The Gambian take on the benefits of market studies

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The Gambian Competition Authority’s commitment to investigating all prohibited practices in markets of any size

Shortly after the renaming of The Gambia Competition Commission to include consumer protection issues earlier this year, the Gambian Minister of Trade, Integration and Employment, Abdou Kolley, endorsed the ability of The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“GCCPC”) to continue pursuing any evidence of cartels, abuses of dominance and other illegal anti-competitive activities in any sector of the economy, as mandated by the the Competition Act 2007.

 

Minister Kolley

In its Strategic Plan over the next 3 years, the GCCPC indicates that it purposefully did not identify any priority sectors, to allow it to commit to investigating prohibited practices regardless of the market or its size. The Minister endorsed this approach given the need for independent agencies like the GCCPC to ensure that the competition playing field is leveled, that barriers to entry are low and that “the rules of the game” are reasonable. The Minister continued that simply having competition regime cannot produce or ensure competition in the market unless this is facilitated by government policies and enforcement.

Sectoral Market Inquiries: As in South Africa, whose Competition Commission has launched its first-ever market inquiry into the state of competition in the healthcare sector in terms of the Competition Amendment Act of 2009, the GCCPC is also empowered to launch “market studies” under section 15(k) of the Gambian Competition Act. A market study enables the GCCPC to consider both policies and enforcement simultaneously, thereby promoting competition in the economy, according to the Minister. The Minister explained that the aim of the market study was to assess competition in a particular area and recommend ways of improving it to the benefit of the economy and consumers in general.

As noted in our prior reporting, the Minister spoke at the opening of a workshop on the “Tourism Market Study” and to bring the concept of competition law closer to home, he placed emphasis on the increasing awareness about competition law within the tourism fraternity, forums such as the workshop will contribute substantially to the spread of competition culture and improving levels of compliance of the Competition Act, which would be beneficial both for the economy as well as individual businesses.

Gambian competition enforcer discusses tourism market inquiry

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Gambia in the antitrust headlines twice in past week

7 days ago, it made news because of its changed name and dawn of a broader enforcement agenda, now including consumer protection matters.  Today, we are covering meeting by Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) with tourism industry stakeholders, as reported by AllAfrica.

Abdou Kolley, Minister of Trade and Employment, gave a Tuesday speech addressing his competition agency’s tourism market study, undertaken according to section 15(k) of the Competition Act, attempting to garner support for the benefits of free-market competition.  “Competition does not emerge on its own”, noting that the GCCPC’s enforcement and oversight activities were necessary to lower entry barriers and assure the absence of illegal price-fixing and other illicit conduct.

“The GCCPC is mandated by the competition Act 2007 to pursue any evidence of cartels, abuses of dominance and other illegal anti-competitive activities in any sector of the economy and I am confident that they will continue to do so.”

Minister Kolley

The Director General of the Gambia Tourism Board, Benjamin Robert, was quoted as agreeing with the minister, saying that the GCCPC’s report was “timely” and noted that the domestic tourism industry possessed certain characteristics of dominance in some sectors, with over 50% market share by some market players.

Namibian merger control: 1st deal of 2014 gets conditions

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Namibian Competition Commission Imposes Conditions on Mining Deal

The Namibian Competition Commission has given its first conditional approval of the year in a gold-mine transaction, imposing employment conditions that require the purchaser not to lay off any employees for a minimum of two years from the date of sale.

Unemployment concerns drive antitrust ruling

The Commission stated, per reporting on AllAfrica.com, that there were no reasons to block the deal on a lessening-of-competition grounds under section 47 of the Competition Act, but that it was “concerned about the effect of the sale on employment, hence the imposition of the above condition.”

AAT reported last year on the revision of the Namibian competition law to include consumer-protection provisions, which would allegedly bar M&A deals not only on pure antitrust grounds but also on a more broadly defined “unfairness” basis.

In the current deal, buyer Guinea Fowl Investments Twenty Six will acquire the Navachab gold mine from AngloGold Ashanti Namibia, which since last year has had gold-mining competition from one other player (B2Gold) in the domestic market.

First 2014 deal with conditions

We note that no other cleared transaction has had conditions imposed since the beginning of the calendar year, as shown by the agency’s May M&A update 2014:

Namibian NaCC approved deals as of May 2014
Namibian NaCC approved deals as of May 2014

 

Appellate competition body questions authority’s lenient fine

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Tribunal expresses doubts as to lenient fining level of Premier Fishing

The chairman of the South African Competition Tribunal, Takalani Madima, has asked the South African Competition Commission and Premier Fishing for ‘detailed substantial submissions’ on the settlement agreement reached between them, which lets the fishing company “off the hook” for an administrative penalty of a mere R2.1m (or 2% of its revenues).

2% fine not sufficient deterrent to anti-competitive conduct

According to a BDlive report, Mr. Madima is quoted as saying: ‘I am personally not too happy (with the agreement). I am still to be persuaded.’

The underlying conduct involves a cartel between Premier Fishing and others, in which the competitors shared information and pricing regarding the pelagic fish industry.  The Commission’s July 2008 investigation included the following companies as targets: Oceana, Foodcorp (note: the two former cartelists recently decided to merge and the competition authorities imposed conditions on the planned transaction), Premier Fishing, Gansbaai Marine, the SA Pelagic Fish Processors Association, Pioneer Fishing, Saldanha Bay Canning and others.

As the leniency applicant, Pioneer Fishing obtained full immunity from prosecution.  Others, such as Oceana, settled for approximately 5% of their fishing turnover.

Airtel Kenya requests probe of Safaricom for abuse of dominance in mobile money transfer market

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Mobile payment wars heating up in Kenya

Airtel Networks Kenya Limited (“Airtel”) has joined forces with Kenya-based Equity Bank to launch a similar mobile banking product, M-KESHO in July 2014 to the established product provided by Safaricom Limited (“Safaricom”).

Safaricom offers a product named “M-Pesa” to its customers in Kenya and Tanzania.  M-Pesa is a mobile-phone based money transfer and micro-financing service, launched in 2007 for Safaricom and Vodacom, the two largest mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania. The service enables its users to deposit and withdraw money, transfer money to other users and non-users, pay bills, purchase airtime and transfer money between the service and, in Kenya, a bank account.  Users of M-Pesa are charged a service fee for sending and withdrawing money.

By 2010, M-Pesa became the most successful mobile-phone-based financial service in the developing world.

In light of the imminent launch of the Airtel product, Airtel has lodged a complaint with the Competition Authority of Kenya on the basis that Safaricom currently holds 78% of the voice market in Kenya, 96% of the short message service market and 74% of the mobile data market.  In addition, Airtel is of the view that these market shares make it impossible for Kenyan consumers to have a choice in operators. By 2012, 17 million M-Pesa accounts were registered in Kenya alone, which has a population of over 40 million.

There are a total of approximately 31 million mobile-phone subscriptions in Kenya in 2013, of which Safaricom accounted for 68%, Airtel 17%, Essar Group’s “yuMobile” 9% and Telkom Kenya Limited 7%.

However, Safaricom has indicated that cash transfers still account for 98% of the total transactions in Kenya and therefore it is impossible for any mobile-money entity to be a dominant player in the payments market.

The Competition Authority of Kenya has identified telecommunications as one of several markets being scrutinised by the Competition Authority for possible abuses of dominance.  This probe is expected to reach completion by July 2014.

In terms of Kenyan law, if a company controls at least half of the provision of trade of services or goods, the company will be considered to be dominant.  In Kenya, a conviction of abuse of dominance can lead to a five-year prison term and a USD 115 000 penalty

Kenya is quite clearly pushing on in relation to significant cases in sectors which affect the majority of the population, as discussed in the overview of maturing African competition regimes published last week.  However, it is noteworthy that in April 2014, Kenya’s telecommunications regulator granted approval for Safaricom and Airtel to buy Essar Group’s “yuMobile” and it is considering awarding licenses for at least three more telecommunications companies.  Orange SA has indicated that its operations may exit the Kenyan market, where it owns 70 percent of Telkom Kenya (which in turn accounts for 7% of the mobile phone subscriptions in Kenya).

“New” antitrust enforcer takes on additional task of consumer protection

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The Gambian Competition Commission has changed its name and enlarged its mandate

With the passage of Consumer Protection Act 2014, the Gambia Competition Commission has changed its name to The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC).  The rationale for inclusion of the broader task of consumer protection (in addition to antitrust enforcement of the Competition Act of 2007) was, perhaps somewhat analogous to other sister agencies worldwide (e.g., the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, which likewise has a similar dual mandate), described as follows by the the minister for
Trade and Industry, Abdou Kolley:

“Trade goes with competition, and where there is trade there is a need for consumer protection.”

In addition to the GCCPC, the Act envisages the establishment of consumer-protection tribunals throughout The Gambia’s administrative regions to hear and adjudicate consumer-protection complaints.

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Commission details plans for private healthcare sector inquiry

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Further details revealed by inquiry panel

On Friday, subsequent to outlining the time table of the project, the South African Competition Commission Competition Commission released important frameworks for its sectoral inquiry into the competitiveness of the private healthcare sector in the RSA. The key documents are a draft “statement of issues” (which the Commission warned may further “evolve” during the course of the inquiry) and “guidelines for participation” for the market inquiry into the private healthcare sector, which is headed by retired Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo. The public and affected stakeholders are invited to make written submissions on these before Monday, 30 June 2014 (South African Competition Commission direct e-mail address: health@compcom.co.za).

Notably, the statement of issues includes the role of the public sector in competition in the market for healthcare. This was a key sticking point for observers and stakeholders, as the initial framing of the inquiry appeared solely focused on the private players, failing to take into account the competitive restraints imposed by the strong public insurance schemes and other state-related participants in the healthcare arena.  (AAT published on this and related issues here and here.)

Other topics include, predictably from an antitrust point of view, regulation, market power and dominance, barriers to entry, as well as consumer-protection aspects. Taken together, the areas of concern have been grouped by the Commission’s inquiry panel into six possible theories of harm, which the Commission defines as follows: “A theory of harm refers simply to a hypothesis about how harm to competition might arise in a market to the detriment of consumers and to the detriment of efficient and innovative outcomes in that market.” (Statement of Issues at para. 9 and 53, as follows):

  1. Theory of harm 1: Market power and distortions in healthcare
    financing.
  2. Theory of harm 2: Market power and distortions in relation to
    healthcare facilities.
  3. Theory of harm 3: Market power and distortions in relation to
    healthcare practitioners.
  4. Theory of harm 4: Barriers to entry and expansion at various levels
    of the healthcare value chain.
  5. Theory of harm 5: Imperfect information.
  6. Theory of harm 6: Regulatory framework.

The Big Picture: AAT History – Maturing competition-law regimes in Africa

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AAT the big picture

Below, AfricanAntitrust.com provides a brief overview of maturing antitrust jurisdictions in Africa

In the past two decades, 26 African countries implemented domestic competition law regimes, and that number continues to grow.

Many competition authorities who were previously deemed as being rather ineffective in their teething stages, have now begun to actively enforce their respective competition law provisions by launching market inquiries, prohibiting anti-competitive mergers, conducting dawn raids and becoming tough on cartel activity.

Below, we provide a short summary of some of the maturing jurisdictions on the continent (notably excluding matured ones (South Africa) as well as young regimes, including supra-national ones such as COMESA, as they arguably fall outside this definition.)

Botswana

The Competition Authority in Botswana was launched in 2011, and with 33 staff members, of which nearly half comprises economists, and the authority has already conducted more than 20 dawn raids and launched market inquiries launched into various “priority sectors” such as retail, poultry and cement. The competition authority has blocked mergers which impede the empowerment of Botswana’s citizens on the basis of public interest concerns in maintaining sufficient local shareholding in certain key markets such as health care.

Kenya

In 2011, Kenya implemented its Competition Act and now, given the new, and higher, merger filing fees, the budgetary constraints within the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) will be addressed and alleviated. The Competition Authority of Kenya announced its intention to launch investigations into claims of powerful cartels in the lucrative coffee industry in Kenya. The Competition Authority of Kenya plans to probe abuse of dominance by coffee firms, particularly in relation to marketing. In addition, the Competition Authority of Kenya has initiated an investigation into allegations of abuse of dominance by Lafarge in Kenya, which may result in Lafarge being forced to sell its stake in the East African Portland Cement Company.

Following the dawn raid conducted by the South African Competition Commission on Unilever and Sime Darby in April 2014 in relation to the edible oils industry, the CAK has launched an investigation into the edible oils market, in which local prices have been unresponsive to reductions in the cost of imported feedstock.

Namibia, Zambia & Mauritius

Both the Namibian and Mauritian competition authorities have announced their respective plans to introduce a formal corporate leniency policy to improve their cartel enforcement. In addition, the Mauritian Competition Commission will investigate whether Stage Beverages, of the Castle Group, and Phoenix Beverages Ltd have agreed to divide markets in Mauritius and Madagascar, given that the Mauritian Competition Commission has reason to believe that Stage Beverages and Phoenix Beverages have agreed that Stage Beverages will cease the manufacture and supply of beer in Mauritius, while Phoenix Beverages will do the same in Madagascar.

The Zambian competition authority has recently imposed significant penalties for price-fixing in the vehicle-repair industry. Furthermore, it has conducted dawn raids on two fertiliser companies.

AAT will continue its summaries (which we hope you find helpful in navigating the competition-law map of Africa) in its “Big Picture” series.

Panel bestows cum laude Ph.D. on AAT contributing author

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Ranchordas, Sofia: Tilburg University doctoral dissertation defense

Tilburg University bestows doctorate cum laude  on AAT author Ranchordás

AfricanAntitrust.com contributing writer, assistant professor of law at Tilburg Univ., and lead author of our #InnovationAntitrust series Sofia Ranchordás was honoured yesterday by a distinguished panel of academics at Tilburg University (Netherlands) with a Ph.D. marked cum laude — a distinction granted only to approximately 2% of Dutch doctoral degrees.

She defended her dissertation on experimental legislation, sunset clauses, innovation, of which we publish a short “layman’s terminology” summary extract here.

Congratulations, doctor!

Sofia Ranchordas, Ass't Professor, Tilburg University

Sofia Ranchordás, Ph.D. cum laude, Ass’t Professor, Tilburg University (Law School)

10-Minute Presentation of Ranchordás Ph.D.
Dissertation in Layman’s Terms

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for being here today.

I especially welcome my front row guests, in particular my mother, and my sister who managed to convince her boss that it is possible do a PhD in Law, and two young guests that even had to ask permission to skip classes today:

Hallo Tim en Indy, fijn dat jullie er zijn en dat jullie vrij van school konden krijgen.

(Last week one of my students asked me why I had written yet another book to obtain a PhD degree. My straightforward answer was: because no one else has even written about it and the world needs to know more about sunset clauses, experimental legislation and innovation. My student wasn’t totally convinced by my answer, but at the end of these 10/9 minutes I hope you will be.

Experimental legislation, sunset clauses, innovation: three enigmatic words, 3 Pandora boxes to lawmakers, 3 years and 3 months to write one book. [And as you can see, it is a thick one, but not thick enough to ask all the questions that should have been asked or to provide all the answers]. This book tells the story of two legislative instruments which have been overlooked by legislators. Two instruments that seem to have much to offer to that one reality we all seek these days: innovation.‘

1. ‘Sunset clauses’ are dispositions that impose the termination of a law after a determined period, which means that a law or some of its dispositions might only last for 5 years.

2. ‘Experimental legislation’ submits new rules to a test, trying them out in the real world, testing their effectiveness. The new rules are tried in a part of the territory, while the ‘old ones’ remain applicable to the other. At the end of a certain period, results are compared and, in principle, the legislator ‘should allow the best law to win. However, in the lawmaking process the legislative winner does always not take it all. Politics very often does.

3. ‘Innovation’ is a broad concept that cannot be reduced to a brilliant idea: it is more and less than this common perception of the innovative wheel, a light bulb or a pair of Google glasses. Innovation is instead the first successful commercialization of a new idea, brilliant or not, that can improve the existing state of technology of society.

4. Innovation is ‘a kind of magic’: it is our hope in difficult times, the promise for long-term sustainable growth. Innovation is also ‘a crazy little thing’: it is all around us, but it is impossible to grasp and to generate through a simple formula. Instead, it is a very complex process that can be stimulated or impeded by a number of elements, including outdated regulation.

5. It is a difficult mission to regulate innovation but I know two perfect candidates for the job: sunset clauses and experimental legislation. They provide the flexibility and adaptability that regulators need to regulate under uncertain conditions, allow legislators to revise rules as more information about innovative products becomes available, and terminate obsolete dispositions.

6. However, as always, friends get the best jobs, strangers do not. And that is the case of sunset clauses and experimental legislation: they are total strangers to most lawyers and lawmakers. Before I started doing my research, how many of you had ever heard about sunset clauses and experimental regulations? And even now how many would be able to recognize you?

7 In my research, I looked into the reasons why sunset clauses and experimental legislation have not been more often used to regulate innovative fields and there are legal and non-legal reasons underlying this general resistance to these instruments. An apparently simple research question, you might say. However, as life often teaches us, appearances are misleading and this question allowed me to rethink the meaning of different principles of law in a changing world, the meeting of minds between innovators and regulators and the non-legal elements influencing the lawmaking process.

8. There appears to be a widespread belief that these instruments ‘are bad’ because they violate a number of principles of law we hold dear. That is the case of the principle of legal certainty that is often connected with the idea of predictability, stability and continuity of law. However, some laws cannot live forever because they regulate phenomena that evolve rapidly or problems that might be temporary. Sunset clauses and experimental legislation can provide in these cases more temporary certainty, because they do not expose laws to the erosion of time. In my dissertation, I also argue that experimental laws do not endanger the principle of equal treatment. While it is true that not all citizens will be equal before the law, this differentiation will be temporary, objectively justified and it is intrinsic to the main objective of experimental legislation: gather more information about the effects of a new law.

10. The scarce use of sunset clauses and experimental legislation can be attributed to a number of non-legal elements, such as lack of information or expertise, a certain intellectual reluctance towards termination of laws or the experimental method, high costs, fear of being confronted with unpleasant facts, or political rationality. While law is for a great deal about politics, there must be a way to ensure that some legislative decisions are rendered more transparent.

11. The real Achilles heel of experimental legislation and sunset clauses is the lack of a clear legal and methodological framework. Legislators do not know when they should choose temporary laws in detriment of lasting ones, how to enact them and for how long. The main contribution of my dissertation lies in the design of a framework, where guidelines are provided to lawmakers: go for sunset clauses when you expect a technology to evolve rapidly, experiment with new rules when you do not know enough about their effectiveness; make sure experiments are meaningful and truly convert the lawmaking process into a learning one, set transparent evaluation criteria and ask regulators to justify their decisions to follow or reject the results of an experiment. Educate lawmakers and citizens with the truth of the facts and not the power of opinions.

12. Are sunset clauses and experimental legislation a blessing or a curse to innovation? I leave you, ladies and gentlemen, with this question. It results from my research that they are not a curse for a law that keeps up with reality, for a law that lives along the paths of innovation. Instead, they bless the courageous legislators that try new laws to see if they work, allow laws to expire when they are no longer necessary, removing unnecessary burdens from the shoulders and pockets of innovators. However, sunset clauses and experimental legislation will only be blessings for innovation, if they are drafted along the lines of law. However, and excuse me for citing a lawyer in a speech supposed to be to laymen: as Felix Frankfurter affirmed: ‘science and technology cannot reshape society while law maintains its Blackstonian essence’, i.e., in layman’s terms this means: while lawyers try to confer their own interpretation to every single phenomenon, lagging behind reality.

Battle of the Agencies: ICASA vs. CompCom

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In dispute over competition-law & merger enforcement in South Africa, Communications agency raises its voice

Jurisdictionally crossed wires and agency disputes in antitrust are no longer the exclusive playground of the FCC and DOJ, of COMESA’s CCC and the Kenyan CAK, or DOJ and FTC.  They have now reached the shores of the Republic of South Africa as well, in the form of the Independent Communication Authority of South Africa (“ICASA”) challenging the country’s Competition Commission’s de facto exclusive right to review merger deals.

Factual Background

ICASA, created in July 2000 by the Independent Communication Authority of South Africa Amendment Act is reported to be in a jurisdictional dispute with the country’s traditional merger watchdog, the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”).  ICASA wants the power to take a closer look at relevant deals such as MTN and Telkom’s network sharing and the announced Vodacom / Neotel deal, on which AAT has reported previously (see Telecom adversaries to remain “principled” in their competing bids for 4G spectrum, Internet & mobile operators at war: merge, acquire, complain, and our prior reports mentioning ICASA here).

ICASA’s specialized “Markets & Competition” division is tasked to deal with promoting “competition, innovation and investment in respect of services and facilities provided in the electronic communications, broadcasting and postal sectors, whilst ensuring account cultural diversity, especially regarding broadcasting content.”  The authority as a whole is “mandated to create competition in the telecommunications, broadcasting and the postal industries. In turn, competition brings about affordable prices for goods and services rendered and provides value for money to consumers.”

Legal Standard – “Public Interest”?

In recent reports by the New Telegraph and HumanIPO, ICASA is said to have voiced discontent with the Competition Commission’s failure to send proposed communications-related M&A deals to the authority.

That said, it is unclear to AAT precisely which legal standard ICASA wishes to impose on any potential future merger review it might undertake.  In the U.S., notably, the FCC’s standard of review is a more flexible public-interest standard, vs. the “classic” antitrust agencies’ (FTC/DOJ) “substantial lessening of competition” standard.

Regardless of (at least our) uncertainty of the legal standard to be applied, ICASA is quoted as saying that deals cleared by the SACC may still require separate approval from the Communications authority, irrespective of any competition-law based decision reached by the Competition Commission:

“While consolidation is a global phenomenon and anticipated in the market, all such deals may require regulatory approval.”

“The authority is aware of what is currently before the Competition Commission; and in accordance with our institutional arrangements with the Competition Commission we will collaborate, however, that in no way negates the regulatory approvals required from ICASA.”

In addition to the previous lack of coordination between the Commission and ICASA on merger reviews, there has also been criticism of the country’s limited allocation of more frequency spectrum to wireless operators.

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