Confusion reigns in COMESA: filing fees misstated, “operation” vs. “threshold”, and new web site

COMESA Competition Commission logo

COMESA Competition Commission makes changes, but observers deplore lack of clarity and persisting mistakes

Visiting the CCC web site will yield a surprise to COMESA followers, as the Commission’s online presence has an updated look.  (Importantly, we express hope that it’s not all cosmetic but also substantive, and that the CCC’s webmaster has improved online security, in light of the numerous hacking attacks to which the agency was subjected in 2014.)

What’s more, the new web site has some new merger-related information, most notably of course the new finalized Merger Assessment Guidelines and an “Explanatory Note” on mergers.

Guidelines subvert Rules threshold under guise of companies’ “operation” within region

The former attempt to infuse some sense into the previous zero-dollar notification threshold regime (by re-defining in the Guidelines what it means to “operate” in COMESA countries as having turnover of >$5 million per annum).  They do so without actually amending or otherwise revoking the underlying Rules, which still do specify to this day that the turnover threshold for notification is “$0” COMESA dollars (which are the fictitious FX equivalent currency of U.S. dollars, so there is effectively no currency conversion required from USD figures).  CNBC/Africa has an 8-minute interview on the topic with a World Bank Group staffer who was part of the working group making the revisions here.

We at AAT respectfully question both the validity and the sensibility of keeping the flawed legislation of the Rules in place, while making agency ex parte interpretive changes via CCC “Guidelines” that notably do not have the force of law in COMESA countries.

“Explanatory Note” and the question of filing fees: 0.01% or 0.5%? Errors continue to persist.

The latter document (reproduced below in full) tries to do the same in a more simplistic fashion — asking, curiously, “What is merger?” [sic!]  However, the Explanatory Note appears fundamentally flawed as it incorrectly includes a reference to the filing fee as being set at 0.01% of the parties’ combined annual revenues.

AAT analysed this statement and believes that the CCC improperly refers to the old Rules (which provided for a 0.01% fee in Rule 55) until they were revised and then subsequently interpreted by CCC guidance in February of 2013: since then, filing a CCC notification incurs a fee of 0.5% of turnover, as we extensively discussed here.  (Update: The CCC has apparently read our post and, as of 5 Nov. 2014, changed this incorrect statement, deleting all references to filing fees in their entirety.)

Continuing lack of clarity emanates from COMESA’s official statements and publications

AAT deplores the ongoing confusion that reigns with respect to the CCC’s pronouncements on crucially important issues such as thresholds, filing fees, and the like.  It takes more than a new web site design to instill parties’ and attorneys’ trust in the young antitrust regime’s competency, and with it, new filings (which have notably stalled at zero for the past half year).

Mergers and Acquisistions

What is Merger?

Most mergers pose little or no serious threat to competition, and may actually be pro-competitive.  Such benevolent mergers have a number of economic advantages such as resultant economies of scale, reduction in the cost of production and sale, and gains of horizontal integration.  There could also be more convenient and reliable supply of input materials and reduction of overheads.  These advantages could, and should, lead to lower prices to the consumer.

Other mergers, however, may harm competition by increasing the probability of exercise of market power and abuse of dominance.  Mergers can also sometimes produce market structures that are anti-competitive in the sense of making it easier for a group of firms to cartelise a market, or enabling the merged entity to act more like a monopolist.

An increasing number of business firms in the COMESA region are merging, or entering into other forms of strategic alliances, in order to take advantage of the many economic benefits that arise from such transactions.  Undertakings in the COMESA region are relatively small compared with those in other parts of the world.  Mergers in the region, however, would create ‘regional champions’ capable of competing with other international companies on an equal footing.

Companies however need to notify the Commission their proposed mergers to enable the mergers to be thoroughly examined for any anti-competitive features that might reduce or eliminate the transaction’s economic benefits.  Not all mergers are notified to the Commission.  Only those large mergers that exceed a certain prescribed threshold have to be notified.  The fee for notifying mergers is not punitive, but is only meant to defray the costs to the Commission for examining the transactions.  The COMESA Competition Rules provide for a relatively small merger notification fee calculated at 0.01% of the combined annual turnover or combined value of assets in the COMESA region of the merging parties.  (NOTE by editor: The CCC has, as of 5 Nov. 2014, changed this incorrect statement and deleted all references to filing fees entirely.) Failure to notify mergers can however be very costly to the merging parties.  The Regulations provide for a high penalty of up to 1% of the merging parties’ annual turnover in the COMESA region for not notifying eligible mergers

Merger in COMESA Competition Regulations

The word merger in this COMESA Competition Regulation is construed in the context of its definition under Article 23(1) of the Regulations.

Control is used in the context of controlling interest as defined under Article 23(2) of the Regulations. Without prejudice to Article 23(2), control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination with and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. The COMESA Competition Commission (‘the Commission’) shall deem a person or undertaking to exercise control within the meaning of Article 23(2) of the Regulations if the person or undertaking;

  • Beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the undertaking;
  • Is entitled to cast a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of the undertaking;
  • Is able to appoint, or to veto the appointment, of a majority of the directors of the undertakings;
  • Is a holding company, and the undertaking is a subsidiary of that holding company;
  • In the case of the undertaking being a trust, has the ability to control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust;
  • In the case of an undertaking being a close corporation, owns the majority of the members’ interest or controls directly, or has the right to control, the majority of the members’ votes in the close corporation; or
  • Has the ability to materially influence the policy of the undertaking in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f).

The Commission shall assess material influence on a case by case basis, having regard to the overall relationship between the acquiring firm and the target firm in light of the commercial context.

In its assessment of material influence, the Commission shall focus on the acquiring undertaking(s). Minority and other interests shall be examined by the Commission to the extent that they are able to influence the policy of the undertaking(s) concerned.

The Commission shall consider an acquiring firm’s ability to influence policy relevant to the behaviour of the target firm in the market place. This includes the management of the business, in particular in relation to its competitive conduct, and thus includes the strategic direction of a firm and its ability to define and achieve its commercial objectives.

The Commission shall consider an acquiring firm’s ability to block special resolutions by virtue of share ownership or other factors, including:

  • The distribution and holders of the remaining shares, in particular whether the acquiring entity’s shareholding makes it the largest shareholder;
  • Patterns of attendance and voting at recent shareholders’ meetings based on recent shareholder returns, and, in particular, whether voter attendance is such that in practice a minority holder is able to block a special resolution;
  • Any special voting or veto rights attached to the shareholding under consideration; and
  • Any other special provisions in the constitution of the target firm which confer the ability to exercise influence.

Where an acquiring firm is not able to block special resolutions of the target firm, the Commission shall have regard to the status and expertise of the acquiring firm, and its corresponding influence with other shareholders, and shall consider whether, given the identity and corporate policy of the target company, the acquiring firm may be able to exert material influence on policy formulation at an earlier stage.

The Commission shall review the proportion of Board of Directors appointed by the acquiring firm and the corporate/industry expertise of members of the Board appointed by the acquiring firm. The Commission may also assess the identities, relevant expertise and incentives of other Board Members.

Interpretation of Article 23(3) of the COMESA Competition Regulations
Article 23(3) of the COMESA Competition Regulations (‘the Regulations’) provides that:

                        “This Article shall apply where:

  • both the acquiring firm and target firm or either the acquiring firm or target firm operate in two or more Member States; and

  • the threshold of combined annual turnover or assets provided for in paragraph 4 is exceeded”.

The interpretation shall focus on Article 23(3)(a) since Article 23(3)(b) is superfluous due to the non-existent of thresholds currently. Article 23(3)(a) is divided into two parts as follows:

  • both the acquiring firm and the target firm operate in two or more Member States;
  • either the acquiring firm or target firm operate in two or more Member States.

The meaning of the first part above is that for a merger to fall within the dominion of Part IV of the Regulations is that both the acquiring firm and the target firm should operate in two or more Member States. For example if Company A is the acquiring firm and it operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B is the target company and it equally operates in Zambia and Malawi, then the requirements of the first limb are satisfied and the merger falls within the ambit of Part IV of the Regulations.

Another scenario where the first part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B the target firm operates in Zambia and Ethiopia. In this example, both Company A and Company B operate in two or more Member States.

The third scenario where the first part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Zambia and Malawi and Company B the target firm operates in Djibouti and Madagascar. In this example, both Company A and Company B operate in two or more Member States.

As regards the second part, a merger falls within the province of Part IV of the Regulations where for example Company A the acquiring firm operates in Kenya and Seychelles and acquires Company B the target which has no operations in the COMESA Member States.

Another scenario where the second part is satisfied is where Company A the acquiring firm has no operations in any of the COMESA Member States but acquires Company B the target which operates in Rwanda and Burundi.

The foregoing are pursuant to the second limb which uses the words “either or” and therefore presupposes that both the acquiring firm and the target firm do not have to operate in two or more Member States as is the case for the first limb but that where either the target or acquiring is operates in two or more Member States, the merger is captured under Part IV of the Regulations.

It is important to note that where the acquiring firm operates in only one Member State and the target firm operates in another Member State and only that Member State, then such a merger does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Part IV of the Regulations. This is however on the premise that such firms do not control any other firm whether directly or indirectly in a third Member State. Such firms should also not be controlled whether directly or indirectly by any other firm in a third Member State. For example, where Company A the acquiring firm operates in Swaziland only and Company B the target operates in Rwanda only, such a merger does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of Part IV of the Regulations. The situation may be different where Company A has a stake in Company C which operates in Mauritius or Company B has a stake in Company D which operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The word operate is taken to mean that a firm(s) in issue derives turnover in two or more Member States. Therefore does not need to be directly domiciled in a Member State but it can have operations through exports, imports, subsidiaries etc. in a Member State.

Kenya competition landscape active

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Zuku pay-TV launched complaint against DStv in Kenya

As we reported in “Your Choice“, MultiChoice has been an active (if unwilling) player in African antitrust news.  Zuku pay-TV has recently requested the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) to impose a financial penalty on DStv for refusing to re-sell some of its exclusive content like the English Premier League to its rivals.

In its letter to the CAK, Zuku pay-TV accuses MultiChoice, the owners of DStv, of abusing its dominance and curbing the growth of other, competing pay-TV operators. Furthermore, Zuku pay-TV requested the CAK to compel DStv to re-sell some of its exclusive content and impose a financial penalty, which can be up to 10 per cent of a firm’s annual sales, on the South Africa firm. According to Zuku pay-TV, DStv has a market share of 95% in Kenya.

The CAK has not indicated whether it is investigating the complaint yet.

Mr Wang’ombe Kariuki, director of the CAK
Kenya to get leniency policy

In addition to the ongoing pay-TV antitrust dispute, the CAK has drafted a law (the Finance Bill of 2014) which will create a Kenyan cartel leniency programme in order for whistleblower companies and their directors to get off with lighter punishment, for volunteering information that helps to break up cartels, as AAT reported here.

To recap the leniency programme will either grant full immunity for applicants or reduce the applicant’s fines, depending on the circumstances. The Finance Act 2014 is awaiting its third reading in Parliament.

The introduction of a leniency programme in Kenya is a pleasing sight due to leniency programmes’ proving to be an integral and vital tool for uncovering cartels in every jurisdiction in which it has been deployed.

The creeping public-interest factor in antitrust: Still creeping or racing yet?

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Race to bottom: dilution of competition-law factors in South Africa?

As we have reported numerous times, both on the global policy front as well as in individual case reports, the South African competition regulators and their superiors in the economic development ministry have had their sights on placing a stronger emphasis on the “public interest” element inherent in the SA competition legislation — thereby diluting pure competition-law/antitrust analysis, as some might argue.

Recently, Minister Patel commended his “independent” team at the Competition Commission for not only doing a good job overall, but also in particular on the public-interest front, encouraging the systematic consideration of public interest by the Commission and the Tribunal.

His prepared remarks from the 8th Annual Competition, Law, Economics and Policy Conference in Johannesburg are now uploaded here.  In them, he emphasizes that competition policy is “rightly”…:

“… a subset of broader competitive policies, which in turn are part of our industrial policy framework. … Our law provides an opportunity, and indeed an obligation, to align corporate strategy (by which I refer to mergers or takeovers) with public interest considerations. … The increasing use of the public-interest requirements in evaluating mergers has been critical in ensuring that competition policy has a growing developmental impact, saving thousands of jobs and providing millions of rands to support small and emerging enterprises.”

On the independence of the enforcers, Mr. Patel had this to say:

This kind of alignment must in future, as in the past, respect the independence of the regulator. But all our agencies, however independent, work within the framework of national policies.

These remarks are fairly strong, indeed!  We leave it to our AAT readership to infer the consequences of these observations on future merger enforcement and on the true degree of independence of the Commission — you can read between the lines.

In a companion paper, entitled “What is competition good for – weighing the wider benefits of competition and the costs of pursuing non-competition objectives”, AAT’s own John Oxenham (Nortons) and Patrick Smith (RBB Economics) argue as follows:

Over the past five years, the South African competition authorities have increasingly struggled to balance a competition test with defined public interest criteria (Metropolitan, Kansai, Walmart). Other agencies (ICASA, NERSA), and government ministries more generally, have also wrestled with how competition policy might fit into wider government policies and even broader concepts of the “public interest”, including notions of equality, fairness and access. In this paper we discuss some of key events in this ongoing debate, and we anticipate some of the battles that are likely to come. Furthermore, we set out a rigorous framework and provide a review of the available research and literature to discuss the effects of competition (both positive and negative) in multiple dimensions, in order to assess how far a “pure competition” test might go in achieving a broad range of efficiency, growth, and employment objectives. Such a comprehensive and evidence based approach is essential in understanding the costs and benefits of the existing pursuit of multiple (and often apparently conflicting) objectives, and will allow decision makers to more logically assess the trade-offs that they will continue to be confronted with.

Bonakele advocates regulation in lieu of antitrust enforcement

south_africa

South African Competition Commissioner quoted as preferring legislative action rather than Commission action

In a BD Live article from today (“Competition policy ‘not best way to plug industrial loopholes’”), Linda Ensor reports on a presentation Tembinkosi Bonakele made to Parliament’s trade and industry portfolio committee.  In it, the head of the Competition Commission (“Commission”) remarked, according to the article, that “the application of competition law by the competition authorities was a slow process that should not be used to address loopholes in the implementation of industrial policy.”  Mr. Bonakele is quoted as noting that the “litigious nature of using competition policy as a mechanism to reduce prices was a ‘delayed remedy to the market’.”

The Acting Commissioner

At issue, in part, are the price levels of South Africa’s natural-resource sector, including a reference by Mr. Bonakele to “a loophole” in industrial policy and regulation, i.e., the Commission’s long-running investigation of alleged excessive pricing by Sasol Chemical Industries, which lasted about seven years prior to a ruling by the Competition Tribunal, in which Sasol was found guilty of excessive pricing of propylene and polypropylene products, fining it R534m.

Mr. Bonakele’s key suggestion was that there are alternative means for the government to intervene, e.g., through regulation.

 

Minister’s grip over antitrust authorities further strengthened

South Africa takes on more price regulation in planned amendment to Competition Act

BDLive’s Carol Paton reports that Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel – with whose involvement in competition policy AAT readers are well aware from reading our site – has further strengthened his grip on the country’s competition authorities.  He is said to be drafting amendments to the Competition Act in relation to dominant firms’ “excessive pricing” practices.  The amendments are to be introduced to Parliament in 2015.
The article quotes Mr. Patel’s Sunday interview, in which he said:

“The past five years indicated that we are serious about dealing with cartels. But the challenge that we have had is that the economy still has many formal monopolies or upstream producers who are able to impose high prices on downstream manufacturers. We have got to move with greater urgency to tackle the structural challenges.  Giving a dominant player the right to set its own price results is an unfairness. In the Sasol example, part of the remedy is for the firm to work with the competition authorities to develop a soft version of price regulation.”

Price regulation is an absolute taboo in U.S. antitrust law, and even under more interventionist and public-policy influenced EU standards, explicit price regulation is not practiced in the bloc’s 28 member states.
Sasol, the giant South African oil company, is said to be aware of the government’s plans, saying: “setting prices, in particular of traded goods, invariably leads to unsatisfactory outcomes.  South Africa’s joining the World Trade Organisation in 1995 took us forward to opening the economy to compete internationally, with prices being brought in line with international prices. Regulating prices to below gate price, is unlikely to lead to building long-term competitive industries.”

The Gambian take on the benefits of market studies

the_gambia

The Gambian Competition Authority’s commitment to investigating all prohibited practices in markets of any size

Shortly after the renaming of The Gambia Competition Commission to include consumer protection issues earlier this year, the Gambian Minister of Trade, Integration and Employment, Abdou Kolley, endorsed the ability of The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“GCCPC”) to continue pursuing any evidence of cartels, abuses of dominance and other illegal anti-competitive activities in any sector of the economy, as mandated by the the Competition Act 2007.

 

Minister Kolley

In its Strategic Plan over the next 3 years, the GCCPC indicates that it purposefully did not identify any priority sectors, to allow it to commit to investigating prohibited practices regardless of the market or its size. The Minister endorsed this approach given the need for independent agencies like the GCCPC to ensure that the competition playing field is leveled, that barriers to entry are low and that “the rules of the game” are reasonable. The Minister continued that simply having competition regime cannot produce or ensure competition in the market unless this is facilitated by government policies and enforcement.

Sectoral Market Inquiries: As in South Africa, whose Competition Commission has launched its first-ever market inquiry into the state of competition in the healthcare sector in terms of the Competition Amendment Act of 2009, the GCCPC is also empowered to launch “market studies” under section 15(k) of the Gambian Competition Act. A market study enables the GCCPC to consider both policies and enforcement simultaneously, thereby promoting competition in the economy, according to the Minister. The Minister explained that the aim of the market study was to assess competition in a particular area and recommend ways of improving it to the benefit of the economy and consumers in general.

As noted in our prior reporting, the Minister spoke at the opening of a workshop on the “Tourism Market Study” and to bring the concept of competition law closer to home, he placed emphasis on the increasing awareness about competition law within the tourism fraternity, forums such as the workshop will contribute substantially to the spread of competition culture and improving levels of compliance of the Competition Act, which would be beneficial both for the economy as well as individual businesses.

Criminalisation of antitrust offences: not on short-term horizon

south_africa

Competition Commission not ready to pursue antitrust cases criminally – plus: AAT‘s recommendations

The newly (permanently) appointed Competition Commissioner, Tembinkosi Bonakele, has referred to a “phased” implementation of the 2009 Competition Amendment Act.  The legislation technically criminalised hard-core antitrust offences such as bid-rigging or price-fixing cartels.  However, it has not yet been implemented or effectively signed into law.

According to a MoneyWeb/ZA report, both he and his boss, Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel, had discussions on how and when to implement “to ensure that the necessary institutional capacity is available to apply the amendments.”  The initially effective provisions (relating to the SACC’s market-inquiry powers) went into effect last year, while the criminalisation provisions remain unimplemented.

In a somewhat remarkable and prudent self-assessment, the minister and SACC have now admitted that the Commission currently lacks “the institutional capacity needed to comply with the higher burden of proof in criminal cases,” according to the report.

One notable aspect of potential discord lies in not only in the different standard of proof in civil vs. criminal matters (“more probable than not” vs. “beyond a reasonable doubt”), but perhaps more importantly can be found on the procedural side, preventing rapid implementation of the law: There has been historic friction between various elements of the RSA’s police forces and (special) prosecutorial services, and the power to prosecute crimes notably remains within the hands of the National Prosecuting Authority, supported in its investigations by the South African Police Service.

Historical and Legislative Background – and a bit of Advice

Starting in the spring and summer of 2008, the rumoured legislative clamp-down on corrupt & anti-competitive business practices by the government made the RSA business papers’ headlines.

During a presentation I gave at a Johannesburg conference in September that year (“Criminalising Competition Law: A New Era of ‘Antitrust with Teeth’ in South Africa? Lessons Learned from the U.S. Perspective“), I quoted a few highlights among them, asking somewhat rhetorically whether these were the words of fearmongers or oracles?

  • “Competition Bill to Pave Way for Criminal Liability”
  • “Tough on directors”
  • “Criminalisation of directors by far most controversial”
  • “Bosses Must Pay Fines Themselves”
  • “New leniency regime to turn up heat on cartels”
  • “New era in the application of competition policy in SA”
  • “Likely to give rise to constitutional challenges”
  • “New Bill On Cartels is a Step Too Far”
  • “Fork out huge sums or face jail time if found guilty”
  • “Disqualification from directorships … very career limiting”

I also quoted international precedent-setting institutions and enforcers’ recommendations, all of which tended towards the positive effect of criminal antitrust penalties:

OECD, 3rd Hard-Core Cartel Report (2005):

  • Recommends that governments consider the introduction and imposition of criminal antitrust sanctions against individuals to enhance deterrence and incentives to cooperate through leniency programmes.

U.S. Department of Justice, Tom Barnett (2008):

  • “Jail time creates the most effective, necessary deterrent.”
  • “[N]othing in our enforcement arsenal has as great a deterrent as the threat of substantial jail time in a United States prison, either as a result of a criminal trial or a guilty plea.”

While the presentation contained a lot more detail, the key recommendations that I summarised would seem to continue to hold true today, and may serve as guide-posts for Commissioner Bonakele and the EDD ministry:

Cornerstones of a successful criminal antitrust regime
  • Crystal-clear demarcation of criminal vs. civil conduct
  • Highly effective leniency policy also applies to individuals
  • Standard of proof must be met beyond a reasonable doubt
  • No blanket liability for negligent directors – only actors liable
  • Plea bargaining to be used as an effective tool to reduce sentence
  • Clear pronouncements by enforcement agency to help counsel predict outcomes
Demarcation of criminal vs civil antitrust conduct in U.S.
Demarcation of criminal vs civil antitrust conduct in U.S.

COMESA news of the day: web site down again; 5 “exemption” letters granted

COMESA Competition Commission logo

Site down – 5 “comfort letters in 5 months – Guidelines revision by June

In an almost farcical repetition of its information-technology woes, the COMESA Competition Commission’s web site (http://www.comesacompetition.org/) is off-line, yet again, after having been successfully hacked multiple times.  Whether the latest outage is due to a similar attack or simply (and hopefully) due to its webmaster’s shoring up the competition enforcer’s IT security measures remains to be seen.  (We have not yet heard back from the agency’s leadership on our request for information on the online data safety of parties’ submissions.)

In more substantive news, IFLR reports that the CCC has issued five so-called “Comfort Letters” since December 2013, exempting otherwise notifiable transactions from the duty to file (as well as the concomitant payment of the (high) filing fees), where the actual nexus to the COMESA region was negligible or non-existent.  This may help explain some of the lackluster filing statistics on which we reported previously.

The report also quotes the CCC’s head of mergers, Mr. Willard Mwemba, as saying that the revision of the Competition Guidelines should be finalised by the end of June 2014.

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Advance africanantitrust.com publication of working paper

By: Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg Univ. Law School)

new multi-part series
new multi-part series on Innovation & Antitrust

Innovation: a path to long-term economic growth,[1]hope for economic recovery,[2] and a vital opportunity for economies in developing countries.[3] Innovation is the Holy Grail we would all like drink from. Individuals dedicate their lives to its pursuit, governments invest significant amounts of money in R&D, but despite decades of research on ‘the wealth of nations’, we remain with a poor perception of innovation as a ‘complex and mysterious phenomenon’[4] that should be stimulated, although no one knows very well how.[5]

Government intervention in itself is insufficient and it might rather have costly results, if incorrectly targeted.[6] This is particularly true when it comes to the inevitable relationship between legal conditions and innovation since the lack of an effective legal framework is in the poorest countries the main obstacle to innovation and consequently to economic growth.[7] In this context, during many years, law was simply told to stay away and admire it from a distance to avoid impeding innovation. However, beyond laboratories, laborious inventions and serendipitous discoveries, law can play a greater role than a mere walk-on in the ‘innovation film’. In fact, law can act as a ‘brakeman’ or ‘a driver’ of innovation.[8] Competition and IP law have been competing for the supporting role of ‘drivers of innovation’. Here this ‘innovation film’ does not take place in the EU or in the US, but in developing countries trying to promote domestic innovation while adopting competition laws and being forced to respect IP rights that incentivize innovation in the Western world. In such context, and before the audition starts, five questions must be posed: (i) What is innovation and what type of innovation do governments aim to promote? (ii) Should and can law in general interfere in the regulation of innovation? (iii) How can competition law play a role in the promotion of innovation? (iv) Should competition law not remain in the shadow of Intellectual Property (IP’) laws that are already designed to provide innovators with incentives or should it be the other way around? (v) Last but not the least, in the context of the problematic trichotomy antitrust/IP/innovation, should a customized approach be conceived for developing countries characterized by different socioeconomic conditions or should one plea for convergence?

In this article (and subsequently, expanded paper), I reflect upon the role of law, and particularly competition laws, in the promotion of innovation in developing countries and the problematic relationship between IP, competition laws and innovation. Up until now, (competition) law’s potential to drive innovation has been either closely associated with patent law[9] or analyzed on a mere casuistic basis in the setting of specific antitrust or mergers cases.[10] However, the enforcement of competition laws against unlawful monopolizing conduct plays in general an undeniable role in the promotion of innovation.[11] Competition law promotes innovation by removing barriers to freedom of choice, trade and market access and prevents the formation of monopolies or conditions in the marketplace susceptible of stifling the development of new products. This implies however analyzing the connection between the market structure and the ability to influence undertakings to innovate:[12] while in some cases, a large number of companies on the market may slow down innovation, in others, the lack of competitive pressure may reduce the incentives to innovate (e.g. international market of derived financial products).[13]

Although the debate on the promotion of innovation has been restricted to developed countries, the promotion of innovation is equally vital for developing countries, notably in Africa.[14] These countries are looking up to the EU and US and trying to adopt similar competition laws and policies.[15] What’s more, a number of developing countries have been deriving their antitrust legal frameworks from Western countries, as a result of trade agreements. Globalization appears to push developing countries in the sense of convergence, but is this tendency beneficial for these countries quest for innovation? Absolute convergence of antitrust enforcement might not suit the current economic stage of most developing countries, particularly in Africa. A ‘Western’ design of antitrust laws and policies might not fit the socioeconomic conditions of these countries. This might be particularly problematic when governments are struggling to promote local innovation but face inevitable IP constraints.

Reconciling the difficult relationship between antitrust and patent law can be particularly complex in African countries since patent policy has a significant impact on development. Although one might at first think that developing countries should emphasize patent policy, as they are considerably behind the global technological frontier and are craving domestic innovation, they cannot afford the short-term consumer welfare loss that must be incurred to generate patentee reward.[16] Some African countries like South Africa have been developing a solid IP regulatory framework so as to incentivize innovation,[17] but many lack the technological and financial capacity to invest in R&D. In such cases, access to protected technologies on reasonable terms may be the key to more domestic innovation. What does this mean for the trichotomy innovation-IP-competition? Although developing countries urgently require innovation,[18] should their competition authorities look less up to Western models and rather question whether they should sacrifice consumer welfare by upholding patent exploitation practices?

Instead of pushing developing countries toward convergence of global competition policy, the specific socioeconomic conditions of these countries should be taken into consideration. Thomas Cheng argues, rightly so one might say, that ‘antitrust principles and doctrines need to be tailored to domestic economic circumstances. Markets and economies function differently in developing countries and antitrust laws should reflect these differences.[19] This is a particularly important lesson for African countries as they are prone to imitate the approaches of developed countries without the required customization. Different suggestions have been advanced in the literature, such as the reduction of patent protection in developing countries, allowing even the imitation of foreign technology so that domestic innovators possess a technological basis they can further develop,[20] or the expansion of compulsory licensing beyond certain drugs for developing countries.[21]

This contribution aimed to draw attention to the challenging role of law as the driver (or at least guardian) of innovation in developing countries. Competition and IP laws both wish to share a supporting role in this ‘innovation film’ taking place in developing countries. Should they be granted this part in a context of convergence of laws and policies or should IP remain in the shadow in order to ensure that the innovation film can successfully be produced and released in the theaters? You decide who gets the part at this audition; however, recalling Eleanor Fox’ words ‘antitrust should not be used to protect David from Goliath, but it may be used to empower David against Goliath’.[22]

To be continued…


[1] Richard S. Whitt, ‘Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy’ (2009) 61(3) Federal Communications Law Journal 485.

[2] BERR, ‘Regulation and Innovation: evidence and policy implications’, BERR Economics Paper No.4, 2008, iv.

[3] Jean-Eric Aubert, ‘Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework’ (2004) World Bank Institute, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KFDLP/Resources/0-3097AubertPaper[1].pdf

[4] D. Augey, ‘Les mystères de l’innovation: le regard contemporain de l’économie et de la gestion’ (2013) In J. Mestre, & L. Merland, Droit et Innovation (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille) 89, 91.

[5] Joshua D. Sarnoff, ‘Government choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change)’ (2013) 62 Emory Law Journal, 1087.

[6] B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347.

[7] Robert Cooter, ‘Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law Review 373.

[8] W. Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit rechtswissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung’, in D. Sauer, Christa Lang (Eds.), Paradoxien der Innovation: Perspektiven sozialwissenschaftlicher Innovationsforschung (Campus Verlag 1999). Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung als Reaktion auf gesellschaftlichen Innovationsbedarf’, überarbeite Fassung eines Vortrages aus Anlass der Überreichung der Universitätsmedaille am 19.12.2000 in Hamburg, available at <http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/ceri/publ/download01.PDF>.

[9] Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See Christine A. Varney, ‘Promoting Innovation Through Patent and Antitrust Law and Policy’ (2010), Department of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice on the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260101.pdf.

[10] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69. Pierre Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation’ (2009) 75 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 933. François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilitaties: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ (2005) 28 World Competition 71.

[11] Douglas Rosenthal, ‘Do Intellectual Property Laws Promote Competition & Innovation?’ (2006) 7 Sedona Conference Journal 143.

[12] David Bosco, Marie Cartapanis, ‘Droit de la concurrence et innovation’ (2013) in Jacques Mestre, Laure Merland (Eds.), Droit et Innovation (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), 69.

[13] COMP/M.6166, NYSE Euronext / Deutsche Börse.

[14] Smita Srinivas, Judith Sutz, ‘Developing countries and innovation: Searching for a new analytical approach’(2008) 30 Technology in Society 129.

[15] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1.

[16] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1, 3.

[17] Alexis Apostolidis, ‘IP Law in South Africa: Key Cases and Issues’ (2009) ASPATORE WL 2029096.

[18] There is a significant body of literature arguing that IP does not necessarily promote innovation. For an overview, see, e.g., B. Frischmann, ‘Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy’ (2000) 24 Vermont Law Review, 347. Julie E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs: Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’ (2007) 40 U.C. Davis L. Review 1151.

[19] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 79.

[20] Thomas K. Cheng, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface’ (2012) 33 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1’, 4.

[21] Colleen Chien, ‘ Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 853.

[22] Eleanor M. Fox, ‘ Economic development, Poverty and Antitrust: the Other Path’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 211.

COMESA and W. Australia now economically linked via MoU

COMESA Competition Commission logo 

The Western Australian government has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with COMESA.

Colin Barnett signed the papers yesterday, January 31, 2014.  COMESA dutifully posted a news release on its web site, albeit misspelling the W. Australian premier’s name (“Colin Barnnet“).

Setting aside the embarrassing PR SNAFU, we expect the MoU to have little to no effect on competition enforcement by the COMESA Competition Commission.  The MoU appears to us to be primarily minerals-focussed (we note that this should come as no surprise, given the mineral-rich COMESA members and the fact that Western Australia is the world’s second-largest iron ore producer).  The six so-called “thematic areas” of the MoU are: fiscal frameworks and mineral policy, strengthening human and institutional capacities, collection and management of geo-scientific information, research and development, environmental and social issues; and linkages, diversification and cluster development.  Antitrust/competition is nowhere to be found.

That said, Western Australian companies may choose to invest more in the region and therefore somewhat increase the merger notification statistics, which have been lackluster to date.