine of approx. $42 million (R688 million) to local media producers following the conclusion of the MDPMI, as they were found to have profited from local news content with no adequate reciprocal compensation. This is done through a reproduction or summary of South African news, resulting in a direct loss of income for South African news publishers.

The payout includes content licensing, innovation grants, and capacity-building initiatives which will be used for newsroom innovation, payments to the Digital News Transformation Fund and financing for language training for the Media Development and Diversity Agency (“MDDA”).   

The Final Report, published in November 2025, comes after 24 months of gathering evidence, holding in-camera and public hearings, expert evidence, discussions with industry stakeholders and an interim report procedure that allowed for opinions from media publishers, broadcasters, the platforms and academia.

The Commission believes that certain online operators restricted fair competition amongst their competitors, which practices have the potential of going against the purpose of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the “Competition Act”) which entails promoting and maintaining competition in South Africa.

Reduced audience, inaccurate reporting and social media

The reason for this agreement follows findings that Google takes news content from media sites without providing payment, with publishers receiving less traffic due to AI-summaries. Furthermore, the Competition Commission revealed that Google’s algorithm preferences foreign media sources over local and vernacular outlets.

Daily newspapers’ print sales have dropped by 66% between 2018 and 2023, with the overall decline being 55% when including weekend editions. Print advertising income for three major publishers fell by 38% in 2018, with broadcasters experiencing a 47% decrease since 2016.

Social media is dominated by platforms such as Meta, YouTube, X and TikTok. These platforms upload content generated and/or published by users in order to promote engagement and advertising, which results in most people viewing news through these respective social media platforms. The Commission stated that when platforms such as X and Meta prioritise engagement over providing news links, misinformation is increased as engagement is preferred over reliable news. A limited number of media platforms are recognized for monetisation in relation to content generation and engagement metrics, and many of these monetisation options are not locally available to South Africans.

Advertising revenues

The Report provides that Google holds the largest position in advertising technology by controlling the advertising servers that publishers use to handle and sell online advertising.  This is accomplished by linking publishers to Google’s advertising exchange and by self-preferencing Google’s own systems through access to external bid data.

Google has committed to providing South African advertising companies with extended support Google provides in the EU. This includes greater insight into advertising expenses and remuneration to publishers. Google has also agreed to stop favouring its own platforms over others.

Artificial intelligence

AI corporations have scraped news websites to develop AI models which are used to answer news queries. AI companies now provide South African media with options to opt-out, which will assist in creating and supporting a paid market for news content. AI firms will now offer the same content controls and opt-out options as in the EU, as well as training biannually to encourage the growth of a fair and functioning market for licensed content. Media platforms can choose whether to subscribe to AI tools and/or assistants, but this is often too large an expense for smaller media companies.

Google plans to introduce new user mechanisms that favour local news sources, offer technical support to developing website operations, sharing advanced audience information and statistics, and create an African News Innovation Forum.        

Government recommendations

The Commission’s report suggests that the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (“DTIC”) provide a block exemption to allow collective bargaining by South African media instead of platform monetisation terms, AI content licensing, advertising technology pricing, and joint advertising sales for community media.

The DTIC was advised to create Regulations that would govern content-moderation in terms of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (the “ECTA”). This would involve the introduction of self-regulation frameworks for social media platforms and creating an independent social media ombud to oversee public complaints and moderation practices.

The Report further recommends that the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (“DCDT”) should create regulations for content moderation of social media in South Africa by utilising the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (“ECTA”) to provide self-regulation by industry bodies in the social media industry to quality for limited liability and for an Ombudsman regulating the moderation of social media content.

Major milestone

James Hodge, the Competition Commission’s MDPMI chair stated that the report is a landmark move in restoring a balance between digital markets, guarding fair competition, and rebuilding the long-term sustainability of South Africa’s news media.

Reshuffling deck chairs in Kenya: S. Kariuki out, C. Mahinda in

Posted on by Editor

Shaka Kariuki Ousted As Non-Exec CAK Chair

President Ruto has removed Shaka Kariuki as Non-Executive Chairperson of the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) early, instead installing Charles W. Mahinda in the role, effective December 11, 2025.

The appointment was made under Section 10(1)(a) of the Competition Act and Section 51(1) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and will last three (3) years.

Mr. David Kibet Kemei, by now an established face for the competition watchdog, will continue to be the Director-General of the agency.

The Evolution of ECOWAS Merger Control: A Review of ERCA’s Latest Approvals

Posted on by Editor

By Simone dos Santos and Megan Armstrong

Throughout November 2025, ERCA has examined and approved four merger transactions in Liberia. Liberia is a Member State of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), which was established in 1975 when the Heads of State and Heads of Government of fifteen Western African Countries signed the ECOWAS Treaty. As of 29 January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger officially withdrew from ECOWAS. The current Member States of ECOWAS include Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sénégal, and Togo; the headquarters of ECOWAS is in Abuja, Nigeria. The aim of ECOWAS is to promote cooperation and integration among Member States in order to raise the standard of living, maintain economic stability, foster relations, and contribute to the development of Africa.

Article 26(3)(a) ECOWAS Treaty sets out the priority sectors of the economy of Member States which include Food and Agriculture Industries, Building and Constructions Industries, Metallurgical Industries, Mechanics Industries, Electrical, Electronic and Computers Industries, Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Petrochemical Industries, Forestry Industries, Energy Industries, Textile and Leather Industries and the Transport and Communications Industries

In each of these sectors, there are mergers and acquisitions that take place, which are regulated by the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (“ERCA”).  ERCAS merger control regime became operational on 1 October 2024, and for any merger and acquisition that takes place, a notification must be submitted to ERCA for prior authorisation (See: Regulation C/REG.23/12/21). The four recent merger approvals centred around the following priority sectors: Mechanics Industries, Food and Agriculture Industries, as well as one of the Treaty’s aims, which is to ensure harmonisation in terms of education. The decisions have been made as follows:

ACQUISITION OF IVECO GROUP N.V. BY TATA MOTORS LIMITED COMMERCIAL VEHICLE HOLDINGS

On 19 August 2025, TML CV Holdings Ltd (“TMLCVH”), a company incorporated in Singapore, notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 100% of the shares issued in Iveco Group N.V., excluding its Defence Business Unit. The proposed merger would result in the full integration of both TMLCVH and Iveco Group N.V. commercial vehicles and powertrain divisions under the control of Tata Motors Limited. They are formally known as TML Commercial Vehicles Limited. The relevant market definition in this decision is the “global design, production and distribution of commercial vehicles (trucks and buses), as well as the supply of engines and related components to end customers and third-party manufacturers (OEMs).” The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and the acquisition is authorised unconditionally, effective from 3 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF TOYOTA GHANA LIMITED COMPANY (TGLC) BY TOYOTA TSUSHO MANUFACTURING GHANA CO. LIMITED (TTMG)

On 29 August 2025, Toyota Tshusho Manufacturing Ghana Co. Limited (“TTMG”) and Toyota Ghana Limited Company (“TGLC”) notified ERCA of TTMG’s intention to acquire the distribution business, assets, and operations of TGLC. The relevant market definition includes “new passenger cars, commercial vehicles such as buses and trucks, and the spare parts and after-sale services.” The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and it promotes local industrialisation and regional trade integration. Additionally, it provides benefits to consumers as the service standards have been improved. The ERCA Council authorised this acquisition as unconditional. Despite the overlap in segments, the combined market share remains below the dominance threshold (Article 11 of the ERCA Manual on Market Dominance Thresholds). The authorisation of this acquisition is effective from 4 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF HONORIS HOLDING LIMITED BY K2025283350 (SOUTH AFRICA) PROPRIETARY LIMITED (SA BIDCO), JOINTLY CONTROLLED BY OMPE SPV AND MANGRO HOLDINGS PROPRIETARY LIMITED

On 4 September 2025, SA BidCo notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 100% of the share capital of Honoris Holding Limited (“HHL”). After the merger, SA BidCo will be jointly controlled by an entity of the Old Mutual Group, OMPE SPV, as well as Mangro Holdings Proprietary Limited. This merger furthermore forms part of a broader restructuring and investment initiative led by Old Mutual Private Equity. The relevant market definition in this decision related to the “provision of private higher (tertiary) education services, including foundation-level preparatory programmes”. The ERCA Council concluded that the merger is unlikely to reduce competition and is expected to improve capacity, attract investment, and enhance the quality of education in Nigeria. The acquisition of HHL was authorised as unconditional and effective as from 6 November 2025.

ACQUISITION OF SIERRA LEONE BREWERY LIMITED BY AFRICAN BOTTLING GROUP ABG LIMITED

On 12 September 2025, African Bottling Group ABG Limited notified ERCA of its intention to acquire 98.07% of the share capital of Sierra Leone Brewery Limited (“SLBL”). This share capital was previously held by Heineken International B. The aim of this acquisition is to integrate SLBL’s brewing operations and distribution network into ABG’s beverage operations across the ECOWAS Member States. The relevant market definition in this decision is the “production and distribution of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages”. In this instance, this includes beer, other alcoholic beverages including beer, malt-based non-alcoholic beverages and carbonated soft drinks, juices or energy drinks. The ERCA Council concluded that the merger may lead to enhanced production efficiency, quality, and provide potential benefits to consumers. This merger is unlikely to reduce competition, however, it may moderately impact competition in Sierra Leone negatively. It is possible for this impact to be mitigated through appropriate remedies and therefore the Council concluded that the merger be authorised, subject to certain conditions, and is effective from 6 November 2025.

These four merger approvals highlight the Executive Directorate and Councils’ continuous effort to clear the docket before the end of 2025. In addition, the ERCA Council took this opportunity to visit Liberia’s Minister for Commerce and Industry to follow up on the progress of Liberia’s new Competition and Consumer Protection Bill. AAT looks forward to seeing developments and merger approvals made by the ERCA Council in 2026.

Behind the Algorithm: NCC challenges E-Commerce Giants on Data, Quality and Compliance

Posted on by Editor

By Nicole Araujo

The South African National Consumer Commission (“NCC”) recently confirmed its investigation into Shein and Temu regarding certain of the e-commerce giants’ operations in the nation. The NCC’s inquiry will assess whether Temu and Shein are complying with the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), with a specific focus on their marketing practices; the safety and quality of products sold; and the accuracy and fairness of their digital-market representations.

Prudence Moilwa, the NCC’s executive head, emphasised that the NCC will undertake a rigorous assessment of their compliance with the CPA, sending a clear message to the e-commerce industry that the NCC will enforce accountability.

The CPA is a strong legislative framework; however, it is increasingly tested by the rapid technological developments that shape e-commerce business models. As innovation progresses faster than regulation, the CPA’s effectiveness is limited in addressing modern consumer protection concerns. The NCC’s intention is not to discourage innovation; however, notes that innovation is expected to take place within the lawful framework. 



Additionally, the NCC has expressed growing concern about Temu’s and Shein’s use of algorithms to drive consumer engagement, particularly in relation to South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act. The key issue is the extent to which users are adequately informed about how their data is processed and whether they meaningfully consent to such use. These concerns also relate to the platforms’ data-mining practices and the use of automated systems to determine what consumers see, interact with, and ultimately purchase. In effect, the algorithms employed by these platforms enable highly targeted marketing, which may undermine consumer choice and preference.

Overall, the investigation is a call from the NCC for the e-commerce world to practice basic transparency.

This latest action by the NCC follows closely on the South African Competition Commission (“SACC)’s separate enforcement measures related to tax compliance by Temu and Shein, which focused on alleged under-declaration of customs duties and improper import-tax structures. Together, the two investigations suggest a coordinated tightening of oversight over foreign e-commerce operators entering the South African market at scale.

For more detailed insight into the SACC’s tax enforcement efforts, see our prior article, Trouble in Store: New challenges for Shein and Temu Devotees in South Africa, here.

Govchat v. Meta: How Competition Tribunal Ruling Could Redefine Big Tech Accountability in South Africa

Posted on by Editor

By Simone dos Santos and Megan Armstrong

GovChat is a civic-tech platform, launched in 2018, that allows South Africans to use WhatsApp to communicate with government departments, apply for grants and report municipal service breakdowns. Conflict arose in 2020 when Meta (the parent company of WhatsApp) attempted to off-load GovChat from WhatsApp, claiming violations of its data and user-protection policies. In 2022, the matter was referred to the Competition Commission, in which GovChat claimed that Meta was engaging in an abuse of dominance. The Competition Commission ruled in favour of GovChat and ordered an interim interdict to stop the proposed off-loading of the platform.

The latest interlocutory hearing at the Competition Tribunal (the “Competition Tribunal Hearing”) began on 1 December 2025, in which Meta was ordered to clarify its e-discovery process. Technology-Assisted Review (TAR) is an innovative AI tool which Meta uses in its e-discoveryprocess. Although the Competition Tribunal did not reject this tool, they demanded human-led transparency. The focus is on who defined the scope of the search, how custodians were selected and whether the process has been adequately documented. Meta complied with the Competition Tribunals request, however, GovChat argued that unless Meta discloses their entire e-discovery process, there is no reliable way to verify that all relevant documentation has been produced. The ruling was adjourned, and Meta has been required to file a comprehensive affidavit of the entire e-discovery process.

On day 2 of the Competition Tribunal Hearing, the focus was on disputes concerning discovery, the need for transparency and the extent to which a dormant company can provide. Meta’s legal representatives argued that GovChat did not fully produce all their documents during discovery and questioned whether their efforts were reasonable. GovChat stated that they are essentially a dormant company, which exists only on the books, but has no assets or documents, and that they have gone beyond the standard requirements of discovery. GovChat argued in response that certain documents could not be produced due to only certain custodians being contacted, and their emails could not be produced due to their email repository being deleted after non-payment. They further highlighted a foundational legal principle in that a sworn discovery affidavit is accepted as true unless deliberate dishonesty has been provided and, therefore, their explanation of the discovery documents must be accepted by the Tribunal. Capital Appreciation (“CA”) is the primary financer for GovChat and Meta had issued summons against CA’s CEO. GovChat argued that the summons was defective in that it does not comply with the procedural requirements and they maintained their position that they had already provided the necessary documents.

The proceedings are still ongoing, and the Tribunal has yet to rule on the discovery and summons application. As the proceedings resume, the Tribunal decisions will not only determine whether the evidence will be admissible but will also reshape how South African Competition Law will treat evidence from Big Tech companies. For civic-tech platforms, the developments will reinforce that access to public digital services such as GovChat should not be determined by a corporate decision.

AAT Wishes Its Readers a Happy World Competition Law Day

Posted on by Editor

Marking the adoption of the United Nations’ “Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices” 45 years ago on Dec. 5th, today’s International World Competition Day is celebrated around the Globe and particularly in Africa, where leading agencies like the COMESA Competition Commission have observed the commemorative event for years, including this year by meeting with the Malawian CFTC leadership.

On this occasion, AAT wishes everyone a safe and happy holiday season…

Kenya Tribunal Upholds CAK’s Steel Cartel Sanction on Appeal

Posted on by Editor

By Michael Williams

Kenya’s Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) has upheld the Competition Authority of Kenya’s (the “CAK”) steelcartel decision, dismissing individual appeals brought by seven manufacturers and affirming the penalties and remedies imposed in 2023. The Tribunal rejected appeals by Tononoka Rolling Mills, Blue Nile Wire Products, Devki Steel Mills, Accurate Steel Mills, Nail & Steel Products, Corrugated Sheets and Jumbo Steel Mills, cementing the CAK’s finding of price-fixing, coordinated price adjustments and output/ import restrictions in the steel value chain. 

This ruling was handed down in two tranches: on 9 July 2025 (Accurate, Blue Nile, Devki, Nail & Steel, Tononoka) and on 11 September 2025 (Corrugated Sheets, Jumbo Steel), each time siding with the Authority. In total, the Tribunal affirmed KES 287.9 million in penalties for the seven appellants. The Tribunal further held that the CAK had afforded the parties due administrative process under Article 47 of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the Competition Act. 

The decision handed dawn on 15 October 2025 is a natural sequel to the CAK’s 23 August 2023 decision, when the CAK imposed record penalties of KES 338.8 million on nine steel producers for a cartel that, per the CAK, distorted construction-input pricing. Five firms reached settlements with the CAK, while the seven above pursued and have now lost their appeals. 

Notably, during the appeal phase Doshi & Company (Hardware) Ltd and Brollo Kenya Ltd concluded out-of-court settlements with the CAK, illustrating the CAK’s willingness to resolve matters via settlement and compliance undertakings, even mid-litigation. 

For context, the AfricanAntitrust 2023 coverage highlighted that the CAK’s original fines constituted the highest cartel penalties in the CAK’s history to that date, following a twoyear investigation that drew on search-and-seizure and market-intelligence evidence. With the Tribunal now endorsing the CAK’s analysis and process, the core liability findings stand, and the fine levels (for the seven appealing firms) are confirmed. 

Why this matters:

i) The Tribunal’s decisions strengthen precedent on price-fixing/ output restrictions in Kenya’s construction-inputs sector and validate CAK’s investigative toolkit and evidence assessment. 

ii) Appellants remain bound to cease collusion and implement internal competition-law compliance programmes.

iii) The CAK links steel-cartel conduct to higher housing and infrastructure costs, this outcome supports the CAK’sbroader enforcement narrative across the building materials market

The breakdown of the KES 287,934,697.83 penalties, as concurred by the Tribunal are as follows: 

Corrugated Sheets (86,979,378.53); Tononoka Rolling Mills (62,715,074.03); Devki Steel Mills (KES 46,296,001.25); Jumbo Steel Mills (KES 33,140,459.40); Accurate Steel Mills (KES 26,826,344.31); Nail & Steel Products (KES22,816,546.01); Blue Nile Wire Products (KES9,160,894.30). 

What’s next

Unless pursued further on points of law, the Tribunal’s decision bring this enforcement chapter close to closure. Penalties, compliance obligations remain, and CAK’s leniency and Informant Reward Schemes continue to beckon for future cartel detection. 

In conclusion, and by quoting the CAK’s Director-General, Mr. David Kemei, “The Tribunal’s findings affirm the CAK’s unwavering commitment to protect Kenyan consumers and businesses from the damaging effects of cartel conduct, and the veracity and completeness of our evidence-gathering, analysis and decision-making processes.”

Competition Exemptions in South Africa: Evolving Tools for Balancing Competition and Public Interest

Posted on by Editor

By Olivia Höll

A Shifting Landscape in Competition Policy

In South Africa, exemptions under the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (“the Act”) provide a critical mechanism for firms to engage in conduct that might otherwise breach the Act’s prohibitions, where such conduct supports broader policy goals. Exemptions are considered under section 10, with block exemptions specifically authorised under section 10(10). These exemptions aim to promote efficiencies, support government policy, safeguard employment, or advance small businesses and historically disadvantaged individuals.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a visible evolution in the types and objectives of exemptions granted by the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”), reflecting South Africa’s shifting economic priorities and ongoing structural challenges.

From Pandemic Emergency to Structural Interventions

The COVID-19 pandemic saw the SACC issue urgent exemptions, such as those for private healthcare providers, banks, retail landlords, and hospitality businesses to enable crisis cooperation. These exemptions were time-bound, tightly monitored, and have since expired. They remain useful precedent for how competition law can be flexibly applied in national emergencies.

However, more recent exemptions illustrate a pivot towards structural or developmental goals. Notable recent examples include:

  1. Ports and Rail Exemption (May 2025)

This exemption directly tackles one of the most significant drags on the South African economy, its dysfunctional logistics system. Chronic inefficiencies at Transnet-owned ports and on the freight rail network have cost the economy billions in lost export revenue. This isn’t merely about allowing cooperation, it’s an explicit attempt to use competition law to solve a market failure.

The exemption encourages private terminal operators (such as those in Durban and Ngqura) and private rail operators to collaborate in ways that would normally be considered anti-competitive (such as coordinating schedules, sharing infrastructure planning data, jointly investing in solutions) to optimise the entire supply chain from mine and factory to port.

This means exporters in sectors like mining and agriculture can anticipate reduced delays and owner spoilage rates, enhancing their global competitiveness. For the operators themselves, it allows for unprecedented cooperation with competitors to optimise the entire supply chain, though they must vigilantly avoid any discussion that veer into product pricing or market allocation, which remain strictly illegal.[1]

  • Sugar Industry Exemption (May 2025)

Functioning as a structured rescue plan formalised through the Sugar Master Plan, this exemption is designed to ensure the survival and transformation of a critically important industry. It permits stakeholders across the value chain, from lager growers to millers, to coordinate on production levels, collectively plan for diversification into biofuels, and present a unified front in negotiations.

For sugar businesses, this means a chance to stabilise the industry and protect livelihoods, particularly for small-scale cane farmers. The practical compliance imperative is stringent, participants must meticulously document that all coordinated activities are for industry restructuring and not for illicit profit-maximisation at the expense of consumers.[2]

  • SMME Block Exemption (January 2025)

This block exemption is a powerful tool for levelling the playing field for Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (“SMMEs”). It recognises that these players often cannot challenge established market structures alone and allows them to band together to achieve scale.

This means SMMEs can legally form buying groups to negotiate bulk purchase discounts, create joint ventures to bid for large tenders, and collaborate on shared logistics and marketing networks to drastically reduce costs. For larger corporations, this necessitates preparedness to engage with more organised and powerful SMME consortiums. The critical compliance rule is that the exemption only protects qualifying SMMEs, larger firms cannot use an SMME partner as a shield for cartel conduct.[3]

  • Energy and Industrial Exemptions

These exemptions represent a critical tool for addressing broad-based economic constraints, with a particular focus on the ongoing energy crisis and its ripple effects. They provide a collaborative framework for firms within key supply chains and strategic industrial sectors to coordinate in ways that would normally be prohibited.

This could mean manufacturers and suppliers in a critical industry such as steel, chemicals, or automative components being permitted to collaborate on optimising energy usage during load-shedding, sharing logistics for essential inputs, or jointly securing raw materials to ensure continued production and prevent factory closures.

For businesses, this exemption is designed to enhance economic stability and prevent a decline in productive capacity by allowing a degree of crisis management and operational coordination that safeguards entire value chains vital to South Africa’s industrial policy and recovery. The essential compliance imperative is that any cooperation must be directly linked to overcoming the identified supply chain or energy constraints and must not be used as a cover for market division, price-fixing, or other blatantly anti-competitive conduct.[4]

  • Banking and Insurance Exemption (July 2025)

This is a forward-looking exemption that aligns competition policy with national climate goals, acknowledging that financing a ‘just transition’ is a collective action problem. It permits banks and insurers to collaborate on developing common standards, definitions, and data-sharing frameworks for sustainable finance.

This means financial institutions can pool data on climate-related risks and develop a common South African taxonomy for ‘green’ assets without fear of prosecution, which should lead to more available and affordable financing for businesses seeking loans for renewable energy or ESG projects. The crucial limitation is that collaboration is restricted to framework development, any coordination on interest rates, premiums, or customer allocation remains absolutely prohibited.

  • Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports (August 2025)

In August 2025, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition published a Draft Block Exemption for the Promotion of Exports. This exemption, still under consultation, seeks to facilitate collaboration among exporters and industry players to overcome structural barriers to accessing foreign markets. It is framed under section 10(10) of the Act and recognises that South Africa’s export competitiveness is often constrained by high logistics costs, fragmented industry structures, and limited bargaining power in international markets.

The exemption is intended to permit cooperative initiatives around joint marketing, shared logistics, standard-setting, and market development, provided that such conduct demonstrably enhances South Africa’s export performance without undermining domestic competition. If finalised, this exemption could become a key instrument to support government’s broader trade and industrial policy agenda, including the drive to increase manufactured exports and deepen regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”).[5]

Understanding Block Exemptions under Section 10(10)

Section 10 of the Act allows firms to apply to the SACC to exempt them from horizontal agreements typically regulated by section 4 of the Act, or vertical agreements regulated by section 5 of the Act where the agreement contributes towards the following objectives:

  1. maintenance or promotion of exports;
  2. promotion of effective entry, participation in or expansion in the market by small and medium enterprises or firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons;
  3. change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an industry;
  4. economic development, growth, transformation or stability of any regulated industry; or
  5. competition and efficiency gains that promote employment or industrial expansion.

The recent SMME Block Exemption echoes earlier block exemptions issued during COVID-19 but represents a shift towards more enduring tools that facilitate inclusive growth. Other possible future candidates for block exemptions include sectors under Master Plans, such as poultry, automotive, and steel, where coordinated action may be needed to meet transformation or industrial policy targets.

Evolving Patterns: Then and Now

While COVID-era exemptions demonstrated the SACC’s agility during crisis management, current exemptions highlight a maturing approach. The SACC increasingly uses exemptions to:

  1. Tackle persistent structural inefficiencies;
  2. Strengthen value chains aligned with industrial policy;
  3. Support small and historically disadvantaged firms; and
  4. Balance economic competitiveness with sustainability and localisation goals.

Risks and Compliance Imperatives

Nonetheless, exemptions remain the exception, not the rule. Historic concerns persist that exemptions, if poorly designed or inadequately monitored, may entrench collusive behaviour or dampen competition. The SACC’s use of clear conditions, sunset clauses, and robust reporting obligations is therefore critical.

Looking Ahead

South Africa’s competition law framework continues to evolve in response to new economic realities. For firms seeking exemptions, the message is clear: any coordination must demonstrably advance the public interest and remain tightly circumscribed within the legal safeguards of the Act.

With the recent wave of block exemptions and sector-specific approvals, businesses, advisors, and stakeholders should actively monitor exemption trends, sector-specific conditions, and the SACC’s enforcement approach ensuring that collaboration serves national priorities without eroding competitive markets in the long term.

[1] Government Gazette No. 52624

[2] Government Gazette No. 52625

[3] Government Gazette No. 52000

[4] Government Gazette No. 52111

[5] Government Gazette No. 53147