Author: andreasstargard

Director, Primerio Ltd. and Partner, EU Advocate SPRL. Competition Law and Antitrust. Advise companies on European, U.S., and international antitrust and related legal matters.

Finally: One step forward for COMESA merger enforcement? New rules, new commissioners

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COMESA old flag color

Clarification or not?

Amended Rules for Merger Notification

Repealing the oft-criticised original 2012 Rules on the Determination of Merger Notification Threshold, the COMESA Board of Commissioners approved on March 26, 2015 the new set of Amended Merger Rules. These are ostensibly meant to permit parties and their legal counsel a more meaningful determination of filing fees, notification thresholds, and calculation of parties’ revenue (and asset) valuation.  Whilst many legal news outlets have reported (uncritically, as we fear) a high-level summary of these Rules, AAT undertook a critical review of them, and finds that many of the previously-identified flaws persist.

Filing Fee

The question of what parties had to pay in administrative fees to be permitted to file a merger notification with the Competition Commission was always in question (see here for AAT summaries of the issue).  We have reported on examples of fees that came dangerously close to the original $500,000 maximum limit.  Since then, the agency’s “Explanatory Note” (which still has a visible link on the Commission’s web site, but which happens to be an essentially “dead” web page, other than its amusing headline: “What is merger?“) attempted to clarify, and indeed informally change, the filing fee from a 0.5% figure to 0.01% of the parties’ annual COMESA-area turnover.

COMESA explanatory note

Where the filing fee stands now is, honestly, not clear to AAT.  While other sources have reiterated the revised fee of 0.1% with a maximum of $200,000, we fail to see any information whatsoever about the filing fee in the (partial set, containing only ANNEX 2 of) the Amended Rules made available by COMESA on its site, despite their title containing the term “fees”.  We have been able to determine, through some internet sleuthing on the COMESA site, that a document marked clearly as “DRAFT” does contain references to 0.1% and $200k maximum fees.

We note that we have now seen three different turnover percentage-based filing fees from COMESA: 0.01%, 0.1%, and 0.5%, as well as several different maxima.  Which shall govern in the end remains to be seen.  We do not envy those parties that have filed with COMESA and have paid the half-million dollar fee within the past 2 years, as we doubt they are entitled to restitution of their evident overpayment.

AAT predicts that this is where things will land, at 0.1% and $200,000, once the good folks at COMESA get around to actually editing the document and finalising their own legislation, so that practitioners and parties alike may have an original, statutory source document on which to rely

Our previous AAT advice has been very clear to companies envisaging a filing with COMESA: wait until the Commission and the Board clarify the regime in its entirety.  Do not file for fear of enforcement, because there is little if any enforcement yet, and the utter lack of clarity – apparently even within the agency itself – on the actual thresholds and other rules provides ample grounds for a legal challenge to the “constitutionality,” if you will, of the entire COMESA merger regime. 

Combined $50 million revenue threshold

What the 5-page document does show, however, is the new notification threshold embodied in Rule 4, which defines the threshold as follows:

Either (or both) of the acquiring and/or target firms must ‘operate’ [defined elsewhere] in at least two COMESA member states and have (1) combined annual turnover or assets of $50 million or more in the COMESA common market, AND (2) in line with the EU’s “two-thirds” merger rule, each of at least 2 parties to the merger must have at least $10 million revenue or assets within the COMESA zone, unless each of the merging parties achieves 2/3 or more of its aggregate revenue within one and the same member state.

The likewise-revised Form 12, the mandatory filing form, which is available in a scanned format (we hope this will be remedied and provided in more legible and native-electronic format soon by the secretariat) here, reflects the rules changes.  It must be submitted at a minimum within “30 days of the merging parties’ decisions [sic] to merge.”  The Competition Commission mus t make a decision within 120 days of receipt of (a complete) notification.

Interestingly, if the same two firms enter into multiple transactions within a 2-year period are to be treated “as one and the same merger arising on the date of the last transaction.” (See Rule 5, in a likely-misidentified subsection that is confusingly entitled 1.2.). Mimicking the EU Merger Regulation and Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, the revised COMESA rules likewise contain special provisions for determining the revenues or assets of financial institutions (and their individual member-state branches’ income) as well as insurance companies.

Parents, sisters, subs: included.

Parent, sister and subsidiary entities are included in the revenue determination of the purchaser, to no surprise.  However, unlike what has been reported in the media, again we fail to see the (entirely logical) exclusion of the target parent’s turnover in calculating total revenues, other than in section 3.16 of the August 2014 Guidelines (which provides: “the annual turnover and value of assets of a target undertaking will not, for the purposes of these Guidelines, include the annual turnover or value of assets of its parents and their subsidiaries under Section 3.15)(d)where, after the merger is implemented, such parents are not parents of (i) the target undertaking if it remains after the merger, or (ii) the merged undertaking in the case of an amalgamation or combination“).

We observe the obvious: the Guidelines have no binding legal effect.

The Amended Rules do however provide that state-owned enterprises do not have to include their “parental” governmental revenues; for instance, if a state-owned airline like Air Tanzania were to acquire its counterpart, such as Air Mauritius, in a hypothetical COMESA-reportable transaction, the parties would not be required to report the full tax income or other revenues of the Tanzanian and Mauritian governments, respectively, but only those of the actual state-owned entity and its subsidiaries.

COMESA's 18th Summit in Ethiopia

18th COMESA Summit in Ethiopia

Four New Commissioners

As AAT reported previously, the Addis Ababa COMESA summit also saw the election and confirmation of four new Competition Commissioners.  We now have the full listing of the members, including the 4 new* ones (listed below in italics), whose term is for three years:

New 2015 Commissioners Origin
Ali Mohammed Afkada Djibouti
Amira Abdel Ghaffar* Egypt
Merkebu Zeleke Sime* Ethiopia
Francis Kariuki Kenya
Matthews Chikankheni Malawi
Georges Emmanuel Jude Tirant* Seychelles
Thabisile Langa Swaziland
Patrick Okilangole* Uganda
Chilufya Sampa Zambia

COMESA antitrust authority swears in 4 new commissioners

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COMESA out of service

Four new Commissioners sworn in – while COMESA’s own site fails to make announcement

We do not commonly report on news from the Seychelles here on AAT, but today, the Office of the President of the Seychelles has in fact beat AAT (as well as the COMESA Competition Commission itself (!)) to it: as the Office reports, the 18th COMESA Summit, held on 30th March 2015 in Addis Ababa, (a city that I have fallen in love with, by the way), saw the swearing-in of four new COMESA Competition Commissioners.

The summit also saw the swearing in of Mr. George Tirant, Chief Executive Officer of the Seychelles Fair Trading Commission. Mr. Tirant was appointed as a commissioner on the COMESA Competition Commission, alongside representatives from Egypt, Uganda and Ethiopia.

We have not yet identified the other new members that were sworn in this week, but in admitting so we note in the same breath that it is surprising for the authority itself not to have this relevant item anywhere on its site, neither in the News category nor anywhere else.  Indeed, the reader looks in vain for even a cursory Press Release announcing that 4 new Commissioners were seated for a new term of 3 years each. COMESA’s site still shows the outdated list of its Commissioners (copied below the photo below).

Irregular?  Perhaps.  But then again, we are used to outages and unfortunately much worse from the COMESA Competition Commission web site.

AAT notes that, in addition to the four new competition commissioners, the 19-country IGO also welcomed new:

  • Judge President and Judges of the Appellate Division of the COMESA Court of Justice
  • Principal Judge and Judges of the First Instance Division of the COMESA Court of Justice
  • the COMESA Committee of Elders
COMESA's 18th Summit in Ethiopia
COMESA’s 18th Summit in Ethiopia

[Outdated] List of Commissioners from Comp Comm web site:

  1. Commissioner Alexander Juvensio Kububa : Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners and former Chief Executive Officer of the Competition and Tariff Commission of Zimbabwe.
  2. Commissioner Mathews Chikankheni: Vice Chairperson of the Board of Commissioner and President of the Malawi Confederation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
  3. Commissioner Ali Mohamed Afkada: Inspector General des Services Judiciarisés’ de Djibouti.
  4. Commissioner Daniel Phillip Gappy – Former Chief Executive Officer of Fair Trading Commission of Seychelles and Chief Executive Officer of Seychelles Licensing Authority.
  5. Commissioner Rajeev Hasnah: former Deputy Director of Competition Commission of Mauritius.
  6. Commissioner Francis Kariuki: Director General of Competition Authority of Kenya.Commissioner Rajeev Hasnah:  Chief Economist and Deputy Executive Director of the Competition Commission of Mauritius.
  7. Commissioner Thabisile Pearl Langa’: Chief Executive Officer of Swaziland Competition Commission.
  8.  Commissioner Rostom Omar: Former Legal Counselor of Egyptian Competition Commission.
  9. Commissioner Chilufya Sampa: Chief Executive Officer of Competition Commission of Zambia

New COMESA merger approvals: stats and details

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COMESA Competition Commission logo

COMESA publishes new Merger decisions

In the past week, the COMESA Competition Commission published the following decisions in its most recent merger cases, resulting from the CCC’s 14th meeting:

  • Case 1/15: Cannon (insurance) – decision time: 176 days – 4 member states affected.
  • Case 2/15: ImproChem (water treatment) – decision time: 166 days – 12 member states affected.
  • Case 3/15: Chlor Arkali (food-grade salt) – decision time: 135 days – 3 member states affected.

…and from its 15th meeting:

  • Case 4/15: Telkom SA (information and telecom technology) – decision time: 11 days (!) – 10 member states affected
  • Case 5/15: Platform Specialty Products (fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides) – decision time: 112 days – 9 member states affected

Of note are the following:

  1. The record time — 11 calendar days — in which the CCC resolved the Telkom transaction in favor of the South African provider, which aquired a BBBEE entity, despite the fact that the affected geographies encompassed 10 COMESA member states.
  2. The average time it took for the CCC to clear these 5 transactions was 120 days from notification to decision.
  3. All 5 notified transactions were unconditionally approved.
  4. The voting Commission members were, in all cases, Chilufya Sampa (Zambia), Thabisile Langa (Swaziland), and Alexander Kububa (Zimbabwe).

Finally, we observe that none of these merger matters presumptively benefitted from the upward-adjusted threshold (>$5 million), as they date to a pre-Assessment Guidelines era (see also here).

AAT’s updated COMESA merger statistics are thus as follows:

 COMESA merger stats 3-2015

Which economy is growing 2-3% above global average…?

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… Africa’s

AAT the big picture

According to a recent article in Polity, “Africa’s economy is projected to continue growing at between 2% and 3% above the global average over the next five years, helping it retain its position as one of the key emerging markets for 2015.”

It quotes a GIBS (Gordon Institute of Business Science) study showing that sub-Saharan Africa’s growth “outstripped global growth for the past 15 years,” which has “slowed down somewhat, owing to a number of challenges, including the drop in commodity prices.”  The GIBS study is the result of an assessment of countries’ institutional evolution, measuring how countries were performing in terms of developing competitive business and living environments across political, social and economic spheres.

Kenya was highlighted, with the authors noting that “Kenya, in terms of perceptions, is a very important country on the continent; it has, since 2007, put in place a number of reforms to build competitiveness. However, it doesn’t come out very well when you look at the data behind industry and comes out poorly in [the DMI], but what you find on the ground is that there is [an entirely] different sentiment.”

Meet the Enforcers: Companies Tribunal’s Prof. Kasturi Moodaliyar

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meet the enforcers

Interview with Professor Moodaliyar marks second in AAT interview series highlighting African enforcers

In the second instalment of our Meet the Enforcers series, we speak with Prof. Kasturi Moodaliyar. An Associate Professor of Competition Law, she is part-time member at the Companies Tribunal; ICASA’s Complaints and Compliance Committee; and the Film and Publication Board Appeal Tribunal. She holds a B.Proc. LLB.LLM.(Natal), M.Phil (Cambridge), and Prog. Economics and Public Finance (UNISA)

As an academic in South Africa, focussing on competition law, how do you perceive the major differences and challenges that developing or younger antitrust-law jurisdictions are faced with, compared to more established ones? Specifically with regards to the Competition Commission, what is your assessment of its strengths and weaknesses?

The Commission has established a credible reputation in the area of anti-cartel enforcement and merger regulation. However, it has been less effective in addressing abuse of dominance. This is a risk as there is increasingly an expectation that the Commission address problems of single firm dominance in concentrated markets in the South African economy. If performance continues to lag in this area it will impact negatively on the perceived effectiveness of the Commission. While under-deterence of abuse of dominance reflects some limitations in the legislation it also highlights the challenge of resource constraints faced by the Commission. Such cases demand extensive legal and economic expertise – a shift of priorities to this area may impact performance of the Commission in areas in which it has traditionally had more success (cartel busting, mergers). The use of complementary tools like market inquiries and advocacy will be important and can asset the Commission – but also places a burden on resources.

Regarding staff turnover: Do you see the personnel turnover in recent history to be of sufficient magnitude to have an impact on the performance of the enforcement agency?

It is a worrying development although there are signs that it is starting to stabilise. Although key executives were lost there are still a number of highly experienced staff at the middle management level within the institution that must be nurtured and developed. Some have moved into executive level positions. This is a positive development but also points to a level go juniority in the executive which may impact on effectiveness. Will watch this space.

On Leadership: Do you consider it a benefit or a hindrance if leadership want to introduce their own philosophy of what competition law should seek to achieve on the agency’s activities during their tenure, or do you think that the law is sufficiently clear, such that leadership should focus on efficient and effective delivery of the service, and leave the interpretation to the Tribunal/courts.

It is natural that any leader will bring their own perspective to the role – this cannot be avoided. However, it will be important for the leadership to ensure that such perspectives do not undermine their objectives in giving effect to the mandate of the Commission – which is set down in the Competition Act. Fortunately there are checks and balances in the adjudicative process (Tribunal, rights of appeal) to ensure that these objectives are not contradicted.

Prioritisation: Every agency has budgetary constraints. What are the factors that you think should be most important in how cases are prioritised, should this be based on the developmental needs to society, particular sectors, or even particular areas of the law. What do you think of the prioritisation of recent Section 8 cases, SAB (10 years on an issue that has been extensively sanitised by foreign agencies), Gold Reef News (de minimis), and Sasol Polymers (niche, with limited potential for downstream beneficiation)?

The Commission’s stated prioritisation principles seem reasonable (as they appear in annual reports). However, there is somewhat of a disjuncture between the principles and the outcomes – particularly with respect to abuse of dominance cases. In fact, the outcomes in respect of anti-cartel enforcement have been largely consistent with the application of the Commission’s prioritisation principles – so credit is deserved here. However, new thinking around prioritisation is needed for abuse of dominance cases. In this regard there needs to be a better integration between the Commissions’s policy and research activity, the use of market inquiries and its advocacy with its planning and actions around enforcement against abuse of dominance.

Do you believe that the Competition Tribunal has a role in relation to broader competition advocacy initiatives in South Africa by way of the decisions made?

Advocacy is primarily a function of the Competition Commission, not the Tribunal. The Tribunal must first and foremost safeguard the integrity of its adjudicative function by ensuring impartiality in its decision making processes. There is no harm done though if the Tribunal makes a contribution to the such initiatives as a bi-product of good decisions.

How important, in your view, is the political independence of competition enforcers?

It is very important if the integrity and effectiveness of the agency is to be upheld.

Comparing merger review in an African jurisdiction (any jurisdiction) with that of other competition enforcement agencies worldwide, where do you see the key differences?

A significant difference does appear to be the elevated status of public interest issues in merger proceedings.

What is your view about the elevation of non-competition assessments above those of pure competition tests in merger review? Is it good for the adjudication of competition matters generally?

It is not a problem in and of itself, and is to be expected given various developmental challenges. However, public interest considerations should not trump core competition concerns. In other words, agencies should strive to achieve consistency between the ‘pure’ competition policy objectives (competitive market structures, efficient outcomes etc) and public interest considerations. However, significant dangers arise when public interest objectives conflict with competition policy objectives. Where there are conflicts, alternative policy mechanisms should be considered so that agencies can focus on core non-conflicting objectives. Otherwise they may end up achieving nothing by trying to please everyone. This also means that the public interest considerations that do fall within the mandate of competition agencies should be carefully circumscribed.

What skills would you encourage regional African practitioners focus in on for purposes of developing antitrust advocacy in the region?

They should build a technocratic and professional staff with strong legal and economic skills. These core functions should also be supported by strong policy research and analysis skills – also of the technocratic professional (rather than political) variety. As an academic in this field I would also encourage ongoing training to strengthen those research, investigative and analytical skills.

Thank you, Professor Moodaliyar.

#antitrustInnovation: Innovation crossing regulatory borders

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new multi-part series

A continuation in our AAT multi-part series on innovation & antitrust as a thematic collection focusing on the concept of innovation markets and how competition and IP laws are able to address the, by definition, novel issues that arise.

By Sofia Ranchordás

In previous posts on the topic of Antitrust & Innovation, we discussed the definition of innovation, its relative character, and the role of regulation in its regulation and advancement, notably in developing countries. In Africa, the lack of a solid regulatory framework may, on the one hand, discourage foreign direct investment, and on the other, fail to stimulate local innovators to invent. However, there are more challenges regarding the advancement of innovation that are impeding a more effective ‘regulation of innovation’. In this short article, attention is paid to the regulatory borders that innovation seems to be crossing at the moment. The next installment shall be focused on two regulatory instruments that might facilitate the regulation of innovation in the dark, not only in Africa but also in other countries.

Democratizing access to finance

The regulation of innovation should start out with understanding the innovation process and its characteristics, notably its uncertain character; the need for diversity, sector-specificity, the complex access to finance, openness to changes and flexibility. An innovation-friendly environment does not exist in most African countries. The lack of flexible rules and the often somewhat inflexible interpretation of existing legal concepts are not helping either. While governments praise innovation as the highest salvation in times of crisis, the list of regulatory obstacles to innovation does not appear to be tackled. This is the case of the poor availability of finance for innovators, insufficient cooperation between public and private parties, or excessive regulation and outdated regulations and procedures.

Think about ‘kickstarter’: while there are already numerous crowdfunding projects supporting startups and non-profit projects in Africa, it is not easy for an African innovator to create this type of crowdfunding accounts from his/her own country and attract anonymous angels. In the case of ‘kickstarter’—one of the platforms with more visibility—this might even be limited to a number of countries (e.g. United States, New Zealand, Australia…) and be subject to specific requirements (e.g. permanent residence).

But what if you do not have a broad network and cannot contact someone reliable in one of those countries? I was recently contacted by a designer from Portugal who had developed an innovative device, but could not create a kickstarter account because he lives in one of the countries where you are not allowed to join this form of crowdfunding (www.dapowa.com). The same would apply to an innovator from an African country, only this one could probably be in a position where he would not even know anyone who would be willing to share his story with you.

There are multiple platforms of crowdfunding that are available worldwide, but the point that I would like to make is that regulators should start paying more attention to this form of democratization of finance. There are obviously risks and controversies behind crowdfunding, but, in a time when we need so much innovation, isn’t it about time we stop adopting an all-or-nothing perspective and rethink the regulatory framework of access to finance? Laissez-faire is not an option, certainly not in the case of finance. Shouldn’t developing countries have more flexible structures allowing their innovators—with properly developed business plans but with a limited social network—to improve access to finance? Funding projects should not necessarily be seen as a mere form of charity. It is a form of philanthropy that should be regarded as a stepping stone for the development of African economies and a complement to foreign direct investment.

Crowdfunding is simply one of the innovations that is putting regulation to the test and making us question the interpretation of existing legal concepts and institutions. Other examples—still less common in Africa—are present in the case of ‘share economy’ (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Airbnb). While ‘share economy’ and crowdfunding are innovative and valuable ideas, they bring along a number of serious risks for consumers (e.g. how many Airbnb houses comply with fire safety regulations? Will the money invested be used for the due purposes?). A ‘laissez faire’ approach might not be enough to conquer the trust of risk-averse consumers, but a stringent regulation of these new forms of democratization of access to finance and facilities will not either.

In this short article, we pose mere questions and alert for the need to think about regulatory solutions for the described democratization. Self-regulation, soft law and experimental regulations might be options to explore. The first step is however to start thinking about this topic, questioning the need for more transparency, and the need for rules. Crowdfunding and share economy will work while they are based on the bona fides of users. However, one incident might be enough to put an end to it all. Rules are created for a purpose and today’s challenge is to make sure that, on the one hand, ‘too much [law] will not kill [innovation]’, ‘if regulators can’ t make up their minds’ and, on the other, ‘too little law’ does not ‘leave [innovation] behind’.

Criminalisation of antitrust offences: not on short-term horizon

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south_africa

Competition Commission not ready to pursue antitrust cases criminally – plus: AAT‘s recommendations

The newly (permanently) appointed Competition Commissioner, Tembinkosi Bonakele, has referred to a “phased” implementation of the 2009 Competition Amendment Act.  The legislation technically criminalised hard-core antitrust offences such as bid-rigging or price-fixing cartels.  However, it has not yet been implemented or effectively signed into law.

According to a MoneyWeb/ZA report, both he and his boss, Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel, had discussions on how and when to implement “to ensure that the necessary institutional capacity is available to apply the amendments.”  The initially effective provisions (relating to the SACC’s market-inquiry powers) went into effect last year, while the criminalisation provisions remain unimplemented.

In a somewhat remarkable and prudent self-assessment, the minister and SACC have now admitted that the Commission currently lacks “the institutional capacity needed to comply with the higher burden of proof in criminal cases,” according to the report.

One notable aspect of potential discord lies in not only in the different standard of proof in civil vs. criminal matters (“more probable than not” vs. “beyond a reasonable doubt”), but perhaps more importantly can be found on the procedural side, preventing rapid implementation of the law: There has been historic friction between various elements of the RSA’s police forces and (special) prosecutorial services, and the power to prosecute crimes notably remains within the hands of the National Prosecuting Authority, supported in its investigations by the South African Police Service.

Historical and Legislative Background – and a bit of Advice

Starting in the spring and summer of 2008, the rumoured legislative clamp-down on corrupt & anti-competitive business practices by the government made the RSA business papers’ headlines.

During a presentation I gave at a Johannesburg conference in September that year (“Criminalising Competition Law: A New Era of ‘Antitrust with Teeth’ in South Africa? Lessons Learned from the U.S. Perspective“), I quoted a few highlights among them, asking somewhat rhetorically whether these were the words of fearmongers or oracles?

  • “Competition Bill to Pave Way for Criminal Liability”
  • “Tough on directors”
  • “Criminalisation of directors by far most controversial”
  • “Bosses Must Pay Fines Themselves”
  • “New leniency regime to turn up heat on cartels”
  • “New era in the application of competition policy in SA”
  • “Likely to give rise to constitutional challenges”
  • “New Bill On Cartels is a Step Too Far”
  • “Fork out huge sums or face jail time if found guilty”
  • “Disqualification from directorships … very career limiting”

I also quoted international precedent-setting institutions and enforcers’ recommendations, all of which tended towards the positive effect of criminal antitrust penalties:

OECD, 3rd Hard-Core Cartel Report (2005):

  • Recommends that governments consider the introduction and imposition of criminal antitrust sanctions against individuals to enhance deterrence and incentives to cooperate through leniency programmes.

U.S. Department of Justice, Tom Barnett (2008):

  • “Jail time creates the most effective, necessary deterrent.”
  • “[N]othing in our enforcement arsenal has as great a deterrent as the threat of substantial jail time in a United States prison, either as a result of a criminal trial or a guilty plea.”

While the presentation contained a lot more detail, the key recommendations that I summarised would seem to continue to hold true today, and may serve as guide-posts for Commissioner Bonakele and the EDD ministry:

Cornerstones of a successful criminal antitrust regime
  • Crystal-clear demarcation of criminal vs. civil conduct
  • Highly effective leniency policy also applies to individuals
  • Standard of proof must be met beyond a reasonable doubt
  • No blanket liability for negligent directors – only actors liable
  • Plea bargaining to be used as an effective tool to reduce sentence
  • Clear pronouncements by enforcement agency to help counsel predict outcomes
Demarcation of criminal vs civil antitrust conduct in U.S.
Demarcation of criminal vs civil antitrust conduct in U.S.

AAT’s LinkedIn presence

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AAT header

AfricanAntitrust, the preeminent competition-law resource in Africa, now has a corporate presence on LinkedIn.

If you are a LinkedIn member, please follow our new AfricanAntitrust.com page on LinkedIn here, also to receive unique updates and information.

Cable Cartel may lead to battle of the titans

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The South African Competition Commission (the Commission) has recently referred its findings of cartel conduct against Alvern Cables, South Ocean Electric Wire Company (SOEW), Tulisa Cables, and Aberdare Cables who are all suppliers of power cables, to the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal). The Power cables include products such as house wire, surface twin and earth wire and are generally made from, amongst other things, copper, aluminium, polyethylene, steel tape and galvanised wire. These power cables are used to distribute electricity to residential and commercial users.

The Commission found that between 2001 to at least 2010, the firms directly or indirectly fixed the selling prices of power cables to wholesalers, distributors and original equipment manufacturers. The Commission, in its referral, is requesting that the maximum penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the companies should be imposed.

Acting Commissioner Tembinkosi Bonakele had some interesting remarks regarding the matter: “We have been working tirelessly to thwart any effort that goes to undermine South Africa’s global position that provides value to businesses. Our steadily growing economy can ill-afford rogue business practices” This from the same individual who defended the right of Government to intervene on the ill-defined “public interest” criterion in high-profile merger investigations, thus subjecting them to lengthy and costly reviews.
It is noteworthy to mention that amongst the affected customers who bought these products, were the Bidvest Group (Voltex Group), ARB Holdings Ltd; Universal Cables (Pty) Ltd, Trinity Cables CC, Powermac, Paragons and South Atlantic Cables and Electrobase. It is a small group of companies, with a great amount of resources, which could mean that civil damages might be instituted if the alleged cartel members are found guilty before the Tribunal.

Furthermore, the first class action matters based on competition law contraventions which are currently before the high courts of South Africa will be finalsised by the time the cable cartel proceedings have been finalised before the Tribunal, which means there would be a clear picture of the situation where distributors and end consumers institute damages claims simultaneously against the same parties.

The Acting Commissioner
The Acting Commissioner

Competition Commission releases latest newsletter

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A couple of months after its official release date, the SACC’s latest newsletter, “CompetitionNEWS“ (December 2013 ed. no. 47), is finally out.

For those interested, the South African Competition Commission has published a piece largely consisting of the agency’s internal personnel news and photographs of “cultural dinners” & the like (even screenshots of related tweets?)…  One of the only substantive sections appears to be the half-pager on p.15 summarising “conditions placed on mergers during September-November 2013.”  Other than that, it’s picture time and a recapitulation of the ICN Cape Town event.

compnewspictureTime

Readers of AfricanAntitrust.com have full access to the PDF here.