Category: AAT

Short-term sights in favour of long-term gains: Patel’s industrial policies risk effective competition in South Africa

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AAT the big picture

By Michael Currie

Discarding any objectivity and international best practice, the Minister of Economic Development, Mr. Ebrahim Patel, has once again expressed his desire to use the South African Competition Commission (“SACC”) as an agency to actively promote the government’s industrial policies.

Speaking at a media briefing, Patel told journalists that the focus of the Economic Development Department would be to grow “black ownership of new industry in South Africa and using state funding to grow the work of black entrepreneurs”.[1]

Minister Patel

Patel said the intention of using the SACC to launch a market inquiry into the retail sector was to “ensure that we’ve got a competitive sector, but also an inclusive sector”. This statement and the decision to institute a market inquiry into the retail sector is, at least at this stage, problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the retail sector is arguably one of the most competitive sectors in South Africa, and any barrier to entry into the sector is a natural consequence of a highly competitive market. Furthermore, Patel identified exclusivity clauses (which are popular provisions inserted into lease contracts between mall anchor tenants and the developers) will be one of the issues that the inquiry will look into. Patel, unfortunately, overlooked the fact that there has already been an investigation relating to these clauses. At the conclusion of the investigation, the SACC found that there is not sufficient evidence of anti-competitive impact, resulting from these clauses, and thus the SACC refrained from referring the matter to the South African Competition Tribunal (“SACT”).[2] This thus begs the question, whether it is necessary to institute a market inquiry with regard to the issue of exclusivity clauses and expose the industry to intensive and unnecessary costs?

In an article written by Mfundo Ngobese in the official newsletter of the SACC, Ngobese responds to an article written by John Oxenham and Patrick Smith, presented at the Eighth Annual Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy titled “What is Competition Really Good For?”. The main focus of Ngobese’s article is evaluating the merits of an argument put forward by Oxenham and Smith: that the Competition Authorities should engage in a balancing exercise between the short term impact on public interest issues (such as employment) versus the long term benefits that are associated with effective competition (such as increased economic growth which leads to more jobs created).

Public Interest Test

This brings us back to Patel’s decision to use public interest as the main ground on which a market inquiry into the retail sector should be instituted. The decision to launch a market inquiry based on the anti-competitiveness of exclusivity clauses is simply untenable in light of the SACC’s findings in respect of a previous investigation into the issue, as well as the fact that the retail industry is highly competitive.[4] Using any ‘anti-competitive’ argument as justification for launching this particular market inquiry, would amount to nothing more than a ‘fishing expedition’ by Patel and the Authorities.

The broad public interest grounds which are increasingly becoming prevalent as Patel transcends into the competition arena, coupled with the ill-defined rationale, guidelines and justifications behind the use of public interest grounds in competition review, is contributing significantly to uncertainty in the South African economy.

This ‘uncertainty’, that surrounds doing business in South Africa was recognised by African National Congress (ANC) stalwart Mathews Phosa.  The former ANC Treasurer and Mpumalanga premier identified corruption, inconsistent government policies, and other factors as root causes of investors’ growing reluctance to invest in South Africa:

Policy stability leads to political, social and economic uncertainty. Policy stability in contrast created an “investment friendly culture where every investor feels protected and free to do business”.

While businesses in the retail industry (and indeed businesses across the board) in South Africa, are desperately seeking certainty, Patel is seeking a ‘second bite of the cherry’.

The second issue with Patel’s reason for instituting the market inquiry relates to him wanting to achieve an “inclusive retail sector” and how to bring more “black South Africans into the sector”. While transformation in the economy is certainly an important issue that needs to be addressed in South Africa, it is the manner and form in which such transformation takes place, which is concerning. In this regard, the SACC is patently not the appropriate institution to ensure that there are sufficient black-owned businesses in the retail sector.

Confused Motives

Patel seems to have, unfortunately, conflated the objectives and role of his own department, with the objectives and purpose of the SACC. This comes at a time when other political meddling has led to the resignation of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mxolisi Nxasana, who quit his post on Sunday, after almost a year of politically-motivated wrangling and formal investigations being initiated and ultimately dropped by President Jacob Zuma.

Former NPA head Mxolisi Nxasana, forced to resign due to political pressure.

The influence that Minister Patel has had on the SACC’s policy is undoubtedly evident when one evaluates the increased reliance of the South African Competition Authorities to impose stringent conditions in approving mergers.[5]

In justifying the use of public interest grounds in competition law, the Competition Authorities may point out that South Africa’s Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (the “Act”) permits and requires public considerations to be taken into account. However, the use of public interest grounds should not, as seems to be the case, be seen as independent issues unrelated to competition which is to be considered in isolation of the purpose of the Act.[6] The Competition Authorities’ purpose, as set out in Section 2 of the Act is to “promote and maintain competition in the Republic…”. It is likely that Patel views the following two subsections which state that competition must be maintained or promoted to:

“promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans” (Section 2(c)); and

“promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons” (Section 2(f))[7]

as the basis for his increased reliance on pushing his Department’s policy objectives through the channels of the SACC. However, placing an overly zealous reliance on these two subsections, fundamentally misconstrues the purpose and function of competition law.

Subsections (c) and (f) quoted above are not self-standing provisions; they are qualified by the general purpose of the Act. Furthermore, by viewing or placing greater reliance on these provisions as self-standing provisions, one would run into an inconceivable difficulty when considering section 2(a), which states as a further objective of the Act (and the purpose of the promoting competition) is to promote the “efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy”. At least from a Section 2 perspective, public interest considerations, at best, have to be reconciled with competition issues.

Market inquiries have often been used very successfully as an investigative tool by a number of competition agencies, especially in Europe. However, a market inquiry requires significant resource expenditure by both the SACC and the market participants and often casts a bad shadow over the relevant industry to the detriment of companies who have not engaged in any anti-competitive conduct. Market inquiries should thus be used sparingly and only when there is significant concern that a particular market is not functioning in a competitive manner. A market inquiry should certainly not be used as a means to affect change in the industry in order simply to suit the objectives of the Government.

There is a further institutional concern which must be noted, and that is that the SACC has, like all institutions, limited resources. In order to function as an efficient and formidable competition law agency, the SACC should ensure that what limited resources are available, is best utilised to achieve a competitive market environment in South Africa.

Before even engaging in policy discussions, as those that Patel is pushing for, it would firstly be necessary to ensure that the SACC has the requisite expertise to deal with policy agenda’s which are far broader than pure competition law. There are already institutions, as Patel has recognised, whose responsibility it is to promote economic growth and to address transformation within the economy.[8] It is not the responsibility of the Competition Authorities to address these issues as directly as has been the case in recent years.[9]

The need for transformation and the promotion of black industrialists is an issue to be addressed by the Government, however, it seems that there is a general lack of regard to competition concerns when Government departments form their policies. A good illustration of this is the significant criticism levelled at the new agreement struck between South African Airways (“SAA”) and the Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”), which will see SAA redirect R10 billion rand of procurement spending to “black industrialists” (“SAA Agreement”).[10]

While this may appear to be a noble policy, the question remains whether new “black industrialists” are coming into existence, or whether existing “black industrialists” are simply going to make substantial profits at the expense of true development.

The SAA Agreement, which requires, without anything more, that a certain amount of supplies (fuel) be purchased from specific suppliers (‘black suppliers’) strikes at the heart of competition. Effectively certain existing competitors are being excluded in order to favour other competitors. In no way does this promote ‘transformation’ within the industry as the existing barriers to entry remain.

From a competition point of view, the benefit of having healthy competition in the commercial aviation market seems to have been overlooked by the DTI. Apart from the direct benefit that flows from actual cheaper air tickets, the knock-on benefits of stimulating the leisure tourism seems to have been overlooked.

While acknowledging that the SAA decision taken by the DTI is not directly linked to competition law, the disregard that the DTI appears to have to competition in the aviation industry is in stark contracts to the to the Competition Authorities in Botswana who have launched a market inquiry into the aviation sector (although notably with the focus being on unscheduled flights), due to having recognised the importance that the price of flight tickets may have on the tourism industry and the benefits that would flow from boosting the tourism industry.

Considering that SAA is battling financially, and is highly dependent on State bailouts, it is baffling that the State’s primary objective is not to ensure that SAA operates viably and competitively, before risking such competitiveness in favour of a policy which is quite frankly, difficult to justify as there is no evidence that such policies actually achieve genuine transformation or promote economic growth.[11]

One can’t help but notice the irony when it comes to the Government’s social and transformation policies. The Government, and Patel in particular, consistently ignore well established economic principles and the benefits that flow from healthy competition in the economy, in favour of promoting short-sighted top-down “transformative industrial policies”, rather than spending the scarce resources on promoting and developing South Africa from a bottom-up approach.

For instance, poor service delivery in South Africa has a significant detrimental economic and social impact on South Africa. Why improving service delivery does not appear to be high on the radar of the Department of Economic Development or the DTI, is surprising if the objectives of these departments are to promote ‘black businesses’, as the areas which are most severely affected by poor service delivery are generally areas where there is a high percentage of black persons living, who form part of the lower income brackets. In other words, areas where the promotion of small businesses and healthy competition would be most valuable to any social development objectives.

Unfortunately, however, a recent report issued by the Institute of Race Relations stated that the highest incidence of recent public protests in relation to poor service delivery, took place in areas were the most “fruitless and wasteful government expenditure” took place.[12]

Recent statistics show that South Africa’s unemployment rate is increasing, bringing into question whether the policy intervention that Patel has been championing over the past 6 years, is indeed yielding the positive results envisioned by the Government. While the purpose of this article is not to evaluate and criticise all policy interventions, the point to be made is that the effectiveness of policy intervention to advance socio-economic interests in the South Africa is in no way proving effective. While there may be a number of reasons for failing policies, it appears worrying that politicians such as Patel are prepared to risk the independence, efficient functioning and objectives of the Competition Authorities, which are ultimately to promote competition in the market, in order to promote industrial policies when there is so much uncertainty whether such policies will truly ensure long term benefits for the Country as a whole.

Two recently issued reports, namely, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Report and the IMD World Development Report, succinctly confirm the concerns and issues which are addressed in this article.

The BCG Report evaluates the reasons for South Africa’s stagnant economic growth. The report acknowledges that it is a necessity to improve education and healthcare and reduce unemployment to advance growth; however, the report importantly states that:

“There is no hiding from the fact that short-term self-interested behaviour has been prevalent; that the emphasis in South Africa has been on cutting the pie rather than growing it.”[13]

This statement could not be truer if one considers Patel’s disregard of well established benefits that flow from a competitive environment, in favour of promoting industrial policies. The following statement by Adam Ikdal on the poor leadership in South Africa, corroborates this papers view:

“a concerted program of execution is essential. In many instances this may mean putting the greater good ahead of the individual or institutional interests.”[14]

The IMD World Competitiveness Report (IMD Report) not only complements the BCG Report, but essentially confirms the views of this paper, with empirical evidence. The IMD Report indicates that South Africa has dropped from a ranking of 37 in 2012 to 53 in 2015 on a list of the world’s most competitive countries. The IMD Report not surprisingly, identified South Africa’s infrastructure shortfall, poor service delivery and lack of education and skills as some of the major contributors to South Africa’s slip down the rankings.

Crucially the director of the IMD World Competitiveness Centre, Arturo Bris, identified what sets the top performing countries apart from the others. This is what Bris had to say, which is essentially, the basis upon which the criticism identified in this paper is levelled at Patel’s policy objectives:

“Productivity and efficiency are in the driver’s seat of a competitiveness wagon. Simply put, business efficiency requires greater productivity and the competitiveness of countries is greatly linked to the ability of enterprises to remain profitable over time”.[15]

In conclusion, we note that both transformation and fostering economic growth is an objective of the South African Government. This is, however, no justification for abandoning the tried and tested benefits that flow from a competitive market, in favour of promoting short-term industrial policies such as Patel is doing. Should the SACC adopt Patel’s industrial policies as part of their policy objectives, the SACC ultimately risks its independence and may effectively become an ‘umbrella institution’ under which any industrial policy agendas are driven. This would be an undesirable and intolerable outcome, and one which the South African Competition Authorities need to carefully guard against.

[1] http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Patels-focus-is-on-black-industrial-growth-20150512

[2] Competition Commission News Letter, Edition 51, January 2015.

[3] Competition Commission News Letter, Edition 51, January 2015.

[4] See footnote1.

[5] We have dealt with this aspect of merger control in more depth in previous articles, please see the following link.

[6] To illustrate the extent that public interest considerations are used by the Competition Authorities, the last intermediate merger that was approved unconditionally was in 2008. Since then, there have been 14 mergers that have been approved subject to conditions. As to large mergers, approximately 10 of the most recent 40 mergers that have come before the Competition Tribunal, 5 have been approved subject to conditions. It should be noted that it is the SACC that reviews intermediate mergers, while large mergers are reviewed bu the Competition Tribunal.

[7] Sections 2(c) and (f) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998.

[8] For example the Industrial Development Corporation.

[9] See the AfriGroup Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Afgri Ltd merger where the South African Competition Tribunal (“SACT”) Acknowledged that the merger poses no horizontal or vertical competition law concerns. Despite reaching such a conclusion, the SACT, approved the merger on condition that an agreement reached by the parties in terms of which Afgri would contribute R90 million over four years, to a development fund for small farmers via the provision of loans, training and grain storage discounts. Similar burdensome conditions are becoming all the more prevalent in merger control, and are often self-imposed by the SACT and are not agreed upon by the parties as was the case in Afgri.

[10] The Business Day, 26 May 2015, page 14.

[11] The Business Day, 26 May 2015, page 14.

[12] http://www.polity.org.za/article/protests-linked-to-fruitless-wasteful-government-expenditure-irr-2015-05-26

[13] Financial Mail, May 21- May 27, 2015 pg 27.

[14] Financial Mail, May 21- May 27, 2015 pg 27.

[15] http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/power-problem-features-in-south-africas-fall-in-2015-competitiveness-ranking-2015-05-27/rep_id:3182 (accessed 28 May 2015).

Meet the Enforcers: Companies Tribunal’s Prof. Kasturi Moodaliyar

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meet the enforcers

Interview with Professor Moodaliyar marks second in AAT interview series highlighting African enforcers

In the second instalment of our Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with Prof. Kasturi Moodaliyar. An Associate Professor of Competition Law, she is part-time member at the Companies Tribunal; ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee; and the Film and Publication Board Appeal Tribunal. She holds a B.Proc. LLB.LLM.(Natal), M.Phil (Cambridge), and Prog. Economics and Public Finance (UNISA)

As an academic in South Africa, focussing on competition law, how do you perceive the major differences and challenges that developing or younger antitrust-law jurisdictions are faced with, compared to more established ones? Specifically with regards to the Competition Commission, what is your assessment of its strengths and weaknesses?

The Commission has established a credible reputation in the area of anti-cartel enforcement and merger regulation. However, it has been less effective in addressing abuse of dominance. This is a risk as there is increasingly an expectation that the Commission address problems of single firm dominance in concentrated markets in the South African economy. If performance continues to lag in this area it will impact negatively on the perceived effectiveness of the Commission. While under-deterence of abuse of dominance reflects some limitations in the legislation it also highlights the challenge of resource constraints faced by the Commission. Such cases demand extensive legal and economic expertise – a shift of priorities to this area may impact performance of the Commission in areas in which it has traditionally had more success (cartel busting, mergers). The use of complementary tools like market inquiries and advocacy will be important and can asset the Commission – but also places a burden on resources.

Regarding staff turnover: Do you see the personnel turnover in recent history to be of sufficient magnitude to have an impact on the performance of the enforcement agency?

It is a worrying development although there are signs that it is starting to stabilise. Although key executives were lost there are still a number of highly experienced staff at the middle management level within the institution that must be nurtured and developed. Some have moved into executive level positions. This is a positive development but also points to a level go juniority in the executive which may impact on effectiveness. Will watch this space.

On Leadership: Do you consider it a benefit or a hindrance if leadership want to introduce their own philosophy of what competition law should seek to achieve on the agency’s activities during their tenure, or do you think that the law is sufficiently clear, such that leadership should focus on efficient and effective delivery of the service, and leave the interpretation to the Tribunal/courts.

It is natural that any leader will bring their own perspective to the role – this cannot be avoided. However, it will be important for the leadership to ensure that such perspectives do not undermine their objectives in giving effect to the mandate of the Commission – which is set down in the Competition Act. Fortunately there are checks and balances in the adjudicative process (Tribunal, rights of appeal) to ensure that these objectives are not contradicted.

Prioritisation: Every agency has budgetary constraints. What are the factors that you think should be most important in how cases are prioritised, should this be based on the developmental needs to society, particular sectors, or even particular areas of the law. What do you think of the prioritisation of recent Section 8 cases, SAB (10 years on an issue that has been extensively sanitised by foreign agencies), Gold Reef News (de minimis), and Sasol Polymers (niche, with limited potential for downstream beneficiation)?

The Commission’s stated prioritisation principles seem reasonable (as they appear in annual reports). However, there is somewhat of a disjuncture between the principles and the outcomes – particularly with respect to abuse of dominance cases. In fact, the outcomes in respect of anti-cartel enforcement have been largely consistent with the application of the Commission’s prioritisation principles – so credit is deserved here. However, new thinking around prioritisation is needed for abuse of dominance cases. In this regard there needs to be a better integration between the Commissions’s policy and research activity, the use of market inquiries and its advocacy with its planning and actions around enforcement against abuse of dominance.

Do you believe that the Competition Tribunal has a role in relation to broader competition advocacy initiatives in South Africa by way of the decisions made?

Advocacy is primarily a function of the Competition Commission, not the Tribunal. The Tribunal must first and foremost safeguard the integrity of its adjudicative function by ensuring impartiality in its decision making processes. There is no harm done though if the Tribunal makes a contribution to the such initiatives as a bi-product of good decisions.

How important, in your view, is the political independence of competition enforcers?

It is very important if the integrity and effectiveness of the agency is to be upheld.

Comparing merger review in an African jurisdiction (any jurisdiction) with that of other competition enforcement agencies worldwide, where do you see the key differences?

A significant difference does appear to be the elevated status of public interest issues in merger proceedings.

What is your view about the elevation of non-competition assessments above those of pure competition tests in merger review? Is it good for the adjudication of competition matters generally?

It is not a problem in and of itself, and is to be expected given various developmental challenges. However, public interest considerations should not trump core competition concerns. In other words, agencies should strive to achieve consistency between the ‘pure’ competition policy objectives (competitive market structures, efficient outcomes etc) and public interest considerations. However, significant dangers arise when public interest objectives conflict with competition policy objectives. Where there are conflicts, alternative policy mechanisms should be considered so that agencies can focus on core non-conflicting objectives. Otherwise they may end up achieving nothing by trying to please everyone. This also means that the public interest considerations that do fall within the mandate of competition agencies should be carefully circumscribed.

What skills would you encourage regional African practitioners focus in on for purposes of developing antitrust advocacy in the region?

They should build a technocratic and professional staff with strong legal and economic skills. These core functions should also be supported by strong policy research and analysis skills – also of the technocratic professional (rather than political) variety. As an academic in this field I would also encourage ongoing training to strengthen those research, investigative and analytical skills.

Thank you, Professor Moodaliyar.

Video: Oxenham on government interventionism in African antitrust

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AAT the big picture

AAT’s own editor John Oxenham has been featured in a video discussion of government interventionism in African competition law.  See the talk on Competition Law Observatory (subscription required)

The topic at issue is successfully negotiating the ever-increasing rise of government interventionism in South African and regional merger control.  Not only does interventionism have the potential to undermine the independence of the agencies, but given the increasing trend of government intervention over the past decade, there are concomitant negative effects on merger control in terms of timing and costs.

John Oxenham, editor
John Oxenham, editor

The number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, which require mandatory merger notification, has increased dramatically in recent times. South Africa, which has the largest economy in Africa and has had a merger control regime in place for some time now, has made significant contributions to merger jurisprudence in Sub-Saharan Africa already. Accordingly, as many regional countries adopt competition law legislation or specific merger control regimes, they will look increasingly towards South Africa’s Competition Authorities to assist in interpreting and enforcing competition law policies.

In addition with this growth in regimes there are significant challenges for companies (and advisors on their behalf) engaging in multi-jurisdictional mergers principally due to the lack of uniformity across the respective jurisdictions. In particular, when one considers the unique merger review considerations that the South African authorities take into account, it becomes clear that navigating through the field of merger control in South Africa and indeed many African countries requires great skill and care.

Meet the Enforcers: COMESA’s Rajeev Hasnah, 1st in exclusive AAT interview series

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meet the enforcers

New AAT interview series highlights individual African competition enforcers

In the first instalment of our new Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with Rajeev Hasnah, CFA, who is a sitting Commissioner of the COMESA Competition Commission.  In our exclusive interview, we discuss the CCC’s merger review practice, its revised Guidelines, young history and achievements, and seek practitioner guidance.

Rajeev Hasnah, CFA
You are an economist by training and currently a sitting COMESA Competition Commissioner.  As the young agency is about to celebrate its 2nd anniversary, what do you consider to be the CCC’s biggest achievement to date?
According to me, it is the fact that the CCC is effectively enforcing the COMESA Competition Regulations since it started operating in January 2013.  It is indeed a commendable achievement given that the current Board of Commissioners sworn-in in October 2011.  In 2012, the CCC worked on the drafting of the guidelines, in consultation with various stakeholders, and under the advice of other competition experts.
The institution also established a good working relationship with national authorities across COMESA and beyond, and proved its credibility and effectiveness as a regional competition authority within the business and legal communities globally.  The rather high number of merger notifications with a COMESA dimension already adjudicated to-date (around 50) is testimony to the success of the CCC being an effective competition law enforcer in its still early days.
Comparing the CCC merger review in practice with that of other competition enforcement agencies worldwide, where do you see the key differences?
Nowadays it is getting harder to talk about differences in any field of economic activity in this increasingly globalised world.  In my view, the key principles and the application of the Competition Law in the COMESA region do not differ significantly either from that of the national authorities or other major jurisdictions across the globe.  The assessment of “substantial lessening of competition” as the underlying fundamental test in merger reviews is at the core of the evaluation conducted by the CCC as well.
Does the multi-national nature of the CCC (akin to the European Commission) make the substantive work more difficult?
It is definitely not an easy feat to enforce the COMESA Competition Regulations across 19 different countries, each with its own economic, legal and cultural environments.  Yet, under the leadership of the current Chairman, Alex Kububa and Director/CEO of the CCC, George Lipimile, a good working relationship and collaboration has been established with the different national authorities across the COMESA region, which facilitates an effective enforcement of the Competition Regulations.   This also ensures that the CCC has a good perspective of the individual local realities, which is no doubt a key element to assess the impact on competition at the regional level.
What prompted the re-drafting of the CCC Merger Guidelines, and why was the indirect path of an administrative guidelines interpretation of the verb “to operate” chosen to elevate the review thresholds, as opposed to increasing the thresholds in the underlying Rules themselves?
It is not uncommon that an authority reviews its guidelines as it gains experience in enforcing the law.  Any changes or further clarifications are geared toward ensuring that the business and legal communities as well as competition economics experts have a good understanding of how the Regulations are enforced by the CCC.  This indeed shows that the CCC stands ready to ensure an improved clarity of its enforcement of the Competition Regulations among its key stakeholders.
The relevant paragraphs defining the verb “to operate” in the Merger Guidelines, should not be construed as a review of the merger notification thresholds per se.  The latter has its own procedures regarding any likely review.  The definition in the Merger Guidelines is rather to ascertain whether the said undertaking is construed to be effectively operating in a Member State or not.
Do you have advice for African practitioners counselling their clients on whether or not to notify a merger to the CCC?
Taking into consideration the rise in the enactment and enforcement of a competition policy regime across various jurisdictions and at the level of regional trading blocs as well, one can safely say that a competition authority is here to stay and to enforce the law as prescribed.
One of the key considerations in doing business is a proper assessment of the risks the undertaking faces or could potentially face and the implementation of a suitable actionplan to deal with these risks.  I believe that non-notification of a notifiable COMESA dimension merger to the CCC should not be construed as carrying a low probability of being detected by the CCC and certainly not a low impact one for the undertaking.
What is your view about the elevation of non-competition assessments above those of pure competition tests in merger review?  Is it good for the adjudication of competition matters generally?
Some jurisdictions consider public interests as important, while some don’t.  This is normally provided for or not in the respective laws, and whichever is the case, as adjudicators, we need to follow what is prescribed in the Regulations.
It is also important to note that in practice, the enforcement of competition law can be defined as being the conduct of economic analysis within a legal framework.  Both the economic analysis and legal framework evolve accordingly in line with the development of the jurisdiction’s economy.  We can take the examples of more mature competition policy regimes which started with the consideration of non-competition issues in merger review, to then afterwards moving to assessing only competition matters.  As such, each jurisdiction has its own specificities that it needs to take into consideration, though these are bound to evolve with time.
By way of background, how did you get into antitrust/competition law & economics?
I am an economist and a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) by training, and prior to joining the antitrust world I was an investment professional.  Four years ago I had the choice between acquiring experience in private equity or joining the nascent competition law enforcement team of the Competition Commission of Mauritius as its Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director, working with the then Executive Director, John Davies.  I chose the latter for its excellent combination of applied microeconomics and law.
What was the path that took you to working for competition enforcement agencies?
I started as a macroeconomist working in London for an economic consultancy firm in the city, where I was advising traders and asset managers.  I then moved on to financial investing in an investment management firm and to corporate finance in one of the largest conglomerates in Mauritius.  So I came to the antitrust world as a business/investment practitioner with a strong background and experience in applied economic and financial analysis.
Having seen the world from the private sector side, I acquired an edge in the application of competition economics in my previous role as a Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director and as a current Commissioner at the COMESA Competition Commission.
What skills would you encourage regional African practitioners focus on for purposes of developing antitrust advocacy in the COMESA region?
Having previously led the Competition Culture project for the International Competition Network (ICN) Advocacy Working Group (AWG), I am now one of the strong proponents of the importance of advocacy to develop and maintain a strong competition culture within society.
Ensuring that advocacy activities are properly designed and tailored to meet the requirements of the target group is crucial.  Equally important is to ability to communicate in a very simple and easy to understand language, adapted to meeting the target audience’s expectations.
Thank you, Mr. Hasnah.

ACF in the spotlight: African Competition Forum promotes policy enhancements

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Putting African antitrust enforcement in the spotlight: the work of the African Competition Forum

AAT is often right and sometimes wrong — and we acknowledge the latter whenever that happens.  Today is one such occasion, as we have been entirely remiss in our coverage of the African Competition Forum (“ACF”).

The ACF (FAQ here) is a 3+ year-old organisation comprising several anglophone and francophone countries with and without competition enforcement agencies across the African continent (with apparently ongoing efforts to recruit Portuguese-language entities as well, e.g., Mozambique, Angola).  It undertakes various research, capacity-building, and advocacy/integration projects, all related to competition policy and enforcement.

The ACF notably spans across the entire continent, having a self-reported 41 countries as members, and its membership scope is larger than that of regional bodies, such as COMESA or SADC.

We look forward to providing more in-depth coverage of the ACF in the future, including interviews with the group’s senior leaders.  For the time being, in the organisation’s own words, its history and mission are as follows:

The African Competition Forum (ACF) was formally launched in March 2011 as a network of competition authorities in African countries. The network is comprised of 41 out of 54 African countries. It was tasked with enhancing the adoption of competition laws, building the capacity of new authorities and assisting in advocating for the implementation of competition reforms that benefit African economies. In countries where there is no authority, the network would assist in paving the way for the development of a competition law. An Interim Steering Group (ISG) was initially tasked with overseeing the setting up of the ACF.

A major task the ISG and then SC had to perform, foremost, was the development of a needs assessment which would be used to develop the ACF’s plan of action and would also help prioritise the key issues for which countries who are members of the network would require assistance. In coming up with the needs assessment a broad questionnaire was administered and sent to the four regional competition authorities of Southern African Development Community (SADC), West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU), Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and to forty-one countries, twenty-seven of which responded.

Overall, the key elements that were identified as priorities for African authorities within the questionnaire fell into three main categories:

1. Capacity building on strategic planning and management, practical aspects of competition law enforcement such as investigative and litigation skills and techniques; and foundational training on the basics of competition law and economics;
2. Technical assistance in drafting and revising competition policy, laws and regulations and in designing agency procedures, guidelines, and operational manuals; and,
3. Support with advocacy and engaging other relevant stakeholders.

The questionnaire incorporated the above elements in five sections, namely:

1. The status of competition policy and law in the responding country
2. The responsible agency’s powers, jurisdiction and functions (if one exists)
3. The resources and workload of the competition agency
4. The capacity building and technical support required by the responding country
5. The nature of relationships with regional and multinational and other competition bodies.

Respondents’ contact details were drawn from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) databases on competition authorities worldwide; information supplied by Department for International Development (DFID); SADC; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); personal contact between the ACF Co-ordinating Team; and, regional and national authorities. A meeting about the needs assessment questionnaire with African countries attending an UNCTAD conference in Geneva in November 2010 also served to provide contacts details of key competition personnel.

The ACF was recently spotlighted in an article in the Tanzanian Daily News, which reported on the ACF’s workshop entitled “Agency Effectiveness.”  The article is worth a read, we believe, as it explains the history of the ACF’s founding as well as some background to African economies’ slower and later adoption of competition regulation, due to previously centrally-planned economics and broadly government-sanctioned monopolies operating lawfully:

Dr Kigoda noted that African economies have co-existed with a number of well-known cartels and anti-competitive conducts such as price fixing, bid-ridding, restrictions of output, allocation of markets and other unwarranted agreements.

Due to that African competition agencies must be vigilant to investigate and prosecute all these in order to ease the burden on their taxpayers.

…

Deputy Chairman of Fair Competition Commission (FCC) Col. (Rtd) Abihudi Nalingigwa said competition authorities seek to ensure that there are no anti-competitive agreements, abuse of market power and unjustified monopolistic market concentrations are put on check.

“We thought it would be worthwhile this time around concentrating on ‘Agency Effectiveness” because we believed the topic falls directly within the expectations of our stakeholders including the consumer, business community and the government who should see value for financing agency operations.

This can best be realized through translation into more effective competition and regulatory authorities which are capable of quick dispensation of justice that provide relief to their lives. On other hand, investor-confidence through better market regulation will increase investment inflow as investors will be assured that no anti-competitive will go unchecked or unaddressed.

Many African countries introduced their competition law in the mid 1990s prompted by a process of privatization and liberalization of their respective economies that started in late 1980s….

 

The creeping public-interest factor in antitrust: Still creeping or racing yet?

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south_africa

Race to bottom: dilution of competition-law factors in South Africa?

As we have reported numerous times, both on the global policy front as well as in individual case reports, the South African competition regulators and their superiors in the economic development ministry have had their sights on placing a stronger emphasis on the “public interest” element inherent in the SA competition legislation — thereby diluting pure competition-law/antitrust analysis, as some might argue.

Recently, Minister Patel commended his “independent” team at the Competition Commission for not only doing a good job overall, but also in particular on the public-interest front, encouraging the systematic consideration of public interest by the Commission and the Tribunal.

His prepared remarks from the 8th Annual Competition, Law, Economics and Policy Conference in Johannesburg are now uploaded here.  In them, he emphasizes that competition policy is “rightly”…:

“… a subset of broader competitive policies, which in turn are part of our industrial policy framework. … Our law provides an opportunity, and indeed an obligation, to align corporate strategy (by which I refer to mergers or takeovers) with public interest considerations. … The increasing use of the public-interest requirements in evaluating mergers has been critical in ensuring that competition policy has a growing developmental impact, saving thousands of jobs and providing millions of rands to support small and emerging enterprises.”

On the independence of the enforcers, Mr. Patel had this to say:

This kind of alignment must in future, as in the past, respect the independence of the regulator. But all our agencies, however independent, work within the framework of national policies.

These remarks are fairly strong, indeed!  We leave it to our AAT readership to infer the consequences of these observations on future merger enforcement and on the true degree of independence of the Commission — you can read between the lines.

In a companion paper, entitled “What is competition good for – weighing the wider benefits of competition and the costs of pursuing non-competition objectives”, AAT’s own John Oxenham (Nortons) and Patrick Smith (RBB Economics) argue as follows:

Over the past five years, the South African competition authorities have increasingly struggled to balance a competition test with defined public interest criteria (Metropolitan, Kansai, Walmart). Other agencies (ICASA, NERSA), and government ministries more generally, have also wrestled with how competition policy might fit into wider government policies and even broader concepts of the “public interest”, including notions of equality, fairness and access. In this paper we discuss some of key events in this ongoing debate, and we anticipate some of the battles that are likely to come. Furthermore, we set out a rigorous framework and provide a review of the available research and literature to discuss the effects of competition (both positive and negative) in multiple dimensions, in order to assess how far a “pure competition” test might go in achieving a broad range of efficiency, growth, and employment objectives. Such a comprehensive and evidence based approach is essential in understanding the costs and benefits of the existing pursuit of multiple (and often apparently conflicting) objectives, and will allow decision makers to more logically assess the trade-offs that they will continue to be confronted with.

Costly COMESA courthouse, ZA investigates Visa provider & holds ground on Sasol fine

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south_africa

Lots AAT news this Monday, from Sudan/COMESA to South Africa

Visa facilitator backed by one branch of government & investigated by another

In substantive antitrust news, the South African Competition Commission is reported to be investigating alleged abuses of market dominance by VFS Global in the visa support services market to foreign embassies.

VFS is a worldwide outsourcing and technology services specialist for diplomatic missions and governments.

The firm has now drawn the potential ire of the Commission, as it is now apparently the only outlet for foreigners to apply for South African visas and work permits, as well as for South African citizens to obtain entry visas for multiple countries abroad.

The irony here that we at AAT perceive is that the monopoly position of VFS appears to be based on the new immigration regulations imposed by the ZA government itself (notably the Department of Home Affairs) earlier in 2014: According to a report, the company had recently opened the doors of its multiple offices across the country — “The Pretoria (Gauteng), Rustenburg (North West) and Kimberley (Northern Cape) centres were the first to open on Monday, 2 June. It is envisaged that the last office will be opened on 23 June.”

The investigation – to be confirmed by the Commission this week, as it potentially launches a full-on formal inquest – was purportedly initiated by a competitor complaint from company Visa Request, claiming damage to its competing business flowing from the governmentally-imposed dominant position of VFS’s (allegedly pricier) services…

Commission stays course on Sasol

In more ZA news, Competition Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele is staying the agency’s strong course on the excessive-pricing fine imposed on Sasol, which is said to be appealing its R543 fine that had been upheld by the country’s Competition Tribunal, and which Commissioner Bonakele thinks “should be bigger”…

In our prior AAT reporting on the Sasol abuse-of-dominance case we said:

The S.A. Competition Tribunal is hearing the excessive-pricing portion (which was not settled) of the Commission‘s claims against the refining & steel giant this month.  The relevant legal underpinning of the case is the provision against excessive pricing by a dominant firm.  Precedent has declared prices excessive that “bear no reasonable relation to the economic value of the good or service” at issue.  Pheeew.  Facts.  Economics.  Nice.  Looks like a coming battle of the experts to me…

By comparison, in the U.S., antitrust law of course does not forbid “excessive pricing.”  While setting and reaping apparently high prices may be indicative of monopoly power, such acts are not in themselves anti-competitive or illegal in the States.  In Verizon v. Trinko, the U.S. Supreme Court held famously that:

The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.

Interestingly, there is a notable history of failures in the area of ‘excessive pricing’ complaints in South Africa, as well, despite the statutory legitimisation of the cause of action.  In the prior ArcelorMittal and Telkom cases, the Commission and/or Tribunal lost in the end, either at trial or on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court.  That Court had found, in the ArcelorMittal case, that the antitrust watchdogs could not use the ‘excessive pricing’ provision of the statute to combat perceived anti-competitiveness in the “market structure rather than price level.”

Today, Bonakele is quoted as follows:

“These are different times.  I can promise you this matter is not going to disappear. Sasol is out of touch if it believes it can win the matter on the basis of technical legal arguments. This issue has to be resolved either through competition law or through government policy.

The issue in this case is fundamental to the development of our economy. We are dealing with resources that should be available to promote that development. The government plays an important role in the country’s industrialisation, and I believe it will be very interested in the progress of this case.”

COMESA’s costly courthouse

While the COMESA organisation has had trouble in the virtual world this year, its real-world endavours appear to be prospering: Its shiny new courthouse, built to the tune of over $4 million (equivalent to only 8 merger filing fees), has opened its doors.  The country’s Minister of Justice, Mohamed Bushara Dosa, last week handed over to the COMESA Secretariat-general the Khartoum-based court premises.

The court will notably hear antitrust and merger cases that are appealed from the organisation’s Competition Commission.

 

https://i0.wp.com/news.sudanvisiondaily.com/media/images/29d17065-0634-951e.jpg
The glimmering COMESA court house in Sudan, built to the tune of $4.1 million

Dual accolades for Nortons Inc.

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Law firm of AAT editor John Oxenham has been awarded two prestigious recognitions

Finance Monthly – Law Awards 2014

Following a nomination and voting process, Nortons Inc. has won the award for “Antitrust & Competition Law Firm of the Year – South Africa” in this year’s Finance Monthly Law Awards. The awards are divided into firm and individual categories and have been chosen to reflect the range of practice areas and skills that lie at the heart of the successful law firm or legal department.

Lawyers World Global Awards 2014

Nortons Inc. also won the South African award in the Lawyers World Global Awards 2014, which recognises a select number of leading professional firms, organisations & advisers worldwide for their individual areas of specialisation within their respective geographical locations.

The Big Picture: AAT History – Maturing competition-law regimes in Africa

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AAT the big picture

Below, AfricanAntitrust.com provides a brief overview of maturing antitrust jurisdictions in Africa

In the past two decades, 26 African countries implemented domestic competition law regimes, and that number continues to grow.

Many competition authorities who were previously deemed as being rather ineffective in their teething stages, have now begun to actively enforce their respective competition law provisions by launching market inquiries, prohibiting anti-competitive mergers, conducting dawn raids and becoming tough on cartel activity.

Below, we provide a short summary of some of the maturing jurisdictions on the continent (notably excluding matured ones (South Africa) as well as young regimes, including supra-national ones such as COMESA, as they arguably fall outside this definition.)

Botswana

The Competition Authority in Botswana was launched in 2011, and with 33 staff members, of which nearly half comprises economists, and the authority has already conducted more than 20 dawn raids and launched market inquiries launched into various “priority sectors” such as retail, poultry and cement. The competition authority has blocked mergers which impede the empowerment of Botswana’s citizens on the basis of public interest concerns in maintaining sufficient local shareholding in certain key markets such as health care.

Kenya

In 2011, Kenya implemented its Competition Act and now, given the new, and higher, merger filing fees, the budgetary constraints within the Competition Authority of Kenya (“CAK”) will be addressed and alleviated. The Competition Authority of Kenya announced its intention to launch investigations into claims of powerful cartels in the lucrative coffee industry in Kenya. The Competition Authority of Kenya plans to probe abuse of dominance by coffee firms, particularly in relation to marketing. In addition, the Competition Authority of Kenya has initiated an investigation into allegations of abuse of dominance by Lafarge in Kenya, which may result in Lafarge being forced to sell its stake in the East African Portland Cement Company.

Following the dawn raid conducted by the South African Competition Commission on Unilever and Sime Darby in April 2014 in relation to the edible oils industry, the CAK has launched an investigation into the edible oils market, in which local prices have been unresponsive to reductions in the cost of imported feedstock.

Namibia, Zambia & Mauritius

Both the Namibian and Mauritian competition authorities have announced their respective plans to introduce a formal corporate leniency policy to improve their cartel enforcement. In addition, the Mauritian Competition Commission will investigate whether Stage Beverages, of the Castle Group, and Phoenix Beverages Ltd have agreed to divide markets in Mauritius and Madagascar, given that the Mauritian Competition Commission has reason to believe that Stage Beverages and Phoenix Beverages have agreed that Stage Beverages will cease the manufacture and supply of beer in Mauritius, while Phoenix Beverages will do the same in Madagascar.

The Zambian competition authority has recently imposed significant penalties for price-fixing in the vehicle-repair industry. Furthermore, it has conducted dawn raids on two fertiliser companies.

AAT will continue its summaries (which we hope you find helpful in navigating the competition-law map of Africa) in its “Big Picture” series.

Panel bestows cum laude Ph.D. on AAT contributing author

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Ranchordas, Sofia: Tilburg University doctoral dissertation defense

Tilburg University bestows doctorate cum laude  on AAT author Ranchordás

AfricanAntitrust.com contributing writer, assistant professor of law at Tilburg Univ., and lead author of our #InnovationAntitrust series Sofia Ranchordás was honoured yesterday by a distinguished panel of academics at Tilburg University (Netherlands) with a Ph.D. marked cum laude — a distinction granted only to approximately 2% of Dutch doctoral degrees.

She defended her dissertation on experimental legislation, sunset clauses, innovation, of which we publish a short “layman’s terminology” summary extract here.

Congratulations, doctor!

Sofia Ranchordas, Ass't Professor, Tilburg University

Sofia Ranchordás, Ph.D. cum laude, Ass’t Professor, Tilburg University (Law School)

10-Minute Presentation of Ranchordás Ph.D.
Dissertation in Layman’s Terms

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for being here today.

I especially welcome my front row guests, in particular my mother, and my sister who managed to convince her boss that it is possible do a PhD in Law, and two young guests that even had to ask permission to skip classes today:

Hallo Tim en Indy, fijn dat jullie er zijn en dat jullie vrij van school konden krijgen.

(Last week one of my students asked me why I had written yet another book to obtain a PhD degree. My straightforward answer was: because no one else has even written about it and the world needs to know more about sunset clauses, experimental legislation and innovation. My student wasn’t totally convinced by my answer, but at the end of these 10/9 minutes I hope you will be.

Experimental legislation, sunset clauses, innovation: three enigmatic words, 3 Pandora boxes to lawmakers, 3 years and 3 months to write one book. [And as you can see, it is a thick one, but not thick enough to ask all the questions that should have been asked or to provide all the answers]. This book tells the story of two legislative instruments which have been overlooked by legislators. Two instruments that seem to have much to offer to that one reality we all seek these days: innovation.‘

1. ‘Sunset clauses’ are dispositions that impose the termination of a law after a determined period, which means that a law or some of its dispositions might only last for 5 years.

2. ‘Experimental legislation’ submits new rules to a test, trying them out in the real world, testing their effectiveness. The new rules are tried in a part of the territory, while the ‘old ones’ remain applicable to the other. At the end of a certain period, results are compared and, in principle, the legislator ‘should allow the best law to win. However, in the lawmaking process the legislative winner does always not take it all. Politics very often does.

3. ‘Innovation’ is a broad concept that cannot be reduced to a brilliant idea: it is more and less than this common perception of the innovative wheel, a light bulb or a pair of Google glasses. Innovation is instead the first successful commercialization of a new idea, brilliant or not, that can improve the existing state of technology of society.

4. Innovation is ‘a kind of magic’: it is our hope in difficult times, the promise for long-term sustainable growth. Innovation is also ‘a crazy little thing’: it is all around us, but it is impossible to grasp and to generate through a simple formula. Instead, it is a very complex process that can be stimulated or impeded by a number of elements, including outdated regulation.

5. It is a difficult mission to regulate innovation but I know two perfect candidates for the job: sunset clauses and experimental legislation. They provide the flexibility and adaptability that regulators need to regulate under uncertain conditions, allow legislators to revise rules as more information about innovative products becomes available, and terminate obsolete dispositions.

6. However, as always, friends get the best jobs, strangers do not. And that is the case of sunset clauses and experimental legislation: they are total strangers to most lawyers and lawmakers. Before I started doing my research, how many of you had ever heard about sunset clauses and experimental regulations? And even now how many would be able to recognize you?

7 In my research, I looked into the reasons why sunset clauses and experimental legislation have not been more often used to regulate innovative fields and there are legal and non-legal reasons underlying this general resistance to these instruments. An apparently simple research question, you might say. However, as life often teaches us, appearances are misleading and this question allowed me to rethink the meaning of different principles of law in a changing world, the meeting of minds between innovators and regulators and the non-legal elements influencing the lawmaking process.

8. There appears to be a widespread belief that these instruments ‘are bad’ because they violate a number of principles of law we hold dear. That is the case of the principle of legal certainty that is often connected with the idea of predictability, stability and continuity of law. However, some laws cannot live forever because they regulate phenomena that evolve rapidly or problems that might be temporary. Sunset clauses and experimental legislation can provide in these cases more temporary certainty, because they do not expose laws to the erosion of time. In my dissertation, I also argue that experimental laws do not endanger the principle of equal treatment. While it is true that not all citizens will be equal before the law, this differentiation will be temporary, objectively justified and it is intrinsic to the main objective of experimental legislation: gather more information about the effects of a new law.

10. The scarce use of sunset clauses and experimental legislation can be attributed to a number of non-legal elements, such as lack of information or expertise, a certain intellectual reluctance towards termination of laws or the experimental method, high costs, fear of being confronted with unpleasant facts, or political rationality. While law is for a great deal about politics, there must be a way to ensure that some legislative decisions are rendered more transparent.

11. The real Achilles heel of experimental legislation and sunset clauses is the lack of a clear legal and methodological framework. Legislators do not know when they should choose temporary laws in detriment of lasting ones, how to enact them and for how long. The main contribution of my dissertation lies in the design of a framework, where guidelines are provided to lawmakers: go for sunset clauses when you expect a technology to evolve rapidly, experiment with new rules when you do not know enough about their effectiveness; make sure experiments are meaningful and truly convert the lawmaking process into a learning one, set transparent evaluation criteria and ask regulators to justify their decisions to follow or reject the results of an experiment. Educate lawmakers and citizens with the truth of the facts and not the power of opinions.

12. Are sunset clauses and experimental legislation a blessing or a curse to innovation? I leave you, ladies and gentlemen, with this question. It results from my research that they are not a curse for a law that keeps up with reality, for a law that lives along the paths of innovation. Instead, they bless the courageous legislators that try new laws to see if they work, allow laws to expire when they are no longer necessary, removing unnecessary burdens from the shoulders and pockets of innovators. However, sunset clauses and experimental legislation will only be blessings for innovation, if they are drafted along the lines of law. However, and excuse me for citing a lawyer in a speech supposed to be to laymen: as Felix Frankfurter affirmed: ‘science and technology cannot reshape society while law maintains its Blackstonian essence’, i.e., in layman’s terms this means: while lawyers try to confer their own interpretation to every single phenomenon, lagging behind reality.