Meet the Enforcers: COMESA’s Rajeev Hasnah, 1st in exclusive AAT interview series

meet the enforcers

New AAT interview series highlights individual African competition enforcers

In the first instalment of our new Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with Rajeev Hasnah, CFA, who is a sitting Commissioner of the COMESA Competition Commission.  In our exclusive interview, we discuss the CCC’s merger review practice, its revised Guidelines, young history and achievements, and seek practitioner guidance.


Rajeev Hasnah, CFA
You are an economist by training and currently a sitting COMESA Competition Commissioner.  As the young agency is about to celebrate its 2nd anniversary, what do you consider to be the CCC’s biggest achievement to date?
According to me, it is the fact that the CCC is effectively enforcing the COMESA Competition Regulations since it started operating in January 2013.  It is indeed a commendable achievement given that the current Board of Commissioners sworn-in in October 2011.  In 2012, the CCC worked on the drafting of the guidelines, in consultation with various stakeholders, and under the advice of other competition experts.
The institution also established a good working relationship with national authorities across COMESA and beyond, and proved its credibility and effectiveness as a regional competition authority within the business and legal communities globally.  The rather high number of merger notifications with a COMESA dimension already adjudicated to-date (around 50) is testimony to the success of the CCC being an effective competition law enforcer in its still early days.
Comparing the CCC merger review in practice with that of other competition enforcement agencies worldwide, where do you see the key differences?
Nowadays it is getting harder to talk about differences in any field of economic activity in this increasingly globalised world.  In my view, the key principles and the application of the Competition Law in the COMESA region do not differ significantly either from that of the national authorities or other major jurisdictions across the globe.  The assessment of “substantial lessening of competition” as the underlying fundamental test in merger reviews is at the core of the evaluation conducted by the CCC as well.
Does the multi-national nature of the CCC (akin to the European Commission) make the substantive work more difficult?
It is definitely not an easy feat to enforce the COMESA Competition Regulations across 19 different countries, each with its own economic, legal and cultural environments.  Yet, under the leadership of the current Chairman, Alex Kububa and Director/CEO of the CCC, George Lipimile, a good working relationship and collaboration has been established with the different national authorities across the COMESA region, which facilitates an effective enforcement of the Competition Regulations.   This also ensures that the CCC has a good perspective of the individual local realities, which is no doubt a key element to assess the impact on competition at the regional level.
What prompted the re-drafting of the CCC Merger Guidelines, and why was the indirect path of an administrative guidelines interpretation of the verb “to operate” chosen to elevate the review thresholds, as opposed to increasing the thresholds in the underlying Rules themselves?
It is not uncommon that an authority reviews its guidelines as it gains experience in enforcing the law.  Any changes or further clarifications are geared toward ensuring that the business and legal communities as well as competition economics experts have a good understanding of how the Regulations are enforced by the CCC.  This indeed shows that the CCC stands ready to ensure an improved clarity of its enforcement of the Competition Regulations among its key stakeholders.
The relevant paragraphs defining the verb “to operate” in the Merger Guidelines, should not be construed as a review of the merger notification thresholds per se.  The latter has its own procedures regarding any likely review.  The definition in the Merger Guidelines is rather to ascertain whether the said undertaking is construed to be effectively operating in a Member State or not.
Do you have advice for African practitioners counselling their clients on whether or not to notify a merger to the CCC?
Taking into consideration the rise in the enactment and enforcement of a competition policy regime across various jurisdictions and at the level of regional trading blocs as well, one can safely say that a competition authority is here to stay and to enforce the law as prescribed.
One of the key considerations in doing business is a proper assessment of the risks the undertaking faces or could potentially face and the implementation of a suitable actionplan to deal with these risks.  I believe that non-notification of a notifiable COMESA dimension merger to the CCC should not be construed as carrying a low probability of being detected by the CCC and certainly not a low impact one for the undertaking.
What is your view about the elevation of non-competition assessments above those of pure competition tests in merger review?  Is it good for the adjudication of competition matters generally?
Some jurisdictions consider public interests as important, while some don’t.  This is normally provided for or not in the respective laws, and whichever is the case, as adjudicators, we need to follow what is prescribed in the Regulations.
It is also important to note that in practice, the enforcement of competition law can be defined as being the conduct of economic analysis within a legal framework.  Both the economic analysis and legal framework evolve accordingly in line with the development of the jurisdiction’s economy.  We can take the examples of more mature competition policy regimes which started with the consideration of non-competition issues in merger review, to then afterwards moving to assessing only competition matters.  As such, each jurisdiction has its own specificities that it needs to take into consideration, though these are bound to evolve with time.
By way of background, how did you get into antitrust/competition law & economics?
I am an economist and a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) by training, and prior to joining the antitrust world I was an investment professional.  Four years ago I had the choice between acquiring experience in private equity or joining the nascent competition law enforcement team of the Competition Commission of Mauritius as its Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director, working with the then Executive Director, John Davies.  I chose the latter for its excellent combination of applied microeconomics and law.
What was the path that took you to working for competition enforcement agencies?
I started as a macroeconomist working in London for an economic consultancy firm in the city, where I was advising traders and asset managers.  I then moved on to financial investing in an investment management firm and to corporate finance in one of the largest conglomerates in Mauritius.  So I came to the antitrust world as a business/investment practitioner with a strong background and experience in applied economic and financial analysis.
Having seen the world from the private sector side, I acquired an edge in the application of competition economics in my previous role as a Chief Economist/Deputy Executive Director and as a current Commissioner at the COMESA Competition Commission.
What skills would you encourage regional African practitioners focus on for purposes of developing antitrust advocacy in the COMESA region?
Having previously led the Competition Culture project for the International Competition Network (ICN) Advocacy Working Group (AWG), I am now one of the strong proponents of the importance of advocacy to develop and maintain a strong competition culture within society.
Ensuring that advocacy activities are properly designed and tailored to meet the requirements of the target group is crucial.  Equally important is to ability to communicate in a very simple and easy to understand language, adapted to meeting the target audience’s expectations.
Thank you, Mr. Hasnah.

The creeping public-interest factor in antitrust: Still creeping or racing yet?

south_africa

Race to bottom: dilution of competition-law factors in South Africa?

As we have reported numerous times, both on the global policy front as well as in individual case reports, the South African competition regulators and their superiors in the economic development ministry have had their sights on placing a stronger emphasis on the “public interest” element inherent in the SA competition legislation — thereby diluting pure competition-law/antitrust analysis, as some might argue.

Recently, Minister Patel commended his “independent” team at the Competition Commission for not only doing a good job overall, but also in particular on the public-interest front, encouraging the systematic consideration of public interest by the Commission and the Tribunal.

His prepared remarks from the 8th Annual Competition, Law, Economics and Policy Conference in Johannesburg are now uploaded here.  In them, he emphasizes that competition policy is “rightly”…:

“… a subset of broader competitive policies, which in turn are part of our industrial policy framework. … Our law provides an opportunity, and indeed an obligation, to align corporate strategy (by which I refer to mergers or takeovers) with public interest considerations. … The increasing use of the public-interest requirements in evaluating mergers has been critical in ensuring that competition policy has a growing developmental impact, saving thousands of jobs and providing millions of rands to support small and emerging enterprises.”

On the independence of the enforcers, Mr. Patel had this to say:

This kind of alignment must in future, as in the past, respect the independence of the regulator. But all our agencies, however independent, work within the framework of national policies.

These remarks are fairly strong, indeed!  We leave it to our AAT readership to infer the consequences of these observations on future merger enforcement and on the true degree of independence of the Commission — you can read between the lines.

In a companion paper, entitled “What is competition good for – weighing the wider benefits of competition and the costs of pursuing non-competition objectives”, AAT’s own John Oxenham (Nortons) and Patrick Smith (RBB Economics) argue as follows:

Over the past five years, the South African competition authorities have increasingly struggled to balance a competition test with defined public interest criteria (Metropolitan, Kansai, Walmart). Other agencies (ICASA, NERSA), and government ministries more generally, have also wrestled with how competition policy might fit into wider government policies and even broader concepts of the “public interest”, including notions of equality, fairness and access. In this paper we discuss some of key events in this ongoing debate, and we anticipate some of the battles that are likely to come. Furthermore, we set out a rigorous framework and provide a review of the available research and literature to discuss the effects of competition (both positive and negative) in multiple dimensions, in order to assess how far a “pure competition” test might go in achieving a broad range of efficiency, growth, and employment objectives. Such a comprehensive and evidence based approach is essential in understanding the costs and benefits of the existing pursuit of multiple (and often apparently conflicting) objectives, and will allow decision makers to more logically assess the trade-offs that they will continue to be confronted with.

Patel commends his competition team

south_africa

Minister finds praise for competition agencies, having increased fines “1000%”

The official South African news agency reports that Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel has lauded the country’s competition authorities as “remarkably effective over the past 15 years.”

“The competition authorities have done solid investigations as they have stepped up actions against cartels and promoted public interest consideration when conducting investigations,” he is quoted as saying at the 8th Annual Competition, Law, Economics and Policy Conference in Johannesburg. “The remedies and fines imposed by the competition authorities climbed ten fold compared to the previous five years, call it 1000 percent, reaching over R6 billion.”

Minister Patel said the competition authority had come into their own with solid pipelines of anti-cartel investigation, the systematic consideration of public interest and issues in merger acquisition.

Setting aside the unorthodox phraseology (“merger acquisition”) in the quoted paragraph, the Minister’s remarks indeed echo what we at AAT have observed for well over a year now, namely the renewed and increased focus of the competition agencies on so-called “public-interest” factors, in lieu of (or in addition to) traditional, classic antitrust considerations, such as market power, concentration/HHIs, and prediction of unilateral/coordinated effects of proposed mergers.

Competition Commission appoints new Spokesperson and Cartels Executive

south_africa

Personnel changes at SACC

The Competition Commission (“the Commission”) has announced that it has appointed Mr Mava Scott (“Mr Scott”) as Spokesperson of the Commission from 1 August 2014 and Mr Makgale Mohlala (“Mr Mohala”) as Divisional Manager of the Cartels division, with effect from 18 August 2014

Mr Scott has more than 12 years’ experience in communications and media relations, and was formerly employed, since 2008, at the Department of Water Affairs as the Chief Director of Communication Services. Mr Scott holds a Baccaleureus Procurationis (BProc) degree from the University of the Western Cape, and is currently studying towards a Master of Laws (LLM) degree in Constitutional and Administrative Law at the University of Pretoria.

Mr Mohlala has been with the Commission for over 14 years, having joined as part of the Graduate Trainee programme in 2000 as part of Mergers and Acquisitions. More recently, Mr Mohala was the Principal Investigator of the Cartels division. In this position, Mr Mohlala led investigations into the cement cartel and the collusion in the construction industry, which included some of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Stadia. Mr Mohlala holds a BProc degree from Vista University, an LLM in Corporate Law from the University of Pretoria and is currently enrolled for a Master of Business Leadership (MBL) with the University of South Africa.

Competition Tribunal members re-appointed by President

south_africa 

President Zuma re-appoints three Tribunal members

The President of the Republic of South Africa has made his decision to re-appoint Competition Tribunal Chairperson Norman Manoim for a second term now that his term has come to an end. Along with Mr Manoim, the President has also re-appointed full-time panel members Yasmin Carrim and Andreas Wessels for a further five years at the Tribunal.

For the past decade, the Tribunal has comprised three full-time panel members and up to eight part-time panel members can be appointed. For the first time, a fourth full-time panel member has been appointed, namely Ms Mondo Mazwai.

Two panel members who were not re-appointed are part-time panel members Professor Merle Holden and Dr Takalani Madima. The President has not announced whether two additional part-time panel members will be appointed to the Tribunal panel.

 

Patel not mincing words, diluting competition-law factors in mergers

south_africa

Economic Development Minister of South Africa, Ebrahim Patel, recently stated that the Competition Commission (“Commission”), South Africa’s key competition authority, will be asked to focus on jobs, industrialisation and small business development in lieu of ‘pure’ antitrust-law issues.

Patel stated that government would require the Industrial Development Corporation to focus on supporting black industrialists, and on the competition authorities to promote economic transformation “not as a by-product of but an explicit objective of competition policy.” According to Patel, competition bodies are in a position to contribute directly to the state’s objective of creating a more equal economy, where workers shared in the benefits of growth. His department is allegedly already in talks with the construction industry on a restitution package to redress collusion and price fixing. The end result, he stated, would be that larger companies will provide funds to support small producers and local suppliers.

Patel’s controversial views have already influenced Commission merger decisions and can clearly be seen in the recent Afgri/AgriGoupe case, where the authority entered into an agreement with the foreign buyer of the local grain and poultry company Afgri, requiring the new owners to contribute R90 million ($9m) to a fund to support small-hold farmers with training and loans.

Based on Mr. Patel’s latest pronouncements, South Africa is on a path to politicizing antitrust law and making pure competition considerations a secondary objective to public-interest considerations.

Competition agencies to split up, abandon dual roles

Dual role of Commission prompts constitutionality questions

As Portia Nkani reports in the Botswana Gazette, the country’s two competition-law authorities are slated to be separated in the near future.  Botswana – a COMESA member state – has both a Competition Commission and Competition Authority.  Concerns over the dual roles of the Competition Commission (it is, since January 2011, both the strategy-setting administrative entity supervising the Authority and a quasi-judicial agency) have reportedly led to the structural change in organization.

The Chairman of the Competition Commission, Dr Zein Kebonang purportedly has voiced support for the decision to separate the two functions and agencies, saying “that regular contact between Commission and CA officials could give raise to reasonable appreciation of bias. ‘The independence and impartiality of Commissioners cannot be guaranteed when it doubles up as a board and as a tribunal. Besides relational bias, the likelihood of informational bias is also far too great. Sitting as a Board, the Commission acquires prior knowledge of disputes that are to be adjudicated before it as a tribunal. Undoubtedly, prior knowledge of a dispute may operate in the minds of the Commissioners and thus deprive the parties that appear before them a proper hearing,'” he has written in a position paper.

Procedural fairness demands that investigative and adjudicative functions must be kept separate. This is desirable because competition law and policy must be implemented in an objective, impartial and transparent manner. Unless the Competition Commission and the Competition Authority are afforded independence from each other, they are unlikely to objectively decide matters presented before them and the risk of bias will forever be present,’” he said, adding that public confidence and trust can only be enhanced if the adjudicative and administrative function were separated.

The initial call for the split of the authorities was made by lawyers for panel-beating companies under investigation last year (see article here):

Sadique Kebonang, counsel for one of the parties, had argued that the relationship between the agencies was “too intimate”: “The main test here is what the ordinary man out there perceives the two entities to be.”

Has national antitrust enforcer abdicated to COMESA?

swaziland

Swaziland Competition Commission all but shuttering its doors

Since the creation of its competition-law authority in 2007, COMESA member state Swaziland has seen only 2 (two) enforcement matters, according to a report by the Observer.  Even by COMESA’s statistical standards, 2 matters in 7 years amounts to a record low.

Over in the virtual world, the SCC’s web site reflects the agency’s real-life inactivity: The last update appears to have been made in March 2012, a full two years ago; many, if not most, hyperlinks to “news” are broken or lead the viewer to blank pages; PDF document downloads often fail for no obvious reason.

As to the two discernible cases undertaken by the agency, the Observer article quotes Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) Advocacy and Communications Officer Mancoba Mabuza as follows:

[T]he first enforcement matter the commission dealt with was The Gables (Pty) Ltd versus Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd where the secretariat conducted an investigation into allegations made by The Gables against Pick n Pay.

[T]he second enforcement case involved Eagles Nest (Pty) Ltd and Usuthu Poultry (Pty) Ltd which was investigated by the secretariat and at the conclusion of the investigation; the report was shared with the parties to the matter as the finding was adverse to the parties.

“The matter was then taken to court where the commission successfully defended the case in the court of first instance and the parties then appealed the matter. In a judgement delivered on May 30, the parties’ appeal was dismissed and that the commission will be adjudicating on this matter soon,” he said.

 

Dual accolades for Nortons Inc.

Law firm of AAT editor John Oxenham has been awarded two prestigious recognitions

Finance Monthly – Law Awards 2014

Following a nomination and voting process, Nortons Inc. has won the award for “Antitrust & Competition Law Firm of the Year – South Africa” in this year’s Finance Monthly Law Awards. The awards are divided into firm and individual categories and have been chosen to reflect the range of practice areas and skills that lie at the heart of the successful law firm or legal department.

Lawyers World Global Awards 2014

Nortons Inc. also won the South African award in the Lawyers World Global Awards 2014, which recognises a select number of leading professional firms, organisations & advisers worldwide for their individual areas of specialisation within their respective geographical locations.

How the bourgeoisie hijacks antitrust: Justice Minister’s dubitable remarks

south_africa

“Bourgeoisie” in the people’s interest?

South African justice ministry’s highest-ranking member calls for strengthened competition enforcement against “monopoly pricing” and creation of “black bourgeoisie”

In an apparently rambling discourse, covering a vast swathe of subject-matter, South Africa‘s Justice Minister Jeff Radebe has been quoted as calling not only for the dismantling of the “over-concentrated” economy “in the hands of a few large companies,” but also for the creation of a “black bourgeoisie,” purportedly to counter-act the remaining racial imbalance in the country’s economic structure, according to an article in the South African Times Live:

On promoting competition in the economy, Radebe said the Competition Act would be strengthened to prevent monopoly pricing of goods such as steel and heavy chemicals.

This would make local manufacturing more competitive, and support infrastructure investment.

“The competition authorities will be further developed to act against cartels and ensure public interests are adequately protected in mergers and acquisitions.”

… Radebe was heckled from opposition benches when he said the emphasis would be on “creating black industrialists in productive sectors of the economy, and developing a patriotic black bourgeoisie”.

He broke from his prepared speech and asked, to laughter: “Why should it only be white bourgeoisie?

Is a “bourgeoisie” reconcilable with populist politics (and competition law)?

One cannot help but wonder what the connection between the elimination of the so-called “white bourgeoisie” and the reduction of “over-concentration” in the economy may be, if any.

Moreover, AAT respectfully expresses its doubt whether creating a “bourgeoisie” — any bourgeoisie (wholly regardless of its race) — is in the general population’s interests, as the Minister seems to think (“It is a people’s plan which has been adopted by the majority of our people and stakeholders. We are therefore calling on all South Africans to rally behind the implementation of the plan, including labour, business and civil society”).  As another article on the topic points out,

In Marxist philosophy, the term bourgeoisie denotes the social class who owns the means of production and whose societal concerns are the value of property and the preservation of capital, in order to ensure the perpetuation of their economic supremacy in society.

The prototypical bourgeois: Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain, the protagonist of the play Le Bourgeois gentilhomme (1670)
Radebe’s vision of a better & more competitive society? Replace Monsieur Jourdain with a new version of Sandton’s bourgeoisie?
Antitrust plan unclear

How the SA antitrust watchdogs (the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal) were going to be “further developed” – structurally, scope/jurisdictionally, personnel-based or otherwise – was not immediately clear.

The remarks were part of the minister’s statement in the parliamentary opening debate on the president’s state-of-the-nation address.

Justice Minister Jeff Radebe (Image via Times Live, by: SYDNEY SESHIBEDI)