Competition Appeal Court’s Ruling in Standard Bank Case: A Changing of the Tides?

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Threat of Referral no Longer an Arrow in the Commission’s Quiver?

By AAT Senior Contributor Michael-James Currie

In the first week of June 2018, the South African Competition Appeal Court (CAC) upheld Standard Bank’s appeal and ordered that the Competition Commission (Commission) make available its investigation record to Standard Bank. Standard Bank is a respondent in the Commission’s ForEx investigation.

Standard Bank had requested that the Commission make available its record in terms of Rule 15 of the Competition Commission Rules. Rule 15 permits any member of the public to request access to the Commission’s non-confidential record. Standard Bank therefore brought its application in terms of Rule 15 not on the basis of it being a respondent to the Commission’s investigation but as an ordinary member of the public.

Although the CAC had in an earlier case, Group 5, set out the correct interpretation and application of Rule 15 and stated that:

  1. the Commission is obliged in terms of Rule 15 to make available its record of investigation;
  2. that the Commission must do so within a “reasonable time”; and
  3. that the Commission must disregard the applicants status as a litigant when determining what a reasonable time is.

The Tribunal in the Standard Bank case, however, deviated from the CAC’s binding decision in Group 5 and held that the Commission would only need to make its record available to Standard Bank at the time of discovery.

Accordingly, the CAC in the Standard Bank case found that the Tribunal took Standard Bank’s status as a litigant into account when assessing what a reasonable time would be by which the Commission was obliged to make available its record to Standard Bank. The CAC in Standard Bank confirmed that although the Tribunal is not bound by the stare decisis principle in relation to its own decisions, the Tribunal is bound by the CAC’s decisions. The Tribunal’s decision in Standard Bank was inconsistent with the CAC’s earlier decision in the Group 5 case – where the CAC expressly stated that there is no rational basis for linking the production of the Commission’s record with discovery proceedings. The Tribunal’s departure from the CAC’s earlier precedent was noted with concern by the CAC in Standard Bank.

The Commission argued – as justification for not producing its record – that Standard Bank was abusing its position as a litigant. In this regard, the CAC expressly rejected this argument and held that simply because a plaintiff would be better placed to plead its case after receiving the Commission’s record that, in of itself, does not amount to an abuse of process. The CAC held that it would only amount to an abuse of process if an applicant sought to rely on Rule 15 in order to avoid or delay having to plead within the prescribed time periods.

Furthermore, the CAC reaffirmed that a member of the public’s right to access the Commission’s record should not be prejudiced by the fact that such a member is also a litigant.

The Court’s Standard Bank decision is important as respondents will invariably be inclined to seek access to the Commission’s record prior to pleading their case. This may have a material impact on the Commission’s settlement strategy as respondents in settlement negotiations with the Commission are likely to request the Commission’s record in order to assess the strength of the Commission’s case against it before deciding whether to settle the case or not – thereby compelling the Commission to ensure that a robust investigation is conducted prior to entering into settlement negotiations with respondents.

Says John Oxenham, ‘the “threat of a referral” is unlikely to present the Commission with the same negotiating leverage as it may otherwise have enjoyed when respondents were kept in the dark as to the evidence which the Commission may have against them.’

Whether this all plays out in practice remains to be seen although any decision which promotes transparency and legal certainty can only be positive. It is for this reason that the CAC’s express criticism of the Tribunal’s decision to depart from established case precedent is particularly noteworthy as it is a stark reminder to all adjudicative bodies of the importance of adhering to the rule of law.

Airlines seek antitrust exemption: KQ-CAK application pending

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Kenya Airways (“KQ”) has applied to the Competition Authority of Kenya  (“the Competition Authority”) for an exemption from competition rules in relation to its joint venture agreement with Tanzania’s national carrier, Precision Air (“the Joint Venture”) until April 2022.  The exemption would allow KQ and Precision Air to discuss revenue sharing, price setting, route schedules, sales and marketing on the two airline’s joint venture routes in Kenya and Tanzania.  The routes in discussion are Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu, Dar-es-salaam, Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar.

Most importantly, the exemption, if granted, would allow for the setting of prices between the two companies, which can be considered “price fixing” but without violating the Kenyan Competition Act, which defines restrictive trade practices as “any agreement, decision or concerted practice which directly or indirectly fixes purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions”.

The two carriers already have a code-sharing agreement that allows airlines to sell seats on each other’s planes on the Nairobi-Dar es Salaam route.

According to the director-general of the Competition Authority the parties intend to align and coordinate network management activities with respect to the Joint Venture including terms of routes, schedules, capacity and designation and pricing of ticket fares on the joint venture routes.

The two airlines are also seeking exemption of competition rules in the management of any and all revenues attributable to the performance of the joint venture by any party, “…including without limit, setting up joint venues management systems and joint venue analysis systems; and joint marketing and sales activities with respect to joint venture”.

John Oxenham, a competition attorney with Primerio Ltd., notes that “[t]here is certainly a growing number of exemption applications filed before the Competition Authority of Kenya. This is attributed largely to an increase in awareness of competition enforcement in Kenya and also due to an increase in the number of ‘tie-ups’ between competitors or potential competitors entering into the Kenya market.”

His fellow Kenyan antitrust colleague, Ruth Mosoti, who previously worked as legal advisor to the CAK, confirms: “The CAK conducts a robust assessment in respect of any exemption application and does not grant these as a matter of course. The CAK has rejected a number of exemption applications in the past and therefore any such application should be supported with credible and quantifiable evidence in support of the exemption application. The most recent exemption applications which have been rejected by the CAK have invariably been brought by Trade Associations or Professional Bodies and the exemption would therefore apply across the entire industry as opposed to only specific firms within a given sector.”

“Exemptions may only be granted on the basis of certain narrow grounds as set out in the Act. In summary, exemptions may be granted on the basis that it will promote (or maintain) exports, benefit a declining industry or promote technical or economic progress in a particular industry.  Accordingly, an exemption which would generally lead to ‘pro-competitive’ effects must be based or fit into one of these grounds. An exemption may also be granted if the public interest benefit in granting the exemption outweighs any potential anticompetitive effect,” says Oxenham.

Ms. Mosoti notes that the Competition Authority has given the public 30 days to submit opinions on the proposal, as is common and required under the rules. The pro-competitive benefits to the public may ultimately outweigh the CAK’s concerns here: “It is not uncommon for Airlines to apply for exemptions particularly if the parties are considering or embarking on flight or code sharing arrangements. By increasing the passenger numbers, Airlines may be able to offer additional routes, decrease costs of tickets and/or offer a more convenient travel experience.”

New Kenya domestic merger thresholds proposed, limiting notifications

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The Competition Authority of Kenya (“the CAK”) has issued a new proposal introducing financial thresholds for merger notifications which will exempt firms with less than 1 billion Kenyan Shillings (KSh)(approximately US$10 million) domestic turnover from filing a merger notification with the CAK.

Currently, it is mandatory to notify the CAK of all mergers, irrespective of their value.  According to Stephany Torres of Primerio Limited, this may deter investments in Kenya as the merger is subject to delays and additional transaction costs for the merging parties while the CAK assesses it.

In terms of the new proposal notification of the proposed merger to the CAK is not required where the parties to the merger have a combined annual turnover and/or gross asset value in Kenya, whichever is the higher, of below KSh500 million (about US$5 million or South African R60 million).

Mergers between firms which have a combined annual turnover or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, in Kenya of between KSH 500 million and KSH 1 billion may be considered for exclusion.  In this case, the merging parties will still need to notify the CAK of the proposed merger.  The CAK will then make the decision as to whether to approve the merger or whether the merger requires a more in depth investigation.

It is mandatory to notify a merger where the target firm has an annual revenue or gross asset value of KSh 500 million, and the parties’ combined annual turnover and/or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, meets or exceeds KSh 1 billion.

Notwithstanding the above, where the acquiring firm has an annual revenue or gross asset value, whichever is the higher, of KSH 10 billion, and the merging parties operate in the same market and/or the proposed merger gives rise to vertical integration, then notification to the CAK is required regardless of the value of the target firm.  However, if the proposed merger meets the thresholds for notification in the supra-national Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (“COMESA”), then the CAK will accede to the jurisdiction of the COMESA Competition Commission (“CCC”) and the merging parties would not have to file a merger with the CAK.

COMESA is a regional competition authority having jurisdiction over competition law matters within its nineteen member states, of which Kenya is one.

It is worth mention that Kenya is also a member state of the East African Community (“the EAC”).  As AAT reported recently, the East African Community Competition Authority (“the EACCA”) became operational in April 2018 and its mandate is to investigate competition law matters within its five partner states  (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda).  There is no agreement between the CAK and EACCA similar to the one between the CAK and CCC, and it uncertain how mergers notifiable in both Kenya and the EAC will be dealt with.

 

Angola does Antitrust: Latest addition to world’s competition-law regimes

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After its 2017 administration change, the Republic of Angola is eager to join other African nations with nascent competition-law enforcement regimes: Having been approved by a unanimous majority of 183 votes in parliament, the new Angolan competition act is expected to be enforced by the also newly-established “Competition Regulatory Authority” (“ARC”) in short order, before year’s end, according to experts.

According to reports, the Angolan law (comprising 56 articles across 8 chapters) prominently includes principles such as the public-interest criterion and “rules of sound competition in morality and ethics.”

Says Andreas Stargard, an antitrust/competition and white-collar attorney with Primerio Ltd.: “These are concepts often deemed non-traditional in the antitrust laws in the Western hemisphere.  Yet, public-interest considerations are increasingly common in African competition-law legislation and indeed often form the basis for otherwise difficult to justify pragmatic enforcement decisions we now encounter more frequently across the continent, both in merger and non-merger cases.”

Angola is a member of the African Union and the SADC (Southern African Development Community), whose most prominent member, the Republic of South Africa, has a comparatively long history of including public-interest considerations in its two decades of antitrust enforcement.  As to the general concept of Angola finally adopting a competition-law regime, it appears that a key driver was the anticipated diversification of the domestic economy:

“A functioning Angolan competition regime (meaning not only the statute but also including an effective enforcement agency) is long overdue, as recognised by the recently elected Angolan president, João Lourenço,” says attorney Stargard. “By supporting enactment of the Competition Bill, Mr. Lourenço has made good on his campaign promise from 2017 to incentivise foreign direct investment, increase domestic business growth, and — importantly for the population — encourage price competition in local consumer goods markets, as the cost of living in Angola is among the highest on the African continent”.

One of the drivers of the new government’s push for FDI and organic GDP growth is the desire to de-link the Angolan economic dependence from oil prices and production, and possibly also from China (which remains the country’s largest trading partner by far). Angolan fossil fuel and diamond exports — together by far the largest sectors of the economy, and as commodity industries, quite naturally subject to collusion risk and/or monopolistic practices, according to Mr. Stargard — have yielded at best inconsistent benefits to the country’s population at-large, and President Lourenço’s pro-competition intitiative appears to support the diversification of his country’s lopsided economy historically focused on mining and resource extraction.

 

 

 

 

 

EAC antitrust enforcement finally a reality: supra-national body carries out market enquiries

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12 years in the making, East African regional competition-law enforcer now operational

By Stephany Torres

The East African Community Competition Authority (“the EACCA”) has finally become operational, after years of starts and spurts, having had its original Commissioners appointed (and half-million US$ budget approved) over 2 years ago.  The EACCA will focus on investigating firms and trade associations suspected of engaging in price fixing in contravention of the EAC Competition Act 2006 (the “EAC Act”), and proceed under its 2010 Competition Regulations.  The East African Community (“EAC”) is a regional intergovernmental organisation of 5 partner states, comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (South Sudan will be covered at a later stage, as it is not fully integrated into the EAC).  The EACCA, therefore has jurisdiction in all the five partner states.  EAC headquarters are located in Arusha, Tanzania.

Now, as of April 2018, the EACCA is said to be undertaking its first market enquiries in selected industries, according to Lilian Mukoronia, the Authority’s deputy registrar.

As we mentioned in the fall of 2017, the success of the EACCA’s activities will also be dependent on the EAC’s member countries’ level of and commitment to domestic competition-law enforcement: “Only two out of the EAC’s six member states — namely Kenya and Tanzania — currently have working antitrust enforcement authorities,” according to competition & antitrust practitioner Andreas Stargard.  “That said — in a fashion rather similar to other supra-national enforcers, such as COMESA’s CCC or the European Commission — the EACCA will oversee competition-law matters that have a regional dimension, implying that there must be economic consequences reaching well beyond domestic borders before the regional body steps in to investigate,” he says.

There is thus no technical need for all of its partner states to have enacted competition laws and created institutions to enable the EACCA to implement its regional mandate.  Moreover, each member state gets to nominate one EACCA commissioner, the current panel of whom were approved by the group’s Council of Ministers and sworn into office in 2016.

The EAC Act, which came into force in December 2014, mandates the EACCA to promote and protect fair competition in the EAC and to provide for consumer welfare.  The EAC Act prohibits, amongst other things, anti-competitive trade practices and abuse of market dominance.  It provides for notification of mergers and acquisitions, notification of subsidies granted by partner states, and regulates public procurement.

Shipping cartels: BMW Pursues Civil Damages Claim against certain Carriers

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By Stephany Torres

BMW plans to lodge a claim in South Africa for damages against international car-carriers and shipping companies which have been found guilty or have pleaded guilty to competition law contraventions, including Japanese-based Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (“MOL”) and K-Line Shipping South Africa, the local subsidiary of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-Line”), Norway’s Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics AS (“WWL”) and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (“NYK”).  BMW is seeking compensation for the losses it alleges to have suffered as a result of the anti-competitive price-fixing arrangements between the car carriers.

BMWship.jpgBMW’s case stems from an amnesty application, by which MOL approached the South African Competition Commission (“the Commission”) in terms of its Corporate Leniency Policy (“CLP”), which outlines a process through which the Commission may grant a self-confessing cartel member, who approaches the Commission first, immunity for its participation in cartel activity upon the cartel member fulfilling specific requirements which includes providing information and cooperating fully with the Commission’s investigation.  Says John Oxenham, a South African competition lawyer, “if the Commission grants an applicant what is called ‘conditional immunity’, a possible outcome is the complete avoidance of a fine, which could otherwise be calculated at up   to 10% of domestic revenues, including exports.”  That said, conditional antitrust immunity, does not offer full exoneration from potential other liability in respect of the conduct for which the Competition Commission granted immunity.

It is notable that MOL, NYK and WWL subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Commission in prosecuting K-Line.

On further investigation by the Commission it found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL fixed prices, divided markets and tendered collusively in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Competition Act no 89 of 1998 in respect of the roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ocean transportation of Toyota vehicles from South Africa to Europe, the Mediterranean Coast of North Africa and the Caribbean Islands via Europe, West Africa, East Africa and the Red Sea.

The Commission’s investigation found that from at least 2002 to 2013 K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL colluded on a tender issued by Toyota SA Motors (“TSAM”) to transport Toyota vehicles from South Africa abroad by sea.  The Commission further found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the number of vessels that they were to operate on the South Africa to Europe routes at agreed intervals or frequencies.

In addition, the Commission found that K-Line, MOL, NYK and WWL agreed on the freight rates that they were to charge TSAM for the shipment of Toyota vehicles.

International competition authorities including authorities in the US, Canada, Japan, China and Australia investigated this case and, in recent years, imposed large fines on the respective cartelists for engaging in market division and price fixing.  In February 2018, Wallenius Wilhelmsen agreed to pay a large fine to the EU.  Höegh Autoliners has reportedly been summoned to a court meeting in South Africa in March 2018.

 

Harmonising agricultural seed regulations across COMESA: COMSHIP Certification

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COMSHIP advances bloc’s Certification Programme to next level

Announced in Lusaka by COMESA’s Assistant Secretary General in charge of Programmes, the long-awaited Regional Seed Certificates will be issued by member states’ national seed authorities, in an attempt to level the competitive playing field and establish guaranteed performance and yields of otherwise unpredictably performing seed products.  The COMESA programme requires verification that a registered seed lot in the region’s “Variety Catalogue” has been inspected to field standards and laboratory analysis.

Andreas Stargard
Andreas Stargard

“The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) having approved no less than three major agricultural mergers over the past year (Bayer/Monsanto, Dow/DuPont, and Syngenta/ChemChina) — all of which involved significant seed production and R&D elements — the Regional Seed Certificate programme represents the next step in bringing to fruition the COMESA Seed Harmonisation Implementation Plan (COMSHIP), designed to align seed regulations within the trading bloc,” says Andreas Stargard, a competition lawyer with Primerio Ltd.  “The Secretariat’s stated goal of COMSHIP is not only to assure product quality and grow intra-bloc commerce, but also increase the extra-regional competitiveness of the trade group’s substantial seed industry,” in line with COMESA’s Seed Trade Harmonization Regulations of 2014.

COMESACCAccording to its own statements, whilst only five member countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe) have fully modelled their national seed laws on the COMESA Seed System, the group’s Seed Certification system is the first such “use and distribution of seed labels and certificates as a way of improving access to quality seeds in the region” anywhere in the world, based on a model suggested by the OECD.  The system will “impact virtually all of the approximately 130 million COMESA inhabitants, who stand to benefit, according to the group, from assured-quality improved seed production and usage, as well as a de-fragmentation of the historically rather localised, national markets for seeds,” commented Stargard.

Practically speaking, the seed certification labels will incorporate machine-readability, traceability, and security features, and will be printed in the COMESA official languages: English, French and Arabic.

COMESA to Introduce Seed Labels and Certificates to Boost regional Trade

Competition Authority approves KFC Franchise M&A with public-interest conditions

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On 7 February 2018 the Competition Authority of Botswana (“The Competition Authority”) approved, with conditions, the acquisition by Bradleymore’s Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“Bradleymore’s”), which is incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Botswana (a joint venture between Vivo Energy Africa Holdings Limited and Baobab Khulisani South Africa (Pty) Ltd) of KFC franchises in Botswana, namely VPB Propco (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), QSR Food Company (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), Boitumelo Dijo (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) and Greenax (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation).

The Competition Authority determined that the Proposed Transaction is not likely to result in the prevention or substantial lessening of competition, or endanger the continuity of the services offered in the market for quick-service or fast food restaurants.

Section 60 of the Competition Act No 17 of 2009 (“the Competition Act”) allows the Competition Authorities to approve a merger “subject to such conditions as it considers appropriate” and “contain such directions as the Authority considers necessary, reasonable and practicable to remedy, mitigate or prevent any adverse effects of the merger”.

Furthermore, section 61 of the Competition Act provides for either of the parties to a merger to offer an undertaking to the Competition Authority to address any concerns that may arise or be expected to arise during the Competition Authorities consideration of the notified merger and the Competition Authority may make determinations in relation to the merger on the basis of such an undertaking.

Pursuant to the provisions of section 60 and 61 of the Competition Act; the Competition Authority approved the Proposed Transaction with the following conditions:

  1. Bradleymore’s shall source a significant portion of their input requirements locally by continuing to source from existing suppliers that were engaged by VPB, provided they are YUM accredited; as well as consider sourcing from any other YUM accredited suppliers based in Botswana who are currently not supplying KFC;
  2. Bradleymore’s shall ensure that local suppliers are assisted in penetrating or meeting YUM’s standards of accreditation with the aim of sourcing from these suppliers; and
  3. The Parties shall not retrench any employees of the target entities as a result of the acquisition for a period of three (3) years from the implementation date. For the sake of clarity, retrenchments do not include: voluntary separation; voluntary early retirement; unreasonable refusal to be deployed in accordance with the provisions of the labour laws of Botswana; resignations or retirements in the ordinary course of business; terminations in the ordinary course of business; dismissals as a result of misconduct of poor performance.

In order for the Competition Authority to properly monitor compliance with the above conditions, the Competition Authority shall require Bradleymore’s to adhere to the following:

  1. Bradleymore’s shall annually (for a period of three years from the implementation date) submit to the Competition Authority, a detailed report     indicating:-
  2. Any changes to its employment records in the country and the reasons thereof;
  3. A list of its existing and new locally based suppliers (including the type of inputs they supply). This information can be captured in the supply agreements KFC has with such suppliers; and
  4. A copy of the strategy to be employed in building capacity of local suppliers in ensuring they meet YUM accreditation standards. That copy should be availed to the Authority within a period of twelve (12) months from the implementation date. The parties need to demonstrate to the Authority efforts made in identifying potential suppliers in line with their expansion strategy.

Stephany Torres, a competition lawyer, believes such a decision is indicative of the Competition Authorities’ tendency to give public interest considerations a prominent role in merger review.

In terms of section 59(1) of the Competition Act, “[i]n assessing a  proposed merger, the Authority shall first determine whether the merger (a) would be likely to prevent or substantially lessen competition or to restrict trade or the provision of any service or to endanger the continuity of supplies or services; or (b) would be likely to result in any enterprise, including an enterprise which is not involved as a party in the proposed merger, acquiring a dominant position in a market”.

In addition to considering the effect of a merger on competition, in terms of section 59(2) of the Competition Act, the Competition Authority may consider any factor which it considers bears upon the broader public interest, including the extent to which “(a) the proposed merger would be likely to result in a benefit to the public which would outweigh any detriment attributable to a substantial lessening of competition or to the acquisition or strengthening of a dominant position in a market; (b) the merger may improve, or prevent a decline in the production or distribution of goods or the provision of services; (c) the merger may promote technical or economic progress, having regard to Botswana’s development needs; (d) the proposed merger would be likely to affect a particular industrial sector or region; (e) the proposed merger would maintain or promote exports or employment; (f) the merger may advance citizen empowerment initiatives or enhance the competitiveness of citizen-owned small and medium sized enterprises; or (g) the merger may affect the ability of national industries to compete in international markets”.

Torres believes the Competition Authorities’ willingness to push public-interest considerations even in instances such as the proposed transaction, where no competition issues arise, is indicative of them trying to address unemployment issues in Botswana through their merger review.  This willingness to let public interest take centre stage is often seen in countries with new competition law regimes.  She expressed concern that public interest considerations may possibly be the deciding factor when making decisions regarding mergers as these are particularly difficult to quantify or objectively assess.

Seeking exemptions from Resale Price Maintenance rules

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Kenya’s RPM regime of exemptions to floor price-fixing regulations

The Kenya Ships Contractors Association (KSCA) recently became the latest in a long line of industry associations that have approached the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) for an exemption to set minimum prices.  Other recent applicants include the Law Society of Kenya (LSK); the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK), the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya (ICPSK) and the Institute of Surveyors of Kenya.

kenyaSection 21 of the Kenyan Competition Act 12 of 2010 (the Act) prohibits firms or associations from entering into any agreement that “involves a practice of minimum resale price maintenance” (‘RPM’).

Under sections 25 and 26 (read jointly), however, firms or associations may apply to the CAK to be exempted from this prohibition by way of an application to the CAK in the prescribed form, especially in instances where they believe there are exceptional and compelling reasons (of public policy) justifying setting such resale price floors.

In evaluating requests for exemption, the CAK will consider whether the granting of an exemption will promote exports, bolster declining industries or, more generally, the potential benefits outweigh the cost of a less competitive environment due to the RPM conduct.

Kenyan competition lawyer Ruth Mosoti, with Primerio Ltd., notes that, “although each exemption will be considered on its own merits, the CAK’s recent decisions in applications of a similar nature seem to have created a precedent unfavourable to the KSCA’s request being approved.” In this regard, the CAK in the ICPAK application rejected the application and stated that the “[i]ntroduction of fee guidelines will decrease competition, increase costs, reduce innovation and efficiencies and limit choices to customers and is in fact likely to raise the cost of accountancy services beyond the reach of some consumers”.

The CAK’s Director General, Mr. Wang’ombe Kariuki has now issued a notice requesting input from the public regarding the application.

Media cartel exposed and fined

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By AAT Senior Contributor Stephany Torres

Print media companies Independent Media and Caxton & CTP Publishers and Printers (“Caxton”) have agreed to pay an administrative penalties as well as an amount to the Economic Development Fund of over R8 million as part of two separate settlement agreements with the Competition Commission (“The Commission”) after admitting to fixing prices and trading conditions in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition Act no. 89 of 1998 (“The Competition Act”).

Caxton owns local print media, including the Citizen newspaper and magazines Bona, Rooirose and Farmer’s Weekly, among others.  Independent owns newspapers The Star, Cape Times, Sunday Independent, among others and magazines GQ and GQ Style.

Attorneys from African competition law firm Primerio Ltd. report that this development follows from a 2011 investigation by the Commission into the matter where they found that, through the facilitating vehicle of the Media Credit CoOrdinators (“MCC”) organization, various media companies agreed to offer similar discounts and payment terms to advertising agencies that place advertisements with MCC members.  MCC accredited agencies were offered a 16.5% discount, while non-members were offered 15%.  In addition, the Commission found that the implicated companies employed services of an intermediary company called Corex to perform risk assessments on advertising agencies for purposes of imposing a settlement discount structure and terms on advertising agencies.  “The Commission found that the practices restricted competition among the competing companies as they did not independently determine an element of a price in the form of discount or trading terms”.

In a media release, the Competition Commission confirmed Caxton will pay a fine of R5 806 890.14, and R2 090 480.45 to the Economic Development Fund over three years.  It will also provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies for three years, capped at R15 000 000 per annum.

Independent Media will pay an administrative penalty of R2 220 603 and will contribute R799 417 to the Economic Development Fund over a three-year period, and provide 25% bonus advertising space for every rand of advertising space bought by qualifying small agencies, over three years and capped at R5 000 000. Independent has also said it would obtain its own credit insurance so small agencies are not required to commit any securities or guarantees in order to book advertising space.

The Economic Development Fund is designed to develop black-owned small media or advertising agencies, which require assistance with start-up capital and will assist black students with bursaries to study media or advertising.

The agreements were confirmed as orders of the Competition Tribunal.